Article 6 — Whether the goodness of the creatures consists in mode, species, and order

Sixth, it is asked whether the goodness of the creatures consists in mode, species, and order, as Augustine says. (Parallel texts: ST I.5.5; I-II.85.4; see also Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, bk. 1, ch. 3 (PL 42:553).)

Obj. 1: And it seems not. For goodness has the notion of an end, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1, 1094a3) But the whole notion of end consists in order. Therefore, the whole notion of goodness consists in order, so that the other two are superfluous.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, being, one, and goodness differ according to intention. But the notion of being consists in species, while that of one consists in mode. Therefore, the notion of goodness does not consist in species and mode.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, species denotes the formal cause. But, according to some, (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, ch. 2, n. 88, 1:140; part 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 3, ch. 2, a. 3, n. 104, 1:163; Albert the Great, De bono, tract. 1, q. 1, a. 10 ; Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2.) goodness and truth are distinguished by this, that truth predicates the notion of formal cause, but goodness the notion of final cause. Thus, species does not pertain to the notion of goodness.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, since evil and goodness are opposites, they pertain to the same thing. But as Augustine says in Eighty-Three Questions, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, bk. 6 (PL 40:13).) the totality of evil within the form is found to be in privation. Thus, the whole notion of goodness consists in the affirmation of a form, and so it seems that mode and order are superfluous.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, mode pertains to what follows from a thing. But some goodness pertains to the thing's essence. Therefore, mode does not pertain to the notion of goodness.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, God does not accomplish through many what he can do by one. But God can make a creature through one of these, since each one of these has the notion of goodness. Therefore, not each one of these are required for the notion of goodness.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, if these three pertain to the notion of goodness, then these three must exist in any good thing. But each of these three is good. Therefore, these three are within each one of these, and so one ought not to be divided against another.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, if these three are good, they must have mode, species, and order. Therefore, there will be a mode of the mode, a species of the species, and so on to infinity.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, mode, species, and order are diminished by sin, according to Augustine. (Cf. Augustine, De natura boni, bk. 1, ch. 4 (PL 42:553).) But the substantial goodness of a thing is not diminished by sin. Therefore, the notion of goodness does not universally consist in the previously mentioned three things.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, what pertains to the notion of goodness does not admit of the predication of evil. But, according to Augustine in On the Nature of Good, (Augustine, On the Nature of Good, bk. 23 (PL42:558).) these three admit of the predication of evil, for one speaks of an evil mode, an evil species, and so on for the others. Therefore, the notion of goodness does not consist in these three.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, Ambrose says in the Hexaemaron, (Ambrose, Hexaemaron, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PL 14:143).) that the nature of light consists in number, weight, and measure, like other creatures. But from these three, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 3 (PL 34:299). (Marietti, de Natura Boni, ch. 3)) the three mentioned before are constituted. Therefore, since light is good, the notion of goodness does not include the three mentioned before.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, according to Bernard, (Bernard of Clairvaux, De diligendo Deo, ch. 1 (PL 182:974).) the mode of charity is not to have a mode, yet charity is good. Therefore, it does not require the three mentioned before.

On the contrary (1) is what Augustine says in On the Nature of Good, (Augustine, On the Nature of Good, bk. 3 (PL 42:553).) that where these three are great, there is great goodness, but where they are slight, then slight goodness, and where they are not, there is no goodness. Thus, the notion of goodness consists in these three.

Furthermore (2), Augustine says in the same book that according to this, some are called good inasmuch as they are moderated, beautiful, and ordered. (Augustine, De natura boni, bk. 1, ch. 3 (PL 42:553).)

Furthermore (3), creatures are called good with respect to God, as Boethius says in the Hebdomads. (Boethius, Hebdomads, solution (PL 64:1312–13).) But God relates to creatures with regard to three causes, namely efficient cause, final cause, and formal exemplar cause. Therefore, the creature is also said to be good by relating to God by the notion of three causes. But inasmuch as it is compared to God as to an efficient cause, it has a mode set for it by God, inasmuch as it is compared to him as to an exemplar cause, it has species, but inasmuch it is compared to him as to an end, it has order. Therefore, the goodness of the creature consists in mode, species, and order.

Furthermore (4), all creatures are ordered to God through the rational creature, which alone is capable of beatitude. But this is the case inasmuch as they are known by the rational creature. Therefore, since the creature is good inasmuch as it is ordered to God, three things are required for it to be good: namely, that it is something existing, that it is knowable, and that it is ordered. But it is something existing by a certain mode, it is knowable by species, and it is ordered by order. Therefore, the goodness of the creature consists in these three.

Furthermore (5), it said in Wisdom 11:21: you have established all things in number, weight, and measure. But, according to Augustine in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 3 (PL 34:299).) measure establishes a mode for each thing, number gives it species, but weight gives it order. Therefore, the goodness of the creature consists in these three, mode, species, and order, for nature is good inasmuch as it is disposed by God.

