Lecture 12 — Empedocles’s theory of cognition and why soul is not composed of the elements

There are, then, three ways in which men have defined the soul: some declaring that it is most of all a mover, being self-moving; some, that it is the finest of bodies or the least corporeal of things; however, what contradictions and problems these views entail we have briefly reviewed. So what is left for us to consider is how it is said to be constituted from the elements. For they say this is so because the soul senses things that exist and knows each one. But many impossible consequences follow upon this account. For they suppose that like is known by like, as if asserting that the soul is the realities [it knows]. However, there are not only these latter things, but many others, perhaps an infinite number, that are derived from them.

Granted, then, that the soul knows and senses the elements of which each of these is formed, yet it will not know or sense composites, such as what a god is, or a man or flesh, or bone, or anything else compounded. For each of these things is not the elements interrelated in just any way at all, but rather by some ratio or composition, as Empedocles said of bone:

The earth all gracious in its ample caverns / took two parts out of eight of luminous water, / but four from the god of fire, and then / bone was made white.

So it is no use supposing elements to be in the soul unless there are also in it ratios and a composition. Let each know its like, but it will not know bone or man unless these be in it. It is hardly necessary to say, however, that this is impossible; who would ever think of inquiring whether there is a stone or a man in the soul? Likewise, with the good and the not-good, and similarly with other things.

Further, “that which is” can be predicated in several ways: in one way, it signifies a this-something; in another, quantity; in another, quality; and in any other way according to the categories that have been distinguished. Will the soul be made up of all these or not? But it does not seem that there are elements common to all these.

If, then, it is from those of the substances only, how will it also know anything of the others? Or is one to say that there are elements and principles proper to each genus, and the soul is composed of these? Then there will be quality and quantity and substance in the soul. But it is impossible that substance and not quantity be derived from the elements of quantity. For those who hold that the soul is composed of all things, these and other such difficulties arise.

It is incongruous to say that a thing cannot be acted on by its like, and yet that sensation and knowledge are “of like by like.” For they posit sensation as a sort of being acted upon and being moved, and knowing and understanding likewise.

What has now been said witnesses to the many doubts and difficulties to be faced by one who, with Empedocles, says that each thing is known through its corporeal elements and their relation to its likeness. For whatever things in the bodies of animals are simply earthy (like bones, sinews, hair) seem to sense nothing, not even their likenesses, and yet they ought to, on this hypothesis.

Again, each one of the principles will have more ignorance than understanding. For each will know a single principle and be ignorant of many others, indeed of all others.

Further, for Empedocles, the God must be the most ignorant of all things, for he alone will not know one of the elements, namely strife; but mortals will know all things, for every individual is composed of all.

In general, then, why is it that not everything that exists has a soul? For all things are either elements or are made of an element, or of several, or of all. For they ought accordingly to know one, or several, or all.

Moreover, one might also wonder what makes them one thing. For the elements are comparable to matter, and each thing is most properly what holds it together.

But it is impossible that there be anything better and more primordial than the soul; moreover, it is still more impossible that it be better than the intellect. For that this is the noblest thing and the ruler according to its nature is most reasonable, whereas these men say that the elements are the first of beings.

However, not one of those who maintain that the soul is constituted from the elements because it senses and knows things that exist, and that it is most capable of moving, speaks about every kind of soul. For not all sensitive things move, for certain animals are observed to remain in one place, although it would seem that the soul moves the animal with this one motion only.

Likewise with those who would make of elements the sensitive and intellectual powers. For plants seem to live, but do not participate in local motion or sensation, and many animals do not possess intelligence. But even setting this fact to one side and admitting that intellect is a part of the soul, and the sensitive power likewise, they would not be speaking of every soul, nor of the whole of any soul, nor of any one single soul. The same objection tells against a notion expressed in the Orphic hymns, where it is said, the soul enters from the universe, breathed in by the winds. This cannot occur in the case of plants and certain animals, if not all of them in fact breathe—a fact overlooked by those who put forward this view.

But if one must constitute the soul from the elements, there is no need to use them all; for one member of the pair of contraries is sufficient for making a judgment about itself and its opposite. For by the straight we know both it itself and the curved; for the judge of each is the rule for the straight, whereas the curved is that of neither its own self nor of the straight.

178. There are, then, three ways (409b18). Having in the preceding sections (Lect. 6–11.) explained that the early philosophers pursued their inquiry into the soul by three ways, that of movement, of knowledge, and of the most incorporeal being, and having pressed certain objections against those who took the way of movement, and against those who said the soul was most incorporeal and most simple, the Philosopher now turns to criticize those who said the soul knows everything because it is composed of everything.

