Article 5 — Whether created goodness is good by its essence

Fifth, it is asked whether created goodness is good by its essence. (Parallel texts: ST I.6.3; SCG I.38; Exposition of Boethius's Hebdomads, lect. 3–4; Commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius's On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 1; ch. 13, lect. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 109.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is. For that seems to be essential to a thing without which it cannot exist. But a creature cannot exist without goodness, since there can be nothing created by God that is not good. Thus, the creature is good by essence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a creature has both its being and its being good from the same thing, for it is good from the fact that it has being, as was shown before. (Above: a. 2.). But the creature has being by its essence, therefore, it is also good by its essence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever belongs to a thing precisely as such is essential to it. But goodness belongs to a creature precisely as such, for, as Augustine says in On the Trinity, we are good inasmuch as we exist. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 3 (PL 42:950).) Therefore, a creature is good by its essence.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, since goodness is a certain created form, inhering in the creature, as was shown (a. 4), it will be either a substantial or an accidental form. If accidental, the creature will be to be without it at some time, which cannot be said of a creature. Therefore it must be a substantial form. But every such form is either the essence of a thing or else a part of the essence. Thus, the creature is good by its essence.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Boethius in the Hebdomads, (Boethius, Hebdomads, solution (PL 64:1312–13).) creatures are good inasmuch as they flow from the first good. But they flow from the first good by their essence, thus, they are good by their essence.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the thing denominating is always more simple or equally simple as the thing denominated. But no form superadded to an essence is more simple or equally simple as the essence itself. Therefore, no other form superadded to an essence denominates the essence itself, for we cannot say that an essence is white. But the thing's essence itself is denominated from goodness, for any essence is good. Thus, goodness is not a form superadded to essence, and so any creature is good by its essence.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, goodness is interchanged with being, just like one. But the oneness by which the thing is called one, which is interchanged with being, does not predicate some form, superadded to the things essence, as the Commentator says in Metaphysics 4, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 4, comm. 3.) but each thing is one by its essence. Therefore, each thing is also good by its essence.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, if a creature is good by some goodness superadded to the essence, that goodness will also be good, for it is some thing, and everything that exists is good. However, it would not be good by another goodness, lest one go on to infinity, but rather by its own essence. Therefore, it could be held for the same reason that the creature itself is good by its own essence.

On the contrary (1), nothing that is said of another by participation belongs to it by its essence. But a creature is called good by participation, as is clear from Augustine, On the Trinity. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 3 (PL 42:950).) Thus, a creature is not good by its essence.

Furthermore (2), all that is good by its essence is a substantial good. But creatures are not substantial goods, as is clear from Boethius in the Hebdomads. (Boethius, Hebdomads, question (PL 64:1312).) Thus, creatures are not good by essence.

Furthermore (3), the opposite of what is predicated essentially of anything cannot itself be predicated of it. But the opposite of goodness, namely evil, is predicated of some creature. Therefore, the creature is not good by essence.

I answer that it must be said that, according to three authorities, creatures are not good by essence but by participation, namely according to Augustine, (Augustine de Trinitate, ch. 2.) Boethius, and the author of The Book of Causes (Book of Causes, prop. 9 [8].) who says that God alone is pure goodness. Nevertheless, they are moved to this one position for different reasons.

In evidence of this it must be known that, as is clear from what was said, (Above: a. 1, ad 6.) just as being is multiplied by substantial and accidental existence, so also is goodness multiplied. Yet, there is this difference between them, that something is said to be a being absolutely because of its substantial being, but it is not said to be absolutely because of its accidental being. Hence, since begetting is a motion toward being, when someone receives substantial being, they are said to be begotten simply, but when they receive accidental being, they are said to be begotten in a certain respect. And it is similarly the case with regard to corruption, by which being is lost.

However, the reverse is the case with regard to goodness. For something is called good in a certain respect with regard to substantial goodness, but it is called good simply with regard to accidental goodness. Hence, we do not call an unjust man good simply, but in a certain respect, inasmuch as he is a man. But we say that a just man is good simply. The reason for this diversity is this: each thing is called a being inasmuch as it is considered absolutely, but it is called good with regard to its relation to others, as is clear from what was said. (Above: a. 1, ad 1.) However, something is made perfect in itself so as to subsist by essential principles, but it is not perfected in a due manner in relation to things outside of itself except by means of accidents superadded to the essence. For actions, by which one is conjoined to another in some way, proceed from the essence by means of powers superadded to the essence; hence, goodness does not prevail except insofar as it is complete with respect to substantial and accidental principles.

