Lecture 2 — Questions of method

The passions of the soul also present a problem: are they all common and belong to what has soul, or are some even proper to the soul itself?

It is necessary indeed, but not easy, to deal with this problem. For in most cases it is seen that none are undergone or done without the body, as in becoming angry, daring, desiring, and sensing altogether. Understanding, however, would seem especially proper to the soul. Yet if this too is a sort of imagination, or it does not occur without imagination, not even this could exist without the body.

So if something of the works or passions belonging to the soul is proper to it, then it could be separated. If, however, there is nothing proper to it, then it will not be separable, but will be like a straight line, which as straight has many accidentals—such as being able to touch a bronze sphere at a point; but due to its being separated, the straight will not touch it. For it is inseparable if it is indeed always with a certain body.

Now, all the soul’s passions do seem to occur with the body—anger, meekness, fear, compassion, and confidence. And even joy and loving and hating. For along with these the body also undergoes something. An indication of this is that sometimes when violent and manifest things are undergone, nothing is provoked, not even fear, while at other times one is moved even by slight and trifling matters, when the body is stimulated and is in a state just like when one becomes angry. This is still more evident when people are frightened without anything fearful being present. If this is the case, it is evident that the passions are accounts within matter. Hence such terms as “becoming angry” mean a motion of a certain sort of body, or of a part, or of a power arising from this and for the sake of that.

For these reasons right away, therefore, the student of nature ought to contemplate the soul, either all kinds, or this kind.

But the student of nature and the dialectician will define each of these very things differently, for example, what anger is. For the latter will say, “a desire for retaliation,” or something similar, the former, “an effervescence of blood or heat about the heart.”

Of these, the student of nature designates the matter; the dialectician, the species and account, for this is the account of anger. This, however, must have existence in material of this sort, if it will exist, just as the account of a house is of a certain sort, since it is a covering to prevent destruction from wind and rain and excessive heat. Now, this one says it is stones and beams and timber, but another one says it is the species in these things for the sake of those things. Which of these, then, is the natural one? That which concerns the matter and ignores the account? Or that which concerns only the account?

Or rather, the compound of both? What, then, of the other two? Or else there is no one who deals with inseparable passions of matter, not precisely as inseparable from it; but the student of nature is one who is concerned with all the passions and activities of a sort of matter and of a certain sort of body.

Whereas someone else considers these things but not in this way, for instance, for certain things it may be the artisan, like a teacher or a physician.

It is the mathematician, however, who is concerned with things that are not separable from matter, but inasmuch as they are not passions of a certain sort of body, but in fact are removed from it; and the one concerned with what is separable is the first philosopher.

But we must return from our digression. We were saying that the passions of the soul are not separable from the physical material of animals (inasmuch as fury and fear exist in this way), and not like the line and the plane.

Investigating the soul, it is necessary to be thorough, while suspending judgment, comprehensively running through the opinions of certain prior thinkers who have spoken about this, whatever they have said, so that we might receive things said well, while if something was not said well, we might avoid this.

16. The passions of the soul (403a3). Having shown the difficulty of this science in respect of the problem of the soul’s substance and what it is, the Philosopher proceeds to manifest the difficulty on the side of its passions and accidentals.

And here he does two things.

He first states and solves a difficulty concerning the soul’s passions;

and then, using this solution, he shows that knowledge about the soul pertains to the natural (or physical) philosopher, where he says, for these reasons right away, therefore, the student of nature (403a27; [23]).

As to the first point, he says it is a problem whether the soul’s passions and activities are proper to the soul independently of the body, as it seemed to Plato, or are none of them proper to the soul, being all shared by body and the composite.

17. At it is necessary (403a5), he again does two things.

First, he shows the difficulty of the question;

second, at but if the soul (403a10; [21]), the necessity of considering it.

He begins, then, by observing that this problem, whether the soul’s passions and activities are proper to it or shared by the body, is a necessary one, and that this is not an easy question but a very difficult one.

The difficulty, as he explains, arises from the fact that it is seen (403a5), in their appearance, that many passions are common to soul and body and cannot be undergone without the body, as for instance, becoming angry and sensing and so on; in these things the soul undergoes nothing without the body doing so as well. But if there is any activity proper to the soul, this would be apparent for the activity of the intellect; for understanding, which is the intellect’s activity, seems to be especially proper to the soul.

18. And yet, on closer consideration, even understanding does not seem to be proper to the soul. For either understanding is imagination, as the Stoics thought, or it does not occur without imagination, for there were some, such as the early students of nature, who used to say that intellect is not different from sensation, which would imply that it is not different from the imagination, as this is why the Stoics were led to say the intellect is imagination. (Augustine (354–430 AD), City of God, bk. 8, ch. 7.) As, then, imagination needs the body, they said that understanding is not proper to the soul but rather is common to soul and body. And even were it granted that intellect is not imagination, nevertheless there is no understanding without imagination. It would follow that understanding is not proper to the soul, since imagination requires the body. Therefore, it does not happen that this, namely understanding, exists without the body.

