Chapter 15 — That God is the cause of being to all things

Now, since we have proved (Ch. 6.) that God is the source of being to some things, we must further show that everything besides himself is from him.

For whatever belongs to a thing not as such belongs to it through some cause, as white to a man, because that which has no cause is something first and immediate, and thus it must belong to the thing essentially and as such. Now it is impossible for any one thing to belong to two things, and to both of them as such. For that which is said of a thing as such does not go beyond that thing: for instance, to have three angles equal to two right angles does not go beyond a triangle. Accordingly, if something belongs to two things, it will not belong to both as such: hence it is impossible for any one thing to be predicated of two so as to be said of neither by reason of a cause. Rather it is necessary that either one be the cause of the other—for instance, fire is the cause of heat in a mixed body, and yet each is called hot—or else some third thing must be cause of both—for instance, fire is the cause of two candles giving light. Now “being” is said of everything that is. Therefore, it is impossible that there be two things, neither of which has a cause of its being; but either both the things in question must have their being through a cause, or else the one must be the cause of being to the other. Hence everything that exists in any way whatever must be from that to which nothing is a cause of being. Now, we have proved above (Bk. 1, ch. 13.) that God is this being to which nothing is a cause of its being. Therefore, from him is everything that is in any way whatever. If, however, it be said that “being” is not a univocal predicate, the above conclusion follows none the less. For it is not said of many equivocally, but analogically: and thus it is necessary to be brought back to one thing.

Moreover. That which belongs to a thing by its nature, and not by some other cause, cannot be diminished and deficient therein. For if something essential be subtracted from or added to a nature, there will be at once another nature, even as it happens in numbers, where the addition or subtraction of unity changes the species. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.3.) And if the nature or quiddity of a thing remain entire, although something is found to be diminished, it is clear that this does not depend simply on that nature, but on something else, through the absence of which it is diminished. Therefore, that which belongs to one thing less than to others belongs to it not through its nature alone, but through some other cause. Consequently, that thing will be the cause of all in a certain genus, to which thing the predication of that genus belongs above all: hence that which is most hot is seen to be the cause of heat in all things hot, and that which is most light is the cause of all things that have light. Now God is being above all, as we have proved in the first book. (Bk. 1, ch. 13.) Therefore, he is the cause of all of which “being” is predicated.

Further. The order of causes must correspond to the order of effects, since effects are proportionate to their causes. (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195b16–30.) Therefore, just as proper effects are reduced to their proper causes, so what is common in proper effects must be reduced to some common cause: thus the sun is the universal cause of generation above the particular causes of the generation of this or that thing, and the king is the universal cause of government in his kingdom, above the wardens of the kingdom and of each city. Now being is common to all. Therefore, above all causes there must be a cause to which it belongs to give being. But God is the first cause, as shown above. (Bk. 1, ch. 13.) Therefore, it follows that all things that exist are from God.

Again. That which is said through the essence of something is the cause of all that are so by participation: thus fire is the cause of all things ignited as such. Now God is being by his essence, because he is being itself. (Bk. 1, ch. 22.) In contrast, everything else is being by participation, for there can be but one being that is its own being, as was proved in the first book. (Ch. 42.) Therefore, God is the cause of being to all other things.

Further. Everything that is possible to be and not to be has a cause, because considered in itself it is indifferent to either, so that there must be something else that determines it to one. Therefore, since we cannot proceed to infinity, there must be some necessary thing that is the cause of all things that it is possible to be and not to be. Now there is a necessary thing that has a cause of its necessity, and here again we cannot proceed to infinity, so that we must come to something that is of itself necessary to be. And this can be but one, as we showed in the first book, (Bk. 1, ch. 42.) and this is God. Therefore, everything other than him must be reduced to him as the cause of its being.

Moreover. God is the maker of a thing inasmuch as he is in act, as we have proved above. (Ch. 7.) Now, by his act and perfection he contains all the perfections of things, as we have shown in the first book, (Bk. 1, ch. 28.) and thus he is virtually all things. Therefore, he is the maker of all. But this would not be if something else were of a nature to be otherwise than from him: for nothing is of a nature to be from another and not to be from another, since if it be of a nature not to be from another, it is of itself necessary to be, and thus can never be from another. Therefore, nothing can be except from God.

Again. The imperfect originate from the perfect, as seed from an animal. Now God is the most perfect being and the highest good, as was shown in the first book. (Cc. 28, 41.) Therefore, he is to all things the cause of being, especially since it was proved (Bk. 1, ch. 42.) that there can be but one such thing.

This is confirmed by divine authority. For it is said in the Psalm: who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is in them (Ps 146[145]:6); and: all things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made (John 1:3); and: from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be glory forever (Rom 11:36).

This sets aside the error of the ancient physicists, who asserted that certain bodies had no cause of their being, as well as that of some who say that God is not the cause of the substance of heaven, but only of its movement.