Chapter 70 — That God knows trivial things

This being established, we must show that God knows trivial things and that this is not inconsistent with the nobility of his knowledge.

For the stronger an active power is, the further does its action extend, as appears even in the action of sensible things. Now, the force of the divine intellect in knowing things is likened to an active power, since the divine intellect knows not by receiving from things, but rather by pouring itself into them. Since, then, it is of infinite power in understanding, as shown above, (Ch. 45.) it follows that its knowledge extends to the most remote things. Now the degrees of nobility and meanness in all beings depend on nearness to and distance from God, who is in the summit of nobility. Therefore, God, on account of the exceeding power of his intellect, knows things even though they be in the last degree trivial.

Further. Whatever is, is actual for as much as it exists or is such, and is a likeness of the first act, and for this reason has nobility. Again, whatever is in potency has a share of nobility through its being ordained to act: for so is it said to be. It follows, therefore, that everything is noble considered in itself, but is said to be mean in comparison with that which is more noble. Now the noblest of things other than God are no less distant from him than the lowest creatures are from the highest. If, therefore, this latter distance hindered God’s knowledge, much more would the former, and thus it would follow that God knows nothing other than himself, which has been disproved above. (Ch. 49.) If, therefore, he knows something other than himself, however most noble it may be, for the same reason he knows everything, no matter how mean we call it.

Moreover. The good of the order in the universe is more noble than any part of the universe, because each part is directed to the good of the order in the whole as to its end, as the Philosopher states in Metaphysics 11. (It is actually Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a11–16.) If, then, God knows some other noble nature, most of all must he know the order of the universe. But this cannot be known unless both noble and mean things be known, because the order of the universe consists in their mutual distances and relationships. It follows, therefore, that God knows not only noble things, but also those that are deemed trivial.

Further. The meanness of things known does not of itself reflect on the knower: for it belongs to the nature of knowledge that the knower contains the species of the things he knows according to his mode. And yet the meanness of things known may reflect accidentally on the knower: either because he is withdrawn from the thought of noble things while considering mean things, or because he is inclined to certain undue affections through considering mean things. But this cannot take place in God, as appears from what has been said. (Cc. 39, 55.) Therefore, the knowledge of trivial things is not derogatory to the nobility of God; rather it belongs to his perfection, for as much as he prepossesses all things in himself, as we have shown above. (Ch. 29.)

Again. A power is accounted little not through being capable of little things, but through being confined to little results, since a power that is capable of great things is also capable of little ones. Accordingly, knowledge that comprises both noble and trivial things is not to be accounted trivial, but only that which comprises none but trivial things, as happens with us: for our thoughts of divine things are distinct from our thoughts of human things, and of each we have a distinct knowledge. Therefore, in comparison with the more noble, the less noble is accounted mean. But it is not thus in God, because he considers all things with the same thought and knowledge. (Ch. 46.) Therefore, no meanness is to be ascribed to his knowledge, on account of his knowing any mean things whatever.

In accord with this is the saying about divine wisdom, that because of her pureness she pervades and penetrates all things . . . and nothing defiled gains entrance into her (Wis 7:24–25).

It is clear from what has been said that the argument put forward in opposition (Cf. ch. 63.) is not incompatible with the truth we have demonstrated. For the nobility of a science depends on the principal object of that science, and not on whatever may come under that science: for with us, not only the highest but also the lowest beings come under the most noble of sciences, for the treatise of metaphysics extends from the first being to potential being, which is the lowest of all beings. Thus then the divine knowledge comprises the lowest beings as being known at the same time with the object known principally, for the divine essence is the principal object of God’s knowledge, and in it he knows all things, as we have shown above. (Cc. 48–49.)

It is also evident that this truth is not in contradiction with the statements of the Philosopher in Metaphysics 11. For there he intends to prove that the divine intellect does not know something other than himself (that is, a perfection of his intellect as the principal object of its knowledge). And in this sense he states that it is better not to know mean things than to know them. (It is actually Metaphysics 12.9, 1074b30–32.) That is, when knowledge of trivial things is distinct from the knowledge of noble things, and the thought of mean things is an obstacle to the thought of noble things.