I answer that it must be said that the notion of goodness consists in the three mentioned above according to what Augustine says. (Cf. Augustine, De natura boni, bk. 1, ch. 3 (PL 42:553).) In evidence of this it must be known that any name can imply a relation in two ways. In one way, such that the name is imposed to signify the relation itself, such as the name "father," or "son," or "fatherhood" itself. But some names are said to imply a relation since they signify a thing belong to some genus, which the relation accompanies, even though the name is not imposed to signify the relation itself; as for example, the name "knowledge" is imposed to signify some quality upon which a certain relation follows, but not to signify the relation itself.

And in this sense the notion of goodness implies a relation, not because the name of goodness signifies that relation alone, but because it signifies that upon which the relation follows together with the relation itself. However, the relation implied in the name of goodness is a disposition of something that perfects, inasmuch as something is such as to perfect another not only with respect to the notion of the species, but also with respect to the being that it has in things. For in this way the end perfects what is for the sake of the end.

But since creatures are not their own existence, they must possess their existence as received, and because of this, their existence is finite and bounded according to the measure of that in which it is received.

Therefore, among these three things that Augustine affirms, the last one, namely order, is the relation which the name of goodness implies. But the other two, that is species and mode, cause that relation. For species pertains to the very notion of the species which, inasmuch as it has being in another, is received in some determinate mode, since whatever exists in another exists within it in the manner of the receiver. Therefore, every good thing, inasmuch as it is perfective with respect to the notion of species and being, as taken together, has mode, species, and order. It has species with respect to the notion itself of species, it has mode with respect to existence, and order with respect to the condition of what perfects.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the argument would follow if the name of goodness had been imposed to signify the relation itself, which is false, as is clear from what was said. And because of this the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that goodness does not differ from being and one, as though having opposed notions, but because the notion of goodness includes the notion of being and one, and adds something.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.3, 1043b36.) just as in numbers any unit either added or subtracted changes the species of the number, so also in definitions, anything added or removed constitutes a different species. Therefore, the notion of truth is constituted from the species itself alone, inasmuch as truth is perfective according to the notion of the species alone, as is clear from what was said. But the notion of goodness is constituted from species and number together, which is not only perfective according to the species, but also according to being.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that when Augustine says that the entirety of evil is found in the species of privation, it does not exclude the other two. For, as he himself says in the same book, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, bk. 6 (PL 40:13).) wherever there is some species, there is necessarily some mode. Order also follows upon species and mode. But it denotes species alone, since the other two follow upon the species itself.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that wherever there is something received, mode must also be there, for the received is limited with respect to the receiver; and thus, since both the accidental and the essential being of the creature is received, mode is found not only in accidental things, but also in substantial things.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that since the notion of goodness is constituted in these three things, God could not have made something good which did not have species, mode, and order, just as he could not make a man who was not a rational animal.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that mode, species, and order are each good, but not good in the way that something subsisting in goodness is good, rather inasmuch as the principle of goodness is good. Hence, each one of them does have to have a mode, species, and order, just as form does not need to have a form, even though it is a being, and every being exists by means of form. And this is what some say, (Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 3, ch. 1, a. 1, n. 111, 1:174.) that when one says all things have mode, species, and order, this is understood of created things, and not of co-created things.

Reply Obj. 8: And from this, the solution to the eighth is clear.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that some (Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 3, ch. 1, a. 4, n. 114, 1:180; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 35, a. 2, q. 1; Albert the Great, De bono, tract. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 9.) say that mode, species, and order are the same thing in reality, inasmuch as they constitute a good of nature, and inasmuch they are diminished by sin, as pertaining to moral goodness. This is clear in the will which can consider one and the same thing either insofar as it is a certain nature: and so there is mode, species, and order constituting a goodness of nature within it; or insofar as it is a will having an order to grace, and mode, species, and order are attributed to it in this way, which constitute moral goodness, and which can be diminished by sin.

Or one could say better that since goodness follows upon being, and goodness is constituted by species, mode, and order, then just as substantial being is other than accidental being, so is substantial form other than accidental form, and both have their own proper mode and their own proper order.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that according to Augustine in On the Nature of the Good, (Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, bk. 23 (PL 42:558)(Marietti ch. 33).) mode, species, and order are not called evil because they are evil in themselves, but because they are either less than they ought to be, or because they are not applied to what they should be applied to. And thus they are called evil not from themselves, but from some privation of mode, species, or order.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that the words of Ambrose are not to be understood such that light wholly lacks mode, since it has a limited species and power. Rather, it is not determined with respect to certain bodily things, since it extends to all bodily things, inasmuch as all are made such as to be illuminated or to receive other effects by means of light, as is clear from Dionysius in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 4 (PG 3:697C).)

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that charity has mode with respect to its own being that it has in a subject, and so it is a creature. But inasmuch as it is compared to an infinite object, which is God, and beyond which our charity should not proceed, it does not have a mode.