Lecture 5 — Soul as identified with the elements

Opinions differ, however, as to the principles—what they are, and how many they are; and the difference is greatest between those who make these corporeal and those who make them incorporeal. But some, making it a mixture, have defined the principles in terms of both. They differ also as to the multitude: some positing one, others several. And they assign a soul to these principles accordingly. (For they, not unreasonably, assumed that what by nature causes movement is among the first things.)

Hence some have held it to be fire; for this is the finest in its parts and the most incorporeal of the elements; moreover, it moves itself, being the first cause of movement in other things. Democritus said something which rather neatly gives the reason for either fact. He said that soul is the same thing as intellect, and that this is among the primary indivisible bodies and causes motion by the fineness of its parts and its shape. He says that the sphere is the most readily mobile of shapes, and that fire and intellect are such.

Anaxagoras, however (as we said above), seems to speak of soul and intellect as diverse, yet he treats both as one nature. Nevertheless, he posits intellect as most of all the principle of all things, saying that among things that are simple, it alone is both unmixed and pure. He attributes, indeed, to the same principle both knowing and moving, saying that the intellect moves all things.

Moreover, it seems that Thales, from what they recollect of him, was also of the opinion that the soul is a cause of motion—if it is a fact that he said that a stone has a soul because it moves iron.

Now, Diogenes, like certain others, held that air is the finest of all things and is their principle, and because of this the soul knows and moves things. As a principle, it is cognitive of all else; and as the finest thing, it is able to move things.

Heraclitus, however, says that soul, as a principle, is some vapor of which it is constituted, since this is the least corporeal thing and is always flowing; and that any moving thing is known by its motion—he and many others holding that all things are in movement.

Alcmaeon seems to have held opinions on the soul similar to these. For he said it is immortal because it bears a resemblance to immortal beings. And this he attributed to it because it always moves; all divine things seem to be in motion continually and always—the sun, the moon, the stars, and the whole heaven.

Some cruder thinkers, like Hippo, thought it is water. They seem to have been persuaded of this because semen is liquid in all animals. For he refutes those who say the soul is the blood, on the grounds that semen, which is the first soul, is not blood.

Others, such as Critias, held that it is blood; that sensation itself is most proper to the soul; and that it is due to the nature of blood that this power is in it.

For opinions have been given in favor of every element besides earth, which no one has proposed, except whoever may have said it is derived from, or is, all the elements.

All, taken together, define soul, we may say, by three things: by movement, by sensation, and by immateriality; and each of these is traced back to the principles. Hence, in defining it as knowing, they make it either an element or made from elements, one saying much the same as another (with a single exception). For they say that like is known by like. For because the soul knows all things, they constitute it from all principles. Whoever says that there is one cause and one element also asserts that the soul is one thing—fire or air, for example; others, saying that there are several principles, say that the soul is multiple.

But Anaxagoras alone says that intellect cannot be acted upon and has nothing in common with other things. But, granted that this be true, he did not say how it knows and in virtue of what cause; nor is this made clear by anything else he said.

Those who posit contraries in the principles also constitute the soul from such contraries, while those who favor some one among contraries (hot or cold, or some other like these) make the soul, accordingly, one of these. Whence also some follow names, as those who allege that it is hot, because life is due to heat and is named from it. But those who identify the soul with cold say that it is named from respiration and cooling.

Such then are the opinions that have been handed down to us about the soul, together with the reasons given for them.

53. Opinions differ, however (404b30). In the preceding chapters, Aristotle has shown the old philosophers agreeing in their consideration of the soul, in that they all regarded it as the principle of movement and knowledge. In the section beginning now, he shows how they variously interpreted that common presupposition. This section falls into three parts.

In the first, he shows the root of the divergence of these philosophers in their teaching on the soul;

in the second, he enumerates the various points of difference, at hence some (405a5; [55]);

in the third, he summarizes all that we have to consider in these differences, at all, taken together (405b10; [65]).

The root of the divergence of the philosophers in their teaching on the soul is to be looked for in the way they attribute it to the principles, as was said; as the philosophers disagreed about these principles, so did they differ about the soul. (Lect. 4, nn. 43–44.) They all agreed that the soul was made up of principles, but they could not agree that it was made up of the same principles; and, differing as to the principles, they also differed in their consideration of the soul.

54. They differ, however, in two ways about the principles: first, as to the substance of the principles, that is, what they are; second, as to their number, how many they are.

As regards their substance, some said these principles were corporeal (those who posited them as fire or water or air), while others said they were incorporeal and immaterial, such as those who spoke of numbers and ideas; and there were others, like the Platonists, who mixed both views and asserted that there existed both sensible principles and separate principles.

They differed as to their number or multitude, for there were some who admitted only one first principle. Heraclitus, for instance, said it was air; and someone else, fire; while others said there were several first principles—Empedocles, for instance, who posited the four elements.

