Article 10 — Whether God is really related to the creature such that this relation is something in God

The tenth point of inquiry is whether God is really related to the creature such that this relation is something in God. (Parallel texts: ST I.13.7, resp., ad 2, ad 4; I.28.1, ad 3; I.28.4; SCG II.12, 13; In I Sent. 26.2.3, ad 2.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that the answer should be in the affirmative. For there is a real relation in the mover to that which it moves; therefore, the Philosopher reckons, in Metaphysics 5, that the relation between mover and moved is a species of the category relation. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1016a7–b1, 1016b17–1017a6; cf. 5.7, 1017a22–30.) Now, God is compared to the creature as mover to that which is moved. Therefore, he is really related to the creature.

Obj. 2: It will be replied that he moves creatures without any change in himself; therefore, he is not really related to the thing moved.

On the contrary, the presence of one of two relative opposites in a thing is not a reason for attributing the other to the same thing; thus, a thing is not double because it is a half, nor is God Father because he is Son. Accordingly, if mover and moved are mutually related, it does not follow that where there is the relation of mover, there must be the relation of moved. Hence, that God is not moved does not hinder him from having the relation of mover to moved.

Obj. 3: As the father gives being to the son, so does the Creator give being to the creature. But the father is really related to the son. Therefore, the Creator is also really related to the creature.

Obj. 4: Terms that are predicated of God properly and not metaphorically indicate the reality signified as being in God; and among terms of this kind, Dionysius reckons “lord.” (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 1.6 (PG 3:595–96).) Therefore, the reality signified by the word “lord” is really in God. But it is a relation to the creature. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 5: Knowledge really relates to the thing knowable, as is clear in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1020b26–32.) Now, God is compared to created things as knower to the thing known. Therefore, in God there is some relation to the created.

Obj. 6: The thing moved always bears a relation to its mover. Now, the will is compared to the thing willed as the thing moved to its mover; for the desirable is an unmoved mover, as is said in Metaphysics 12. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7, 1072a26–29.) Since, then, it is God’s will that things exist, it would seem that he is really related to the creature.

Obj. 7: If God is not related to creatures, the only reason would seem to be that he is not dependent on them and because he is far above them. But the heavenly bodies likewise are independent of elemental bodies and surpass them almost out of all proportion. Therefore, it would follow that there is no real relation in the higher bodies to the lower world.

Obj. 8: Every name is taken from form, and form is something inhering in the thing to which it belongs. Since, then, God is named from his relation to creatures, it would seem that these relations are something in God.

Obj. 9: Proportion—for instance, that of double to half—is a real relation. Now, it seems that there is a proportion of God to the creature, since there must be proportion between mover and the thing moved. Therefore, it would seem that God is really related to creatures.

Obj. 10: Whereas understanding is a likeness of realities and words are signs of the realities, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.1, 16a3–9.) these two are ordered differently in the student and in the teacher. For the teacher begins with the realities whence he has gathered the knowledge in his intellect and the words signify its conceptions, whereas the student begins with the words through which he arrives at the conceptions of the teacher’s intellect, and from them he arrives at the knowledge of the realities. Now, whatsoever is said about these relations must first of all be received by the teacher. Consequently, with him these relative terms follow the conceptions of his intellect, which themselves follow the reality; therefore, it seems that these relations are real.

Obj. 11: These relative terms which are predicated of God from time signify relations that are either according to existence or according to speech. If their relativity is according to speech, they posit nothing real in either extreme. But according to what has been said, this is false; for they really exist in the creature as related to God. Therefore, they signify relatives according to existence, and consequently they posit something real in both extremes.

Obj. 12: It is in the nature of relatives that given one the other follows, and if one be removed the other is also removed. If, then, there is a real relation in the creature, there must be in God a real relation to the creature.

On the contrary (1), Augustine says in On the Trinity 5: it is clear that whatsoever is said of God relatively is an accident in the thing to which God begins to be referred. (Augustine, On the Trinity 5.16 (PL 42:924).) Hence, it would seem that these relations are attributed to God not by reason of something in him but on account of something outside him, such that they posit nothing real in him.

