Article 4 — Whether all things are good by the first goodness

Fourth, it is asked whether all things are good by the first goodness. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 3; ST I.6.4; SCG I.40.)

Obj. 1: It seems that this is so. For according to Boethius in the Hebdomads, (Boethius, Hebdomads, question (PL 64:1312).) if we were to consider God as existing, yet as abstracted from goodness by our understanding, impossible though this be, it would follow that all other things are beings, but that they are not good.

However, presuming that goodness is in God, it would follow that all things are good just as they are beings. Therefore, all things are said to be good by the first goodness

Obj. 2: But one might say that if one does not consider goodness to be in God, there is no goodness in other creatures, since the creature's goodness is caused by the goodness of God, and not because the thing is formally denominated as good from the goodness of God.

On the contrary, whenever something is denominated in some way only from a reference towards another, it is not denominated in such a way by something inhering formally within it, but rather by what is outside of it and to which it is referred; as for example urine, which is called healthy inasmuch as it signifies the animal's health, it is not denominated as healthy from any health inhering within it, but rather from the animal's health which it signifies.

But a creature is said to be good with respect to the first goodness, since each thing is said in this respect to be good inasmuch as it flows from the first good, as Boethius says in the Hebdomads. (Boethius, Hebdomads, solution (PL 64:1312–13).) Therefore, a creature is not denominated as being good from some formal goodness existing within it, but from divine goodness itself.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says in On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 3 (PL 42:949).) this and that are good; remove this and that and see goodness itself, if you are able. Thus you shall see God, not as good by another good, but the goodness of every good. But all things are called good by that very goodness which is the goodness of every good. Therefore, all things are called good by the divine goodness, about which we are speaking.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, since each creature is good, either it is good by some goodness inhering within it, or only by the first goodness. If by some goodness inhering within it, then since that goodness is also a certain creature, it will also be good either by its own goodness or by another. If by its own goodness, then it will be the first goodness, since this is the account of the first good, that it should be good by itself, as is clear from the authority of Augustine, quoted above. However, if that goodness is good by some other goodness, the same question remains concerning it. Either it will go on to infinity, which is impossible, or one will arrive at some goodness denominating a creature, which is good by itself, and this will be the first goodness. Therefore, in all ways, the creature must be good by the first goodness.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Anselm, (Cf. Anselm, On Truth, cc. 7, 13 (PL 158:475, 484).) anything true is true by the first truth. But the first goodness is related to true things just as the first truth to true things. Therefore, all things are good by the first goodness.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, what is incapable in lesser things is incapable in greater. But to be is less than to be good. However, the creature is incapable with regard to being, since every being is from God. Therefore, neither is it capable with regard to being good. Thus, the goodness by which something is said to be good is not created goodness.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, being is proper to God, according to Hilary. (Cf. Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity, bk. 1, para. 5 (PL 10:28C); bk. 7, para. 11 (PL 10:208B); bk. 12, para. 24 (PL 10:447B).) But the proper belongs to one alone. Therefore, there is no other being than God himself. But all things are good inasmuch as they have being. Therefore, all things are good by that divine being which is his goodness.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, the first goodness adds nothing upon goodness, otherwise the first goodness would be composed. But it is true that all things are good by means of goodness. So also it is true that all things are good by the first goodness.

Obj. 9: One might say that the first goodness adds onto absolute goodness according to reason and not in reality.

On the contrary, that notion is empty and useless to which nothing corresponds in reality. But the notion by which we understand the first goodness is not useless. Therefore, if it adds something according to reason, it would also add in reality, which is impossible, and so neither would it add according to reason. And so all things are said to be good by the first goodness, just as by absolute goodness.

On the contrary (1), all things are good inasmuch as they are beings, since, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32 (PL 34:32).) we are good inasmuch as we are. But all things are not formally called beings by the first essence, but by a created essence. Therefore, neither are all things formally good by the first goodness, but by a created good.

Furthermore (2), the changeable is not informed by the unchangeable, since they are opposed. But every creature is changeable, whereas the first goodness is unchangeable. Therefore, the creature is not said to be formally good by the first goodness.

Furthermore (3), every form is proportionate to what it perfects. But the first goodness, since it is infinite, is not proportionate to the creatures, since it is finite. Therefore, the creature is not said to be formally good by the first goodness.

Furthermore (4), according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 3 (PL 42:950).) all created things are good by participation in the good. But participation in the good is not the first goodness itself, for it is complete and perfect goodness. Therefore, not all things are formally good by the first goodness.

Furthermore (5), a creature is said to possess a vestige of the Trinity inasmuch as it is one, true, and good. And so goodness pertains to the vestige. But the vestige and its parts are something created. Therefore, the creature is good by created goodness.

