L. 5 - Commentary on the Objections and Replies

Commentary on the Objections and Replies

Accordingly, the problem has been solved. For although they are good in that they are, they nevertheless are not like the first good. For it is not howsoever things are that their being is itself good. Instead, since the being of things cannot itself be unless it derives from the first being (i.e. the good), consequently the being is itself good and is not like that from which it is. For the latter, howsoever it is, is good in that it is, for it is nothing else than good. Yet the former, unless it were from the latter, could perhaps be good—but it could not be good in that it is. In that case it would perhaps participate in the good, but they could not have being itself (which they would not have from the good) as good.

Hence once the first good is taken away from them in the mind and in thought, although they would be goods, nevertheless they could not be goods in that they are. And since they weren’t able to exist actually had not that which is genuinely good produced them, consequently both their being is good and that which derives from the substantial good is not like it. And unless they were to derive from it, even though they would be goods they nevertheless could not be goods in that they are, since apart from the good and not from the good they would not be—because that first good itself is being itself and the good itself and being good itself.

Yet won’t it also be necessary for those things that are white to be white in that they are white, since they derive from the will of God in order to be white? Not in the least. For being is one thing and being white another. This holds because the one who produced them so that they be is indeed good, but not white in the least. Hence it is in accord with the will of the good that they be good in that they are. But it is not in accord with the will of something non-white such as this that it is a property that it be white in that it is, for they did not derive from the will of the white. Therefore, since the one who willed those things to be white was not white, they are only white, but since the one who willed them to be good was good, they are good in that they are.

Thus according to this reasoning all things must be just, since the one who willed them to be is itself just? Not even this! For being good pertains to essence, whereas being just pertains to an act. Now that case being is the same as acting, and so being good is the same as being just. But in our case being is not the same as acting, for we aren’t simple. Hence in our case being good is not the same as being just. However, in our case, being is the same for all in that we are. Hence all things are good, but not also just.

Furthermore, "good" is generic whereas "just" is specific, and the species doesn’t descend to all [instances of the genus]. Consequently, some are just and others something else; all are good.

64. Accordingly, the problem has been solved. After Boethius determined the truth about the problem given above, he here answers an objection wherein the conclusion was drawn that created goods are good in that they are like the first good; and concerning this he does two things:

first, he answers the objection [65],

second, he brings together what has so far been said, at: hence once the first good [66].

65. Boethius thus says first that from his foregoing remarks the problem has clearly been solved. For they are not like the first good by the fact that they are good in that they are, since the being itself of created things is not good absolutely, in whatever way it stands, but only in its stance toward the first good. But since the being of created things cannot itself be unless they are derived from the first good, it still is not like the first good in its goodness. For the first good is absolutely good, however it stands, since nothing else is in it but the very essence of goodness. This is so because there is no perfection through addition in it. Instead, it has perfection in every way through its simple being [63]. But a created good perhaps could be good even considered in itself, even if it be granted per impossibile that it not proceed from the first good (namely from the goodness which is suitable to it absolutely)—but it wouldn’t thus be good in that which it is, since then it would be good through participation in goodness that was added on, but its being itself would not be good if it were not derived from the good from whose stance the being of created things is itself good.

66. Then when he says, hence once the first good, Boethius summarizes his remarks and says that if the first good were removed from things by the understanding, all else, even granting them to be good, would still not be able to be good in that which they are. But since they wouldn’t be able to be actually except insofar as they are products of the first good, which is truly good, so too their being is good. Yet being flowing from the first good is not like the first, which is substantially good. But had they not flowed from it, although they would be goods they would nevertheless not be goods in that which they are, namely inasmuch as theywould not be from the first good. Yet the first good itself is its very being, since its being is its substance, and the good itself, because it is the very essence of goodness, and being good itself, because in it being and that which is do not differ.

67. Then when he says, yet won’t it also be necessary, Boethius next gives two objections against what has been said. He presents the second of these below, at: thus according to this [70].

68. The first objection is as follows. It is said that all things are good in that which they are, since it proceeds from the will of the first good that they be good. Well, then, aren’t all white things white in that which they are, since it proceeds from the will of God that they be white?

69. Boethius replies that this is not in the least necessary. For in the case of white things, being simply (which is suitable to them according to their essential principles) differs from that whereby they are white. The reason for such differences between white and good is that God, who makes created good things and white things, is surely good but is not white. So, therefore, it follows upon the will of the first good that created things be good (insofar as he wanted them to be good) and that they are good in that which they are (insofar as they are produced by the good), since the being of created things has the account of good by the very fact that it is from the good [65]. However, such a property doesn’t follow upon the will of God, so that what is created is white in that which it is, because it doesn’t derive from the will of the white as good things have derived from the will of the good, so that it could be said that their being is white insofar as they are from the first white!

Thus it’s obvious that since God (who isn’t white) wanted some things to be white, it can only be said of them that they are white, though not in that which they are. But since God (who is good) wanted all things to be good, thus they are good in that which they are, namely insofar as their being has the account of good because it is from the good.

70. Then when he says, thus according to this, Boethius presents the second objection. Someone could say: all things are good in that which they are, since he who is good wanted them to be good; by the same reasoning all things must be just, since he who is just wanted them to be.

71. Boethius replies that this doesn’t follow for two reasons.

First, because "good" signifies a certain nature or essence. We have claimed that God is the very essence of goodness [62], and that any given thing is called good according to the perfection of its proper nature [63]. But the just is so-called with regard to activity, as any virtue is. Now in God being is the same as doing; accordingly, in him being good is the same as being just. But in our case being is not the same as doing, since we don’t reach God’s simplicity. Hence for us being good men isn’t the same as being just men. Instead, being applies to us all insofar as we are, and so too does goodness apply to us all. But the action which justice receives doesn’t apply to all. Nor in the case of those to whom it does apply is it the same as their being. Therefore, it remains that not all things are just in that which they are.

72. Boethius presents the second reason here, at: furthermore, "good" is generic. For "good" is something generic of which justice is certain a species, as are the rest of the virtues. In God, however, the entire account of goodness is found, and so not only is he good but just as well. Yet not every species of goodness is found in all things, but different species in different things. And so it isn’t necessary that the species which is justice be derived for all entities, as goodness is derived. Accordingly, some entities are just while others have another species of goodness. Yet all things are good, insofar as they are derived from the first good.

Here ends my exposition of this book. Blessed be God in all things. Amen.