Chapter 28 — How there is anything due in the production of things

Again. From what has been said it may be shown that God in the creation of things did not work of necessity, as though he brought things into being as a debt of justice.

For justice, according to the Philosopher, in Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b25–1130a13.) is towards another person to whom it renders his due. But nothing to which anything may be due is presupposed to the universal production of things. Therefore, the universal production of things could not result from a debt of justice.

Again. Since the act of justice is to render to each one that which is his own, (Corpus juris civilis, bk. 1, tit. 1, “De justitia et jure.”) the act by which a thing becomes one’s own precedes the act of justice, as appears in human affairs: for a man by working has a right to call his own what is rendered to him, as an act of justice, by the person who pays him. Therefore, the act by which a person first acquires something of his own cannot be an act of justice. Now a created thing begins to have something of its own by creation. Therefore, creation does not proceed from a debt of justice.

Further. No one owes something to another except from the fact that in some way he depends on him or receives something either from him or from a third, on whose account he owes something to the other. Thus a son is a debtor to his father, because he receives being from him; a master to his servant, because he receives from him the service he requires; and every man is a debtor to his neighbor for God’s sake, from whom we have received all good things. But God is dependent on no one, nor does he need to receive anything from another, as is manifestly clear from what has been said. (Bk. 1, cc. 13, 28, 40, 102.) Therefore, it was not on account of a debt of justice that God brought things into being.

Moreover. In every genus, that which is on account of itself precedes that which is on account of another. Consequently, that which is simply first of all causes is a cause on its own account only, whereas that which acts by reason of a debt of justice does not act on its own account only, for it acts on account of the thing to which the debt is due. Therefore God, since he is the first cause and the first agent, (Bk. 1, ch. 13.) did not bring things into being from a debt of justice.

Hence it is said: who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid? For from him and through him and to him are all things (Rom 11:35–36); and: who hath given me before that I should repay him? All things that are under heaven are mine (Job 41:2).

Hereby is refuted the error of some who strive to prove that God cannot do save what he does, because he cannot do except what he ought to do. For he does not produce things from a debt of justice, as we have proved.

Nevertheless, although nothing to which anything can be due precedes the universal creation of things, something uncreated precedes it, and this is the principle of creation. This may be considered in two ways. For the divine goodness precedes as the end and first motive of creation, according to Augustine, who says: because God is good, we exist. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32.) Also his knowledge and will precede, as by them things are brought into being.

Accordingly, if we consider the divine goodness absolutely, we find nothing due in the creation of things. For in one way a thing is said to be due to someone on account of another person being referred to him, in that it is his duty to refer to himself that which he has received from that person. Thus it is due to a benefactor that he be thanked for his kindness, inasmuch as he who has received the kindness owes this to him. But this kind of due has no place in the creation of things, since there is nothing preexistent to which it can be competent to owe anything to God, nor does any favor of his preexist. In another way, something is said to be due to a thing in itself, since that which is required for a thing’s perfection is necessarily due to it. Thus it is due to a man to have hands or strength, since without these he cannot be perfect. Now God’s goodness needs nothing outside him for its perfection. Therefore, the production of creatures is not due to him by way of necessity.

Again. God brings things into being by his will, as we have shown above. (Ch. 23.) Now it is not necessary, if God wills his own goodness to be, that he should will other things than himself to be produced, because the antecedent of this conditional proposition is necessary, but not the consequent. For it was shown in the first book (Bk. 1, ch. 80.) that God necessarily wills his own goodness to be, but does not necessarily will other things. Therefore, the production of creatures is not necessarily due to the divine goodness.

Moreover. It has been proved (Cc. 23, 26, 27, 28.) that God brings things into being neither by necessity of his nature, nor by necessity of his knowledge, nor by necessity of his will, nor by necessity of his justice. Therefore, by no manner of necessity is it due to the divine goodness that things be brought into being.

It may be said, however, that it is due to him by way of a certain becomingness. But justice properly speaking requires a debt of necessity, since what is rendered to someone out of justice is due to him by a necessity of right.

Accordingly, it cannot be said that the production of creatures arose either from a debt of justice whereby God is the creature’s debtor, or from a debt of justice whereby he is a debtor to his own goodness—if justice be taken in the proper sense. But if justice be taken in a broad sense, we may speak of justice in the creation of things insofar as the creation is becoming to the divine goodness.

If, however, we consider the divine ordinance whereby God decided by his intellect and will to bring things into being, then the production of things proceeds from the necessity of the divine ordinance. (Bk. 1, ch. 83.) For it is impossible that God should decide to do a certain thing which afterwards he did not, otherwise his decision would be either changeable or weak. It is, therefore, necessarily due to his ordinance that it be fulfilled. And yet this debt is not enough for the notion of justice, properly speaking, in the creation of things, in which we can consider nothing but the action of God in creating, and there is no justice properly speaking between one same person and himself, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.11.) Therefore, it cannot be said properly that God brought things into being from a debt of justice, for the reason that he ordained by his knowledge and will to produce them.