Furthermore (6), the first goodness is most simple. Therefore, neither is it compounded in itself, nor compoundable with others. And so it cannot be the form of another. But the goodness by which things are are said to be good is a certain form, since all being is from a form. Therefore, creatures are not formally good by the first goodness.

I answer that it must be said that some have held different positions regarding this question. For some, led by frivolous arguments, were so deceived that they held God to belong to the substance of each thing. Some of them held him to be the same as prime matter, as did David of Dinant. (From Albert the Great, Summa de homine, q. 5, a. 2.) But some held him to be the very form of each thing. (This is the opinion of the Almaricians, according to ST I.3.8, resp.) The falsity of this error is immediately apparent, for all who speak about God understand that he is the effective principle of all things, since all beings must flow from one first being. However, according to the teaching of the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 2.11, 198a24.) the efficient cause does not identically coincide with the material cause, since they have contrary accounts. For each thing is an agent inasmuch as it is in act, but the account of matter is to exist in potency. However, the efficient cause and the form of the effect possess the same formality, inasmuch as every agent makes what is similar to itself, but they are not the same in number, since the maker and what is made cannot be the same. From this it is clear that the divine essence is neither the matter of any thing, nor is it the form, such that a creature could be called formally good by it as by a conjoined form; but any form is some likeness of God. And therefore, the Platonists said that all things are formally good by the first goodness, not as by a conjoined form, but as by a separated form.

In order to solve this, it should be know that Plato held that what can be separated according to understanding was also separated according to being. (Plato, from Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.7, 997b8; Physics 2.3, 193b35.) And so, inasmuch as man can be understood apart from Socrates and Plato, thus he held that man exists apart from them, which he called man through itself and the idea of man, by whose participation Socrates and Plato were said to be men. However, just as he found manhood and other such things to be common to Socrates and Plato, so also did he find that goodness is common to all good things and can be understood as good without considering this or that good thing. Hence, he held goodness to be separated apart from all particular goods, which he held to be goodness through itself, or the idea of the good, by whose participation all things are called good, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 1.4, 1095a26.) But there is this difference between the idea of goodness and the idea of man: the idea of man does not extend to all things, but the idea of goodness does extend to all things, including the ideas, for the idea itself of goodness is a particular good. And so one must say that goodness, existing through itself, is the universal principle of all things, which is God. Hence, according to this opinion, it follows that all things are called good by the first goodness, which is God, just as, according to Plato, Socrates and Plato were called men by participating in the separated man, and not by the humanity inhering within them.

And the Porretani followed this opinion to some extent. (Gilbert de la Porrée, Commentary on Boethius' De hebdomads [Commentary on 'Quomodo substantiae bonae sint'] (PL 64:1317–18) as referred to by Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 3, ch. 2, n. 105, 1:165.) For they said that we say the creature is simply good, as when one says that a man is good, and that he is good by something added, as when we say that Socrates is a good man. Thus, they said that a creature is said to be simply good by the first goodness, and not by some inherent good, as though absolute and common goodness itself were divine goodness. But when this or that creature is said to be good, it is denominated from a created goodness, since particular created goods are like particular ideas, according to Plato. But this opinion is disproved by the Philosopher in many ways, not only inasmuch as the natures and forms of things are within the particular things themselves and not separated from them, as is proved in many ways in the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.14, 1039a24.) but also with the supposition of the ideas, since this supposition in particular would not have a place in the good. For goodness is not said univocally of good things, and one idea was not assigned for such things, according to Plato. The Philosopher argues against him in this way in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 1.7, 1096b20.)

Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is pertinent to the current question, the falsity of the previously mentioned position is clear from the fact that every agent is found to make something similar to itself. Hence, if the first goodness makes all good things, it must impress its likeness into the things made; and so, each would be called good as by a form and likeness of the highest good, inhering and placed within it, and furthermore, by the first good as by the exemplar and maker of every created goodness. Plato can be followed with regard to this opinion. Therefore, we say in accord with the common opinion (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 3, ch. 2, n. 105, 1:165; Albert the Great, De bono, q. 1, a. 2.) that all things are formally good by a created goodness as by an innate form, but they are good by uncreated goodness as by an exemplary form.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that, as was mentioned before, creatures would not be good for such a reason unless goodness were understood to be in God, for the goodness of the creature is exemplified by divine goodness; hence, it does not follow that a creature is called good by uncreated goodness, except as by an exemplary form.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that something is denominated with respect to another in two ways. In one way when the reference itself is the account of the denomination, and thus urine is called healthy with respect to the animal's health. For the notion of health, inasmuch as it is predicated of urine, is a sign of the animal's health. In such things, what is denominated in reference to another is not denominated from some form inherent within it, but rather from something extrinsic to which it is referred.