19. Now, although Aristotle clears up this problem in Book 3, (Bk. 3, lect. 6.) we shall say something about it here. For understanding is in a certain way proper to the soul, and in another way it belongs to the composite. Therefore, it should be realized that certain activities or passions of the soul need the body both as an instrument and as an object. Sight, for instance, needs a body as object because its object is color, which belongs to body; and also as an instrument because, while the act of seeing comes from the soul, it cannot occur except through the visual organ, that is, the pupil of the eye, which is the instrument. Seeing, then, belongs not to the soul alone but also to the organ.

But there is one activity that needs the body not as its instrument but only for its object. For understanding does not occur through a bodily organ, though it does need a bodily object; for, as will be shown later, in Book 3, (Bk. 3, lect. 6, nn. 770, 772; lect. 7, n. 791; lect. 11, n. 854.) things imagined stand to the intellect in the way that colors stand to sight, whereas colors stand to sight as its objects, so the things imagined stand to the intellect as its objects.

Since, then, things cannot be imagined without a body, this is why understanding does not occur without a body—not, however, such that it is its instrument, but as its object.

20. Two things follow from this. One is that understanding is an activity proper to the soul, needing the body, as was said above, only as needing its object; seeing and various other activities and passions, on the other hand, belong not to the soul alone but to the compound of soul and body together.

The other is that whatever has an activity through itself has also being and subsistence through itself, and what does not have its activity through itself does not have being through itself. Intellect, then, is a subsistent form, whereas the other powers are forms in matter.

And the difficulty in dealing with this type of question arises simply from the fact that all passions of the soul seem at first sight to be also functions of the body.

21. After this, when Aristotle says, so if something (403a10), he states a reason for taking up this question, namely, that on it depends the answer to a question that everyone asks very eagerly about the soul: whether it can be separated from the body. So he says that if it is possible that there is some activity or passion proper to the soul, it could be separated from the body because, as was pointed out above, what has an activity through itself also has existence and subsistence through itself. Conversely, if the soul had no such proper activity or passion, for the same reason the soul itself could not be separated from the body. Rather, the soul would be like a straight line—for though many things can happen to a straight line as straight, such as being able to touch a bronze sphere at a point, they can only happen to it as in matter, for a straight line does not touch a bronze sphere at a point except when it is in matter. So also with the soul, if it has no proper activity; however many things happen to it, they will happen to it only insofar as it is in matter.

22. Next, when he says, now, all the soul’s passions do seem (403a16), he makes manifest what had been presupposed above, namely, that certain passions belong to the composite, not to the soul alone. And this he shows by the following argument.

Everything to which the bodily constitution contributes belongs not to the soul alone but to the body as well; but the bodily constitution contributes to all the passions of the soul, such as anger, meekness, fear, confidence, pity, and so forth; hence, all these passions would seem to occur with the body.

And to show that the bodily constitution contributes to such passions, he uses two arguments.

First, we sometimes see a man beset by obvious and severe passions without being provoked or frightened, whereas if his body is already stimulated by rage, that is, due to its constitution, he is moved by slight and trifling matters and is in a state just like when one becomes angry.

Second, at this is still more evident, he makes it even clearer that the bodily constitution contributes to such passions. For we see in some people, even when there is no danger present, passions arising that are like these passions of the soul; for instance, melancholy people, simply as a result of their disordered constitution itself, are often fearful when there is no imminent danger. It is evident, then, if this is the case, that is, if one’s constitution contributes to the passions in this way, that such passions are accounts within matter, that is, accounts that have their being in matter. (Themistius, In De anima, f. 2vb.) This is why such terms, that is, the definitions of these passions, are not designated without reference to matter; for example, if anger is being defined, it will be called a movement of a certain sort of body, such as the heart, or of a part or of a power of the body (saying this in reference to the subject or material cause) arising from this (in reference to the efficient cause) and for the sake of that (in reference to the final cause).

23. Then, at for these reasons (403a27), he concludes from the foregoing that the contemplation of the soul pertains to the student of nature—a conclusion following from the way the soul is defined. So he does two things here:

first, he proves his statement;

second, he pursues his discussion of definitions, where he says, the student of nature and the dialectician (403a29; [24]).

