Article 5 — Whether these terms signify the divine substance

The fifth point of inquiry is whether these terms signify the divine substance. (Parallel texts: ST I.13.2, 3, 11; SCG I.31; In I Sent. 2.2.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that they do not. For Damascene says in On the Orthodox Faith 4: we must not think that the terms we employ in speaking of God denote what he is in his substance; rather do they indicate what he is not, or some kind of relationship, or something to be excluded from him, or else such things as are consequent to his nature or action. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.4 (PG 94:799–800).) Now, the being that is predicated of a thing substantially denotes what that thing’s substance is. Therefore, these terms are not predicated of God substantially as indicating his substance.

Obj. 2: No term that signifies the substance of a thing can truly be denied of that thing. For Dionysius says that negations about God are true but affirmations are vague. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 2.3 (PG 3:142).) Therefore, these terms do not signify God’s substance.

Obj. 3: According to Dionysius, these expressions signify the outpouring of divine goodness into things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 3.2–3 (PG 3:681–84).) But God does not pour out his substance on things. Therefore, such expressions do not signify the divine substance.

Obj. 4: Origen says that God is called wise because he fills us with wisdom. (Origen, On First Principles 1.2, para. 2.) Now, this denotes not the divine substance but a divine effect. Therefore, these terms do not signify the divine substance.

Obj. 5: The first cause is denominated only from its first effect, which is the intelligence, as is said in The Book of Causes. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 17.) Now, when a cause is denominated from its effect, the predication connotes not the essence but the cause. Therefore, expressions that are ascribed to God do not predicate his substance but his causality.

Obj. 6: Words signify the concepts of the intellect, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.1, 16a13–18.) Now, we are unable to understand the divine substance; for, as Damascene says, we know not what he is, but that he is. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.4 (PG 94:797–800).) Therefore, we cannot give him a name, nor employ words to express his substance.

Obj. 7: According to Dionysius, all things participate of the divine goodness. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.4 (PG 3:697–700).) But all do not participate of the divine substance, which is only in the three persons. Therefore, God’s goodness does not denote his substance.

Obj. 8: We cannot know God except from his likeness in creatures; thus the Apostle says that the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom 1:20). Now, we name him according as we know him. Therefore, we do not name him except from his likeness in creatures. But when we name a thing from its likeness to another, such a name is predicated of it not substantially but metaphorically, inasmuch as it is said posteriorly of God and first of the thing from which the simile is taken, while that which signifies the substance of a thing is said of that thing first.

Obj. 9: According to the Philosopher, that which signifies the substance denotes that and nothing else. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.1, 1042a12–18; 8.3 1043a37–b4.) Therefore, if this word “good” signifies the divine substance, there will be nothing in the divine substance that is not signified thereby, just as there is nothing in human substance that is not signified by this word “man.” But this word “good” does not signify “wisdom.” Therefore wisdom will not be the divine substance—and for the same reason neither will the other terms. Therefore, all these words cannot possibly signify the divine substance.

Obj. 10: As quantity is the cause of equality and quality the cause of likeness, so is substance the cause of identity. If, then, all these expressions signify God’s substance, they would no longer indicate equality or likeness but rather identity between God and us, such that a creature might be identified with God from the fact that it imitates his wisdom, goodness, and so forth; and this is absurd.

Obj. 11: Nothing can be contrary to nature in God, who is the source of all nature, nor does he do anything contrary to nature, according to the Gloss on Romans 11:24. (Ordinary gloss: contra naturam insertus es, that is, “You were grafted contrary to nature.” Cf. Glossa ordinaria 6, 150, at Romans 11:24.) Now, it is contrary to nature that an accident be substance. Since, then, wisdom, justice, and the like are per se accidents, they cannot be substance in God.

Obj. 12: When we say that God is good, this is a complex term. But there would be no complexity if God’s goodness were his very substance. Therefore, it seems that “good” does not denote God’s substance, and the same reason applies to all similar expressions.

Obj. 13: Augustine says that God eludes every conception of our intellect, and therefore it cannot grasp him. But this would not be so if these terms signified the divine substance, since God would correspond to a conception of our intellect. Therefore, they do not signify the divine substance.

