Chapter 65 — That God knows singulars

Accordingly, we shall prove first that God cannot be lacking in the knowledge of singulars.

For it has been shown (Ch. 49.) that God knows other things inasmuch as he is their cause. Now God’s effects are singular things, because God causes things in the same way as he makes them to be actual; and universals are not subsistent, but have their being only in singulars, as is proved in Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.13–14.) Therefore, God knows things other than himself not only in the universal but also in the singular.

Again. As soon as one knows the constituent principles of a thing’s essence, one must know that thing: thus knowledge of the rational soul and of such a body implies knowledge of man. Now the essence of a singular is made up of signate matter and an individual form: thus the essence of Socrates is made up of this particular body and this particular soul, even as the essence of man in general is made up of soul and body, as stated in Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.10.) Therefore, since the latter are included in the definition of man in general, so would the former be included in the definition of Socrates, if he could be defined. Hence whoever has knowledge of matter, and of those things whereby matter is designated, and of the form individualized by matter, cannot lack knowledge of the singular. Now God’s knowledge reaches to matter, individualizing accidents, and forms. For, since his act of understanding is his essence, (Ch. 45.) it follows that he understands all that is in any way whatever in his essence, in which virtually are all that have being in any way whatever as in their first origin, forasmuch as he is the first and universal principle of being. (Ch. 13.) Among these we must include matter and accident, since matter is being in potency, and accident is being in another. Therefore, God lacks not knowledge of singulars.

Moreover. The nature of a genus cannot be known perfectly unless its first differences and proper passions be known: thus the nature of number would not be perfectly known if odd and even were unknown. Now “universal” and “singular” are differences or proper passions of being. Therefore, if God, in knowing his essence, knows perfectly the common nature of being, it follows that he knows perfectly the “universal” and the “singular.” But, just as he would not know the universal perfectly if he knew the intention of universality without knowing the thing in the universal, such as man or animal, so too he would not know the singular perfectly if he knew the nature of singularity without knowing this or that singular thing. Therefore, God must know singulars.

Again. Just as God is his very being, so is he his own act of knowledge, as we have proved. (Ch. 45.) Now from the fact that he is his own being it follows that in him are all the perfections of being as in the first source of being, as we have shown above. (Ch. 28.) Therefore, it follows that every perfection of knowledge is found in his knowledge, as in the first fount of knowledge. But this would not be if he were lacking in the knowledge of singulars, since the perfection of some knowers consists in this. Therefore, it is impossible for him not to have knowledge of singulars.

Further. In every order of powers it is universally found that the higher power extends to more things and yet is but one, whereas the lower power extends to fewer things, and yet is multiple in relation to them. This appears in the imaginative power and sense; for the one power of imagination extends to all the things of which the five senses take cognizance, and to more besides. Now the cognitive power in God is higher than in man. Therefore, whatever man knows by various powers (namely, his intellect, imagination, and sense), God considers it by his one simple intellect. Therefore, he knows singulars, which we apprehend by sense and imagination.

Moreover. God’s intellect does not derive its knowledge from things as ours does. Rather is he the cause of things by his knowledge, as we shall prove further on: (Bk. 2, ch. 24.) therefore, his knowledge of other things is after the manner of practical knowledge. Now practical knowledge is not perfect unless it extend to singulars, because the end of practical knowledge is operation, which is about singulars. Therefore, the divine knowledge of other things extends to singulars.

Again. The first movable is moved by a motor that moves by intellect and appetite, as was shown above. (Ch. 44.) Now a motor by intellect cannot cause movement unless it knows the movable as naturally inclined to local movement, and that is as existing here and now, and consequently as a singular. Therefore, the intellect that is the motor of the first movable knows the first movable as a singular. But this motor is either supposed to be God, and thus our point is proved, or else it is something beneath God. And if the intellect of this motor is able by its own power to know a singular which our intellect is unable to know, much more will the divine intellect be able to do so.

Again. The agent is more excellent than the patient and the thing done, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a18.) as act is more excellent than potency. Therefore, a form of lower degree cannot by its action transmit its likeness to a higher degree, whereas a higher form is able by its action to transmit its likeness to a lower degree. Thus corruptible forms are produced in this lower world by the incorruptible agency of the stars, while a corruptible agency cannot produce an incorruptible form. Now all knowledge is the result of assimilation between knower and known. Yet there is this difference: in human knowledge assimilation is brought about by the action of sensible things on the human cognitive powers, whereas contrariwise in God’s knowledge it arises from the action of the form of the divine intellect on things known. Accordingly, the form of a sensible object, being individualized by its materiality, is unable to transmit the likeness of its singularity to that which is altogether immaterial, and it can only reach those powers which use material organs. However, it is transmitted to the intellect by virtue of the active intellect insofar as it is wholly stripped of material conditions: and so the likeness of the singularity of a sensible form cannot reach as far as the human intellect. But the likeness of the form in the divine intellect, since it extends to the smallest details to which his causality extends, reaches to the singularity of a sensible and material form. Therefore, the divine intellect can know singulars, whereas the human intellect cannot.

Further. If God knows not singulars which even men know, this would involve the absurdity which the Philosopher urges against Empedocles, namely, that God is most foolish. (Cf. ch. 50.)

The truth which we have established is confirmed by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is written: before him no creature is hidden (Heb 4:13). The contrary error is rejected: do not say, ‘I shall be hidden from the Lord, and who from on high will remember me?’ (Sir 16:16).

From what we have said it is also clear how the objection (Cf. ch. 63.) raised in the contrary sense does not rightly conclude. For that by which the divine intellect understands, although immaterial, is nevertheless the likeness of both the matter and the form, as the first productive principle of both.