In another way something is denominated with respect to another when that reference is not the account of the denomination, but the cause, just as if air were called illuminating from the sun, not that the reference itself of the air to the sun is the illuminating of the air, but that the direct opposition of the air to the sun is the cause that it should illuminate. And in this way the creature is said to be good with respect to God. Hence, the objection does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that Augustine follows Plato's opinion in many things, as much as one can with respect to the truth of the faith. And so his words should be understood thus, that the divine goodness itself is said to be the goodness of every good thing inasmuch as it is the first, efficient, and exemplar cause of every good, but without excluding created goodness by which creatures are named as good as from an inherent form.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the case is different in general and in particular forms. For in particular forms, the predication of the concrete is not admitted with regard to the abstract, so that one would says "whiteness is white"; or else "hotness is hot"; as is also clear from Dionysius in On the Divine Names 2. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, bk. 2, ch. 8 (PG 3:645D).) But predication of this kind is admitted in general forms; for we say that essence is existing, that goodness is good, that oneness is one, and so on.

The reason for this is that since being is what first falls into the intellect's apprehension; hence, the intellect must attribute being to anything apprehended by the intellect. Therefore, when it appreheneds the essence of any being, it says that essence is a being; and it is similarly the case with any general or particular form, such as: goodness is a being, whiteness is a being, and so on. And since there are some things that inseperably accompany the notion of existence, such as one, good, and the like; these must also be predicated of anything that is apprehended for the same reason as being.

Hence, we say that an essence is one and good, and we say likewise that oneness is one and good, and so also for goodness, whiteness, and any general or particular form. But since it is particular, white does not inseparably accompany the notion of being; hence, the form of whiteness can be apprehended without being white having to be attributed to it. Thus, we are not forced to say that whiteness is white.

For white is said in one way, whereas being, one, good, and other such things, which one must say of anything apprehended, are said in many ways. For something is called a being because it subsists in itself, another because it is the principle of the things subsistence, such as a form, another because it is the subsisting thing's disposition, such as quality, another because it is the privation of the thing's disposition, such as blindness.

And thus, when we say that essence is a being, if one goes on to say that it is therefore a being by something, either by itself or by another, the progression does not follow, for it was not said to be a being in the way that something subsisting in its own existence is a being, but rather as that by which something exists. Hence, one does not have to ask how that essence exists by another, but instead how something other exists by means of essence.

Likewise, when goodness is called good, it is not called good in this way, as if subsisting in goodness, but rather in the way we say that something is good as being that by which another is good. And so one does not have to ask whether goodness is good by its own goodness or by another, but instead whether something is good by the goodness that is other than goodness itself, as in creatures, or whether it is the same as goodness itself, as in God.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that one should make a similar distinction with regard to truth, namely, that all things are true by the first truth as by a first exemplar, whereas they are true by created truth as by an inherent form. Yet, the account is different for truth and goodness. For the account of truth consists in a certain adequation or commensuration. However, something is denominated as measured or commensurate from something exterior, as a sleeve is from the forearm. And in this way Anselm understands all things to be true by the first truth, namely, inasmuch as each thing is commensurate to the divine intellect, fulfilling that to which divine providence has ordered or foreknown it. However, the notion of goodness does not consist in commensuration. Hence, the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that a creature cannot inhere in another in such a way as to have being from itself. Nevertheless, some creatures can inhere so as to be a formal principle of existence, for any form can inhere in this way. And it is also in this way that created goodness can inhere in a good thing as a formal principle.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that when one says that being is proper to God, it should not be thought that there is no other being besides the uncreated, rather that only that being is properly said to exist, inasmuch as by reason of its immutability, it admits of neither having existed nor that it will exist. However, the being of a creature is said to exist by some likeness to that first being, since it has a mixture of what will be and what has been by reason of created changeability. Or else one can say that being is proper to God since God alone is his own existence, even though other things have a being which is not divine being.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that the first goodness adds nothing in reality upon absolute goodness, but it does add something according to reason.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that as the Commentator says in On Causes, (Book of Causes, comm. 9 [8].) pure goodness itself is individuated and divided from all other thing by this fact, that it does not receive any addition. For it does not pertain to the notion of absolute goodness that it should receive or not receive addition. For if it pertained to its notion to receive addition, then any goodness would receive addition, and there would be no pure goodness. So likewise if it pertained to its notion to not receive addition, it would not receive any goodness, and every goodness would be pure goodness, just as it pertains to the notion of animal to be neither rational nor irrational. And therefore, this not being able to receive addition itself contracts absolute goodness and distinguishes the first goodness, which is pure goodness, from all other goodnesses. However, since not receiving addition is a negation, it is a being of reason, and yet it is grounded upon the simplicity of the first goodness. Hence, it does not follow that the argument is empty and useless.