Lecture 8 — The division of enunciation into simple and composite, affirmative and negative

17a8. First affirmation, then negation, is enunciative speech that is one; the others are one by conjunction.

17a9. Every enunciative speech, however, must contain a verb or a mode of the verb; for the definition of man, if “is” or “was” or “will be” or something of the kind is not added, is not yet enunciative speech.

17a13. But then the question arises as to why the definition “terrestrial biped animal” is something one and not many—for clearly it will not be one by reason of the words being said in juxtaposition—but this belongs to another subject of inquiry.

17a15. Enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing or is one by conjunction; but it is many when it signifies many things and not one, or many things not joined together.

17a17. Let us call the name or the verb a word only, since to speak in this way is not to signify something with the voice so as to enunciate, either in reply to someone asking a question or by one’s own choice.

17a20. Of enunciations that are one, simple enunciation is one kind, that is, something affirmed of something or something denied of something; the other kind is composite, that is, speech composed of these simple enunciations.

17a22. A simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject according to the divisions of time. Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something; negation the enunciation of something separated from something.

First affirmation, then negation, is enunciative speech that is one. Having defined the enunciation the Philosopher now divides it.

And this is in two parts.

First, he gives the division;

second, he manifests it, at: every enunciative speech however, must contain a verb (17a9; [94]).

It should be noted that Aristotle in his concise way gives two divisions of the enunciation.

The first is the division into one simply and one by conjunction. This parallels things outside of the soul where there is also something one simply—for instance, the indivisible or the continuum—and something one either by aggregation or composition or order. In fact, since being and one are convertible, every enunciation must in some way be one, just as every thing is.

The other is a subdivision of the enunciation; if the enunciation is one, it is either affirmative or negative.

The affirmative enunciation is prior to the negative for three reasons, which are related to three things already stated.

It was said that vocal sound is a sign of thought and thought a sign of the thing. Accordingly, with respect to vocal sound, affirmative enunciation is prior to negative because it is simpler, for the negative enunciation adds a negative particle to the affirmative.

With respect to thought, the affirmative enunciation, which signifies composition by the intellect, is prior to the negative, which signifies division, for division is posterior by nature to composition, since division is only of composite things (just as corruption is only of generated things).

With respect to the thing, the affirmative enunciation, which signifies “to be,” is prior to the negative, which signifies “not to be,” as the having of something is naturally prior to the privation of it.

What he says, then, is this: affirmation (that is, affirmative enunciation) is one and the first enunciative speech (17a8). And in opposition to first, he adds: then negation, that is, negative speech, for it is posterior to affirmative, as we have said. In opposition to one, that is, one simply, he adds, certain others are one not simply, but by conjunction, namely, that any of them is one by conjunction.

From what Aristotle says here, Alexander argues that the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation is not a division of a genus into species, but a division of a multiple name into its meanings, for a genus is not predicated according to the prior and posterior, but is predicated univocally of its species. This is the reason Aristotle would not grant that being is a common genus of all things, for it is predicated first of substance, and then of the nine genera of accidents.

However, in the division of that which is common, one of the dividing members can be prior to another in two ways:

according to the proper notions or natures of the dividing members,

or according to the participation of that common notion that is divided in them.

The first of these does not destroy the univocity of a genus, as is evident in numbers. Twoness, according to its proper notion, is naturally prior to threeness, yet they equally participate in the notion of their genus, that is, number; for both a multitude consisting of three and a multitude consisting of two is measured by one.

The second, however, does impede the univocity of a genus. This is why being cannot be the genus of substance and accident, for in the very notion of being, substance, which is being in itself, has priority in respect to accident, which is being through another and in another. Applying this distinction to the matter at hand, we see that affirmation is prior to negation in the first way—that is, according to its notion—yet they equally participate in the definition Aristotle has given of the enunciation, that is, speech in which there is truth or falsity.

Where he says: every enunciative speech, however, must contain a verb or a mode of the verb (17a9), he explains the divisions.

He gives two explanations:

one is of the division of enunciation into one simply and by conjunction;

the second is of the division of the enunciation which is one simply into affirmative or negative, at: a simple enunciation is vocal sound (17a22; [106]).

Before he explains the first division, that is, into one simply and one by conjunction, he states certain things that are necessary for the evidence of the explanation, and then explains the division where he says: enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing (17a15; [99]).

About the first he sets out two things.