However, whatever the creature possessess of perfection, from its conjoined essential and accidental principles, God has all of this by his one, simple being. For his essence is his wisdom, his justice, his courage, and so on, which in us are superadded to the essence. And therefore, absolute goodness itself in God is the same as his essence; but it is considered in us with respect to what is superadded to the essence, and to such an extent is complete or absolute goodness augmented, diminished, and completely removed, but not in God; even though substantial goodness would always remain within us. And it seems that Augustine says with respect to this mode that God is good by essence, but not by participation. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 3 (PL 42:950).)

But there is still found another difference between God's goodness and ours. For essential goodness is not understood according to an absolute consideration of nature, but according to its being, for humanity does not have the notion of the good or of goodness except insofar as it has being. But the divine nature or essence itself is its own being. However, the nature or essence of each created thing is not its own being, but is a being that is participating in another. And so pure being is in God, since God himself is his own subsisting being, but received or participated being is in creatures. Hence, given that absolute goodness is said of the created thing with respect to its own substantial being, nevertheless, it would still have goodness by participation, just as it has participated being. But God is goodness by essence, inasmuch as his essence is his being. And this seems to be the intention of the philosopher in The Book of Causes, (Book of Causes, prop. 9 [8].) where he says that only divine goodness is pure goodness.

But there is still another difference between divine goodness and that of the creature. For goodness has the notion of a final cause. But God has the notion of a final cause, since he is the final end of all things. From this it must be the case that every other end does not have the condition or notion of an end except with regard to an order toward the first cause, since a secondary cause does not influence what is caused by it except by presupposing the influence of the first cause, as is clear in The Book of Causes. (Book of Causes, prop. 1.) Hence, also the goodness that has a notion of an end cannot be said of the creature, except by having presupposed an order of the Creator to the creature.

Thus, granting that the creature is its very own being, just like God, nevertheless, the being of the creature would still not have the notion of goodness except by having presupposed an order to the Creator; and to such an extent would it still be called good by participation and not absolutely by the fact that it exists.

But divine being, which has the notion of the good without having presupposed anything else, has the notion of goodness through its very self; and this seems to be the intention of Boethius in the Hebdomads. (Boethius, Hebdomads, question (PL 64:1312).)

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that a creature cannot be not-good by essential goodness, which is goodness in a certain respect. Yet it can be not-good by accidental goodness, which is simply absolute goodness. And furthermore, goodness itself, which is considered according to substantial being, is not the very essence of the thing, but a participated being; and this is also the case, presupposing an order to the first self-subsistent being.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that a thing is good in a certain respect by the thing from which it has existence, namely according to substantial being; however, it is clear from what was said that it does not formally possess existence simply speaking and being good simply speaking from the same source, as is clear from what was said. It is for this reason that the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3–4: And it is to be responded similarly to the third and fourth objections.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the creature is not only from God with regard to its essence, but with regard to its being, in which the notion of substantial goodness primarily consists, and also with regard to superadded perfections, in which absolute goodness consists; and these are not the thing's essence. Further, the very relation by which a thing's essence is referred to God as to a principle is other than the essence.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that essence is denominated from goodness, just like being; hence, just as it has being by participation, so also is it good by participation. For being and goodness, taken commonly, are more simple than essence, for they are more common, being said not only of essence, but also of what subsists by essence, and again of the accidents themselves.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the one that is interchanged with being is said with respect to the notion of negation, which it adds upon being. However, goodness does not add negation upon being, but its notion consists in affirming something: and so the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that the goodness of a thing is called good in this way just as existence is called a being, not because it belongs to it that something else exists, but that a thing is said to exist by this, and because a thing is called good by this goodness. Hence, just as it does not follow that the substance itself of a thing is not called a being by some existence other than itself, so also the previously mentioned notion does not follow from goodness. But it does follow from oneness, for which reason the Commentator introduced it in On the Metaphysics 4. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 4, comm. 3.) For oneness is related indifferently with regard to essence or existence; hence, the essence of a thing is one by itself and not on account of its own being: and so it is not one by some participation, as happens in being and goodness.