179. Their position was that the soul knows all things and, because knowledge occurs through assimilation, as though divining this, they said that the soul knows all things because it is composed from all things, and that a likeness of all realities is in the soul according to its own proper mode of existence. Hence, since the realities consist of elements, they said that the same is true of the soul, so that it might sense and know all things that exist. The chief upholder of this view was Empedocles, who posited more elements in the soul than anyone else; and therefore the Philosopher is more concerned here to refute and dispute against him than anyone else. He does two things in this regard: first, he attacks the opinion of Empedocles, and then, at and some say (411a7; [192]), that of certain others.

180. Against Empedocles he brings ten arguments. The first is as follows. Empedocles argues that, since it knows all things, the soul must be composed of all things, because knowledge takes place by means of likeness. But it is clear that many incongruous and impossible consequences follow upon this account (409b18). For clearly the elements are not only these latter things, that is, the elements, that any given reality contains; it includes many others that come from the elements, such as the proportion of the mixture and the ratio of each thing; and there may even be an infinite number of accidents belonging to realities composed from them, that is, from the elements. Take, for example, bones. To understand bones, we need to know not only the elements from which they are composed, but also the proportion between the things from which they are composed, and the ratio for bones; for things that are composite consist not of the elements in just any sort of relation to each other, but with a certain ratio and composition, such that they be proportioned to each other.

For if bone, as Empedocles (who says everything is composite) says, is composed of eight parts, the eight parts are not equally attributed to all the elements; rather, earth contributes two parts, air has one part, water one, but fire four—and because of the predominance of fire bone was made white and it was made dry by earth (410a4). Thus, in compound realities there are not only the elements themselves, but also a certain proportion and account. Well then, either these proportions are in the soul together with the elements, or not. If they are in the soul, then bones and flesh and so forth, and therefore men and stones and bodies and the rest, are all in the soul; and this nobody dreams of conceding. But if these proportions and accounts are not in there, but only the elements are, then the soul would not know the proportions of things nor the compounds themselves; for how can it know God (that is, the heavens as a whole) or man or stone or bone? In no way, but only the elements.

181. The second argument, starting at further, “that which is” (410a13), runs thus. You say the soul is made up of the principles. But of diverse kinds of things there are diverse principles; therefore, since that which exists is spoken of in many ways—that is, since there are diverse genera, such as substance, quality, quantity, and the remaining categories, there will be diverse principles. Is, then, the soul made up of the principles of substance alone, or does it include those of all genera? If the first alternative is right, then the soul knows only substances, yet they assert it knows everything. But if it is composed of the principles of all things, then, since whatever is composed of the principles of substance is a substance, and whatever is composed of the principles of quantity is a quantity, and so on likewise with the rest, it follows that the soul is a substance, a quality, a quality, a relation, and so forth.

182. It might be answered against Aristotle’s argument that the principles of substance are also those of quantity, quality, etc., since everything is founded upon substance; hence, the soul need only possess the principles of substance to know everything. But to this it must be said that every reality has both remote and proximate principles and knowledge must occur by means of the proximate principles. Now, although the principles of substance are the principles of the others, they are nonetheless the remote principles, not the proximate ones; hence they cannot give knowledge of anything except substance.

183. The third argument, starting at it is incongruous (410a23), is the sort that reduces to incongruity. It is as follows. The reason why the soul is said to be composed of all the elements is that it knows all things and knowledge is by likeness. Against this is the admitted fact that sensation and knowledge are a sort of being acted upon; and it seems incongruous to say that like is acted upon by like and not rather by its contrary; and consequently, it is incongruous to say that sensation or knowledge are of like by like.

184. The fourth argument, at what has now (410a27), is this. What has been said already is enough to show that Empedocles’s statement (that is, that like is known by like) raises many doubts and difficulties.

But there is a yet stronger sign that it is said improperly. For if the soul, as Empedocles says, knows like by like, then the element air will know air, and so on for the other elements. But we see that animals’ bodies have many earthy parts that lack sensation, such as hair, bones, and nerves; yet they ought to have sensation, according to their position. Therefore, like is not known by like, or it is not also composed of all the elements.

185. The fifth argument, at again (410b2), runs thus. Another objection to this view of Empedocles that like is known by like is that another incongruity follows, namely that the principle has more ignorance than understanding. For if knowledge is only by likeness, and if every principle is simple and has no likeness to anything but itself, it follows that each principle only knows itself and is ignorant of many things, that is, of all things other than itself.

