Article 11 — Whether these temporal relations are in God according to account or reason

The eleventh point of inquiry is whether it is according to account and reason (The reader should note that, to indicate the ambiguity of the Latin, here “account and reason” is given as translating the single word ratio. Although in the rest of this translation ratio is typically rendered as “account,” in this article and the next few, Aquinas appears to refer sometimes to the faculty of reason and sometimes to its conception of what it knows, so the translator must make a judgment call about which word to give. In most cases we will give “reason,” but the reader should bear in mind the possibility that “account” is intended.) that these temporal relations are in God. (Parallel texts: ST I.6.2, ad 1; I.13.7; I.28.1, ad 3; I.32.2; I.45.3, ad 1; III.35.5; In I Sent. 8.4.1, ad 3; 30.1.1, ad 1; 30.1.3, resp.; SCG II.13; Quodlibet I, q. 2, a. 1; Quodlibet IX, q. 2, a. 3.)

Obj. 1: And it would seem that they are not. For an account to which no reality corresponds is idle and vain, according to Boethius. (Boethius, Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, bk. 1, cc. 10–11 (PL 64:82–84; CSEL 48:159–67).) Now, these relations are not in God in reality, as proved above. Therefore, reason would be vain and idle if they were in God according to an account.

Obj. 2: Things that exist only according to account are not ascribed to realities except insofar as they are in the intellect, for instance, genus, species, and order. Now, these temporal relations are not ascribed to God only insofar as he is in our intellect, since if they were, then, to say that God is Lord because we understand him to reign over creatures would have no objective reality, which is clearly false. Therefore, these relations are not in God only according to account.

Obj. 3: This name “lord” signifies a relation, since it is relative according to existence. But God is not a Lord only according to account. Therefore, neither are these relations in God only according to account.

Obj. 4: If there were no created intelligence, God would still be Lord and Creator. But there would be no beings of reason (Note that here “reason” renders ratio, which we have typically translated as “account.”) if there were no created intelligence. Therefore, “God” and “lord” and the like do not denote merely relations of reason.

Obj. 5: That which exists only according to our reason has not existed from eternity. Now, some of God’s relations to the creature have been from eternity, such as the relations implied in the terms “knowledge” and “predestination.” Therefore, such relations are not in God according to reason alone.

On the contrary, names signify accounts, that is, concepts, as is said at the beginning of On Interpretation. (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.2, 16a19–28.) Now, it is plain that these names are relative terms. Therefore, these relations must be according to account.

I answer that just as a real relation consists in the order of one reality to another reality, so a relation of reason consists in the order of thoughts; and this may occur in two ways.

First, when the order is discovered by the intellect and attributed to that which is expressed relatively. Such are the relations attributed by the intellect to the realities understood insofar as they are understood; for instance, the relations of genus and species, for reason discovers these relations by observing the order of that which is in the intellect to realities that are outside it, or even by observing the order of thoughts to each other.

Second, when these relations arise from the mode of understanding, namely, when the intellect understands one thing in its order to another—although that order is not discovered by the intellect; rather, it follows by a sort of necessity its mode of understanding. Such relations are attributed by the intellect not to that which is in the intellect but to that which is in the reality.

This happens insofar as certain things not mutually ordered are understood with an order—although the intellect does not understand them to have this order, for in that case it would be in error. Now, for two things to have an order, they must each be a being, be distinct from each other (for nothing bears an order to its very self), and be orderable to the other.

Now, the intellect sometimes conceives two things as beings while one or neither of them is a being, as when it considers two futures, or one present and one future, and understands one with an order to the other by saying one is before the other; therefore, such relations are relations only of reason, insofar as they arise from the mode of understanding.

And sometimes, the intellect conceives one thing as though it were two and understands them with a certain order, as when a thing is said to be identical with itself; and such a relation is of reason alone.

Sometimes it conceives two things as orderable to each other, while there is no order between them, and in fact one of them is itself essentially an order, as when a relation is said to be accidental to its subject; therefore, such a relation of a relation is related to anything else according to reason only. Again, sometimes it conceives something with an order to another inasmuch as it is the terminus of an order of the other to it itself, and yet it itself is not ordered to that other; for example, when it conceives the knowable as terminating the order of the knowledge to it, and in this way with a certain order to knowledge it signifies the term “knowable” in a relative way; and such a relation is purely one of reason. In like manner, our intellect attributes to God certain relative terms, inasmuch as it considers God as the terminus of the relations of created things to him; therefore, such relations are purely relations of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: In these relations there is something real corresponding to them, namely, the relation of the creature to God. For just as a thing is called “knowable” relatively not because it is referred to the knowledge but because the knowledge refers to it, as is said in Metaphysics 5, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a28–b11.) so too God is spoken of relatively because creatures are related to him.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers those relations that are discovered by reason and attributed to things existing in the intellect. The relations in question, however, are not of this kind but arise from the mode of understanding.

Reply Obj. 3: A man is identical with himself really and not only according to reason (although the relation is only according to reason) on account of the cause of the relation being real, namely, the unity of substance, which the intellect understands under a relation. And so too the power to compel subjects is in God really, and our intellect understands it within an order to its subjects on account of the subjects’ order to God; and thus, he is called “Lord” really, although in him the relation is merely one of reason. In the same way, it is evident that he would be Lord even if there were no created intellect in existence.

Reply Obj. 4: Hence, the reply to the fourth objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 5: As stated above, God’s knowledge is related primarily and essentially not to the creature but to the essence of the Creator, through which God knows all things.