Lecture 9 — Theory of soul as harmony

There is another opinion handed down about the soul, acceptable to many, and in no way inferior to the theories already discussed, yet chastised, as it were, and condemned, even in public discussions. For some call the soul a kind of harmony.

And they say that harmony is a composition or tempering of opposites and that the body is compounded of opposites.

Yet a harmony is either a proportion in the components of a compound or the composition itself; and the soul cannot be either of these.

Further, movement, which all attribute to the soul, does not pertain to harmony.

It would be more appropriate to call health a harmony, and in general, the powers of the body rather than those of the soul. This is evident if one tries to explain the passions and activities of the soul by some harmony: it is difficult indeed to correlate these.

Further, we speak of harmony with two considerations in mind. Primarily, as something proper to magnitudes in things that have motion and position, their composition, so that nothing is missing that is becoming to them. Second, the ratio of this composition. In neither way is this reasonable.

The composition of the parts of the body is very easy to examine, for there are many and various such compositions. Of what and how can one suppose the intellect to be a composition? Or sensation? Or appetite? It is no less absurd to account the soul the ratio of a composition. The synthesis of elements for bone does not have the same ratio as that for flesh. There would have to be many souls in one body, and indeed, a soul for every body, if each is a mixture of elements and the ratio of the mixture is a harmony and a soul.

One might at this point question Empedocles. He says that each of these exists in virtue of a ratio. Is this ratio then the soul, or is soul some other thing, thus inborn in the members?

Or further: is concord the cause of any chance combination or only of one based on some ratio?

And whether this concord is the ratio of the composition or something else? These are the kinds of problem involved in this hypothesis.

But if the soul is other than the composition, why does it perish together with the essence of flesh and of other parts of the body? Moreover, granted that each of these parts has a soul, if the soul is not the ratio of the whole composition, what is it that is corrupted when the soul departs?

It is evident, then, from what has been said, that the soul cannot be a harmony or move in a circle. It can, however, be moved and move itself accidentally, insofar as what it dwells in moves and is moved by the soul. In no other way can it move in place.

132. There is another opinion (407b27). After rejecting Plato’s theory, the Philosopher here disposes of another opinion rather similar to Plato’s. For certain philosophers thought the soul was a harmony, agreeing so far with Plato’s view that the soul was composed of harmonic numbers, and yet differing from him in that, while he spoke only of a numerical harmony, they extended the principle to include harmonies of compounds, mixtures, and contrary qualities.

Concerning this, he does three things:

first, he puts forth their opinion and the reason for their opinion;

second, he disputes against this opinion, at yet a harmony (407b32; [135]);

third, he shows how this opinion is much more probable, at but if the soul (408a24; [144]).

133. Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, then, he tells us of another opinion handed down from the early philosophers about the soul, which seemed to contain correct accounts not only about the soul specifically but also about something common to all the principles. He says, “something common,” because the early philosophers said nothing about formal causes, treating only of material causes.

Democritus and Empedocles were the two who seem to have come nearest to treating of the formal cause. The latter reduced everything to six principles, of which four—the elements—were material and two were formal, namely the partly active and partly material principles, friendship and strife. And the material elements had, they said, within themselves a certain proportion that resulted from them such that they agreed in a certain unity, since without this they could not exist together. And this proportion they called the form and a kind of harmony of things. Whence also they said that the soul was a sort of harmony, like other forms.

134. Then, at and they say that harmony (407b30), he states the reason for this opinion: harmony is the combination, and proportion, and tempering of contraries in compounds and mixtures. The proportion that is between these contraries is called a harmony and is the form of the compound; and because the soul is a kind of form, they said it was a harmony. Such was apparently the view of Dynarchus, Simiates, and Empedocles.

135. Next, at yet a harmony (407b32), he begins to criticize it:

first, in a general way, relative to the position of the philosophers mentioned;

and second, at one might (408a18; [141]), with particular reference to Empedocles, who formulated it.

The position is attacked with four arguments. The first is as follows. It is clear that harmony, properly speaking, is a consonance within sounds, but they transferred the name to every due proportion, either in things composed of different parts or in mixtures of contraries. On this view, then, “harmony” can say two things: either it is the composition or mixture itself, or it is the proportion existing in the composition or mixture. But the soul is clearly neither of these; therefore, it is not a harmony. The clear reason why the soul cannot be either the composition or the proportion of the composition is that they take the soul as a certain substance, whereas these are both accidents; so they are not the same thing.

136. The second argument begins at further, movement (407b34). All philosophers agree that the soul moves something. But harmony does not move anything; rather, it is a result and trace of a mover, just as in music the movement of strings leaves its trace in harmonious sound. And the putting together and coadaptation of parts by some composing agent results in a certain proportional composition. If, then, the soul were a harmony resulting from some producer of harmony, we should have to posit another soul in the producer of the harmony.