He states the first thing that is necessary for his explanation when he says (17a9) that every enunciative speech must contain a verb in present time, or a case of the verb, that is, in past or future time. (The infinite verb is not mentioned because it has the same function in the enunciation as the negative verb.) To manifest this, he shows that one name, without a verb, does not even constitute imperfect enunciative speech, let alone perfect speech. Definition, he points out, is a certain kind of speech, and yet if the verb “is” or modes of the verb such as “will be” or “was” or something of the kind is not added to the notion of man, that is, to the definition, it is not enunciative speech.

But, one might ask, why mention the verb and not the name, for the enunciation consists of a name and a verb?

This can be answered in three ways.

First, because enunciative speech is not attained without a verb or a mode of the verb, but it is without a name, such as when infinitive forms of the verb are used in place of names, as in “to run is to be moving.”

A second and better reason for speaking only of the verb is that the verb is a sign of what is predicated of another. Now, the predicate is the principal part of the enunciation because it is the formal part and completes it. This is the reason the Greeks called the enunciation a categorical—that is, predicative—proposition. It should also be noted that denomination is made from the form which gives species to the thing. He speaks of the verb, then, but not the name, because it is the more principal and formal part of the enunciation. A sign of this is that the categorical enunciation is said to be affirmative or negative solely by reason of the verb being affirmed or denied, and the conditional enunciation is said to be affirmative or negative by reason of the conjunction by which it is denominated being affirmed or denied.

A third and even better reason is that Aristotle did not intend to show that the name or verb is not sufficient for a complete enunciation, for he explained this earlier. Rather, he is excluding a misunderstanding that might arise from his saying that one kind of enunciation is one simply and another kind is one by conjunction. Some might think this means that the kind that is one simply lacks all composition. But he excludes this by saying that there must be a verb in every enunciation; for the verb implies composition and composition cannot be understood apart from the things composed, as he said earlier. The name, on the other hand, does not imply composition, and therefore did not have to be mentioned.

The other point necessary for the evidence of the first division is made where he says: but then the question arises (17a13). He indicates by this that “terrestrial biped animal”, which is a definition of man, is one and not many. The reason it is one is the same as in the case of all definitions but, he says, to assign the reason belongs to another subject of inquiry. It belongs, in fact, to metaphysics, and he assigns the reason in Metaphysics 7.12, 1037b7 and 8.6, 1045a6. It is this: the difference does not accrue to the genus accidentally, but in itself, and is determinative of it in the way in which form determines matter; for the genus is taken from matter, the difference from form. Thus, just as one thing—not many—comes to be from form and matter, so one thing comes to be from the genus and difference.

The reason for the unity of this definition might be supposed by some to be only that of juxtaposition of the parts, that is, that this definition is said to be one only because the parts are said to be side by side without conjunction or pause. But he excludes such a notion of its unity. Now, it is true that non-interruption of locution is necessary for the unity of a definition, for if a conjunction were put between the parts, the second part would not determine the first immediately and the many would consequently signify many in act. The pause used by rhetoricians in place of a conjunction would do the same thing. Hence it is a requirement for the unity of a definition that its parts be uttered without conjunction and interpolation, for in the natural thing, whose definition it is, nothing mediates between matter and form. However, non-interruption of locution is not the only thing that is needed for unity of the definition, for there can be continuity of utterance in regard to things that are one accidentally and not simply, like “white musical man.”

Aristotle has therefore manifested very subtly that absolute unity of the enunciation is not impeded either by the composition which the verb implies or by the multitude of names from which a definition is established. And the reason is the same in both cases, that is, the predicate is related to the subject as form to matter, as is the difference to a genus. But from form and matter a thing that is one simply comes into existence.

He begins to explain the division when he says: enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing (17a15).

First, he makes evident the common thing that is divided (namely, the enunciation as it is one);

second, he makes the parts of the division evident according to their own proper notions, at: of enunciations that are one, simple enunciation is one kind (17a20; [105]).

After he has made the division of the common thing evident—namely, enunciation—he then concludes that the name and the verb are excluded from each member of the division at: let us call the name or the verb a word only (17a17; [104]).

Now, plurality is opposed to unity. Therefore, he is going to manifest the unity of the enunciation through the modes of plurality.

He begins his explanation (17a15) by saying that enunciation is either one absolutely, that is, it signifies one thing said of one thing, or one relatively, that is, it is one by conjunction. In opposition to these are the enunciations that are many, either because they signify not one but many things, which is opposed to the first mode of unity, or because they are uttered without a connecting particle, which is opposed to the second mode of unity.

