Lecture 5 — On the nature of the verb and its conformity with the name

16b6. The verb is that which signifies with time; no part of it signifies separately, and it is a sign of something said of something else.

16b8. I mean by “signifies with time” that “maturity,” for example, is a name, but “matures” is a verb, for it connotes the present existence of maturity.

16b10. Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something that belongs to something, that is, of something belonging to a subject or in a subject.

16b12. “Non-matures” and “non-declines” I do not call verbs. They signify with time and always belong to something, but they differ from the verb and no name has been established for the difference. Let us call them infinite verbs, since they belong equally to anything whatever, to both what is and what is not.

16b16. Likewise, “has matured” and “will mature” are not verbs but modes of the verb. They differ from the verb in that the verb signifies with present time, whereas the modes signify time outside of the present.

16b19. Verbs said by themselves are names.

16b20. And they signify something. For in uttering a verb the one speaking informs the mind of the one hearing it and sets it at rest.

16b21. But they do not yet signify whether a thing is or is not, for the verb is not a sign of the being or non-being of a thing.

16b23. Nor would it be a sign of the being or non-being of a thing if you were to say it alone, for it is nothing; it signifies with a composition which cannot be conceived apart from the things composing it.

The verb is that which signifies with time. After determining the nature of the name, the Philosopher now determines the nature of the verb.

And he does three things:

first, he defines the verb;

second, he excludes certain forms of verbs from the definition, where he says: “non-matures” and “non-declines” (16b12; [61]);

third, he shows in what the verb and name agree where he says: verbs in themselves, said alone, are names (16b19; [66]).

About the first he does two things:

first, he defines the verb;

second, he explain the definition where he says: I mean by “signifies with time” (16b8; [58]).

In order to be brief, Aristotle does not give what is common to the name and the verb in the definition of the verb, but leaves this for the reader to understand from the definition of the name.

He posits three elements in the definition of the verb (16b6).

The first of these distinguishes the verb from the name, for the verb signifies with time, the name without time, as was stated in its definition.

The second element, no part of which signifies separately, distinguishes the verb from speech.

This second element was also given in the definition of the name; therefore, it seems that this second element, along with vocal sound significant by convention, should have been omitted.

Ammonius says in reply to this that Aristotle posited this in the definition of the name to distinguish it from speech which is composed of names (as in “man is an animal”), but, since speech may also be composed of verbs (as in “to walk is to move”), this also had to be repeated in the definition of the verb to distinguish it from speech.

We might also say that since the verb introduces the composition which brings about speech signifying truth or falsity, the verb seems to be more like speech (being a certain formal part of it) than the name, which is a material and subjective part of it. Therefore, this had to be repeated.

The third element distinguishes the verb not only from the name, but also from the participle, which also signifies with time. He makes this distinction when he says: and it is a sign of something said of something else, that is, names and participles can be posited on the part of the subject and the predicate, but the verb is always posited on the part of the predicate.

But it seems that verbs are used as subjects. The verb in the infinitive mode is an instance of this, as in the example, “to walk is to be moving.”

Verbs of the infinitive mode, however, have the force of names when they are used as subjects. (Hence in both Greek and ordinary Latin usage articles are added to them as in the case of names.) The reason for this is that it is proper to the name to signify something as existing in itself, but proper to the verb to signify action or passion.

Now there are three ways of signifying action or passion.

It can be signified per se, as a certain thing in the abstract and is thus signified by a name such as “action,” “passion,” “walking,” “running,” and so on.

It can also be signified in the mode of an action, that is, as proceeding from a substance and inhering in it as in a subject; in this way action or passion is signified by the verbs of the different modes attributed to predicates.

Finally—and this is the third way in which action or passion can be signified—the very process or inherence of action can be apprehended by the intellect and signified as a thing. Verbs of the infinitive mode signify such inherence of action in a subject and hence can be taken as verbs by reason of concretion, and as names inasmuch as they signify as things.

On this point, the objection may also be raised that verbs of other modes sometimes seem to be posited as subjects; for example when we say, “‘Matures’ is a verb.”

In such a statement, however, the verb “matures” is not taken formally according as its signification is referred to a thing, but as it signifies the vocal sound itself materially, which vocal sound is taken as a thing. When posited in this way—that is, materially—verbs and all parts of speech are taken with the force of names.

