Chapter 71 — That God knows evil things

It remains now to be proved that God knows evil things.

For if a good be known the opposite evil is known. Now God knows all the particular goods to which evils are opposed. Therefore, God knows evil things.

Further. The notions of contraries in the mind are not opposed to one another, else they would not be together in the mind, nor would they be known at the same time. Therefore, the aspect under which we know evil is not repugnant to good; rather, it is connected with the idea of good. Accordingly, if, as we have proved above, (Ch. 40.) all the aspects of goodness are to be found in God by reason of his absolute perfection, it follows that in him is the notion by which evil is known. Therefore, he knows evils also.

Again. The true is the good of the intellect. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a27–31.) For an intellect is said to be good for as much as it knows the true. Now it is not only true that good is good, but also that evil is evil: for just as it is true that what is, is, so is it true that what is not, is not. Hence the good of the intellect consists even in the knowledge of evil. But, since the divine intellect is perfect in goodness, (Ch. 41.) it cannot possibly lack any intellectual perfection. Therefore, it has the knowledge of evils.

Moreover. God knows the distinction between things, as shown above. (Ch. 50.) Now the notion of distinction includes negation, for when things are distinct, the one is not the other. Hence primaries, which are distinguished by themselves, include mutual negation of one another; and for this reason negative propositions about them are self-evident (for instance, that no quantity is a substance). Therefore, God knows negation. Now privation is negation in a definite subject, as is proved in Metaphysics 4. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1004a9–15.) Therefore, he knows privation, and consequently evil, which is nothing else than the privation of due perfection.

Further. If God knows all the species of things, as was proved above, (Ch. 50.) and as granted and proved even by some philosophers, it follows that he knows contraries, both because the species of certain genera are contrary, and because the differences of genera are contrary, as stated in Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.8.) Now contraries include opposition of form and of privation, according to the same authority. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.4, 1055b11–13.) Therefore, it follows that God knows privation and, consequently, evil.

Again. God knows not only form but also matter, as was proved above. (Ch. 65.) Now matter, since it is being in potency, cannot be known perfectly unless it be known to what its potency extends: and this applies to all kinds of power. But the potency of matter extends to both form and privation: for that which can be, can also not be. Therefore, God knows privation, and consequently he knows evil.

Again. If God knows anything besides himself, most of all he knows that which is best, and this is the order of the universe, to which all particular goods are directed as their end. (It is actually Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a11–16.) Now, in the order of the universe there are certain things intended for the removal of harms that might result from certain other things, as evidenced by the means of defense with which animals are provided. Therefore, God knows these harms: and thus he knows evils.

Further. We are never blamed for knowing evils, as regards that which belongs essentially to knowledge (that is, as regards judgment about evil), but only accidentally, for as much as sometimes one is inclined to evil through thinking about it. But it is not so in God, for he is unchangeable, as was proved above. (Ch. 13.) Nothing, therefore, hinders God from knowing evils.

In agreement with this it is written that against God’s wisdom evil does not prevail (Wis 7:30); and that hell and destruction are before the Lord (Prov 15:11). Also in the Psalm it is said: the wrongs I have done are not hidden from you (Ps 69:5[68:6]); and: he knows worthless men; when he sees iniquity, will he not consider it? (Job 11:11).

It must, however, be observed that with regard to the knowledge of evil and privation, there is a difference between the divine intellect and ours. (Cf. ch. 63.) For seeing that our intellect knows each thing by its respective proper and distinct species, it knows that which is in act by an intelligible species, through which the intellect is made actual. Hence it is able to know potency inasmuch as it is sometimes in potency to such a species: and thus just as it knows act by means of act, so it knows potency by means of potency. And since potency belongs to the notion of privation (for privation is a negation whose subject is a being in potency), it follows that it is becoming to our intellect to know privation in some way, inasmuch as it is naturally fitted to be in potency. Although we may also say that the mere knowledge of act leads to the knowledge of potency and privation.

On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is in no way in potency, knows neither privation nor anything else in the above manner. (Cf. cc. 45–50.) For if he knew anything by a species other than himself, it would follow of necessity that he is compared to that species as potency to act. It follows, therefore, that he understands only by a species that is his essence, and consequently that he understands himself as the first object of his understanding, and yet in understanding himself he understands other things, as shown above, (Ch. 49.) and not only acts but potentialities and privations.

This is what the Philosopher means when he says in On the Soul: (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430b21–26.) how does it know evil, or black? For it knows contraries (The Greek would perhaps be better rendered as he knows them by their contraries.) somewhat. And it must know them by a potency that is in itself. But if anything there be in which the contrary is not (namely, in potency), it knows itself, and is in act and separable. Nor is it necessary to admit the explanation of Averroës, who maintains that it follows from the above that the intellect which is pure act does not know a privation at all. But the sense is that it knows privation not through being in potency to something else, but through knowing itself and being always in act.

Again, it must be observed that if God knew himself in such a way that by knowing himself he did not know other beings which are particular goods, he would have no knowledge whatever of privation or evil. For there is no privation contrary to the good that is himself: for a privation and its contrary are naturally adapted to be in relation to the same thing, and so no privation (and therefore no evil) is opposed to that which is pure act. Therefore, supposing God to know himself alone, he would not know evil through knowing the good which is himself. But since by knowing himself he knows things in which there is a natural aptness for privations, it follows of necessity that he knows the opposite privation, and the evils contrary to particular goods.

It must also be observed that, just as God, by knowing himself, knows other things without any discursion of his intellect, as shown above, (Ch. 57.) so too there is no need for his knowledge to be discursive if he knows evil through good. For good is the reason, as it were, of the knowledge of evil, so that evil is known through good, as a thing through its definition, and not as conclusions through their premises.

Nor does it argue imperfection in the divine knowledge if God knows evil through the privation of good, because evil does not indicate being except insofar as it is a privation of good. Therefore, it is knowable in this way alone, since a thing is knowable so far as it has being.

God’s will