Obj. 14: Dionysius says that man is best united to God by realizing that in knowing God he knows nothing about him. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology 1 (PG 3:997–1002).) But this would not be so if the things that he conceives and signifies were the divine substance. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as before.

On the contrary (1), Augustine says: in God to be is to be mighty or to be wise; such is his simplicity that whatsoever you may say of him is his substance. (Augustine, On the Trinity 6.4, 7.1 (PL 42:927, 933–36).) Therefore, all things of this sort signify the divine substance.

Furthermore (2), Boethius says that under whatsoever category, except relation, when we predicate things of God, they all refer to his substance; (Boethius, On the Trinity 4 (PL 64:1252–53).) thus, although “just” apparently indicates a quality, it signifies his substance: the same applies to “great” and so forth.

Furthermore (3), all things that are ascribed to another by way of participation presuppose one to whom they are ascribed per se and essentially. Now, these expressions are applied to creatures by way of participation. Since, then, they are reduced to God as their first cause, it follows that they are said of God essentially, and thus, it follows that they signify his essence.

I answer that it should be said that:

some have maintained, and Rabbi Moses most emphatically, that these terms, when predicated of God, do not signify the divine substance. (Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 1.54–56.) He says in effect that these expressions are to be taken in reference to God in two ways.

First, as indicating a likeness of effect such that God is said to be wise not because wisdom is something in him but because in his effects he acts like a wise man, namely, by directing each one to its due end; again, that he is said to be living inasmuch as he acts like a living being, in that he acts of himself.

Second, by way of negation, such that when we say that God lives, we do not mean that life is something in him but that God has not that mode of existence that is in inanimate things. Likewise, when we say that God is an intelligent being, we do not mean that intelligence is something in him but that he does not have that mode of existence by which the beasts exist, and so on.

In either case, however, the explanation is apparently insufficient and objectionable. In the case of the first explanation, this is so for two reasons.

First, because according to this explanation, there would be no difference in saying, “God is wise,” or “God is angry,” or “God is a fire,” since he is said to be angry because he acts like someone angry when he punishes, for angry men are wont to act thus. Also, he is said to be a fire because he acts like fire when he purifies, which fire does in its own way. Now, this is contrary to the view taken by the saints and prophets in speaking of God, since certain things they affirm of him and deny others; for they assert that he is living, wise, and the like, and they deny that he is a body or subject to passions. But in the opinion we are discussing, anything may be said or denied of God with equal reason.

The second reason is that since, as our faith teaches and as he also grants, created things have not always existed, it follows that we could not say that God was wise or good before the existence of creatures. For it is evident that before creatures existed he did nothing as regards his effects, neither as good nor as wise. Now, this is altogether contrary to sound faith, unless perhaps he meant to say that before the existence of creatures God could be called wise not because he worked as wise but because he could do so. And then it would follow that wisdom denotes something in God and consequently is his essence, since whatsoever is in God is his essence.

The second explanation appears likewise to be unsatisfactory because there is not a specific term that does not exclude from God some mode of being that is unbecoming to him. For every specific term includes the difference by which the opposite species is excluded; thus, the term “lion” includes the difference quadruped, which differentiates a lion from a bird. Accordingly, if predicates about God were employed merely for the purpose of exclusion, just as we say that God is living because, according to Rabbi Moses, God does not have being in the same way as inanimate creatures, even so might we say that God is a lion because he does not have the mode of being of a bird. Moreover, the idea of negation is always based on an affirmation, as evinced by the fact that every negative proposition is proved by an affirmative; therefore, unless the human mind knew something positively about God, it would be unable to deny anything about him. And it would know nothing if nothing that it affirmed about God were positively verified about him.

Hence, following Dionysius, we must hold that these terms signify the divine essence, albeit defectively and imperfectly, (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 13.3–4 (PG 3:979–84).) the proof of which is as follows.

Since every agent acts inasmuch as it is in act and consequently produces its like, the form of the thing produced must in some manner be in the agent, yet in different ways. For when the effect is proportionate to the power of the agent, this form must be of the same account in the maker and the thing made, for then maker and thing made are of the same species, and this is the case in all univocal causes; thus, a man begets a man, and a fire generates a fire. When, however, the effect is not proportionate to the power of the cause, the form is not of the same account in both maker and thing made but is in the agent in a more eminent way. For insofar as the form is in the agent, the latter has the power to produce the effect such that, if the whole power of the agent is not reflected in the thing made, it follows that the form is in the maker in a more eminent way than in the thing made. This is the case in all equivocal agents, for instance, when the sun generates a fire.