Boethius interprets this passage in the following way. Unity and plurality of speech refers to what is signified, whereas simple and composite is related to the vocal sounds. Accordingly, an enunciation is sometimes one and simple, namely, when one thing is signified by the composition of name and verb, as in “Man is white.” Sometimes it is one and composite. In this case it signifies one thing, but is composed either from many terms, as in “A mortal rational animal is running,” or from many enunciations, as in conditionals that signify one thing and not many. On the other hand, sometimes there is plurality along with simplicity, namely, when a name signifying many things is used, as in “The dog barks,” in which case the enunciation is many because it signifies many things, (That is, it signifies equivocally.) but it is simple as far as vocal sound is concerned. But sometimes there is plurality and composition, namely, when many things are posited on the part of the subject or predicate from which one thing does not result, whether a conjunction intervenes or not, as in “The musical white man is arguing,” or “The musical and white man is arguing.” This is also the case if there are many enunciations joined together, with or without connecting particles, as in “Socrates runs, Plato argues.” According to this exposition, the meaning of the passage in question is this: an enunciation is one when it signifies one thing said of one thing (and this is the case whether the enunciation is one simply or is one by conjunction); an enunciation is many when it signifies not one but many things, and this not only when a conjunction is inserted between either the names or verbs or between the enunciations themselves, but even if there are many things that are not conjoined. In the latter case, they signify many things either because an equivocal name is used or because many names signifying many things from which one thing does not result are used without conjunctions, as in “The white musical man is running.”

However, this exposition does not seem to be what Aristotle had in mind.

First of all, the disjunction he inserts seems to indicate that he is distinguishing between speech signifying one thing and speech which is one by conjunction.

In the second place, he has just said that “terrestrial biped animal” is something one and not many (17a13); moreover, what is one by conjunction is not one, and not many, but one from many.

Hence it seems better to say that since he has already said that one kind of enunciation is one simply and another kind is one by conjunction, he is showing here what one enunciation is. Having said, then, that many names joined together are something one—as in the example “terrestrial biped animal”—he goes on to say that an enunciation is to be judged as one, not from the unity of the name but from the unity of what is signified, even if there are many names signifying the one thing. If an enunciation which signifies many things is one, it will not be one simply, but one by conjunction. Hence, the enunciation “A terrestrial biped animal is risible” is not one in the sense of one by conjunction (as the first exposition would have it), but because it signifies one thing.

Then—because an opposite is manifested through an opposite—he goes on to show which enunciations are many, and he posits two modes of plurality.

Enunciations are said to be many which signify many things. Many things may be signified in some one common thing, however. For example, when I say, “An animal is a sentient being,” many things are contained under the one common thing, animal, but such an enunciation is still one, not many. Therefore, Aristotle adds, and not one. It would be better to say, however, that this is added because of definition, which signifies many things that are one. The mode of plurality he has spoken of thus far is opposed to the first mode of unity.

The second mode of plurality covers enunciations that not only signify many things but many that are in no way joined together. This mode is opposed to the second mode of unity. Thus it is evident that the second mode of unity is not opposed to the first mode of plurality. Now, those things that are not opposed can be together. Therefore, the enunciation that is one by conjunction is also many insofar as it signifies many and not one.

According to this understanding of the text there are three modes of the enunciation:

the enunciation that is one simply inasmuch as it signifies one thing;

the enunciation that is many simply inasmuch as it signifies many things, but is one relatively inasmuch as it is one by conjunction;

finally, the enunciations that are many simply—those that do not signify one thing and are not united by any conjunction.

Aristotle posits four kinds of enunciation rather than three, for an enunciation is sometimes many because it signifies many things, and yet is not one by conjunction; a case in point would be an enunciation in which a name signifying many things is used.

Where he says: let us call the name or the verb a word only (17a17), he excludes the name and the verb from the unity of speech.

His reason for making this point is that his statement that an enunciation is one inasmuch as it signifies one thing might be taken to mean that an enunciation signifies one thing in the same way the name or verb signify one thing. To prevent such a misunderstanding, he says: let us call the name or the verb a word only, that is, a locution which is not an enunciation. From his mode of speaking, it would seem that Aristotle himself imposed the name “word” to signify such parts of the enunciation. Then, he shows that a name or verb is only a word by pointing out that we do not say that a person is enunciating when he signifies something in vocal sound in the way in which a name or verb signifies.

To manifest this, he suggests two ways of using the enunciation.

Sometimes we use it to reply to questions; for example, if someone asks, “What happens in school?” we answer, “The teacher argues.”

At other times, we use the enunciation not in reply to a question, but of our own accord.

What Aristotle is saying, then, is that the person who signifies something one by a name or a verb is not enunciating in the way in which either the person who replies to a question or who utters an enunciation of his own accord is enunciating.

