L. 2 - Commentary on the Rules

Commentary on the Rules

Being and that which is are different.

For being itself is not yet, whereas what has taken on the form of being is and exists.

What is can participate in something, but being doesn’t itself in any way participate in anything. For participation occurs when something already is; something is, however, because it has taken on being.

That which is can have something beyond the fact that it is, whereas being has nothing else mixed in with itself.

Yet being something and something in that which it is are different.

In the former case an accident is signified, in the latter a substance.

Everything which is participates in that which is being so that it is something else; it participates so that it is something.

Accordingly, that which is participates in what is being so that it be, but it is so that it participate in anything whatsoever.

In everything composite, being and it itself differ.

Everything simple has its being and that which is as one.

Every diversity is discord, whereas likeness is to be pursued.

Whatever pursues something is shown to be itself by nature like the very object that it pursues.

The [rules] that we have given above, then, are sufficient; the careful interpreter of the reasoning will apply each one in its arguments.

19. Being and that which is are different. Boethius had said above [12] that he would proceed in this order: he would first set out certain terms and rules, on the basis of which he would proceed to further matters. In line with this established order, then,

he first begins by spelling out some rules or some conceptions of the wise [22];

he then begins to fashion his argument from them, at: now the problem is as follows [41].

20. As was stated above [16], those propositions are the most known which use terms everyone understands. Now terms that enter into every understanding are the most common. They are entity, one, and good.

Thus Boethius here puts forward first some conceptions pertaining to entity [22];

second, some pertaining to unity, from which his account of the simple and the composite is taken, at: in everything composite [31];

third he puts forward some conceptions pertaining to good, at: every diversity is discord [37].

21. Concerning entity: it is considered to be something almost common and indeterminate, and it is determined in two ways: on the side of the subject, which itself has being; on the side of the predicate, as when we say of a man or anything else not simply that it is but that it is something, such as white or black.

First, therefore, Boethius puts forward conceptions taken according to the comparison of being with that which is [22].

Second, he puts forward conceptions taken according to the comparison of what it is to be simply to what it is to be something, at: yet being something [26].

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he presents the difference between what being is and that which is [22];

Second, he clarifies this kind of difference, at: for being itself is not yet [23].

22. Therefore, Boethius says first: being and that which is are different. We shouldn’t refer the divergence here to things (Boethius hasn’t talked about them yet), but rather to the accounts or the intentions themselves. We signify one thing in saying "being" and another in saying "that which is," just as we signify one thing in saying "running" and another when we say "a runner." For running and being are signified abstractly, like whiteness, whereas that which is, that is, an entity and a runner, are signified concretely, like something white.

23. Then when he says, for being itself is not yet, Boethius clarifies the divergence mentioned [22] in three ways.

The first is that being itself isn’t signified in the same way as the subject of being, just as running itself isn’t signified in the same way as the subject of running. Accordingly, just as we can’t say that running itself runs, similarly we can’t say that being itself is. Rather, just as that which is itself is signified as the subject of being, so too that which runs is signified as the subject of running. Hence just as we can say of that which runs (or of a runner) that it runs, insofar as it is the subject of the running and participates in it, so too can we say that an entity (or that which is) is, insofar as it participates in the act of being. Boethius says that being itself is not yet, since being is not attributed to itself as to the subject of being. Instead, that which has taken on the form of being (namely by undertaking the very act of being) is and exists, that is, subsists in itself, for "entity" is said strictly and per se only of substance, whose distinctive feature is subsisting—accidents aren’t called entities as though they themselves are, but only insofar as something underlies them, as will be said later.

24. He presents the second difference [between being and that which is] here, at: what is can participate in something. This is taken in line with the account of participation. Now participating is as it were taking a part.

Hence: whenever something particularly receives what pertains universally to something else, it is said to participate in it. For instance, man is said to participate in animal, since it does not have the account of animal in its full generality. Socrates participates in man for the same reason.

The subject likewise participates in its accident, and so does matter in form, since the substantial or accidental form, which is common in virtue of its account, is determined to this or that subject.

The effect is similarly said to participate in its cause, especially when it isn’t equal to the power of its cause—for example, when we say that air “participates” in sunlight because it doesn’t receive it with the brightness there is in the sun.