Now, it is plain that no effect equals the power of the first agent, which is God, else only one effect would proceed from his one power. But seeing that from his one power many and various effects proceed, it is evident that every effect of his falls short of the power of its cause. Consequently, no form of a divine effect is in the effect by the same account as it is in God, and yet they must be in him in a more eminent way. Therefore, all forms which in the various effects are distinct and different from one another are united in him as in one common power, just as all the forms produced by the power of the sun in lower things are in the sun through its one power, to which all things generated by the sun’s action are assimilated as regards their forms.

In like manner, the perfections of created things are assimilated to God according to his one simple essence. Since, then, our intellect takes its knowledge from created things, it is informed by the likenesses of perfections found in creatures, namely, of wisdom, power, goodness, and so forth. Therefore, just as creatures by their perfections are in some way, albeit deficiently, like God, so too our intellect is informed with the species of these perfections.

Now, whenever an intellect is by its intelligible form assimilated to some reality, that which it conceives and affirms in accordance with that intelligible species is true of that reality to which it is assimilated by its species; for knowledge is the assimilation of the intellect to the reality known. Therefore, it follows that whatsoever the intellect informed with the species of these perfections conceives or asserts about God, truly exists in God, who corresponds to each one of these species inasmuch as they are all like him. Now, if such an intelligible species of our intellect were proportionate to God in its likeness to him, our intellect would comprehend him, and the intellect’s very conception would be the complete account of God, just as biped walking animal is the complete account of a man.

However, this species is not perfectly like the divine essence, as was stated above, and therefore, although these terms which our intellect attributes to God from such conceptions do signify that which is the divine substance, yet they do not signify it perfectly as it exists in itself, but as it is understood by us.

Accordingly, we conclude that each of these terms signifies the divine substance, not as comprehending it but only imperfectly. Therefore, this name He who is is most becoming to God, since it does not ascribe any particular form to God but signifies being without any limitation. This is the meaning of Damascene when he says that the name He who is denotes a boundless sea of substance. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.9 (PG 94:835).)

This solution of the question is confirmed by the words of Dionysius: since all things are comprised in the divine nature simply and without limit, it is fitting that he should be praised and named on account of them all. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 1.3 (PG 3:589–90).) He says simply because the perfections which are in creatures by reason of various forms are ascribed to God in reference to his simple essence; and he says without limit because no perfection found in creatures is equal to the divine essence, such that it enables the mind under the account of that perfection to define God as he is in himself. A further confirmation may be found in Metaphysics 5, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1021b30–1022a1.) where it is stated that the simply perfect is that which contains the perfections of all genera, which words the Commentator expounds as referring to God.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene means to say that these expressions do not signify what God is by defining and including his essence, as it were; therefore, he goes on to say that this name “He who is,” (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.4 (PG 94:797–800).) which denotes God’s substance indefinitely, is most becomingly ascribed to God.

Reply Obj. 2: Although Dionysius says that there is truth in denying these expressions of God, he does not say that there is untruth in affirming them, but that their signification is vague; for as regards the reality signified they are truly ascribed to God, since in a way they are in him, as we have shown. But as regards their mode of signification they can be denied of God, since each of these terms denotes a definite form, and in this way they are not ascribed to God, as we have already stated. Therefore, absolutely speaking they can be denied of God because they are not becoming to him in the way signified, since this mode is according to the way in which they are in our intellect, as already stated, while they are becoming to God in a more eminent way. For this reason the affirmation of them is described as “vague” as being not altogether fitting on account of the difference of mode. Hence, according to the teaching of Dionysius, these terms are applied to God in three ways. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 2.8–3.3 (PG 3:645–84); Mystical Theology 1 (PG 3:997–1002); The Celestial Hierarchy 2 (PG 3:135–46).)

First, affirmatively, as for instance, when we say, “God is wise”; for we must say this of God because in him there is a likeness to the wisdom that derives from him.

