Lecture 1 — Introduction

16a1. First, we must determine what a name is and what a verb is; then what negation is and affirmation, and the enunciation and speech.

There is a twofold operation of the intellect, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3.6, 430a26.

One is the understanding of simple objects, that is, the operation by which the intellect apprehends just the essence of a thing alone.

The other is the operation of composing and dividing.

There is also a third operation, that of reasoning, by which reason proceeds from what is known to the investigation of things that are unknown.

The first of these operations is ordered to the second, for there cannot be composition and division unless things have already been apprehended simply. The second, in turn, is ordered to the third, for clearly we must proceed from some known truth to which the intellect assents in order to have certitude about something not yet known.

Since logic is called rational science, it must direct its consideration to the things that belong to the three operations of reason we have mentioned. Accordingly, Aristotle treats those belonging to the first operation of the intellect, that is, those conceived by simple understanding, in the book Categories; those belonging to the second operation, that is, affirmative and negative enunciation, in the book On Interpretation; and those belonging to the third operation in the book Prior Analytics and the books following it, in which he treats the syllogism absolutely, the different kinds of syllogism, and the species of argumentation by which reason proceeds from one thing to another. And since the three operations of reason are ordered to each other, so are the books: the Categories is ordered to On Interpretation, and On Interpretation to the Prior Analytics and the books following it.

The one we are now examining is named Peri hermeneias, that is, On Interpretation. Interpretation, according to Boethius, is significant vocal sound—whether complex or incomplex—which signifies something by itself. Conjunctions, then, and prepositions and other words of this kind are not called interpretations since they do not signify anything by themselves. Nor can sounds signifying naturally but not from purpose or in connection with a mental image of signifying something—such as the sounds of brute animals—be called interpretations, for one who interprets intends to explain something. Therefore only names and verbs and speech are called interpretations and these Aristotle treats in this book. The name and verb, however, seem to be principles of interpretation rather than interpretations, for one who interprets seems to explain something as either true or false. Therefore, only enunciative speech in which truth or falsity is found is called interpretation. Other kinds of speech, such as optatives and imperatives, are ordered rather to expressing volition than to interpreting what is in the intellect. This book, then, is entitled On Interpretation, that is to say, On Enunciative Speech, in which truth or falsity is found. The name and verb are treated only insofar as they are parts of the enunciation; for it is proper to a science to treat the parts of its subject as well as its properties.

It is clear, then, to which part of philosophy this book belongs, what its necessity is, and what its place is among the books on logic.

The Philosopher begins this work with an introduction, in which he points out one by one the things that are to be treated.

For, since every science begins with a treatment of the principles, and the principles of composite things are their parts, one who intends to treat enunciation must begin with its parts. Thus, Aristotle begins by saying: first we must determine, that is, define, what a noun is and what a verb is (16a1). In the Greek text it is: first we must posit, which signifies the same thing, for demonstrations presuppose definitions, from which they conclude, and hence definitions are rightly called “positions.” This is the reason he only points out here the definitions of the things to be treated; for from definitions other things are known.

It might be asked why it is necessary to treat simple things again, that is, the name and the verb, for they were treated in the book Categories.

In answer to this, we should say that simple words can be considered in three ways:

first, as they signify simple intellection absolutely, which is the consideration proper to the book Categories;

second, according to their function as parts of the enunciation, which is the way they are considered in this book. Hence, they are treated here under the formality of the name and the verb, and under this formality they signify something with time or without time and other things of the kind that belong to the formality of words as they are components of an enunciation.

Finally, simple words may be considered as they are components of a syllogistic ordering. They are treated then under the formality of terms, and Aristotle does this in the book Prior Analytics.

It might be asked why he treats only the name and verb and omits the other parts of speech. The reason could be that Aristotle intends to establish rules about the simple enunciation and for this it is sufficient to consider only the parts of the enunciation that are necessary for simple speech. A simple enunciation can be formed from just a name and a verb, but it cannot be formed from other parts of speech without these. Therefore, it is sufficient to treat these two.

On the other hand, the reason could be that names and verbs are the principal parts of speech. Pronouns, which do not name a nature but determine a person—and therefore are put in place of names—are comprehended under names. The participle—although it has similarities with the name—signifies with time and is therefore comprehended under the verb. The others are things that unite the parts of speech. They signify relations of one part to another rather than parts of speech, as nails and other parts of this kind are not parts of a ship, but connect the parts of a ship.

After he has proposed these parts [the name and the verb] as principles, Aristotle states what he principally intends to establish: then what negation is and affirmation (16a1). These, too, are parts of the enunciation; however, they are not integral parts, as are the name and the verb (otherwise every enunciation would have to be formed from an affirmation and negation), but subjective parts, that is, species. This is supposed here but will be proved later.

Since enunciation is divided into categorical and hypothetical, it might be asked why he does not list these as well as affirmation and negation. In reply to this we could say that Aristotle has not added these because the hypothetical enunciation is composed of many categorical propositions, and thus categorical and hypothetical only differ according to the difference of one and many.

Or we could say, and this would be a better reason, that the hypothetical enunciation does not contain absolute truth, the knowledge of which is required in demonstration and to which this book is principally ordered. Rather, it signifies something as true by supposition, which does not suffice for demonstrative sciences unless it is confirmed by the absolute truth of the simple enunciation. This is the reason Aristotle does not treat either hypothetical enunciations or syllogisms.

He adds: and the enunciation (16a1), which is the genus of negation and affirmation, and speech, which is the genus of enunciation.

If it should be asked why, besides these, he does not mention vocal sound, it is because vocal sound is something natural and therefore belongs to the consideration of natural philosophy, as is evident in On the Soul 2.8, 420b5–421a6, and at the end of On the Generation of Animals. (ch. 8.) Also, since it is something natural, vocal sound is not properly the genus of speech, but is presupposed for the forming of speech, as natural things are presupposed for the formation of artificial things.

In this introduction, however, Aristotle seems to have inverted the order of the enunciation, for affirmation is naturally prior to negation, and enunciation is prior to these as a genus; consequently, speech is prior to enunciation. We could reply to this that he began to enumerate from the parts; consequently, he proceeds from the parts to the whole. He puts negation, which contains division, before affirmation, which consists of composition, for the same reason: division is closer to the parts, composition closer to the whole.

Or we could say, as some do, that he puts negation first because in those things that can be and not be, non-being, which negation signifies, is prior to being, which affirmation signifies.

Aristotle, however, does not refer to the fact that one of them is placed before the other, for they are species equally dividing a genus and are therefore simultaneous according to nature.