L. 4 - Commentary on the Solution

Commentary on the Solution

For this problem a solution of the following kind can be used. There are many things that, while they cannot be actually separated, are yet separated in the mind and in thought. For example, while no one actually separates a triangle (or other geometrical figures) from the underlying matter, still, removing it by the mind, we speculate upon the triangle itself and upon its distinctive feature apart from matter.

Therefore, let us put the presence of the first good out of our mind for a while. (It certainly exists: this can be known from the view of all the learned and the unlearned, and from the religions of the barbarian peoples!)

Putting this aside for a while, then, let us postulate all things that are to be good, and let us consider how they could be good if they were not to derive from the first good. From this point of view I perceive it to be one thing that they are good, another that they are. For let us suppose one and the same good substance to be white, heavy, and round. Then the substance itself would be one thing, its roundness another, color another, goodness another. For if each of these were the same as the substance itself, heaviness would be the same as color [or] as the good, and the good as heaviness—which nature doesn’t allow to happen. And so in their case, then, being is one thing, being something another. Then they would indeed be good, yet they wouldn’t have being itself as good. Hence if they were to be in any way, they would not be goods from the good and they would not be the same as goods, but there would be one being for them and another being for goods.

However, if they were nothing else at all except goods, and they were neither heavy nor colored nor extended in spatial dimension and no quality were in them but that they were only good, then they would not seem to be things but the principle of things, and 'they' would not seem so but instead 'it' would seem so. For there is one thing alone like this that is only good and nothing else.

And since they are not simple, they can’t be at all unless that which is good alone had willed them to be. Consequently, since their being derives from the will of the good, they are said to be goods. For the first good, since it is, is good in that it is, whereas the secondary good, since it derives from that whose being itself is good, is also itself good. But the very being of all things derives from that whose being itself derives from that which is the first good and which is good in such a way that it is correctly said to be good in that it is. Hence their being is itself good, for then they are not good in that which they are, if they haven’t been derived from the first good.

55. For this problem. With the problem set out and arguments on one side and the other adduced, Boethius here presents a solution to the problem: and concerning this he does three things.

First, he determines the truth concerning the problem [56].

Second, he solves the objection, at: accordingly, the problem has been solved [65].

Third, he introduces some objections to the solution and solves them, at: yet won’t it also be necessary [68].

As regards the first, he does three things.

First, Boethius initially gives a certain supposition [57].

Second, he points out what follows concerning the goodness of things once that supposition has been made, at: putting this aside for a while [59].

Third, he shows how the goodness of things stands in reality without making the supposition, at: and since they are not simple [62].

56. Boethius does two things with respect to the first point.

First, he puts forward what is necessary for showing that such a supposition can be framed [57].

Second, he introduces the supposition, at: therefore, let us put [58].

57. Boethius says first that many things cannot be actually separated which are yet separated in the mind and in thought, because things are in the soul in one way and in matter in another way. Therefore, something can have an inseparable conjunction with another in virtue of how it is in matter, and yet it doesn’t have an inseparable conjunction with it as it is in the soul—since, clearly, the account of the one is distinct from the account of the other. Boethius gives the example of the triangle and other mathematical figures which cannot actually be separated from sensible matter. The mathematician does consider the triangle and its distinctive feature apart from sensible matter by abstracting mentally, since the account of the triangle doesn’t depend on sensible matter.

58. Then when he says, therefore, let us put, Boethius now presents the supposition he meant, namely that by mental consideration we remove the first good from the remaining things for the time being. This is indeed possible in the order of what is knowable with respect to us. For although God is the first known in the natural order of knowing, still, with respect to us, his sensible effects are known beforehand. Hence nothing prevents the effects of the highest good entering into our thought without considering the first good itself. So let us remove from our mental consideration the first [good], which we fully agree exists—a point that can be known from the common view of the learned as well as the unlearned, and even from the very religions of the barbarian peoples (which would be nothing if God does not exist).

59. Then when he says, putting this aside for a while, Boethius points out what follows concerning the goodness of things once this supposition has been made, and concerning this he does two things.

