Article 8 — Whether there is any relation between God and the creature

The eighth point of inquiry is whether there is any relation between God and the creature. (Parallel texts: ST I.28.1, ad 3; In I Sent. 14.1.1, resp.; SCG II.11.)

Obj. 1: And it would seem that there is none. For according to the Philosopher, relatives are simultaneous. (Aristotle, Categories 5, 2a11–4b19; cf. 7, 7b15.) But a creature cannot be simultaneous with God, since in every way he precedes creatures. Therefore, there cannot be any relation between God and the creature.

Obj. 2: Things that are related can be compared in some way. But there is no comparison between God and the creature, since things that differ in genus are not comparable with one another, for instance, a number and a line. Therefore, there is no relation between God and the creature.

Obj. 3: The relative and its correlative belong to the same genus. But God is not in the same genus as the creature. Therefore, they cannot be spoken of as relative to each other.

Obj. 4: The creature cannot be in opposition to the creator, because one opposite is not the cause of the other. But relatives are in opposition to each other. Therefore, there cannot be a relation between the creature and God.

Obj. 5: Anything of which something can be newly predicated may be said in some way to become. Consequently, if something be said of God in relation to the creature, it follows that in some way God becomes, which is impossible since he is unchangeable.

Obj. 6: Whatsoever is predicated of a thing is predicated either essentially or accidentally. Now, expressions that denote relation to the creature are not predicated of God essentially, since essential predicates are predicated necessarily and always, nor are they predicated accidentally. Therefore, such relations can nowise be predicated of God.

On the contrary, Augustine says that the Creator is related to the creature as the master is to his servant. (Augustine, On the Trinity 5.13–15 (PL 42:920–922); see also: On the Trinity 6, 9 (PL 42:923–32, 959–72).)

I answer that relation differs from quantity and quality in that quantity and quality are accidents residing in the subject, whereas relation, as Boethius says, signifies something not as inhering in a subject but as in a certain passage toward something else; (Boethius, On the Trinity 5 (PL 64:1253–56).) therefore, de la Porrée said that relations are not inherent but existing-toward, (Gilbert de la Porrée, Commentary on the De Trinitate (PL 64:1291–92).) which is true in a sense, as we shall show further on.

Now, when a thing is attributed to someone as proceeding from him to another, this does not make a composition with him, just as neither does action imply a composition with the agent. And for this reason the Philosopher proves, in Metaphysics 5, that there can be no movement in toward-something, (Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 225b11–12.) since without any change in the thing that is related to another, the relation can cease to exist for the sole reason that this other changes. For example, it is clear with regard to action that there is no movement in respect of action, except metaphorically and improperly speaking, just as we say that one who passes from leisure into action “changes,” which would not be the case if relation or action signified something abiding in the subject.

Hence, it is evident that it is not incompatible with a thing’s simplicity to have many relations between itself and other things; indeed, the more simple a thing is the greater the number of its concomitant relations. For its power is so much the less limited and consequently its causality so much the more extended. Therefore, it is stated in The Book of Causes that every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 17.)

Now, we must admit a certain relation between a principle and the things that are from it, and in fact not only a relation of origin, inasmuch as results spring from their principle, but also a relation of diversity, since an effect must be distinct from its cause, for nothing is its own cause.

Accordingly, from God’s supreme simplicity there results an infinite number of respects or relations between created things and him, inasmuch as he produces creatures diverse from himself and yet somewhat like him.

Reply Obj. 1: Those relatives are naturally simultaneous which have the same reason for their mutual relationship, for instance, father and son, master and servant, double and half. But when there is not the same reason on either side for referring one thing to another, then relatives are not naturally simultaneous but one naturally precedes the other, as the Philosopher states with regard to sense and the sensible object, knowledge and the thing knowable. (Aristotle, Categories 5; 7, 6a37–8a35.) Therefore, it clearly does not follow that God and the creature are naturally simultaneous, since there is not the same reason on either side for one being referred to the other. It is not necessary, however, even in relatives that are naturally simultaneous that the subjects be naturally simultaneous, but only that the relations are.

Reply Obj. 2: Not all the things that are related can be compared to each other, but only those that are related in respect of one quantity or quality, such that one may be described as greater, better, whiter, and so on than the other. But different relations can be compared to each other even if they belong to different genera, since things that differ generically differ from one another. And yet, although God is not in the same genus as the creature as a thing contained in the genus, he is nevertheless in every genus as a principle of the genus, and for this reason there can be a certain relation between the creature and God as between what is from the principle and the principle.

Reply Obj. 3: The subjects of things mutually related need not be in the same genus, but only the things themselves that are thus related; thus, quantity is said to be diverse from quiddity. And yet, as we have already said, it is not the same with God and creatures as with things differing generically and nowise coordinated to one another.

Reply Obj. 4: Relative opposition differs in two ways from other kinds of opposition.

First, in other kinds of opposition, one thing is said to be opposite to another inasmuch as it excludes it, for a negation excludes the affirmation, and in this respect is opposed to it; and opposition of privation and possession as well as opposition of contrariety include the opposition of contradiction, as is said in Metaphysics 4. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1004a9–21.) But it is not thus with things that are opposed relatively. For son is not opposed to father by excluding him but on account of his orientation to him.

Hence follows the second difference, because in other kinds of opposition, one of the opposites is always imperfect by reason of the negation attaching to privation and to one of the contraries. But this is not necessarily so in relative opposition; indeed, it is possible to consider both relatives as perfect, as is especially evident in relatives at the same level and in relatives of origin, for instance, the equal, like, father, and son.

Therefore, relation is more attributable to God than are the other kinds of opposition.

By reason of the first difference, relative opposition may be observed between a created thing and God but not any other kind, seeing that because of God creatures are more asserted rather than excluded; and yet, creatures have a certain orientation to God.

By reason of the second difference, in the divine persons (in whom there can be no imperfection) there can be relative opposition and no other, as we shall show further on. (Q. 8.)

Reply Obj. 5: To become is to change, properly speaking; therefore, just as a thing does not change in respect of a relation—except accidentally, namely, through a change in the thing to which the relation is consequent—so neither is a thing said to become in respect of a relation, except accidentally. Thus, a body through a change in its quantity becomes equal to another, yet the change is not essentially connected with equality but only accidentally. And yet a thing does not need to change in order that a relation begin to be predicated of it; rather, it suffices that a change occur in one of the extremes, for the cause of the relationship between two is something inherent in both.

Consequently, from whichever side a change occurs in that which caused the relationship, the relationship between them ceases. Accordingly, from the fact that a change occurs in the thing created a relation begins to be attributed to God. Hence, he cannot be said to “become” except metaphorically, inasmuch as he is like a thing that becomes through something new that is said about him; thus, we say: Lord, you are become our refuge (Ps 89:1).

Reply Obj. 6: When these relations begin to be ascribed to God on account of some change wrought in creatures, it is evident that the cause of their being attributed to him is on the part of the creature and that they are predicated of God accidentally. But as Augustine says, this does not imply an accident in God but refers to something outside him and compared to him accidentally, for God’s existence does not depend on creatures, just as neither does the builder’s existence depend on the house; therefore, just as it is accidental to the builder that the house exists, so is it accidental to God that the creature exists. For we say that anything without which a thing can exist is accidental to it.