Putting aside this third mode of participation, it is impossible that being itself should participate in something according to the first or second mode. For it can’t participate in something the way that matter or the subject participates in form or accident, since being itself is signified as something abstract [23]. It likewise can’t participate in something the way a particular participates in the universal, for even those things that are said abstractly can participate in something in this way, as whiteness does in color. Rather, being itself is the most common. It is thus participated in by another while it doesn’t participate in anything else.

But although that which is (namely an entity) is the most common, it’s nevertheless said concretely. Hence it participates in being itself—not in the way in which something less common participates in something more common, but it participates in being itself the way the concrete participates in the abstract. This is why Boethius says: that which is (namely, an entity) can participate in something, but being doesn’t itself in any way participate in anything. Boethius proves this on the basis of what has been said [23], namely: being itself is not yet, for that which being is clearly can’t participate in anything; it thus follows that participation is suitable for something once it already is. But on this score it is something that takes on being itself, as stated. Accordingly, it remains that that which is can participate in something, whereas being itself can’t participate in anything.

25. Boethius presents the third difference [between being and that which is] here, at: that which is can have something, which is taken from the admixture of something extraneous.

We should note on this score that anything considered abstractly has truth and that it doesn’t have anything extraneous in itself—namely anything that would be beyond its essence of it, for example, humanity and whiteness and anything said in this way. The reason for this is that humanity is signified as that by which something is a man, and whiteness as that by which something is white. Now something is a man, formally speaking, only through what pertains to the account of man. Likewise, something is white formally only through what pertains to the account of white. Hence such abstract items have nothing foreign in themselves.

Matters are otherwise for items that are signified concretely. For a man is signified as what has humanity, and a white thing as what has whiteness. The fact that a man has humanity or whiteness, however, doesn’t prevent him from having something else which doesn’t pertain to the account of humanity or whiteness (with the sole exception of what is opposed to them); hence a man and a white thing can have something other than humanity or whiteness. This is why whiteness and humanity are signified as parts and aren’t predicated of concrete items, just as a part isn’t predicated of its whole.

Therefore, since being itself is signified as something abstract and that which is as something concrete [24], it follows that what Boethius says here is true: that which is can have something beyond the fact that it is (that is, beyond its essence), but being has nothing mixed in beyond its essence.

26. Boethius now presents conceptions derived from comparing that which is being simply to that which is being something.

First, he presents their divergence [27].

Second, he assigns the differences, at: in the former case an accident [28].

27. With respect to the first point, we should note that because that which is can have something beyond its essence [25], being must be considered in two ways in it.

For since form is the principle of being, then, with regard to any given form that is possessed, its possessor must be said to be somehow. Thus if the form were not beyond the essence of its possessor but rather constitutes its essence, then from having such a form it will be said to have being simply, as man does from having the rational soul.

But if it were the sort of form that is extraneous to the essence of its possessor, then according to that form it won’t be said to be simply but rather to be something, as a man is said to be white according to his whiteness. This is why Boethius says that being something (which is not being simply) and that something is in that it is (which is the proper being of the subject) are different.

28. Then when he says, in the former case an accident, Boethius presents three differences between being something and being something in that it is.

The first is that in the former case (i.e. where it is said of a thing that it is something and that it is not simply) an accident is signified, since the form which makes it to be of that sort is beyond the essence of the thing, whereas in the latter (when it is said to be something in that which it is) a substance is signified, since clearly the form making it to be constitutes the essence of that thing.

29. Boethius presents the second difference here, at: everything which is, saying that [everything] participates in being itself so as to be some subject simply, whereas it must participate in something else so as to be something. For instance, a man participates not only in substantial being but also in whiteness so as to be white.

30. Boethius presents the third difference here, at: accordingly, that which is, which is taken in order after the other two and drawn as a conclusion from them. Well, this difference is that something must first be understood to be simply, and only then that it is something. This is obvious from the foregoing: something is simply because it participates in being itself, but when it already is (namely by participation in being itself), it remains that it participate in something else, namely so as to be something.

31. Then when he says, in everything composite, Boethius now presents conceptions about the composite and the simple, which pertain to the account of unity. We should note that the points made above about the divergence between being itself and that which is are in accordance with the intentions themselves. Here Boethius points out how it applies to these matters.

And first, he shows this in composites [32];

second, in simples, at: everything simple [33].

