Lecture 2 — The signification of vocal sound

16a3. Now, those that are in vocal sound are signs of passions in the soul.

And those that are written are signs of those in vocal sound.

16a5. And just as letters are not the same for all men, so neither are vocal sounds the same.

But the passions of the soul, of which vocal sounds are the first signs, are the same for all; and the things of which passions of the soul are likenesses are also the same.

This has been discussed, however, in our study of the soul for it belongs to another subject of inquiry.

Now, those that are in vocal sound. After his introduction the Philosopher begins to investigate the things he has proposed.

Since the things he promised to speak of are either complex or incomplex significant vocal sounds, he prefaces this with a treatment of the signification of vocal sounds;

then he takes up the significant vocal sounds he proposed in the introduction, at: a name, then, is a vocal sound significant by convention (16a19).

About the first he does two things:

first, he determines what kind of signification vocal sound has;

second, he shows the difference between the signification of complex and incomplex vocal sounds where he says: as sometimes there is thought in the soul (16a9; [23]).

About the first he does two things:

first, he presents the order of the signification of vocal sounds;

second, he shows what kind of signification vocal sound has—that is, whether it is from nature or by imposition. This he does where he says: and just as letters are not the same for all men.(16a5; [18]).

He proposes three things about the order of signification of vocal sounds, from one of which is understood a fourth. He proposes writing, vocal sounds, and the soul’s passions. “Things” is understood from the last, for a passion is from the impression of something acting, and hence the soul’s passions have their origin from things. Now, if man were by nature a solitary animal, the passions of the soul by which he was conformed to things to have knowledge of them would be sufficient for him; but since he is by nature a political and social animal, his conceptions had to be made known to others. He does this through vocal sound. Therefore, there had to be significant vocal sounds so that men might live together, and thus those who speak different languages find it difficult to live together in social unity. Again, if man had only sensitive cognition, which is of the here and now, such significant vocal sounds as the other animals use to manifest their conceptions to each other would be sufficient for him to live with others. But man also has intellectual cognition, which abstracts from the here and now; consequently, he is concerned with things distant in place and future in time as well as things present according to time and place. Thus, the use of writing was necessary so that he might manifest his conceptions to those who are distant according to place and to those who will come in future time.

However, since logic is ordered to obtaining knowledge about things, the signification of vocal sounds, which is immediate to the conceptions of the intellect, is its principal consideration. The signification of written signs, being more remote, belongs to the consideration of the grammarian rather than the logician. Aristotle therefore begins his explanation of the order of signification from vocal sounds, not written signs.

First, he explains the signification of vocal sounds: now, those that are in vocal sound are signs of passions in the soul** (16a3).

He says therefore as if concluding from premises because he has already said that we must establish what a name, verb, and the other things he mentioned are, but since these are significant vocal sounds, therefore signification of vocal sounds must be explained.

When he says: those that are in vocal sound, and not vocal sounds, his mode of speaking implies a continuity with what he has just been saying, namely, that we must define the name and the verb and other things of this kind.

Now, these have being in three ways:

in the conception of the intellect,

in the utterance of the voice,

and in the writing of letters.

Therefore, when he says: those that are in vocal sound, he could mean names and verbs and the other things we are going to define, which, insofar as they are in vocal sound, are signs.

Or, he may be speaking in this way because not all vocal sounds are significant, and of those that are, some are significant naturally, and are thus different in nature from the name and the verb and the other things to be defined. Therefore, to adapt what he has said to the things of which he intends to speak, he says: those that are in vocal sound, that is, that are contained under vocal sound as parts under a whole.

Or, it could because vocal sound is something natural, whereas the name and the verb signify by human institution—that is, the signification is added to the natural thing as a form to matter, as the form of a bed is added to wood. Therefore, to designate names and verbs and the other things he is going to define, he says: those that are in vocal sound, in the same way that he would say of a bed: that which is in wood.

When he speaks of passions in the soul, we are apt to think of the emotions of the sensitive appetite, such as anger, joy, and the other passions that are customarily and commonly called passions of the soul, as is the case in Ethics 2.5, 1105b21. It is true that some of the vocal sounds man makes naturally signify passions of this kind, such as the groans of the sick and the sounds of other animals, as is said in Politics 1.2, 1253a10–14. But here Aristotle is speaking of vocal sounds that are significant by human institution. Therefore, “passions in the soul” must be understood here as conceptions of the intellect; names, verbs, and speech signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately, according to the teaching of Aristotle. They cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from the mode of signifying. For the name “man” signifies human nature in abstraction from singulars; hence it is impossible that it immediately signify a singular man. For this reason, the Platonists held that it signified the separated idea of man. But because in Aristotle’s teaching man in the abstract does not really subsist, but is only in the mind, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately and things by means of them.

Since Aristotle did not customarily speak of conceptions of the intellect as passions, Andronicus took the position that this book was not Aristotle’s. In On the Soul I, however, it is obvious that he calls all of the operations of the soul “passions of the soul.” Thus, even the conception of the intellect can be called a passion, and this is either because we do not understand without a phantasm, which requires corporeal passion (for which reason the Philosopher calls the imaginative power the passive intellect), (On the Soul, bk. 3, ch. 5, 430a25.) or because by extending the name of passion to every reception, the understanding of the possible intellect is also a kind of undergoing. (On the Soul, bk. 3, ch. 4, 429b29.)