Then, when he says: I mean by “signifies with time” (16b8), he begins to explain the definition of the verb.

First, in regard to this, he says that it signifies with time;

second, that the verb is a sign of something said of something else, at: moreover, a verb is always (16b10; [59]).

But he does not explain the second part, no part of which signifies separately, because an explanation of it has already been made in connection with the name.

First, he shows by an example that the verb signifies with time. “Maturity,” for example, because it signifies action, not in the mode of action but in the mode of a thing existing in itself, does not signify with time, for it is a name. But “matures,” since it is a verb signifying action, signifies with time, because to be measured by time is proper to motion; moreover, actions are known by us in time. We have already mentioned that to signify with time is to signify something measured in time. Hence it is one thing to signify time principally, as a thing, which is appropriate to the name; however, it is another thing to signify with time, which is not proper to the name but to the verb.

Then, when he says: moreover, a verb is always (16b10), he explains the last part of the definition of the verb.

It should be noted first that the subject of an enunciation signifies as that in which something inheres. Hence, when the verb signifies action through the mode of action (the nature of which is to inhere), it is always posited on the part of the predicate and never on the part of the subject—unless it is taken with the force of a name, as was said.

The verb, therefore, is always said to be a sign of something that belongs to something, and this not only because the verb always signifies that which is predicated, but also because there must be a verb in every predication, for the verb introduces the composition by which the predicate is united with the subject.

The last phrase of this portion of the text presents a difficulty, namely, of something belonging to a subject or in a subject. For it seems that something is said of a subject when it is predicated essentially, as in “man is an animal”; but in a subject, when it is an accident that is predicated of a subject, as in “man is white.” But if verbs signify action or passion (which are accidents), it follows that they always signify what is in a subject. It is useless, therefore, to say belonging to a subject or in a subject.

In answer to this, Boethius says that both pertain to the same thing, for an accident is predicated of a subject and is also in a subject. Aristotle, however, uses a disjunction, which seems to indicate that he means something different by each.

Therefore, it could be said in reply to this that when Aristotle says the verb is always a sign of those things that are predicated of another, it is not to be understood as though the things signified by verbs are predicated. For predication seems to pertain more properly to composition; therefore, the verbs themselves are what are predicated and do not signify predicates. The verb, then, is always a sign that something is being predicated, because all predication is made through the verb by reason of the composition introduced, whether what is being predicated is predicated essentially or accidentally.

Then, when he says: “non-matures” and “non-declines” (16b12), he excludes certain forms of verbs from the definition of the verb.

First, he excludes the infinite verb;

second, the verbs of past and future time, at: likewise, “has matured” and “will mature” (16b16; [63]).

Therefore, he says first that “non-matures” and “non-declines” cannot strictly speaking be called verbs for it is proper to the verb to signify something in the mode of action or passion. But these words remove action or passion rather than signify a determinate action or passion. Now, while they cannot properly be called verbs, all the parts of the definition of the verb apply to them.

First of all, the verb signifies time, because it signifies to act or to be acted upon. Since these are in time, so are their privations (and thus rest, too, is measured by time, as is said in Physics). (Physics, bk. 4, ch. 3, 234a24–234b9; & bk. 4, ch. 8, 238a23–239b41.)

Again, the infinite verb is always posited on the part of the predicate, just as the verb is. The reason is that negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation. Hence, just as the verb, which signifies action or passion, signifies something as existing in another, so the foresaid words signify the remotion of action or passion.

Now, someone might object that if the definition of the verb applies to the above words, then they are verbs.

In answer to this, it should be pointed out that the definition which has been given of the verb is the definition of it taken commonly. Insofar as these words fall short of the perfect notion of the verb, they are not called verbs.

Before Aristotle’s time, a name had not been established for a word that differs from verbs as these do. He calls them infinite verbs because such words agree in some things with verbs and yet fall short of the determinate notion of the verb. The reason for the name, he says, is that an infinite verb can be said indifferently of what is or what is not, for the adjoined negation is taken not with the force of privation, but with the force of simple negation, since privation supposes a determinate subject. Infinite verbs do differ from negative verbs, however, for infinite verbs are taken with the force of one word, negative verbs with the force of two.