137. The third argument comes at it would be more appropriate (408a1). In Physics 4, the Philosopher says that if the definition or nature of anything is to be adequate, it must answer to that given thing’s activities and to what it can suffer from other things; for what a thing is, is best defined when we know not only the substance and nature of the thing itself but also its accidents and passions. (Aristotle, Physics 4.4, 211a6–11; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Physics, bk. 4, lect. 5.) If, then, the soul were a harmony, we ought to be able to work out its activities and accidents from our knowledge of this harmony. But this is extremely difficult; if, for example, we want to derive the activities of the soul from harmony, to what harmony does feeling and loving, hating, (Themistius, In De anima, f. 8ra.) or understanding belong? It would be more appropriate indeed to come to know the accidents of the body through knowing the harmony. For example, if we wish to know health, we will say that it is the duly proportioned and equally balanced commingling of the body’s humors and qualities, and likewise with the powers of the body. Thus, harmony should be attributed to the body more than to the soul.

138. The fourth argument starts at further, we speak (408a5). Harmony is sometimes found in things that have motion and position, when, that is, such things are so placed and arranged that nothing is missing that is becoming to them, that is, no defect occurs within the genus of the thing in question. The parts then are said to be well harmonized and the whole composition is called a harmony, for example, of wood or stones or (Themistius, In De Anima, f. 8ra.) other natural bodies. In the same way, when stringed instruments or flutes are well-tuned, so that a consonant of sounds results, they are said to be well-harmonized, and the consonance is called a “harmony.” This is the proper meaning of the word.

Sometimes, again, harmony is found in mixtures of contraries; for when contraries are so combined and mixed that no incompatibility remains nor any excess of any one of them, for example, of heat or cold or moisture or dryness; then they are said to be harmonized well and their ratio, that is, the proportion, is called a “harmony.” So, if the soul is a harmony, it must be in one of these ways. But it is certain that it cannot rationally be so called in either of these ways. Those philosophers therefore spoke amiss.

139. Clearly, the soul should not be called a harmony in either of these modes. For the soul cannot be called a harmony in the way it is found in compounds and things with position. For, in the body, the order of the various parts of the composite is quite evident; for we can easily know the order of the bones or the nerves, what the arm is to the hand and the flesh to the bones. On the other hand, the account of the order of the parts of the soul is obscure; for the order that is between the intellect, sensation, appetite, and such we cannot know from that.

140. Nor can the soul be called a harmony in the same way as the proportion in bodies compounded of a mixture of contraries; and this is for two reasons.

One reason is that a different proportion is to be found in different parts of the living body; for the mixture of elements does not have the same ratio, or proportion, to form flesh as to form bone; and consequently, there would be different souls for the different parts.

The other reason is that all bodies are a mixture of elements and contraries; hence, if the proportion of the mixture in each body is a harmony, and each harmony is a soul, there will be no body without a soul, which is incongruous. It is incongruous, therefore, to call the soul a harmony.

141. Next, at one might at this point (408a18), Aristotle attacks Empedocles by drawing three unforeseen consequences from his account of the matter.

The first is this. If you maintain that every body has a certain ratio, that is, a proportion, which you call “harmony” and identify with the soul, I put the question to you whether the soul itself is this ratio or proportion, or something else. If you answer that it is the proportion itself, then, since in the same body there are different proportions for the different parts, two difficulties arise: there will be many souls in the same body, and there will be a soul for every compound. But if you answer that the soul is not the proportion itself, then, since the proportion is the harmony, the soul will not be a harmony.

142. The second argument begins at or further (408a21). Empedocles had asserted that the cause of unification in things is friendship and the cause of separation is strife. Now, in a unification a certain proportion arises. I ask you, then, whether friendship is the cause of any and every unification or only of such unifications as are harmonious. If you answer, “of every union,” then you must find some cause other than friendship for the harmony and proportion in harmonious unions—unless you say that the harmonization occurs by chance. But if you say that concord is the cause of harmonious unifications, then friendship is not the cause of all unifications.

143. The third argument, at and whether this (408a22), runs as follows. Empedocles says that friendship is what unites things. I ask: is friendship the same as the harmonized unification itself or not? If it is the same, then, since nothing causes its very self, friendship cannot be the cause of the unification, as Empedocles asserted. But suppose it is not the same. Still, harmonious unification is nothing other than a kind of agreement, which seems to be precisely what friendship is too. So they are the same after all, and the preceding argument applies as before.

144. At but if the soul is other (408a24), Aristotle shows how plausible is the theory in question. And concerning this he does two things.

First, its plausibility, he says, relies on the argument that if you grant one thing, another must follow, and if you remove one thing, another is removed. For when a body loses its harmony, it loses its soul, and while its harmony remains, the soul too remains. Yet this does not follow; for this kind of proportion is not, as those philosophers thought, the form, but only the disposition of the matter to the form. And if the proportion of the harmonized composite is being taken for the disposition, then the consequence is quite correct, that, so long as the matter’s disposition to the form remains, the form itself remains, and when the disposition goes, the form also goes. Still, the harmony is not the form but a disposition of the matter to the form.

145. Second, where he says, it is evident, then (408a29), Aristotle, concluding, summarizes his rejection both of Plato’s view that the soul is moved in a circle and of Empedocles that it is a harmony. The soul, as has been said, is moved and moves itself, accidentally. (Lect. 6, nn. 75–86.) That it is moved accidentally is clear, for it is moved when its body is moved, but the body itself receives movement from the soul. Only accidentally, and in no other way, does the soul move in place.