Lecture 6 — On speech, the formal principle of the enunciation

16b26. Speech is significant vocal sound, some parts of which are significant separately, that is, as words but not as an affirmation.

16b28. Let me explain. The word “man” signifies something, but it does not signify that it is or that it is not; it will be an affirmation or negation, however, if something is added.

16b30. But one syllable of a name does not signify anything; similarly, in the word “fowl,” “owl” does not signify anything in itself, but is only a vocal sound. In composite names, however, the part does signify something, but not in itself, as has been said.

17a1. But all speech (That is, words put together to express thought.) is significant—not just as an instrument, however, but by convention, as has been said.

Speech is significant vocal sound. Having established and explained the definition of the name and the verb, which are the material principles of the enunciation inasmuch as they are its parts, the Philosopher now determines and explains what speech is, which is the formal principle of the enunciation inasmuch as it is its genus.

About this, he does three things:

first, he proposes the definition of speech;

second, he explains it, at: let me explain (16b28; [78]);

third, he excludes an error where he says: but all speech is significant (17a1; [80]).

In defining speech, the Philosopher first states what it has in common with the name and verb where he says: speech is significant vocal sound (16b26). This was posited in the definition of the name but not repeated in the case of the verb, because it was supposed from the definition of the name. This was done for the sake of brevity and to avoid repetition; but subsequently he did prove that the verb signifies something. He repeats this, however, in the definition of speech because the signification of speech differs from that of the name and the verb, for the name and the verb signify simple thought, whereas speech signifies composite thought.

Second, he posits what differentiates speech from the name and verb when he says: some parts of which are significant separately. For a part of a name taken separately does not signify anything in itself, except in the case of a name composed of two parts, as he said above. Note that he says: some parts of which are significant, and not, a part of which is significant separately; this is to exclude negations and the other words used to unite categorical words, which do not in themselves signify something absolutely, but only the relationship of one thing to another.

Then, because the signification of vocal sound is twofold, one being referred to composite thought, the other to simple thought (the first belonging to speech, the second, not to speech but to a part of speech), he adds: as words but not as an affirmation. What he means is that a part of speech signifies in the way a word—say, a name or a verb—signifies; it does not signify in the way an affirmation signifies, which is composed of a name and a verb. He only mentions affirmation because negation adds something to affirmation as far as vocal sound is concerned, for if a part of speech does not signify as an affirmation since it is simple, it will not signify as a negation.

Aspasius objects to this definition because it does not seem to belong to all parts of speech. For there is a kind of speech, he says, in which some of the parts signify as an affirmation, such as, “If the sun shines over the earth, it is day.”

Porphyry says in reply to this objection that in whatever genus there is something prior and posterior, it is the prior thing that has to be defined. For example, when we give the definition of a species—say, of man—the definition is understood of that which is in act, not of that which is in potency. Since, then, in the genus of speech, simple speech is prior, Aristotle defines it first.

Or, we can answer the objection in the way Alexander and Ammonius do. They say that speech is defined here commonly. Hence what is common to simple and composite speech ought to be stated in the definition. Now, to have parts signifying something as an affirmation belongs only to composite speech, but to have parts signifying something in the mode of a word and not in the mode of an affirmation is common to simple and composite speech. Therefore, this had to be posited in the definition of speech. We should not conclude, however, that it is of the nature of speech that its part not be an affirmation, but rather that it is of the nature of speech that its parts be something that signify in the manner of words, and not in the manner of an affirmation.

Porphyry’s solution reduces to the same thing as far as meaning is concerned, although it is a little different verbally. Aristotle frequently uses “to say” for “to affirm,” and hence to prevent “word” from being taken as “affirmation” when he says that a part of speech signifies as a word, he immediately adds, not as an affirmation, meaning—according to Porphyry’s view—“word” is not taken here in the sense in which it is the same as “affirmation.”

A philosopher called John the Grammarian thought that this definition could only apply to perfect speech because there only seem to be parts in the case of something perfect, or complete (such as a house to which all of the parts are referred). Therefore, only perfect speech has significant parts.