Then when he says: likewise, “has matured” (16b16), he excludes verbs of past and future time from the definition.

And he says that just as infinite verbs are not verbs absolutely, so “will mature”, which is of future time, or “has matured”, of past time, are not verbs, but they are cases of the verb, and differ from the verb (which signifies with present time) by signifying time before and after the present.

Aristotle expressly says present time and not just present because he does not mean here the indivisible present which is the instant, for in the instant there is neither movement, nor action, nor passion. Present time is to be taken as the time that measures action which has begun and has not yet been terminated in act.

Accordingly, verbs that signify with past or future time are not verbs in the proper sense of the term, for the verb is that which signifies to act or to be acted upon; therefore, strictly speaking, it signifies to act or to be acted upon in act, which is to act or to be acted upon simply. But to act or to be acted upon in past or future time is relative.

It is with reason that verbs of past or future time are called cases of the verb signifying with present time, for past or future are said with respect to the present, the past being that which was present, the future, that which will be present.

Although the inflection of the verb is varied by mode, time, number, and person, the variations that are made in number and person do not constitute cases of the verb, since such variation is on the part of the subject, not on the part of the action. But variation in mode and time refers to the action itself and hence both of these constitute cases of the verb. For verbs of the imperative or optative modes are called cases, as well as verbs of past or future time. Verbs of the indicative mode in present time, however, are not called cases, regardless of their person and number.

Then, when he says: verbs in themselves, said alone, are names (16b19), he points out the conformity between verbs and names.

And concerning this he does two things:

first, he proposes what he intends to do;

second, he manifests it, at: and they signify something (16b20; [67]).

First, then, he says that verbs said by themselves are names (16b19).

Some have taken this to mean those verbs that are taken with the force of names—either verbs of the infinitive mode (as in “to run is to be moving”), or verbs of another mode (as in “‘matures’ is a verb”). But this does not seem to be what Aristotle means, for it does not correspond to what he says next.

Therefore, name must be taken in another way here, that is, as it commonly signifies any word whatever that is imposed to signify a thing. Now, since to act or to be acted upon is also a certain thing, verbs themselves as they name, that is, as they signify to act or to be acted upon, are comprehended under names taken commonly. The name as distinguished from the verb signifies the thing under a determinate mode, that is, according as the thing can be understood as existing in itself. This is the reason names can be subjected and predicated.

He proves the point he has just made when he says: and they signify something (16b20).

First, by showing that verbs, like names, signify something;

second, by showing that, like names, they do not signify truth or falsity when he says: but they do not yet signify (16b21; [69]).

He says first that verbs have been said to be names only insofar as they signify a thing (16b20). He proves this by saying it has already been said that significant vocal sound signifies thought; hence it is proper to significant vocal sound to produce something understood in the mind of the one who hears it. To show, then, that a verb is significant vocal sound, he assumes that the one who utters a verb brings about understanding in the mind of the one who hears it. The evidence he introduces for this is that the mind of the one who hears it is set at rest.

But what Aristotle says here seems to be false, for it is only perfect speech that makes the intellect rest. The name or the verb, if said by themselves, do not do this. For example, if I say “man,” the mind of the hearer is left in suspense as to what I wish to say about him; and if I say “runs,” the hearer’s mind is left in suspense as to whom I am speaking of.

It should be said in answer to this objection that the operation of the intellect is twofold, as was said above, and therefore the one who utters a name or a verb by itself determines the intellect with respect to the first operation, which is the simple conception of something. It is in relation to this that the one hearing, whose mind was undetermined before the name or the verb was being uttered and its utterance terminated, is set at rest. Neither the name nor the verb said by itself, however, determines the intellect in respect to the second operation, which is the operation of the intellect composing and dividing; nor do the verb or the name said alone set the hearer’s mind at rest in respect to this operation.

Aristotle therefore immediately adds: but they do not yet signify whether a thing is or is not (16b21), that is, they do not yet signify something by way of composition and division, or by way of truth or falsity.

This is the second thing he intends to prove, and he proves it by the verbs that especially seem to signify truth or falsity, namely, the verb “to be” and the infinite verb “to non-be,” neither of which, said by itself, signifies real truth or falsity (and much less so do any other verbs).

