Chapter 63 — The arguments of those who would deny to God the knowledge of singulars

Now there are some who endeavor to withhold knowledge of singulars from the perfection of God’s knowledge. In support of their contention, they proceed by seven ways.

The first is from the very nature of singularity. (Cf. ch. 65.) For, since the principle of singularity is signate matter, it seems impossible for singulars to be known by an immaterial power, if all knowledge result from some kind of assimilation. Therefore, in us only those powers which use material organs apprehend singulars (for instance, the imagination, the senses and so on), while our intellect, since it is immaterial, does not know singulars. Much less, therefore, is the divine intellect cognizant of singulars, since it is furthest removed from matter. Hence by no means does it seem possible that God should know singulars.

The second argument (Cf. ch. 66.) is that singulars are not always. Either, therefore, they are always known by God, or they are known at one time and unknown at another. The first is impossible, since about what is not there can be no knowledge, which is always about true things, and things which are not cannot be true. The second is also impossible, because the knowledge of the divine intellect is altogether unchangeable, as we have proved. (Ch. 45.)

The third argument (Cf. ch. 67.) proceeds from the fact that singulars do not all happen of necessity, but some contingently. Therefore, there can be no certain knowledge about them except when they are. For certain knowledge is that which cannot be deceived, and every knowledge of contingencies, since these are future, can be deceived, because the event may prove the opposite of that to which the mind holds, since if the opposite could not happen, they would be necessary. Therefore, we can have no knowledge of future contingencies, but only a kind of conjectural estimate. Now we must suppose that all God’s knowledge is most certain and infallible, as we have proved above. (Ch. 61.) Moreover, it is impossible that God begin anew to know something, on account of his unchangeableness, as stated. (Ch. 45.) Hence it would seem to follow that he knows not contingent singulars.

The fourth (Cf. ch. 68.) is based on the fact that the will is the cause of certain singulars. Now an effect, until it actually is, cannot be known save in its cause, for only thus can it be before it begins to be in itself. But the movements of the will cannot be known for certain by anyone except the willer in whose power they are. Therefore, it seems impossible for God to have eternal knowledge of such singulars as have their cause in the will.

The fifth (Cf. ch. 69.) proceeds from the infinity of singulars. For the infinite as such is unknown, (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187b7.) because whatever is known is measured in a way by the comprehension of the knower, since measurement is nothing else than a kind of certification of the thing measured. Thus every art rejects the infinite. Now singulars are infinite, at least in potency. Therefore, it seems impossible for God to know singulars.

The sixth (Cf. ch. 70.) proceeds from the pettiness of singulars. For as the excellence of knowledge is gauged by the excellence of its object, so apparently the pettiness of the object conduces to pettiness of knowledge. Now the divine intellect is supremely excellent. Therefore, it is incompatible with its excellence that God should know the most trivial of singulars.

The seventh (Cf. ch. 71.) argues from the presence of evil in certain singulars. For, since the thing known is, in a manner, in the knower, and since evil cannot be in God, as proved above, (Ch. 39.) it would seem to follow that evil and privation are entirely unknown to God, and known only by an intellect that is in potency, since privation can only be in that which is potential. Hence it follows that God has no knowledge of singulars, in which evil and privation are found.