Nevertheless, seeing that wisdom in God is not of the sort that we ourselves understand and name, it can be truly denied, such that we may say: God is not wise.

Again, since wisdom is not denied of God as though he were lacking in wisdom, but because in him it transcends the wisdom we indicate and name, we ought to say that God is beyond-wise.

Accordingly, Dionysius explains perfectly, by these three ways of ascribing wisdom to God, how these expressions are to be applied to God.

Reply Obj. 3: These expressions are said to denote the divine outpourings because they are first employed to signify these outpourings as existing in creatures, while from the likeness thereof to God our intellect is led to ascribe the same expressions to God in a more eminent mode.

Reply Obj. 4: The saying of Origen does not mean that when we say, “God is wise,” the sense is that God is the cause of wisdom, but that (as we have explained) from the wisdom that he causes our intellect is led to ascribe supereminent wisdom to God.

Reply Obj. 5: When we call God intelligent, we name him after his effect. But a name that signifies the substance of his effect cannot be applied to him definitively in the same way as the name signifies. Therefore, this name, although it is applicable to him in a way, is not applicable as his name, since that which a name signifies is the definition. On the other hand, it is applicable to the effect as its name.

Reply Obj. 6: This argument proves that we cannot give God a name that defines or comprehends or is proportionate to his substance; for we do not know to that extent what God is.

Reply Obj. 7: Just as all things participate in God’s goodness—not in numerically the same goodness but rather by way of likeness to it—so also do they participate in a likeness of God’s being. But there is a difference, for goodness implies the relationship of a cause, since good is self-diffusive, while essence connotes mere existence as quiescent.

Reply Obj. 8: An effect includes something by which it is like its cause and something by which it differs therefrom; and this is so by reason of its matter or something of the kind. Take, for example, a brick hardened by fire: the clay is heated by the fire and thus becomes like the fire; then it is condensed and hardened, and this is due to the nature of the material. Accordingly, if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick is likened to it, it will be ascribed to it properly in a more eminent degree and with priority. For fire is hotter than the brick and, moreover, it is hot in a more eminent way; for the brick is hot by being made hot while the fire is hot by nature. On the other hand, if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick differs from the fire, it will be untrue, and any term that signifies this condition of dissimilarity cannot be said of fire unless metaphorically. Thus, it is false to say that fire, the most subtle of bodies, is dense. It can, however, be described as hard on account of the violence of its action and the difficulty to quench it.

Accordingly, in creatures there are certain perfections by which they are likened to God and which, as regards the reality signified, do not denote any imperfection, such as being, life, understanding, and so forth; and these are ascribed to God properly; in fact, they are ascribed to him first and in a more eminent way than to creatures. And there are in creatures certain perfections wherein they differ from God and which the creature owes to its being made from nothing, such as potency, privation, movement, and the like. These are falsely ascribed to God; and whatsoever terms imply suchlike conditions cannot be ascribed to God otherwise than metaphorically; for instance, lion, stone, and so on, inasmuch as matter is included in their definition. They are, however, ascribed to him metaphorically by reason of a likeness in their effects.

Reply Obj. 9: This argument considers that which signifies substance definitively and comprehensively. But none of these expressions denote the divine substance in this way, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 10: Although these perfections in God are his very substance, they are not the very substance of the creature; therefore, in their respect, the creature is not said to be the same as God but like him.

Reply Obj. 11: It would be contrary to nature if wisdom in God were of the same account as that which is an accident; but this is not the case, as we have already stated. Nor is the authority quoted to the point, for God makes nothing against nature in his very self, because he makes nothing in his very self.

Reply Obj. 12: When we say, “God is good,” this term is complex not as reflecting any composition in God but on account of a composition that is in our intellect.

Reply Obj. 13: God eludes the form of our intellect as transcending every form that our intellect conceives of him, but not such that our intellect in no way becomes like him according to any intelligible form.

Reply Obj. 14: It is because human intelligence is not proportionate to the divine substance that this same divine substance surpasses our intellect and thus is unknown to us; this is why man reaches the highest point of his knowledge about God when he knows that he does not know him, inasmuch as he knows that that which is God transcends whatsoever he understands about him.