Article 2 — Whether being and goodness are interchangeable with regard to the individual

Second, it is asked whether being and goodness are interchangeable with regard to the individual. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; SCG II.41; III.20; ST I.5.3; Exposition of Boethius's Hebdomads, lect. 2–3.)

Obj. 1: It seems not. Opposites happen by nature to the same thing. However, good and evil are opposed. Therefore, because evil is not in all things by nature, since as Avicenna says, beyond the sphere of the moon there is no evil, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 9, ch. 6.) it seems that neither is goodness found in all beings. And so goodness is not interchanged with being.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever things are such that one extends to more than another, they are not interchangeable with each other. But, as Maximus the commentator says in On the Divine Names, (Maximus the Confessor, Scholia, ch. 5, para. 1 (PG 4:309B).) goodness extends to more than being, for it extends to non-beings, which are called into being by goodness. Thus, goodness and being are not interchangeable.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Al-Ghazali says, (Cf. Al-Ghazali, Metaphysics, part 1, tract. 5.) goodness is that perfection whose apprehension is delightful. But not every being has perfection, for prime matter does not have any perfection. Therefore, not every being is good.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, there is being in mathematics. But goodness is not there, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.4, 996a35.) Thus, goodness and being are not interchanged.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in The Book of Causes, it is said that being is the first among created things. (Book of Causes, prop. 4.) But according to the Philosopher in the Categories, that thing is first from which what follows does not interchanged with it. (Aristotle, Categories, ch. 12, 14a34.) Therefore, what follows from being is not interchanged with goodness. And so goodness and being are not interchanged.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, what is divided is not interchanged with the things that divie, as animal with rational. But being is divided by good and evil, for many beings are said to be evil. Thus, goodness and being are not interchanged.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, even privation is said to be a being in some way according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.1, 1003b5.) But in no way can it be called good. Otherwise evil, whose account consists in privation, would be good. Therefore, goodness and being are not interchanged.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, according to Boethius in the Hebdomads, (Boethius, Hebdomads, solution (PL 64:1313).) all things are called good on account of this, that they are from the Good, which is God. But the goodness of God is his very own wisdom and justice. Therefore, for the same reason, all things that are from God would be wisdom and justice, which is false, thus, also the first, namely that all things are good.

On the contrary (1), nothing inclines except to its likeness. But every being inclines toward the good, as Boethius says in the Hebdomads. (Boethius, Hebdomads, question (PL 64:1312).) Therefore, every being is good, and neither can anything be good unless it exist in some way. Thus, goodness and being are interchanged.

Furthermore (2), nothing comes from goodness except what is good. But every being proceeds from divine goodness. Therefore, every being is good, and so the same conclusion as before.

I answer that it must be said that since the notion of goodness is that something is perfective of another as an end, everything that has the notion of an end also has the notion of goodness. However, two things pertain to the notion of end, namely, that it be sought after or desired by what has not yet attained the end, and that it be loved and, as it were, delighted in by what participates in the end. For it pertains to the same notion both to tend toward the end and to rest in it in some way, just as a stone moves toward the middle of the earth and rests there by the same nature. But these two are found to belong to being itself. For what does not yet participate in being tends by a natural appetite toward a certain being. Hence, matter desires form according to the Philosopher in Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 1.15, 192a18.)

However, everything that already has being naturally loves and preserves its own being with all its power. Hence, Boethius says in On the Consolation of Philosophy, (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, prose 11 (PL 63:774 B).) divine providence gave to the things created by it this greatest cause for persisting, so that they might naturally desire to endure, as much as they were able. For there is nothing that could in any way doubt that everything which exists naturally desires a constancy of endurance and to avoid destruction.

Therefore, existence itself has the notion of goodness. Hence, just as it is impossible that there be some being which does not have existence, so also must every being be good insofar as it has existence, even though in some beings many other notions of goodness are super-added to their existence by which they subsist. But since goodness includes the notion of being, as is clear from what was said, it is impossible that there be something good which is not a being, and so it stands that goodness and being are interchanged.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, it must be said that good and evil are opposed as privation and possessing. However, it is not necessary that in everything in which there is a habit by nature there should also be a privation. Thus, it is not necessary that in whatever thing there is naturally goodness there should also be evil. For, according to the Philosopher in the Categories, (Aristotle, Categories, ch. 10, 13a18.) among contraries, even when one is in something by nature, the other is not in it by nature. But goodness is naturally in any being whatsoever, since it is called good from its very own natural being.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that goodness does not extend to non-beings by predication but by causality, inasmuch as non-beings desire goodness, so that we call non-beings what are in potency but not in act. But existence does not have causality, except perhaps as an exemplary cause, which causality only extends to what participates in the act of existence.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that just as prime matter is being in potency but not in act, so also is there something perfect in potency that is not in act, and something good in potency that is not in act.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the things which mathematics considers are good with respect to the being that they have in things. For the being itself of the line or number is good, yet it is not considered by the mathematician with regard to its being, but rather only with respect to the account of the form; for he considers it abstractly. However, they are not abstract according to being, but only according to account.

But it was said above (Above: a. 1.) that goodness does not follow upon the notion of form except with regard to the being that it has in some thing. And therefore, even though the line and the number are good, the notion of goodness does not belong to line or number inasmuch as they fall under the consideration of the mathematician.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that being is not said to be before goodness in the manner of saying before that the objection touches upon, but in another way, considering it as absolute in reference.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that something can be called good both from its being and from some property or super-added condition, as a man is called a good man both insofar as he exists and insofar as he is just and chaste, or else ordered to beatitude. Therefore, being is interchanged with goodness by reason of the first goodness, and conversely, but goodness divides being by reason of the second.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that privation is not called a being of nature, but only of reason, and it is similarly a good of reason. For to know privation or any such thing is good; and the knowledge of evil cannot be lacking in goodness, according to Boethius. (Cf. Boethius, De topicis differentiis, bk. 2 (PL 64:1184B).)

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that, according to Boethius, (Cf. Boethius, Hebdomads, response to the second objection (PL 64:1314).) something is called good from its very own being, but it is called just by reason of some one of its actions. However, being is poured forth into everything that comes from God; however, not all participate in that activity to which justice is ordered.

For even though acting and being are the same in God, and by this his justice is his goodness, acting and being in creatures are different. Hence, being can be shared with something with which acting is not shared. And being and acting are not the same in those things with which both are shared. Hence also, men who are good and just are indeed good inasmuch as they are, but they are not just inasmuch as they are, rather, inasmuch as they have some habit ordered to act. The same can be said about wisdom and other such things.

Or, one can say differently with regard to the same, namely that justice, wisdom, and other such things are certain particular goods, since they are certain special perfections. But goodness denotes absolutely that something is perfect. Therefore, from the perfect God himself there proceed perfect things, but not in the same manner of perfection by which God is perfect; for what is made does not exist in the mode of the maker, but in the mode of the thing made; neither do all things which receive perfection from God receive it in the same way. And thus, just as perfect being, taken absolutely, is common to God and all creatures, though not perfect being in this or that mode, so also does being good belong to God and to all creatures. However, it is not necessary that possessing this goodness that is wisdom or justice be common to all; but some belong to God alone, such as eternity and omnipotence, while some belong to creatures and God, such as wisdom, justice, and other such things.