Chapter 10 — In what way power is ascribed to God

Since, however, nothing is its own principle, and God’s action is not other than his power, (Ch. 9.) it is clear from the foregoing that power is ascribed to God not as the principle of action, but as the principle of the thing made. And since power implies relation to something else under the aspect of its principle—for active power is the principle of acting on something else, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12; 8.2.)—it is evident that power is ascribed to God in relation to things made, according to reality, and not in relation to action, except according to our way of understanding, insofar as our intellect considers both (the divine power and action) by different concepts. Therefore, if certain actions are becoming to God which do not pass into something made but remain in the agent, power is not ascribed to God in their respect, except according to our manner of understanding, and not according to reality. Such actions are intelligence and volition. Accordingly, God’s power, properly speaking, does not regard such actions, but only their effects. Consequently, intellect and will are in God not as powers, but only as actions.

It is also clear from the foregoing that the manifold actions ascribed to God, as intelligence, volition, the production of things, and the like, are not so many different things, since each of these actions in God is his own very being, which is one and the same thing. How one thing may remain true while having many significations may be clearly seen from what has been shown in the first book. (Cc. 31, 35.)