Now, Aristotle uses the name passion rather than understanding for two reasons:

first, because man wills to signify an interior conception to another through vocal sound as a result of some passion of the soul, such as love or hate;

second, because the signification of vocal sound is referred to the conception of the intellect inasmuch as the conception arises from things by way of a kind of impression or passion.

When he says: and those that are written are signs of those in vocal sound (16a3), he treats of the signification of writing.

According to Alexander, he introduces this to make the preceding clause evident by means of a similitude. The meaning is as follows. Those that are in vocal sound are signs of the passions of the soul in the way in which letters are of vocal sound. He manifests this point where he says: and just as letters are not the same for all men, so neither are vocal sounds the same (16a5), introducing this as a sign of the preceding. For when he says that there are different letters among different people just as there are diverse vocal sounds, he means that letters signify vocal sounds. And according to this exposition, Aristotle said: those that are written are signs, rather than: letters are signs of those that are in vocal sound, because they are called letters in both speech and writing (though they are more properly called letters in writing, and elements of vocal sound in speech).

Aristotle, however, does not say: just as* *those that are written, but continues with his account. Therefore, it is better to say (as Porphyry does) that Aristotle adds this to complete the order of signification; for after he says that names and verbs in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, he adds—in continuity with this—that names and verbs that are written are signs of the names and verbs that are in vocal sound.

Then, where he says: and just as letters (16a5), he shows that the foresaid things differ as signified and signifying, inasmuch as they are either according to nature or not.

He makes three points here.

First, he posits a sign to show that neither vocal sounds nor letters signify naturally. Things that signify naturally are the same among all men, but the signification of letters and vocal sounds, which is the point at issue here, is not the same among all men. There has never been any question about this in regard to letters, for their character of signifying is from imposition and their very formation is through art. Vocal sounds, however, are formed naturally, and hence there is a question as to whether they signify naturally. Aristotle determines this by comparison with letters: these are not the same among all men, and so neither are vocal sounds the same. Consequently, like letters, vocal sounds do not signify naturally but by human institution. The vocal sounds that do signify naturally, such as groans of the sick and others of this kind, are the same among all men.

Second, when he says: but the passions of the soul (16a5), he shows that passions of the soul exist naturally, just as things exist naturally, for they are the same among all men. Thus he says: but the passions of the soul are the same for all; of which the first, that is, of which passions, which are first, these, namely, vocal sounds, are tokens, that is, signs (for passions of the soul are compared to vocal sounds as first to second, since vocal sounds are produced only to express interior passions of the soul). and so also the things are the same, that is, are the same among all, of which, that is, of which things, these passions of the soul are likenesses.

Notice he says here that letters are signs—that is, signs of vocal sounds—and similarly that vocal sounds are signs of passions of the soul, but that passions of the soul are likenesses of things. This is because a thing is not known by the soul unless there is some likeness of the thing existing either in the sense or in the intellect. Now, letters are signs of vocal sounds and vocal sounds of passions in such a way that we do not attend to any idea of likeness in regard to them but only one of institution, as is the case in regard to many other signs (for example, the trumpet as a sign of war). But in the passions of the soul we have to take into account the idea of a likeness to the things represented, since passions of the soul designate things naturally, not by institution.

There are some who object to Aristotle’s position that passions of the soul, which vocal sounds signify, are the same for all men.

Their argument against it is as follows. Different men have different opinions about things; therefore, passions of the soul do not seem to be the same among all men.

In reply to this object, Boethius says that here Aristotle is using passions of the soul to denote conceptions of the intellect, and since the intellect is never deceived, conceptions of the intellect must be the same among all men. For if someone is at variance with what is true, in this instance he does not understand.

However, since what is false can also be in the intellect, not as it knows what a thing is (that is, a thing’s essence), but as it composes and divides, as is said in On the Soul 3.6, 430a26, Aristotle’s statement should be referred to the simple conceptions of the intellect that are signified by the incomplex vocal sounds, which are the same among all men; for if someone truly understands what man is, whatever else than man he apprehends he does not understand as man. Simple conceptions of the intellect, which vocal sounds first signify, are of this kind. This is why Aristotle says (in Metaphysics 4.4, 1006b4) that the notion which the name signifies is the definition. And this is the reason he expressly says: of which the first of these are signs, namely, so that this will be referred to the first conceptions first signified by vocal sounds.

The equivocal name is given as another objection to this position, for in the case of an equivocal name the same vocal sound does not signify the same passion among all men.

Porphyry answers this by pointing out that a man who utters a vocal sound intends it to signify one conception of the intellect. If the person to whom he is speaking understands something else by it, if the one who is speaking explains himself, he will make his listener refer his understanding to the same thing.

It is better to say, however, that it is not Aristotle’s intention to maintain an identity of the conception of the soul in relation to a vocal sound such that there is one conception in relation to one vocal sound, for vocal sounds are different among different peoples. Rather, he intends to maintain an identity of the conceptions of the soul in relation to things, which things he also says are the same.

Third, when he says: this has been discussed (16a5), he excuses himself from a further consideration of these things, for the nature of the passions of the soul and the way in which they are likenesses of things does not pertain to logic but to philosophy of nature, and has already been treated in the book On the Soul. (On the Soul, bk. 3, ch. 4–8.)