First, he clarifies his intention [60].

Second, he proves something he had assumed, at: however, if they were nothing else [61].

60. Thus Boethius says firstly that, having removed the first good by the understanding, let us postulate that the rest are good. Since we arrive at knowledge of the first good from the goodness of its effects, let us therefore consider how they could be good if they had not proceeded from the first good. Now having made this supposition, goodness itself seems to differ from their very being. For if we suppose one and the same substance to be good, white, heavy, and round, it would follow that in the thing its substance would be one thing, its roundness another, color another, goodness another. For the goodness of any given thing is understood to be a virtue it has through which it completes a good operation. For virtue is what makes something have the good and renders its work good, as Aristotle makes clear in Nicomachean Ethics II, 5.

Now Boethius proves that this differs from the substance of a thing by the fact that if any of the foregoing were the same as the substance of the thing it would also follow that they would all be the same as one another—namely that heaviness would be the same as color, as the good, as something white, and as roundness, since items the same as one and the same are the same as one another. But the nature of things does not permit all these to be the same. Hence it remains that, the foregoing supposition having been made, being itself differs in the case of things from being something (e.g. being good or white or whatever is said in this fashion). Hence, under the previously mentioned hypothesis, things would indeed be goods, yet their being itself would not itself be good. So, then, if they were not in some way from the first good and yet were good in themselves, it would follow that that they are such and that they are good would not be the same in them; instead, being would differ from being good in them.***

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61. Then when he says, however, if they were nothing else, Boethius proves what he had supposed, namely that under the aforementioned supposition being good would differ from being simply (or from being anything else) in them. For if there were nothing else in them except that they are good, namely such that they would be neither heavy nor colored nor distinct in some spatial dimension (as all bodies are), and no quality were in them but this one alone, [namely] that they are good, then they would not seem to be created things but rather the first principle of things itself, because that which is the very essence of goodness is the first principle of things. Consequently, it would follow that it wouldn’t be necessary to say plurally of all of them that they seem to be the principle of things, but singularly that it seems to be the first principle of things, inasmuch as all good things would be simply one. For there is one thing alone that is like this so as to be only good and nothing else. But this is clearly false. Therefore, so is the first claim, namely that created things, with the first good removed, would be nothing other than this which it is to be good.

62. Then when he says, and since they are not simple, Boethius points out what we should judge about the goodness of things according to the truth. He says: since created things don’t have simplicity in every way (namely so that there isn’t anything in them other than the essence of goodness), and they could not be in the actual world unless God, who is that which alone is good (inasmuch as he is the very essence of goodness), had willed them to be—it follows that since the being of created things flowed out of the will of him who is essentially good, created things are therefore said to be good. For the first good (namely God) is good in that he is, because he is essentially goodness itself. But the secondary good (which is created) is a secondary good because it flowed from the first good which is good through its essence. Hence the being of all things has derived from the first good. As a result, the being itself of created things is good, and any given created thing, insofar as it is, is good. But created things would thus only not be good in that they are if their being didn’t derive from the highest good.

So Boethius’s solution comes to this: that the being of the first good is good according to its proper account, since the nature and essence of the first good is nothing other than goodness. Now the being of a secondary good is indeed good, although not according to the account of its proper essence (since its essence isn’t goodness itself but humanity or some such). Instead, its being has the feature that it is good from its stance toward the first good, which is its cause. We can compare it to this as to its first principle and ultimate end, the way in which something directed to the end of healthiness is called ‘healthy’ [and] as something is called ‘medical’ in that it is from the effective principle of the art of medicine.

63. In line with the foregoing remarks, we should note that in created goods there is a twofold goodness: one, according to which they are called goods due to their relation to the first good. In this sense, their being and anything in them from the first good is good. The other goodness is considered in them absolutely, namely as any one at all is called good insofar as it is perfected in its being and its operation. This perfection is not suitable for created goods according to their essential being itself but according to something added on, which is called their virtue [60]. In this sense, their being itself isn’t good, but the first good has perfection in every way in its own being and hence its being is good absolutely and from itself.