This could also be understood in a more general way—that is, that here he is speaking of all verbs—for he says that the verb does not signify whether a thing is or is not. He manifests this further, therefore, by saying that no verb is a sign of a thing’s being or non-being, that is, that a thing is or is not. For although every finite verb implies being, for “to run” is “to be running,” and every infinite verb implies non-being, for “to non-run” is “to be non-running,” nevertheless, no verb signifies the whole, namely, that a thing is or a thing is not.

He proves this point from something in which it will be clearer when he adds: nor would it be a sign of the being or non-being of a thing if you were to say “is” alone, for it is nothing (16b23).

It should be noted that the Greek text has the word “being” in place of “is” here.

In order to prove that verbs do not signify that a thing is or is not, he takes the source and origin of all words—namely, being itself—of which he says that it is nothing.

Alexander explains this passage in the following way. Aristotle says being itself is nothing because being is said equivocally of the ten predicaments, and, since an equivocal name used by itself signifies nothing unless something is added to determine its signification, thus “is” said by itself does not signify what is or is not.

But this explanation is not appropriate for this text.

In the first place, “being” is not, strictly speaking, said equivocally, but according to the prior and posterior. Consequently, when said absolutely, it is understood of that of which it is said primarily.

Second, an equivocal word does not signify nothing, but many things, sometimes being taken for one, sometimes for another.

Third, such an explanation does not have much application here.

Porphyry explains this passage in another way. He says that “being” itself does not signify the nature of a thing as the names “man” or “wise” do, but only designates a certain conjunction. This is why Aristotle adds: it signifies with a composition, which cannot be conceived apart from the things composing it (16b23).

This explanation does not seem to be consistent with the text either, for if “being” itself does not signify a thing, but only a conjunction, it, like prepositions and conjunctions, is neither a name nor a verb.

Therefore, Ammonius thought this should be explained in another way. He says “being” itself is nothing means that it does not signify truth or falsity. And the reason for this is given when Aristotle says, it signifies with a composition. The “signifies with,” according to Ammonius, does not mean what it does when it is said that the verb “signifies with time”; “signifies with” here means “signifies with something,” that is, joined to another it signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition.

But since it is common to all names and verbs not to signify truth or falsity, this explanation does not seem to be in accordance with the intention of Aristotle, who takes “being” here as though it were something special.

Therefore, in order to understand what Aristotle is saying, we should note that he has just said that the verb does not signify whether a thing exists or does not exist. Nor does “being” signify that a thing exists or does not exist. This is what he means when he says: it is nothing, that is, it does not signify that a thing exists. This is indeed most clearly seen in saying “being,” because “being” is nothing other than that which is. And thus we see that it signifies both a thing, when I say “that which,” and existence, when I say “is.” If the word “being” as signifying a thing having existence were to signify existence principally, without a doubt it would signify that a thing exists. But the word “being” does not principally signify the composition that is implied in saying “is”; rather, it signifies with composition inasmuch as it signifies the thing having existence. Such signifying with composition is not sufficient for truth or falsity, for the composition in which truth and falsity consists cannot be understood unless it connects the extremes of a composition.

If in place of what Aristotle says, we say nor would “to be” itself, as it is in our texts, the meaning is clearer. For Aristotle proves through the verb “is” that no verb signifies that a thing exists or does not exist, since “is” said by itself does not signify that a thing exists, although it signifies existence. And because to be itself seems to be a kind of composition, so also the verb “is,” which signifies to be, can seem to signify the composition in which there is truth or falsity.

To exclude this, Aristotle adds that the composition which the verb “is” signifies cannot be understood without the composing things. The reason for this is that an understanding of the composition which “is” signifies depends on the extremes, and unless they are added, understanding of the composition is not complete and hence cannot be true or false.

Therefore, he says that the verb “is” signifies with composition, for it does not signify composition principally but consequently. It primarily signifies that which is perceived in the mode of actuality absolutely, for “is,” said simply, signifies to be in act, and therefore signifies in the mode of a verb. However, the actuality which the verb “is” principally signifies is the actuality of every form commonly, whether substantial or accidental. Hence, when we wish to signify that any form or act is actually in some subject, we signify it through the verb “is,” either absolutely or relatively—absolutely, according to present time; relatively, according to other times. For this reason the verb “is” signifies composition, not principally, but consequently.