Lecture 13 — The elements have no soul

And some say that a soul is intermingled with everything in the universe. That is perhaps why Thales thought that everything was full of gods.

This, however, presents certain difficulties. For why does the soul in air and fire not make ensouled beings of them, whereas it does so in composite beings—and that, even though it is thought to be more excellent in the former? (And one might well ask why the soul in the air should be higher and more immortal than that in animals.) On either count, the theory is incongruous and unreasonable. To say that air or fire is an animal is among the greatest absurdities; and if there is a soul in them, it is incongruous not to call them animals.

They seem to have held that a soul existed in these on the ground that the universe is made up of parts of a like species; so that if animals become animate by partaking of the containing element, they must say that the soul is of a like species with its parts.

However, if the air, removed thus, is of a like species, but the soul is composed of heterogeneous parts, something of the soul will exist and something not. It is necessary, then, either that it be of homogeneous parts, or that it be not in any and every part of the whole.

It is evident, then, from what has been said, that the cause of knowledge being in the soul is not that soul is made up of the elements, and that it is neither true nor well said to say that it is in motion.

192. And some say that the soul (411a7). Having stated and rejected the opinion and arguments of those who maintained that the soul was composed of elements, the Philosopher is now led, by the same train of thought, to discuss the notion, upheld by some, according to which a soul is within the elements.

First, then, he states this opinion;

and second, at they seem to have held (411a16; [196]), the argument used to support it.

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he states the opinion;

second, at this, however (411a9; [193]), he disproves it.

There are, he says, some who say that a soul is intermingled with everything, whether simple elements or things composed of these. This perhaps is why Thales thought that everything was full of gods; perhaps he thought that the entire universe was ensouled and its soul was divine, that just as soul exists in every part of animal and in the whole, so a god was in every part of the universe and everything therefore was full of divinities. And perhaps idolatry arose from this.

193. At this, however (411a9), he points out, against this opinion, that it—that is, that the soul is in the elements and things made from the elements—presents certain difficulties. For instance, if a soul exists in air and in fire (and of these two especially this was asserted), it is hard to see why it does not make ensouled beings of them, that is, why the soul in them does not constitute an animal. For the soul in composed things does make an animal (that is, the composite ensouled things are animals); especially since one would think that it, that is, the soul, would be all the more excellent in the simple elements than in the things composed of elements.

194. Again, one might well ask, moved by these things, he says, why the soul which they place in the elements is higher and more immortal than the soul that is in things composed of elements. For the latter constitute knowing, sentient animals, (Albert, De anima, p. 51, ll. 16–20, 25–27.) but that which is in the elements does not do this.

195. But however the objections are put, the result is that the theory is incongruous and unreasonable. For to say that fire or air is an animal is most incongruous, and it is contradicted by experience and is unsupported by any good reason. And not to call animals those things that have souls is extremely incongruous; for it would follow that there was no difference between souls that exist in bodies and those that do not. (Albert, De anima, p. 51, ll. 33–36.)

196. Then, at they seem to have held (411a16), he states the reason used in support of this theory; and concerning this, he does two things.

First, he states the reason and refutes it.

Second, at it is evident (411a24; [198]), he draws a general conclusion from all the foregoing discussions.

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he presents the reason why some philosophers seem to have held that a soul existed in these, that is, in all the elements: because they thought that the whole and the parts (Albert, De anima, p. 51, ll. 47–48.) in elements were of a like species, since the elements are simple. Observing that that part of the containing element, that is, the air, which came into contact with the bodies of animals through their inhaling and exhaling, was the cause and principle of animals becoming ensouled, they thought it necessary to conclude that the soul of the whole was of the same specific nature as the parts, that is to say, that all the containing air was ensouled.

197. At however, if the air (411a20), he refutes this argument. The assumption is that, because the portion of the air removed and inhaled by an animal is of a like species to the air as a whole, the soul of the animal is, as it were, a portion of the soul of the whole air. But on their own principle this is clearly false; for, according to them, the soul of each animal is heterogenous with the soul of air, because one of them, namely, the soul of air, exists, that is, is immortal, as that which has never ceased from vivifying living beings, (Albert, De anima, p. 51, ll. 63–64.) whereas the soul of this or that animal does not exist, that is, is mortal. It is necessary, therefore, that one of two incongruities flow from this. If all the parts of air, those outside and those breathed in, are alike, then the same is true of the soul; but this has been disproved. But if the soul’s parts are dissimilar while the air’s parts are similar, then the soul is not in every part of the whole, that is, of the whole air, which is against those who said that all the air had a soul.

198. Then, at it is evident (411a24), Aristotle concludes this part of the discussion of earlier opinions. Neither of these things that they attribute to the soul, in the way in which they said it, is true or well said, namely, that knowledge in the soul is a consequence of its being composed of elements (as they asserted) and that movement or being moved is in it because it was composed of these elements. So much should be clear to anyone who has followed the discussion up to the present.