He was in error on this point, however, for while it is true that all the parts are referred principally to the perfect, or complete whole, some parts are referred to it immediately—for example, the walls and roof to a house and organic members to an animal. Others, however, are referred to it through the principal parts of which they are parts—for example, stones to the house by the mediate wall, and nerves and bones to the animal by the mediate organic members like the hand and the foot and such things. In the case of speech, therefore, all of the parts are principally referred to perfect speech, a part of which is imperfect speech, which also has significant parts. Hence this definition belongs both to perfect and to imperfect speech.

When he says: let me explain (16b28), he elucidates the definition.

First, he shows that what he says is true;

second, he excludes a false understanding of it where he says: but one syllable of a name does not signify anything (16b30; [79]).

He explains that when he says some parts of speech are significant, he means that some of the parts signify something in the way the name “man,” which is a part of speech, signifies something, and yet does not signify as an affirmation or negation, because it does not signify to be or not to be. By this I mean it does not signify affirmation or negation in act, but only in potency, for it is possible to add something that will make it an affirmation or negation, that is, if there is added to it a verb.

Then he excludes a false understanding when he says: but one syllable of a name does not signify anything (16b30).

This could be referred to what has just been said, and the meaning would be that the name will be an affirmation or negation if something is added to it, but not if what is added is one syllable of a name.

However, what he says next is not compatible with this meaning; therefore, these words should be referred to what was stated earlier in defining speech, namely, to some parts of which are significant separately. Now, since what is properly called a part of a whole is that which contributes immediately to the formation of the whole, and not that which is a part of a part, “some parts” should be understood as the parts from which speech is immediately formed—that is, the name and verb—and not as parts of the name or verb, which are syllables or letters. Hence, what is being said here is that a part of speech is significant separately but not such a part as one syllable of a name.

He manifests this by means of syllables that sometimes can be words signifying in itself. “Owl,” for example, is sometimes one word signifying in itself. When taken as a syllable of the name “fowl,” however, it does not signify something in itself but is only a vocal sound. For a word is composed of many vocal sounds, but it has simplicity in signifying insofar as it signifies simple thought. Hence, a word inasmuch as it is a composite vocal sound can have a part which is a vocal sound, but inasmuch as it is simple in signifying it cannot have a signifying part. Thus syllables are indeed vocal sounds, but they are not vocal sounds signifying in themselves.

In contrast to this, it should be noted that in composite names, which are imposed to signify a simple thing from some composite understanding, the parts appear to signify something, although according to truth they do not. For this reason he adds that in compound words, that is, composite names, the syllables may be words contributing to the composition of a name, and therefore signify something, namely, in the composite, and according as they are words; but as parts of this kind of name they do not signify something in themselves, but in the way that has already been explained.

Then, when he says: but all speech (17a1), he excludes a certain error.

Here he excludes the error of those who said that speech and its parts signify naturally rather than by convention. To prove their point they used the following argument. The instruments of a natural power must themselves be natural, for nature does not fail in regard to what is necessary. But the interpretive power is natural to man. Therefore, its instruments are natural. Now, the instrument of the interpretive power is speech, since it is through speech that expression is given to the conception of the mind—for we mean by an instrument that by which an agent operates. Therefore, speech is something natural, signifying, not from human institution, but naturally.

Aristotle refutes this argument, which is said to be that of Plato in the Cratylus, when he says that all speech is significant, but not as an instrument, that is, of a natural power. For the natural instruments of the interpretive power are the throat and lungs, by which vocal sound is formed, and the tongue, teeth, and lips, by which letters and articulate sounds are formulated. Rather, speech and its parts are effects of the interpretative power through the aforesaid instruments. For just as the motive power uses natural instruments, such as arms and hands, to make an artificial work, so the interpretative power uses the throat and other natural instruments to make speech. Hence, speech and its parts are not natural things, but certain artificial effects. This is the reason Aristotle adds here that speech signifies by convention, that is, according to the ordinance of human will and reason.

It should be noted, however, that if we do not attribute the interpretative power to a motive power, but to reason, then it is not a natural power but is beyond every corporeal nature, since thought is not an act of the body, as is proved in On the Soul. (On the Soul bk. 3, ch. 4, 429a10.) Moreover, it is reason itself that moves the corporeal motive power to make artificial works, which reason then uses as instruments; thus artificial works are not instruments of a corporeal power. Reason can also use speech and its parts in this way—that is, as instruments—although they do not signify naturally.