Article 3 — Whether goodness is before truth according to reason

Third, it is asked whether goodness is before truth according to reason. (Parallel texts: ST I.16.4; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 11, lect. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is. For what is in things is prior to what is only in the apprehension, inasmuch as our apprehension is caused and measured by things. But, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b25.) goodness is in things, whereas truth is in the mind. Therefore, goodness is before truth according to reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, something is perfect in itself according to reason before it is perfective of another. But something is called good inasmuch as it is perfect in itself, whereas it is true inasmuch as it is perfective of another. Therefore, goodness is before truth.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, something is called good in its order to a final cause, whereas it is called true in its order to a formal cause. But the final cause is before the formal cause, since the end is the cause of causes. Therefore, goodness is before truth according to reason.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the particular good is consequent to the universal good. But truth is some particular good, since it is the good as understood, as the Philosopher says in Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 6.2, 1139a27.) Therefore, goodness is naturally before truth according to reason.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, goodness has the notion of an end. But the end is first in intention. Therefore, the intention of the good is before the intention of the true.

On the contrary (1), goodness prefects the affective power, but truth the intellect. However, the intellect naturally precedes the affective power, so also does truth precede goodness.

Furthermore (2), something is prior inasmuch as it is more immaterial. But truth is more immaterial than goodness, since goodness is found in natural things, but truth only in the immaterial mind. Therefore, truth is naturally prior to goodness.

I answer that it must be said that both truth and goodness have the notion of perfection or of what perfects, as has been said. (Above: a. 1.) However, one can consider the order between certain perfections in two ways: in one way on the part of the perfections themselves, and in another on the part of the things perfected. Therefore, considering truth and goodness in themselves, truth is before goodness according to reason, since truth is perfective of another with respect to the notion of form, though goodness is perfective not only with respect to the notion of form, but also with respect to the being that is has in the thing.

And so the notion of goodness contains more than the notion of truth, so that goodness presupposes truth, but truth presupposes oneness, since the notion of truth is perfected by the apprehension of the intellect. However, anything is intelligible inasmuch as it is one, for whoever does not understand oneness, understands nothing, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.4, 1006b10.) Hence, the order of these transcendental names is the following, if they are considered in themselves: after being is oneness, then after oneness is truth, and then after truth is goodness.

But if one considers the order between truth and goodness on the part of what is perfected, then conversely, goodness is naturally before truth for two reasons. First, because the perfection of goodness extends to more than the perfection of truth. For only those things are naturally perfected by truth which can perceive some being in themselves, or else can have it in themselves according to its account and not according to the existence that the being has in itself: and only those things which have the power of knowing and which receive something immaterially are of this kind. For the form of a stone is in the soul, but not with respect to the being that it has in the stone.

But those things which receive another according to material being are naturally perfected by goodness, since the notion of goodness consists in something being perfective according to both the account of the form and of being, as said before. And thus, everything desires goodness, but not all things know truth. For the relation of perfection and the perfectible is manifested in both of them, which is goodness or truth, namely in the desire for the good and the knowledge of the true.

In the second place, goodness is before truth since what are naturally perfected by goodness and truth are perfected by goodness before truth, for they are perfected by goodness inasmuch as they participate in being, as was said. However, they are perfected by truth inasmuch as they know something. But knowledge is consequent to being. Hence, considering the side of the perfectible, goodness precedes truth.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that that argument proceeds from the order of the true and the good on the part of the perfectible, but not on the part of truth and goodness themselves. For the mind is only perfectible by truth, but everything is perfectible by goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that goodness has not only the notion of what is perfected, but also of what perfects, as also the true, as was said before. (Above: a. 1.) Hence, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the end is more prior in causing than any other cause. But the caused is perfected by its cause. Hence, this objection argues with regard to the order of the perfectible to perfection, in which goodness is before. But, considering the form and the end absolutely, since the form itself is the end, then considered in itself, it is prior to any other end. However, the notion of truth arises from the form, insofar as it is understood inasmuch as it exists.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that truth is said to be some good thing, inasmuch as it has being in some particular thing, which is able to be perfected. And so this objection also pertains to the order of the perfectible to perfection.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the end is said to be prior in intention with respect to what is for the sake of the end, but not with respect to other causes, except inasmuch as they also are for the sake of the end. And so this argument is to be solved like the third. Nevertheless, it should be known that when it is said that the end is prior in intention, intention is taken as an act of the mind, which is to intend. But since we are comparing here the intention of goodness and truth, intention is taken for the account which the definition signifies. Hence, it is taken equivocally in both cases.

Reply Sed Contra 1: To the first argument advanced in the contrary sense, it must be said that something is naturally perfected by goodness not only by means of the affective power, but also inasmuch as it has existence. Hence, even though understanding is before affection, it does not follow that something is perfected by truth before goodness.

Reply Sed Contra 2: To the second argument it must be said that the objection treats of truth and goodness inasmuch as they are considered in themselves, so it is to be granted.