Article 4 — Whether good, wise, just, and the like predicate an accident in God

The fourth point of inquiry is whether good, wise, just, and the like predicate an accident in God. (Parallel texts: ST I.3.6; SCG I.23; In I Sent. 8.4.3; Compendium theologiae, ch. 23.)

Obj. 1: And it would appear that they do. For a predicate that signifies not the substance but something consequent upon the nature of a thing predicates an accident. Now, Damascene says that good, just, and holy, when said of God, are consequent to his nature and do not signify his substance. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.4 (PG 94:798–800).) Therefore, they predicate an accident in God.

Obj. 2: But it was replied that Damascene is referring to the mode of signification of these terms.

On the contrary, a mode of signification that results from the account of the genus must be referred to something real; for the predicated genus signifies the substance of the subject, for it predicates what it is. Now, to aforesaid words belongs a signification through a mode consequent upon a nature in the account of a genus; for they are in the genus of quality, which by its proper account bears a relation to the subject, for quality is that by which we say something to be of a sort (quales). Therefore, this mode of signification must be referred to a reality; in other words, the things signified by these terms are consequent upon the nature of the thing of which they are predicated and are therefore accidents.

Obj. 3: But it will be said that these terms are not predicated of God in reference to their genus, which is quality, because the expressions we apply to God are not to be said properly.

On the contrary, the species is falsely predicated of what is not included in the genus. Thus, if a thing is not an animal, it is untrue to say that it is a man. If, then, the genus of the aforesaid, which is quality, is not predicated of God, these terms will be not only improperly but also falsely predicated of God; and consequently, it will be untrue to say that God is just or holy, and this cannot be admitted. Therefore, we must conclude that these terms are predicated of God accidentally.

Obj. 4: According to the Philosopher, that which really has being, namely, substance, is never an accident; (Aristotle, Physics 1.3, 186a32–b4, 186b33.) therefore, in like manner, a per se accident is always an accident. Now justice, wisdom, and the like are per se accidents. Therefore, in God also they are accidents.

Obj. 5: Whatsoever we find in created things is copied from God, who is the exemplary form of all things. Now, wisdom, justice, and so on are accidents in creatures. Therefore, they are accidents in God.

Obj. 6: Wherever there is quantity and quality, there is accident. Now, in God it seems that there is quantity and quality, because in him there is likeness and equality; thus, we say that the Son is like and equal to the Father, and likeness is oneness in quality, and equality is oneness in quantity. Therefore, there are accidents in God.

Obj. 7: A thing is measured by the first of its genus. Now, God is the measure not only of substances but also of all accidents, since he is the creator of both substance and accident. Therefore, in God there is not only substance but also accidents.

Obj. 8: If A can be understood apart from B, B is accidental to A. Thus, Porphyry proves that things which are separable are accidents, since we can conceive a white crow and a white Ethiopian. (Porphyry, Isagoge 5.) Now, it is possible to conceive God apart from goodness, according to Boethius. (Boethius, Hebdomads, Solution, ll. 95–110 (PL 64:1312–13).) Therefore, goodness denotes an accident in God and for the same reason the others.

Obj. 9: Two things should be considered in the meaning of a name: that from which it is taken and the thing to which it is given. And in both respects the term “wisdom” would appear to denote an accident. For it is taken from the fact that it makes a man wise, which seems to be the act of wisdom, while the thing to which it is given is a quality. Therefore, in every respect this and similar terms signify an accident in the subject of which they are predicated; and thus, it is an accident in God.

On the contrary (1), Boethius says that God, inasmuch as he is a simple form, cannot be a subject. (Boethius, On the Trinity 2 (PL 64:1250).) Now, every accident is in a subject. Therefore, there can be no accident in God.

Furthermore (2), every accident is dependent on something else. But no such thing can be in God, since that which is dependent must have a cause, and God is the first cause and has no cause whatsoever. Therefore, no accidents can be in God.

Furthermore (3), Rabbi Moses says that, in God, suchlike terms do not signify tendencies in addition to his substance. (Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 1.61.) Now, every accident denotes a tendency in addition to the substance of its subject. Therefore, these terms do not denote accidents in God.

Furthermore (4), an accident is something that can be present or absent without the destruction of its subject. But this is impossible in God, since he is unchangeable, as proved by the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 8.5, 256b4–13, 258b4.) Therefore, accidents cannot be in God.

I answer that without any doubt whatever we must hold that there are no accidents in God. For our present purpose, it will suffice to prove this by three arguments.

The first argument is that no nature, essence, or form can receive the addition of something extraneous, although that which has a nature, form, or essence can have something extraneous within itself; for humanity contains nothing but what belongs intrinsically to humanity. This is clear from the fact that if anything be added to or subtracted from definitions, which signify the essence of things, the species is changed, as is the case even with numbers, as the Philosopher observes. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.3, 1043b32–1044a9.)

