L. 3 - Commentary on the Problem

Commentary on the Problem

Now the problem is as follows. The things that are, are good. For the common view of the learned maintains that everything that is tends to the good, and everything tends towards its like; hence things that tend to the good are themselves good.

But we should look into how they are good—is it by participation or by substance?

If by participation, they aren’t themselves good per se in any way. For what is white by participation is not white per se in that it is, and the same in the case of other qualities. If they are good by participation, then, they aren’t themselves good per se in any way. Hence they don’t tend to the good. But it was granted that they do. Therefore, they aren’t good by participation but rather by substance.

Yet for those things whose substance is good, that which they are, are good. That which they are, however, they have from that which is being. Hence their being is good, and so the being of all things is good. But if being is good, those things that are, in that they are, are good— and being and being good are the same for them. Hence they are substantial goods, since they do not participate goodness. But if being itself in them is good, there is no doubt that since they are substantial goods they are like the first good. Consequently, they will be this good itself, for nothing is like it apart from it itself. It follows from this that all things that are, are God—which is abhorrent. Hence they are not good in that they are.

But neither do they participate in goodness, for then they would not tend to the good in any way.

40. Now the problem is as follows. Now that Boethius has laid out the principles necessary for the discussion of the problem at hand, he comes here to the problem at hand, and concerning this he does three things.

First, he puts forward the problem [41].

Second, he provides a solution, at: for this problem [57].

Third, he defeats some objections to his solution, at: yet won’t it also be necessary [68].

With regard to the first he does two things.

First, he first presents what the problem presupposes [41].

Second, the predicament the problem involves, at: but we should look into [42].

41. Boethius, therefore, tells us to approach the problem at hand such that we presuppose that all the things that are, are good. To prove this he brings in an argument based on this premise: anything tends towards its like. Accordingly, he said before: whatever pursues something shows itself to be by nature like the object that it pursues [38]. But everything that is tends towards the good, which he introduces according to the common view of the learned. Accordingly, at the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle says that the wise assert the good to be what all things pursue. The good is the proper object of pursuit, just as sound is the proper object of hearing. Accordingly, just as sound is what is perceived by all hearing, so too the good must be what all pursuit tends towards. Thus since any thing whatsoever (intellectual or sensible or natural) has some pursuit, it follows that every thing pursues the good. Hence we conclude that every thing is good. Our intended problem assumes this.

42. Then when he says, but we should look into, Boethius points out the predicament the problem involves. He makes three points on this score.

First, he proposes the problem [43].

Second, he objects to both sides of the problem, at: if by participation [46].

Third, he moves on from this to reject the initial supposition, at: hence they are not good in that they are [48].

First of all, then, Boethius says that having assumed all things to be good we should look into the way in which they are good. Now something is said of another in two ways: in one way, substantially; in another way, by participation.

43. The problem, therefore, is whether entities are good by essence or by participation.

44. To understand this problem, we should note that it presupposes that being something by essence and being something by participation are opposites. This is clearly true for the kind of participation described above [24], namely where the subject is said to participate in an accident, or matter in form. For an accident is beyond the nature of the subject, and form beyond the very substance of the matter.

45. But in the other kind of participation [24], namely where the species participates in its genus, the above claim [44] is true because the species participates in the genus. It is also true on Plato’s view, which held that the idea of animal differs from that of two-footed man. But on Aristotle’s view, which held that man truly is that which is animal (as though the essence of animal didn’t exist beyond the differentia of man), nothing prevents what is said by participation from being predicated substantially. However, Boethius speaks here [42] according to the mode of participation where the subject participates in an accident. Hence that which is predicated substantially is contradistinguished from that which is predicated participatively, as is clear from the example he subsequently provides.

46. Then when he says, if by participation, Boethius objects to both sides of the problem:

first of all to the claim that things are good by participation [47],

and then to the claim that they are good in their substance [48].

47. Thus Boethius says first that if all things are good by participation, it follows that they would in no way be good per se.

And this is indeed true if the per se there were taken as what is put into the definition of that of which it is said, e.g. man per se is an animal. For what is put into the definition of something pertains to its essence, and thus it isn’t said of it by participation—which is what we’re talking about now.

On the other hand, if per se were taken in some other way, namely insofar as the subject is put into the definition of its predicate, what Boethius says here would be false. For in this way a proper accident is per se present in the subject and nonetheless participatively predicated of it. Hence Boethius takes "participation" here as the subject participates in an accident, whereas he takes per se as what is put into the definition of the subject. Thus it follows necessarily that if things are good by participation, they are not good per se. He clarifies this by an example. For that which is white by participation is not white per se, i.e. in that which it is, which pertains to the first mode; similarly for other qualities.

So, then, if all entities are good by participation, it follows that not all things are good per se, i.e. through their substance. It follows from this that the substances of entities do not tend towards the good. But the contrary of this claim was granted [41], namely that all things do tend towards the good. It therefore seems that entities are good not by participation but rather by their substance.

48. Then when he says, yet for those things whose substance is good, Boethius objects to the other side [of the problem] in this way. Those things whose substance is good must be good according to that itself which they are, for it pertains to the substance of any given thing whatsoever that it concurs with its being. But they are something in virtue of that which being is. For it was said [24] that something is when it takes on being.

49. Hence it follows that the very being of things which are good as a subject is good. Hence if all things are good in their substance, it follows that the very being of all things is good. And since the premises from which Boethius has proceeded in his argument are convertible, he proceeds now conversely.

50. For it follows conversely that if the being of all things is good, then the things which are, insofar as they are, are good—namely such that being and being good are the same for any given thing. Hence that they are substantial goods follows from the fact that they are good, but not by participation in goodness.

51. However, Boethius shows immediately that an unacceptable result follows from this. He says that if the being of all things is good, since it follows from this that they are substantial goods; it also follows that they are like the first good, which is the substantial good for whom being and being good are the same. And it follows further from this that all things are the first good itself, since nothing is like it apart from it itself, namely with regard to its kind of goodness. But nothing else apart from the first good is good in the same way as it, since it alone is the first good. Yet some things are said to be like it insofar as they are goods derived secondarily from the first principal good.

52. Thus if all things are the first good itself, since the primary good itself is nothing other than God it follows that all entities are God: which is abhorrent to say!

53. Hence it follows that the given premises are false. Hence not all entities are substantial goods, nor is the being itself in them good, since we concluded from these premises that all things are God. It follows further that not all things are good insofar as they are.

54. Then when he says, but neither do they participate, Boethius proceeds further to eliminate the initial assumption. He says that if we add to the fact that entities are substantial goods the other conclusion reached above [46], namely that entities are not good by participation—since it would follow from this that they tend in no way towards the good [47]—it seems that we can further conclude that in no way are entities good. This conclusion is against to what was said above [41].