The proof of this statement runs thus. Activities and passions of the soul are also activities and passions of the body, as has been shown. But the definition of any passion must include that to which the passion belongs; for the subject of a passion always falls within the definition of the passion. If, then, such passions belong not only to the soul but also to the body, the body must be included in the definition of the passions themselves. But everything in which body or matter is present pertains to natural science. Therefore such passions also pertain to natural science. Moreover, since contemplating the subject of passions belongs to the one who is contemplating the passions, the student of nature ought to contemplate the soul—either absolutely all souls or this kind, that is, the soul that is joined to a body. He adds this because he has left it uncertain whether intellect is joined to the body.

24. Where he says, the student of nature and the dialectician (403a29), he continues his discussion of definitions. For because he shows that, while some definitions of the passions of the soul include matter and the body, others exclude matter and refer only to the form, he shows that the latter sort of definition is inadequate. This leads him to go into the difference between such definitions. For sometimes a definition is given in which there is nothing on the side of the body, such as that anger is a desire for vengeance; and sometimes a definition is presented in which there is something on the side of the body or matter, such as that anger is the heating up of blood surrounding the heart. The former is a dialectical definition, but the latter is natural, since it includes something on the side of matter, and so pertains to the student of nature. For he, that is, the student of nature, designates the matter when he says that anger is a heating up of blood surrounding the heart, whereas the other, that is, the dialectician, points to the species and notion; for this, that is, a desire for vengeance, is the notion of anger.

25. Now, the first definition is obviously inadequate. For the definition of any form that exists in a determinate matter will be insufficient unless matter is placed within its definition. But this form, namely, the desire for vengeance, is a form in a determinate matter; whence, if matter is not placed in its definition, the definition itself is clearly inadequate. The definition, then, must state that this, that is, the form, has existence in material of this sort, namely, determinate matter.

26. Thus we have three definitions. The first designates the species and the account of the species (Themistius, In De anima, f. 2vb.) and is purely formal—as if one were to define a house as a covering to prevent destruction from wind and rain and excessive heat. The second designates the matter, as when a house is called a covering made of stones and beams and wood. But another designates, that is, puts in the definition, each of them: the matter and the form, calling a house a sort of covering built of certain things and for the sake of certain other things—that is, to keep out the wind, etc. This is why he says that another definition (the third) places in these things (that is, in the beams and stones, which stand on the side of matter) the species (that is, the form) for the sake of those things (that is, to keep out the wind). So matter is included when he says, in these, form when he says, species, and the final cause when he says, for the sake of those things. All three are needed for a perfect definition.

27. To the question, which of these definitions belongs to natural science, I answer that one that contemplates only the form is not natural but logical, whereas that which concerns the matter but ignores the form belongs to no one but the student of nature, because only he contemplates the matter. Yet that which is the compound of both, that is, of matter and form, belongs to the student of nature still more so. Thus two of these definitions pertain to natural science, but one is imperfect (that is, the one that presents only the matter) while the other (the one that is composed of both) is perfect. For there is no one who deals with inseparable passions of matter except the student of nature.

28. But because there are some who consider the passions of matter in a different way, he therefore shows who they are and how they consider it. He says they are three.

One kind consists of those who differ from the student of nature as regards the principle, although he considers passions insofar as they exist in matter, for example, the artisan, who does consider the form in its matter, but differs from the student of nature because his principle is the art, whereas the principle of the student of nature is the nature.

Another kind consists of those who, though they consider things that have their being in sensible matter, do not include such matter in their definitions; for example, the curved, the straight, and so on, although they have being in matter and are of the number of non-separable things as regard their being, still the mathematician does not determine a sensible matter for them. The reason is that certain things are sensible through their quality, and quantities exist prior to the qualities, so the mathematician is solely concerned with what belongs to quantity in an absolute way, one not determining this or that matter.

Finally, the third kind contemplates things whose existence is either completely independent of matter or can be without matter. This is the first philosopher.

29. Note that this division of philosophy is based on definition and the modes of defining. The reason is that definition is the principle of the demonstration of things, but things are defined through their essentials, so diverse definitions of things demonstrate diverse essential principles; and due to this one science differs from another.

30. Then, at but we must return (403b16), because he seemed to have made certain digressions from what he establishes regarding the inquiry about definitions, he brings himself back to the proper matter, saying, we must return to the proper matter from where the discussion stood—namely, that passions of the soul, like fury, fear, and so forth are not separable from the physical material of animals inasmuch as they exist in this way, that is, as passions, which do not exist without the body, and they are not like the line and the plane, that is, the surface, which can be separated in account from natural matter. If this is the case, then the contemplation of these things and even of the soul itself looks to the student of nature, as has been said. And concerning this, that is, the soul, it is necessary, at our present stage, to take up any opinions of the ancients who have spoken about this. This will be useful in two ways.

First, we shall take up as an aid what has been well said by them.

Second, we shall be put on our guard against what is badly stated.