Furthermore (2), as the knowable thing is the measure of knowledge, so is God the measure of all things, as the Commentator says in Metaphysics 10. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 10.) Now, the knowable thing is not referred to knowledge by a real relation existing in it but rather by the relation of knowledge to it, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a14–b11.) Therefore, it seems that neither is God related to the creature by a real relation in him.

Furthermore (3), Dionysius says: likeness is not reciprocal between cause and effect, for an effect is said to be like its cause and not vice versa. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 9.6 (PG 3:913–16).) Now, the same would seem to apply to other relations as to that of likeness. Therefore, it seems that neither is there reciprocity in the relations between God and the creature, and we cannot argue that because the creature is really related to God, therefore is God really related to the creature.

I answer that the relations by which we refer God to creatures are not really in God. To make this clear we must observe that, since a real relation consists in the order of one reality to another reality, as already stated, a real relation is mutual in those things alone wherein on either side there is the same account of order of the one to the other, and this applies to all relations consequent upon quantity. For since the account of quantity is abstracted from everything sensible, the quantity in all natural bodies is of the same account. And for the same reason that a quantitative thing A is really related to the quantitative thing B, B is really related to A.

Now, one quantity, considered absolutely, holds to another an order according to the account of measure and thing measured, and this according to the names of “whole” and “part,” and of other such accounts that follow on quantity.

On the other hand, in relations that follow on action and passion, that is, active and passive power, the order of movement is not always on both sides. For that which always holds the account of the patient and moved, that is, the caused, must have an order to the agent or mover, seeing that the effect is always perfected by its cause and dependent thereon; whence it is ordered to it as the cause of its own perfection.

Now agents (that is, movers) or even causes sometimes have an order to their patients or things moved or caused, inasmuch as a certain good or perfection of the mover or agent is seen in the effect itself, or the patient, or thing moved. This is especially evident in univocal agents, which by their action produce a likeness of their own species and consequently preserve a continuous existence, insofar as this is possible.

This is also evident in all other things that, while moved, themselves move, act on, or cause things, for by their very movement they are ordered to producing the effects; and it is likewise the case in all things where any good accrues to the cause from its effect. But there are some things to which others are ordered but they are not, since they are wholly foreign to that genus of actions or power from which that order arises; thus, knowledge has a relation to the knowable object because the knower by an intelligible act has an order to the reality known, which is outside the soul. But the reality itself that is outside the soul is not in any way touched by that act, inasmuch as an act of the intellect does not pass into exterior matter, changing it; whence the very thing that is outside the soul is wholly outside the genus of the intelligible. For this reason the relation which arises from the act of the intellect cannot be in that thing.

The same account applies to sensation and the sensible object, for although the sensible by its own action affects the organ of sense and consequently bears a relation to it, just as other natural agents also have a relation to the things on which they act, nevertheless, it is not the alteration of the organ that perfects the act of perception; rather, it is perfected by the act of the sensitive power, to which act the sensible object outside the soul is altogether immune. In like manner, a man who stands to the right of a pillar bears a corresponding relation to the pillar by reason of his motive power, by which he is competent to be to the right or to the left, before or behind, above or below. Therefore, such-like relations in man or animal are real, but they are not real in the reality that lacks that power. In like manner, money is external to the action by which prices are established, which action is a convention between certain persons; and man too is outside the genus of artful actions whereby he produces his image. Hence, there is not a real relation either in a man to his image or in money to its price, but there is one on the other side.

Now, God does not work by an intermediary action that is understood as issuing from God and terminating in the creature, but his action is his own substance, and whatever is in it is wholly outside the genus of created being, by which the creature is related to God. Nor again does any good accrue to the Creator from the production of the creature, so his action is supremely liberal, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 7.7.) It is also evident that he is not moved to act; rather, without any change in himself, he makes changeable things.

It follows, then, that there is no real relation in him to the creature, even though there is a relation of the creature to him, as an effect to its cause.

In this matter Rabbi Moses erred in many ways, for he wished to prove that there is no relation between God and the creature because, since God is not a body, he has no relation to time or place. (Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 1.9, 1.56.) Thus, he considered only the relation that follows on quantity and not that which follows on action and passion.