32. Therefore, note first that just as being and that which is differ in simples according to their intentions, so too do they really differ in composites. This is surely evident from the foregoing. For being itself does not participate in anything so that its account is constituted out of many factors [24]. Nor does it have anything extraneous mixed in so that there is accidental composition in it [25]. Hence being itself is not composite. Therefore a composite thing is not its own being. This is why Boethius says that in everything composite, being and the composite itself differ, which participates in being itself.

33. Then when he says, everything simple, Boethius here points out how matters stand in simples, wherein being itself and that which is must really be one and the same. For if that which is and being itself were really different, then it would not be simple but composite.

34. Yet we should note that although something is called simple on the grounds that it lacks composition, nothing prevents something from being simple in a respect (insofar as it lacks composition) which nevertheless is not completely simple. Fire and water are accordingly called simple bodies insofar as they lack the composition stemming from contraries which is found in mixtures; yet each of them is composite—on the one hand, from parts of quantity; on the other hand, from form and matter. Thus if some forms were found not in matter, any one of them is indeed simple inasmuch as it lacks matter and consequently also quantity (which is a disposition of matter).

Yet since any given form is determinative of being itself, none of them is being itself but rather has being. For instance, let’s postulate in line with Plato’s view that an immaterial form subsists which is the idea and account of material men, and there is another form which is the idea and account of horses. The immaterial subsistent form, since it is something determined into species, will clearly not be general being itself but instead participates in it. And it makes no difference on this score if we postulate these immaterial forms to belong to a higher level than do the accounts of these sensible things, as Aristotle held: any given one of them, insofar as it is distinguished from another, is a certain specific form that participates in being itself. Thus none of them will be truly simple.

35. Now this alone will be truly simple: what does not participate in being, not inherent but subsistent. This can only be one, since if being itself has nothing else mixed in beyond that which being is [25], it is impossible for that which being is itself to be proliferated through any diversifying factor. And since it has nothing else mixed in beyond itself, it follows that it underlies no accident. Moreover, this sublime and simple one is God himself.

36. Then when he says, every diversity, Boethius now presents two conceptions relevant to pursuit, from which the good is defined. For what all men pursue is called good.

37. Thus the first conception is: every diversity is discord, whereas likeness is to be pursued. Note here that discord brings in the contrareity of pursuit. Accordingly, discord is said to be what fights off pursuit. Yet everything diverse, insofar as it is such, fights off pursuit. The reason for this is that like is increased and perfected by its like. Now everything pursues its own increase and perfection, as does its like, insofar as such is pursuable by anything. By the same argument, the diverse fights off pursuit, insofar as it decreases and hinders its perfection. Hence Boethius says that every diversity is discord (i.e. discordant with its pursuit), whereas likeness is to be pursued.

Yet it does happen by accident that some pursuit hates its like and pursues what is diverse or contrary. For, as mentioned, everything pursues first and in itself its perfection, which is the good for anything and is always proportional to the perfectible; on this score it has a likeness to itself. But other items external to it are pursued or avoided insofar as they contribute to its proper perfection, which is sometimes lacking because of defect and sometimes because of excess. For the proper perfection of any given thing consists in a certain balance. For example, the perfection of the human body consists in a balance of heat; if this were lacking, one pursues something warm through which its heat is increased. On the other hand, if it were to exceed [the balance], one pursues the contrary—namely something cold through which one is brought down to the temperature wherein consists perfection in conformity with nature. So too one potter hates another, namely because he carries off for himself the desired perfection (namely, money).

38. Boethius presents the second conception here, at: whatever pursues, as a conclusion from what was said before [37]. For if likeness per se is to be pursued, as a result that which pursues something is shown to be itself by nature like the object it pursues, namely because it possesses a natural inclination towards what it pursues. This natural inclination sometimes follows upon the very essence of a thing. For instance, the heavy pursues being downward according to the account of its essential nature. But at other times it follows upon the nature of some supervenient form, for example, when someone has acquired a habit and desires whatever is appropriate to him according to that habit.

39. Finally, as an epilogue, Boethius says that the matters set out above are sufficient for the case at hand, and that anyone who carefully interprets the reasons for his claims will be able to fit any of them to their appropriate arguments, namely by applying them to the requisite conclusions, as will be clear in what follows.