186. The sixth argument comes at further, for Empedocles (410b4). This position, that like is known by like, also implies another incongruity for Empedocles, that the God is the most ignorant of all animals. For, as we have seen, Empedocles thought that all lower things are composed of the four elements together with strife and friendship, these last being the causes of the coming-to-be and passing-away in things. (Lect. 4, n. 45; lect. 9, n. 133.) But he called the sky, “God,” and he said it was composed of the four elements and friendship, but not strife, and it was therefore incorruptible. If, then, like is known by like, the God cannot know strife, since it is not composed of strife, and the God is more of a simpleton than other animals, which do know strife because they are composed of it.

187. The seventh argument comes at in general, then, why (410b7). It is as follows. If the soul is made of all the elements, then it follows that all things that exist have souls. For all things that exist are made of either all or some elements. Now, whatever is made up of elements of elements is a body. Hence, all bodies and, indeed, all things that exist, have souls, which is false.

188. The eighth argument begins at one might wonder (410b10). It is as follows. The elements are many and contrary; but whenever contrary things come together in a composition, there must be some other thing that holds them together and makes them one thing. Hence, if the soul is made up of the elements, there must be something else holding them together. But it is extremely doubtful what this can be, for it would be nobler and prior to the soul, which is an impossibility, at least as regards the intellect, since it is quite reasonable to consider the intellect to be the noblest of all things and what rules according to its nature. Besides, this other thing would have to be prior to the elements, which is not true, for Empedocles and the rest assert that the elements were the first of all beings. Therefore, the soul is not made up of elements.

189. He begins the ninth argument at not one of those (410b16), showing the weakness and inadequacy of Empedocles’s view and that of all the others who have inquired about the soul by way of movement or sense-perception. For it is apparent that those who said the soul is something that moves relative to place spoke in an inadequate way; for many ensouled beings, such as plants and things resembling plants, do not move locally at all but are fixed in one place. And there is a like inadequacy with those who said the soul is something intellectual or sensitive; for many ensouled things neither sense nor think. And even if local motion, intellect, and sensation are set to one side and regarded as distinct parts of the one soul, this will not apply to every soul, since not all souls are intellectual, nor to the whole of any one soul, since only parts of it will be intellectual and sensitive, nor to any one single soul, since this description does not enumerate all the properties of each soul; for in any soul there are other properties besides understanding and sensation.

190. And a certain philosopher named Orpheus, having fallen into a rather similar error in what he said about the soul, is mentioned here too.

Note that Orpheus was one of those first philosophers who were, so to say, poet-theologians; for they wrote in verse on philosophy and about God; and there were only three of them, that is, Museus, Orpheus, and a certain Linus. This Orpheus, a wonderful orator whose words had power to civilize wild and brutish folk, was the first to induce his fellows to live together in society. For this reason it is said of him that he was the greatest cithara player, to the point that he could make rocks dance—that is, his eloquence could soften the hardest of men. And after these three came the seven sages, of whom Thales was one.

Now, this Orpheus thought that the whole air was ensouled, and was indeed a sort of soul, and that the soul of living bodies was nothing but the ensouled air drawn into them in breathing; and this idea he expressed in verse. But the Philosopher objects to the Orphic account expressed in metered songs, saying that it is just as inadequate as the others he has criticized; for, as was said, he wanted the soul to be what is drawn in through the breathing of animals. But this opinion is inadequate, for there are many animals that do not breathe at all, a fact (410b27), he says, which was overlooked by those who held this opinion. And thus it is clear that such touches the inadequacy of the theory.

191. At but if one (411a2) comes the tenth argument, which convicts the Empedoclean position of unnecessary complication. It is as follows. The soul’s capacity for knowledge is explained by its composition from elements. Now, since we see that knowledge of every reality can be possessed through fewer things, therefore, even if one grants that the soul is composed of the elements, we ought not to suppose that the soul is composed of all the elements, but at the most two.

And that knowledge rests on few things is clear if we consider that, since a composite is put together from something perfect and something imperfect, the perfect one is the reason we know the imperfect; and since in contraries, which can be reduced to possession and privation, (Albert the Great (ca. 1200–1280 AD), De anima (Cologne edition, vol. 7/1, 1968), p. 50, ll. 87–89.) one member of the pair of contraries is sufficient, that is, the one that stands in the mode of possession and the perfect in order to understand both itself and the other term that stands in the mode of privation and the imperfect. Thus, by the straight we know and form judgments about both the straight and the curved; for the rule, that is, the measure, is the means of knowing both; (Albert, De anima, p. 51, ll. 1–2.) but the curved line is the means of knowing neither itself nor the straight.

Hence there was no need to constitute the soul as made up of all the elements, but it was enough to adduce two only, fire and earth, as its means of knowing both itself and contrary things. Through fire it could know both cold and hot objects, and through earth, it could know both the dry and the moist.