Reply Obj. 1: The natural mover or agent moves and acts by an intermediary movement or action that is between the mover and the thing moved, between the agent and the patient; therefore, in this intermediary the agent and patient, mover and thing moved, must come together. And in this way the agent as such is not extraneous to the genus of the patient as such. Whence each has a real order to the other, especially seeing that this very intermediary action is a certain perfection proper to the agent; and consequently the terminus of that action is the agent’s good. This does not apply to God, as stated above; and thus, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that the mover is moved is not the cause of its relation of mover being a real relation but a certain sign thereof. For the fact that it itself moves through being moved shows that in a way it falls into the genus of the moved; and again, it is apparent that the very thing toward which it moves is some good of it, due to which it is ordered to this through its motion.

Reply Obj. 3: The father, being a univocal agent, gives the nature of his own genus to his son, but God does not give such being to the creature; hence, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 4: The denomination “lord” comprises three things in its signification: first, a power to compel subjects; arising from that authority, an order to those subjects; and the terminus of the order of the subjects to their lord, since one relative is in the understanding of the other relative. Accordingly, the term “lord” retains its meaning in God as regards the first and third but not as regards the second. Hence, Ambrose says that this name, “lord,” is a name of authority, (Ambrose, Exposition of the Christian Faith 1.1, para. 7 (PL 16:530–31).) and Boethius says that dominion is a certain authority for compelling servants. (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy 2.6, 3.2, 3.5 (CSEL 67:4–5, 47–49, 54–55; PL 63:701–8, 723–31, 739–44).)

Reply Obj. 5: God’s knowledge has not the same relation to things as ours has, since it is related to them as their cause and measure. For things are according to the truth insofar as they are such as God, by his knowledge, has ordained them. On the other hand, the things themselves are the cause and measure of our knowledge. Therefore, just as our knowledge bears a real relation to real things and not vice versa, so are real things really related to God’s knowledge and not vice versa. Or we may reply that God understands other realities by understanding himself; therefore, the relation of the divine knowledge is not to the realities directly but to the divine essence itself.

Reply Obj. 6: The appetible object that moves the appetite is the end, whereas the means do not move the appetite save on account of the end. Now, the end of the divine will is nothing else than the divine goodness. Hence, it does not follow that other things bear the same relation to the divine will as the mover does to that which it moves.

Reply Obj. 7: The heavenly bodies are really related to the lower bodies according to relations arising from quantity, inasmuch as on either side there is quantity of the same account. Furthermore, they are related by real relations arising from action and passion, because they move other things while they themselves are moved by an intermediary action that is not their substance, since by being a cause of lower things, they obtain a certain good.

Reply Obj. 8: That on the basis of which a thing is denominated need not always be the form in reference to the nature of the thing; rather, it suffices for it to be expressed, grammatically speaking, through the mode of a form. Thus, a man is denominated from an action, his apparel, and the like, which are not really forms.

Reply Obj. 9: If “proportion” is understood as a definite excess, then there is no proportion in God to the creature. But if “proportion” is understood as relation alone, then there is clearly relation between the Creator and the creature: in the latter really, not in the former.

Reply Obj. 10: Although the teacher begins with the things, the conceptions of the things are received by the teacher’s mind in a different mode than they exist in the thing’s nature; for each thing is received into another through the mode of the recipient; for it is plain that conceptions are in the teacher’s mind immaterially and materially in nature.

Reply Obj. 11: This distinction between relatives according to existence and according to speech does not make a relation real. For there are some relatives according to existence that are not real, like the right and the left of a pillar, and some relatives according to speech that bring in real relations, like those concerning knowledge and sensation. This is because relatives are said to be “according to existence” when the terms are employed to signify the relations themselves, whereas relatives are said to be “according to speech” when the terms are employed to signify principally qualities or something of the sort from which relations follow. Nor as regards the question at issue does it matter whether they be real relations or relations of reason alone.

Reply Obj. 12: Although given one relative the other is also given, this does not imply that both are posited in the same way, and it suffices that one be real and the other be according to reason.