Chapter 72 — That in God there is will

After discussing the matters concerning the knowledge of the divine intellect, it remains for us to consider the divine will.

For, from the fact that there is intelligence in God, it follows that there is will in him. Because, since the good understood is the proper object of the will, it follows that the good understood, as such, is willed. Now “understood” indicates a reference to one who understands. It follows, therefore, of necessity that one who understands good, as such, has a will. Now God understands good: For, since he is perfectly intelligent, as shown above, (Cc. 44–45.) he understands being simultaneously with the notion of good. Therefore, in him there is will.

Again. Whatever has a form is thereby related to things actually existing: thus white timber, by its whiteness, is like some things and unlike others. Now, in intelligent and sentient subjects there is the form of the thing understood and sensed, because all knowledge is through some likeness. Therefore, there must be a relation in the intelligent or sentient subject to the things understood or sensed, according as the latter actually exist. Now this is not due to the fact that they understand or sense: for in this respect there is rather a relation in things to the intelligent or sentient subject, since intelligence and sensation depend on things being in the intellect and sense according to the respective modes of each. But the sentient and the intelligent subject have by the will and appetite a relation to things outside the mind. Therefore, every sentient and intelligent subject has an appetite and will, although, properly speaking, will is in an intellect. Since, then, God is intelligent, it follows that he has a will.

Moreover. That which is consequent upon every being belongs to being as such, and a thing of this kind must be found especially in the first being. Now, every being desires its own perfection and the preservation of its being. And to each one this is according to its mode: to intelligent beings by will, to animals by sensitive appetite, to those that are devoid of sense by natural appetite. But it is otherwise to those who have it than to those who do not have it: for those who do not have it tend, by the appetitive power of their genus, with desire to acquire what is lacking to them, whereas those who have it are at rest in it. Therefore, this cannot be lacking to the first being, which is God. Since, then, he is intelligent, there is will in him, by which his being and his goodness are pleasing to him.

Again. The more perfect the act of understanding is, the more delightful is it to the one who understands. Now God understands, and his act of understanding is most perfect, as was proved above. (Cc. 44–45.) Therefore, to understand is to him most delightful. But intellectual delight is by the will, even as sensitive delight is by the appetite of concupiscence. Therefore, there is will in God.

Further. A form considered by the intellect neither moves nor causes anything except through the medium of the will, whose object is an end and a good by which one is moved to act. Hence the speculative intellect does not move; nor does the sole imagination without the estimative power. Now the form of the divine intellect is the cause of being and movement in other things, for God moves things by his intellect, as we shall prove further on. (Bk. 2, ch. 24.) Therefore, it follows that he has a will.

Again. The first of motive powers in intelligent beings is the will, because the will applies every power to its act, for we understand because we will, we imagine because we will, and so forth. And the will has this because its object is the end, although the intellect moves the will—not by way of efficient and moving cause, but by way of final cause—by putting its object before it (which is the end). Therefore, it is especially fitting that the first mover should have a will.

Further. The free is that which is its own cause, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982b25–27.) and so the free has the aspect of that which is of itself. Now liberty of action is seated primarily in the will, for insofar as one acts voluntarily, one is said to perform any action whatever freely. Therefore, it is especially fitting that the first agent should act by will, since to him it is most competent to act of himself.

Moreover. The end and the agent intending the end are always of the same order in things: therefore, the proximate end (which is proportionate to the agent) is of the same species as the agent, in works both of nature and of art. For the form of the art whereby the craftsman works is the species of the form that is in matter, and is the end of the craftsman; and the form of the generating fire, whereby the fire acts, is of the same species as the form of the fire generated, which form is the end of the generation. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 2.7, 198a24–b5.) Now, nothing is coordinate with God as though it were of the same order, except God himself, otherwise there would be several first beings, and we have shown the contrary to be the case. (Ch. 42.) He is, therefore, the first agent intending an end which is himself. Therefore, not only is he a desirable end, but he also desires himself, so to speak, as an end; and, since he is intelligent, he desires himself by intellectual appetite; and this is will. Therefore, in God there is will.

Sacred Scripture bears witness to this will of God. For it is said in the Psalm: whatever the Lord willed, he has done (Ps 134:6); and: who can resist his will? (Rom 9:19).