And according to these suppositions concerning principles, they assign a soul to these principles accordingly. For those who posited material principles, like Empedocles, said the soul was composed of such; and those, like Plato, who posited immaterial principles did likewise. But all considered the soul to be the chief source of movement.

55. Next, at hence some (405a5), he proceeds to run through the more particular differences between the philosophers.

It should be noted that, of those who thought that one of the bodies is the principle of things, not one deigned to identify it with mere earth. Rather, some said the first principle is fire, others air, others water, but nobody said it is earth, except those who thought that all the four elements together were the first principle. The reason is that, with its density, earth seemed more to be composed of principles than to be a principle. Aristotle, then, does three things here.

First, he gives the views of those who asserted that the first principle and soul is fire and joined to fire;

second, he gives the opinion of those who held that the first principle and soul is air, at now, Diogenes (405a21; [59]);

and third, he gives the opinion of those who held that water is the first principle and soul, at some cruder thinkers (405b1; [62]).

56. As to the first of these groups, we should note that, since causing movement and knowing were ascribed to the soul, some have held that the soul is able to move and to know in the highest degree; and as the ability to move and to know seemed to connote what is finest, they concluded that the soul is fire, which is the finest and most active of bodies. And while many were of this opinion and thought the soul to be fire, Democritus more subtly and rationally explained the reason for either fact, that is, he expressed more clearly the account of movement and of knowledge. For he held, as we have seen, that all things are made of atoms; and though for him these atoms were the principles of all realities, he maintained, nevertheless, that the round atoms were of the nature of fire, so that the soul, he said, was composed of atoms of spherical shape. (Lect. 3, n. 34.) Considered as first principles, these atoms have the account of knowing, but as spherical, they have the account of moving; hence he said that the soul knows and moves all things precisely because it is made up of these round, indivisible bodies. Whence, in assuming that these round bodies were of the nature of fire, he agreed with those who thought that the soul is of the nature of fire.

57. Then, at Anaxagoras, however (405a13), Aristotle gives the view of Anaxagoras, who agreed with the others already mentioned in ascribing the account of knowledge and of causing motion to the soul. However, Anaxagoras sometimes seems to speak of soul and intellect as diverse, as was said above, but sometimes he treats both, that is, soul and intellect, as one nature. (Lect. 3, nn. 38–40.) For he ascribes to the soul motive power and knowledge, so because he also says that intellect knows and moves all things, he takes the soul and the intellect as the same thing. But he differed from the others in this, that whereas Democritus held that the soul is of a corporeal nature, being composed of material principles, Anaxagoras said that intellect is simple, excluding diversity in its essence, and unmixed, excluding composition with anything else, and pure, excluding any addition to it from outside. But he ascribed moving and knowing to the same principle, that is, the intellect; for intellect of its own nature knows, and movement pertains to it, so he said, because it moves everything else. (Lect. 3, n. 38.)

58. Next, at it seems that Thales (405a19), he states the opinion of a philosopher called Thales, who had only this in common with the others mentioned above, that he said that the soul has a motive power. For this Thales was one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece; but while the others studied moral matters, Thales devoted himself to the inquiry about natural things and was the first natural philosopher. This is why Aristotle says, from what they recollect. He maintained that water was the principle of all things; for he thought, following his consideration of the principle in ensouled things, that it is the principle of all things; for, since all the principles or seeds of ensouled things are moist, he thought that whatever is the most moist would be the principle of all things; and this being water, he said water was the principle of all things. Yet still he did not follow his own opinion about the principle in saying that the soul is water, but rather he said that the soul is what has the motive power. Hence he asserted that a certain stone, the magnet, had a soul because it moved iron. Anaxagoras and Thales, then, are included in the present list not for identifying the soul with fire but because the former said that the soul holds the account of knowledge and movement, and the latter that it holds the account only of movement.

59. Where he says, now, Diogenes (405a21), Aristotle alludes to those who thought that air was the first principle and soul. There were three of these.

First, there was Diogenes who held that air was the first principle and also the finest of all bodies, and that the soul therefore was air—hence its power to know and move. The knowing power was due to the fact that air was, as he said, the first principle; for as knowledge is through likeness, as we have seen, the soul could not know all things unless it included the principles of all. (Lect. 4, n. 43.) And the moving power was due, he said, to the fact that air was the finest of bodies and, therefore, the most mobile.

60. Second, at Heraclitus, however (405a25), he states the second opinion, that of Heraclitus, who thought that not mere air but vapor, the blend of air and water, was the first principle. He could not allow that this was either water by itself, or fire, or air; it had to be something between, because, being a materialist, he was concerned to find a principle midway between the opposite extremes of material quality. Thinking that vapor answered this requirement most precisely, he said that the soul was vapor, which explained its extraordinary capacity to know and to move. His view was, indeed, that everything was in continual flux, that nothing stayed the same even for one hour, and that no determinate statement could be made about anything. And it was just because vapor is so unstable that he identified it with the first principle of all things, which, he said, was a soul. As the first principle, soul has the power to know, while as the least material and most fluid of things, it has the power to move.