Man, however, who has humanity, can have something else that is not contained in the account of humanity, such as whiteness and the like, which are not humanity but are in the man. Now, in everything created there is a distinction between the one who has a thing and the thing which he has. For in composite creatures there is a twofold difference because the supposit or individual has the nature of its species—thus, a man has humanity—and it also has being, for a man is neither humanity nor his own being. Therefore, a man can have an accident, but his humanity itself or his being cannot.

But in simple substances there is only one difference, that between essence and existence. Thus, in the angels every supposit is his own nature since the quiddity of a simple being is the simple being itself, according to Avicenna, but it is not its own being; whence the quiddity subsists in its own being. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 5.5.) In these substances, therefore, there can be an intelligible accident but not a material accident.

On the other hand, in God, there is no distinction between haver and the thing had, or between participator and the thing participated; indeed, he is both his own nature and his own being; therefore, nothing in him can be adventitious or accidental. This argument is apparently indicated by Boethius when he says: that which has being can have something in addition to its being: but that which is being, has nothing besides itself. (Boethius, Hebdomads 4, ln. 35 (PL 64:1311).)

The second reason is that because an accident is extraneous to the essence of its subject, and things that are diverse are not united together save by some cause, it follows that if any accident accrues to God, this is due to some cause. It cannot, however, be due to some extrinsic cause, since it would follow that this extrinsic cause acts on God and is previous to him, even as the mover precedes that which is moved and the maker that which is made; for an accident is produced in a subject by an extrinsic cause acting on the subject in which the accident is produced.

Likewise, it cannot be due to an intrinsic cause, as happens with per se accidents, whose cause is in their subject. For a subject cannot both cause and receive an accident due to the same thing, since no power moves itself into action. Therefore, it must receive the accident on one count and cause it on another, and thus, it will be composite; for example, certain things receive an accident through the nature of their matter and cause the accident through the nature of their form. Now, we have shown that God is not composite. (Q. 7, a. 1.) Therefore, no accident can possibly be in him.

The third argument is that an accident is compared to its subject as act to potency, since it is a certain form of it. Therefore, since God is pure act without any admixture of potency, he cannot be the subject of an accident.

Accordingly, from the foregoing we conclude that in God there is not composition of matter and form, or of any substantial parts, nor of genus and difference, nor of subject and accidents, and that the aforesaid terms do not predicate an accident in God.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene is speaking of these names not as to what they predicate of God, but as to the reason why we predicate them of him. For we take these terms on account of their signification from certain accidental forms that we observe in creatures. In fact, from this it is his intention to show that the expressions employed by us in speaking of God do not signify his substance.

Reply Obj. 2: Although quality is the genus of human goodness, wisdom, and justice, it is not their genus if we take them as predicated of God; for quality as such is a being in that it inheres as qualifying its subject. But wisdom and justice are named not from this but more from a certain perfection or act; therefore, such things are predicated of God according to the account of their difference and not according to the account of their genus. Hence, Augustine says: as far as we can, let us conceive goodness that is not a quality and greatness that is not a quantity. (Augustine, On the Trinity 5.1, para. 2 (PL 42:912).) Therefore, we cannot conclude that such things are consequent to God’s nature.

Reply Obj. 3: If good and just were predicated of God univocally, it would indeed follow that their predication is false if we do not predicate their genus of him; but, as we shall show further on, (Q. 7, a. 7.) nothing is predicated univocally of God and the creature, so the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: The wisdom that is an accident is not in God; rather, his is another wisdom not univocally so called; hence, the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 5: Things based on an exemplar are not always perfect reproductions of the exemplar; whence sometimes what is based on the exemplar reproduces defectively and imperfectly what is in the exemplar. Especially is this the case in things based on the exemplar derived from God, who is an exemplar surpassing all proportion of the creature.

Reply Obj. 6: Likeness and equality are ascribed to God not as though there were quality and quantity in him but because we ascribe to him certain things that imply quality and quantity in us: for instance, when we say that God is great, wise, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 7: Accidents are not called beings save in relation to substance as the first being; therefore, we infer that accidents are measured by some first thing that is not an accident but by the one first thing that is a substance.

Reply Obj. 8: If we understand a thing in its essence, then it is true that anything that does not enter into that consideration is accidental; for given that we understand it in its essence, we must understand whatsoever pertains to its essence; for example, if we understand what a man is, we must understand what an animal is. Here, however, we do not see God in his essence but consider him in his effects. Therefore, nothing prevents us from considering him in his effect that is being without considering him in his effect that is goodness; and this is what Boethius intends to say. Yet it must be observed that, although we may understand God somewhat without understanding his goodness, we cannot understand God and understand that he is not good—as neither can we understand man and understand that he is not an animal—for this would be to deny God’s essence, which is goodness. On the other hand, the saints in heaven who see God in his essence, by seeing God, see his goodness.

Reply Obj. 9: The term “wisdom” in its application to God is true as regards that from which it is taken. It is not taken, however, from the fact that it makes one wise but from the fact that one intellectually possesses sapiential things. For knowledge as such is referred to the thing known, but as an accident it is referred to the knower. Moreover, the fact that he possesses sapiential things is accidental to a man but not to God.