He introduces this point because the simple name or verb, when used in reply to a question, seems to signify truth or falsity, and truth or falsity is what is proper to the enunciation. Truth and falsity is not proper, however, to the name or verb unless it is understood as joined to another part proposed in a question; for example, if someone should ask, “Who reads in school?” we would answer, “The teacher,” understanding the verb, “reads.”

If, then, something expressed by a name or verb is not an enunciation, it is evident that the enunciation does not signify one thing in the same way as the name or verb signify one thing. Aristotle draws this by way of a conclusion from what was said earlier: every enunciative speech must contain a verb or a mode of the verb (17a9).

Then when he says: of enunciations that are one, simple enunciation is one kind (17a20), he manifests the division of enunciation by the natures of the parts.

He has said that the enunciation is one when it signifies one thing or is one by conjunction. The basis of this division is the nature of one, which is such that it can be divided into simple and composite. Hence, Aristotle says: of these, that is, enunciations into which one is divided, which are said to be one either because the enunciation signifies one thing simply or because it is one by conjunction, simple enunciation is one kind, that is, the enunciation that signifies one thing. And to exclude the understanding of this as signifying one thing in the same way as the name or the verb signifies one thing, he adds: something affirmed of something, that is, by way of composition, or something denied of something, that is, by way of division. The other kind—the enunciation that is said to be one by conjunction—is composite, that is, speech composed of these simple enunciations. In other words, he is saying that the unity of the enunciation is divided into simple and composite, just as one is divided into simple and composite.

He manifests the second division of the enunciation where he says: a simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject (17a22), that is, the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation.

This is a division that belongs primarily to the simple enunciation, and consequently to the composite enunciation. Therefore, in order to suggest the basis of the division, he says that a simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs to a subject, which pertains to affirmation, or does not belong to a subject, which pertains to negation. And to make it clear that this is not to be understood only of present time, he adds: according to the divisions of time, that is, this holds for other times as well as the present.

Alexander thought that Aristotle was defining the enunciation here and because he seems to put affirmation and negation in the definition he took this to mean that enunciation is not the genus of affirmation and negation, for the species is never posited in the definition of the genus. Now, what is not predicated univocally of many (namely, because it does not signify something one that is common to many) cannot be made known except through the many that are signified. One is not said equivocally of the simple and composite, but primarily and consequently, and hence Aristotle always used both simple and composite in the preceding reasoning to make the unity of the enunciation known. Now, here he seems to use affirmation and negation to make the enunciation known; therefore, Alexander took this to mean that enunciation is not said of affirmation and negation univocally as a genus of its species.

But the contrary appears to be the case, for the Philosopher subsequently uses the name “enunciation” as a genus when, in defining affirmation and negation, he says: affirmation is the enunciation of something about something, that is, by way of composition; negation is the enunciation of something separated from something, that is, by way of division. Moreover, it is not customary to use an equivocal name to make known the things it signifies.

For this reason, Boethius says that Aristotle with his customary brevity is using both the definition and its division at once. Therefore, when he says that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, he is not referring to the definition of enunciation but to its division.

However, since the differences dividing a genus do not fall in its definition, and since significant vocal sound is not a sufficient definition of the enunciation, Porphyry thought it would be better to say that the whole expression, vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, is the definition of the enunciation. According to his exposition, this is not affirmation and negation that is posited in the definition, but capacity for affirmation and negation—that is, what the enunciation is a sign of, which is to be or not to be, which is prior in nature to the enunciation. Then, immediately following this, he defines affirmation and negation in terms of themselves when he says that affirmation is the enunciation of something about something; negation the enunciation of something separated from something.

But just as the species should not be stated in the definition of the genus, so neither should the properties of the species. Now, to signify “to be” is the property of the affirmation, and to signify “not to be” the property of the negation. Therefore, Ammonius thought it would be better to say that the enunciation was not defined here, but only divided. For the definition was posited above when it was said that the enunciation is speech in which there is truth or falsity—in which definition no mention is made of either affirmation or negation.

It should be noticed, however, that Aristotle proceeds very skillfully here, for he divides the genus not into species, but into specific differences. He does not say that the enunciation is an affirmation or negation, but that it is vocal sound signifying that something belongs to a subject, which is the specific difference of affirmation, or does not belong to a subject, which is the specific difference of negation. Then, when he adds: affirmation is the enunciation of something about something, which signifies “to be,” and negation is the enunciation of something separated from something, which signifies “not to be,” he establishes the definition of the species by joining the differences to the genus.