61. Third, at Alcmaeon seems (405a29), he gives the third opinion, Alcmaeon’s, which agrees with the others only as regards movement, for he said the soul is a most mobile thing. Whence, because it is always in motion, it bears a resemblance to immortal beings, that is, to the heavenly bodies. For he attributed immortality just as the heavenly bodies, which are always moving, like the moon, sun, and the like, are immortal.

62. Then, at some cruder thinkers (405b2), Aristotle states an opinion of some who made water the first principle of all things. For there were certain rather crude students and followers of Thales who (as was said) tried to compare the principle of one particular thing to the principle of nature as a whole. Observing that moisture was fundamental to living things, they concluded that in the same way it must be the principle of all things; in short, since water has more of moisture than do any of the others, they said it is the principle of all things.

So far indeed they followed their master, Thales; but whereas he, though admitting water to be the principle of all things, would not, as we have seen, allow that the soul is water, but rather a motive power, his cruder disciples, like Hippo, asserted that it is water. Hippo tried to refute those who said the soul is blood with the argument that blood is not semen, which they called the first soul of ensouled things. He identified this with water on account of its moisture.

63. Next, at others, such as Critias (405b5), he alludes to a philosopher who was more interested in the soul’s knowledge. He was still cruder in his expressions, saying that the soul itself is blood. His reason was that because sensation does not take place in animals without blood, he said it is the blood, without which sensation does not occur in animals, since the soul is the principle of knowing: for the bloodless organs, such as bones, nails and teeth are without sensation (he forgot the nerves, which are extremely sensitive and yet bloodless). (Themistius, In De anima, f. 4v16.) It was Critias who said this.

64. In case anyone should wonder why he has not mentioned earth along with the other elements, Aristotle, at opinions have (405b8), explains that his predecessors’ views on the soul followed on what they thought about the principles; and as earth received no opinion, that is, no one judged it to be the principle, nobody said it is the soul, unless we count those—such as Democritus and Empedocles—who said that soul is, or is composed of, all the principles.

65. Then, at all, taken together (405b10), he summarizes, concluding this part of the inquiry:

and first, with reference to the elements or principles themselves;

and second, with regard to the contrarieties that are found in them, at those who posit contraries (405b23; [67]).

First, then, as regards the principles themselves, because they attributed to the soul its being extremely fine, the ability to know, and the ability to move, these three things also—sensation, motion, incorporeality—they trace back to a principle. For that is called a principle which is simple. Also, a principle, it is said, has the ability to know because, to recall what was said above, like is known by like; whence they said that the soul is composed of, or even is, the elements, because like is known by like. (Lect. 4, n. 43.) Anaxagoras, to be sure, is an exception as he posited an unmixed intellect. Again, they said it is most able to move because a principle is something most fine. And because the soul knows all things, they said that it is composed of all the principles. And they all said this because the way they posited the principles is the way they also posited the soul. Some posited there is one cause or principle or element, such as fire, air, or water, these saying that the soul is a single thing. So, too, whoever upheld several principles said likewise that the soul is many.

66. And because he said that all agree in saying that the soul is composed of the principles because like must be known by like—all, that is, except one: Anaxagoras; therefore, he says, but Anaxagoras alone (405b19), to show how this man differed from the others. Anaxagoras alone, says Aristotle, denied the passivity of the intellect, (Themistius, In De anima, f. 4vb.) saying that Anaxagoras alone said that the intellect cannot be acted upon and has nothing in common with other things. But how intellect knows, Anaxagoras does not say how; nor can one infer anything certain by anything else he said. (Lect. 3, nn. 38–40.)

67. To end this section, Aristotle summarizes what he has to say touching the contrariety of the above-mentioned principles to one another. Some, he says, arrange the first principles of things in pairs of opposites; and the soul also they regard as coming from contraries (405b23). Thus Empedocles thought that the heat and cold, the moisture and dryness which he found in the elements were intrinsic to the soul also. As earthy, he said, we know earth, as watery water, and so on. (Themistius, In De anima, f. 4vb–5ra.)

Others found their first principle of all things in only one element, whose particular quality they then attributed to the soul. If it was fire, they attributed heat, (Themistius, In De anima, f. 4vb–5ra.) for those who say the principle of all things is fire; those who say it is water attribute coolness to the soul. According to the principle assumed, so was the quality of that principle attributed to the soul, as though it shared in the nature of heat or cold, etc.

This is clear from the names they gave to the soul. Those who said it was hot gave it names derived from zaein or zooein, meaning to live, which itself comes from zeein, meaning to boil; (Themistius, In De anima, f. 5ra5.) while others who said it was cold called it psychron, meaning cold, whence comes psyche, a term applied to the soul because the coolness caused by breathing preserves animal life. (Themistius, In De anima, f. 5ra5.) Those who thought the soul was by nature hot named it from life; those who thought it was by nature cold, from respiration.

And Aristotle concludes by saying that the foregoing are the opinions handed down about the soul, together with the reasons given for them (405b29).