Chapter 16 — That God brought things into being out of nothing

From this it is clear that God brought things into being out of no preexisting thing as matter.

For if a thing is an effect of God, either something exists before it, or not. If not, our point is proved, namely, that God produces an effect from no preexisting thing. If, however, something exists before it, we must either go on to infinity—which is impossible in natural causes, as the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics 2 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994a19–21.)—or we must come to some first thing that presupposes no other. And this can only be God. For it was shown in the first book (Bk. 1, ch. 17.) that he is not the matter of any thing, nor can there be anything other than God the being of which is not caused by God, as we have proved. (Ch. 15.) It follows, therefore, that God in producing his effects requires no preexisting matter out of which to produce his work.

Further. Every matter is constricted to some particular species by an introduced form. Thus, to produce an effect out of preexisting matter by enduing it with a form in any way belongs to an agent that aims at some particular species. Now a like agent is a particular agent, since causes are proportionate to their effects. (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195b16–30.) Therefore, an agent that requires of necessity preexisting matter out of which to work its effect is a particular agent. But God is an agent as the universal cause of being, as was proved above. (Ch. 15.) Therefore, he needs no preexisting matter in his action.

Again. The more universal an effect, the higher its proper cause, because the higher the cause, to so many more things does its virtue extend. Now “to be” is more universal than “to be moved,” since some beings are immovable, as also philosophers teach (for instance stones and the like). It follows, therefore, that above the cause which acts only by causing movement and change, there is that cause which is the first principle of being, and we have proved (Ch. 15.) that this is God. Therefore, God does not act merely by causing movement and change. Now everything that cannot bring things into being save from preexisting matter acts only by causing movement and change, since to make something out of matter is the result of movement or change of some kind. Consequently, it is not impossible to bring things into being without preexisting matter. Therefore, God brings things into being without preexisting matter.

Again. That which acts only by movement and change is inconsistent with the universal cause of being, since by movement and change a being is not made from absolute non-being, but this being from this non-being. Now God is the universal cause of being, as we have proved. (Ch. 15.) Therefore, it is not becoming to him to act only by movement or change. Neither, then, is it becoming to him to need preexisting matter, in order to make something.

Moreover. Every agent produces something like itself in some way. Now every agent acts according as it is actually. Consequently, to produce an effect by causing in some way a form inherent to matter, will belong to that agent which is actualized by a form inherent to it, and not by its whole substance. Hence the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics 7 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8, 1033a30–b19.) that material things, which have forms in matter, are engendered by material agents that have forms in matter, and not by essentially existing forms. Now God is actual being not by a form inherent to him, but by his whole substance, as we have proved above. (Bk. 1, cc. 22–23.) Therefore, the proper mode of his action is to produce a whole subsistent thing, and not merely an inherent thing (namely, a form in matter). And every agent that requires no matter for its action acts in this way. Therefore, God requires no preexisting matter in his action.

Further. Matter is compared to an agent as the recipient of the action proceeding from the agent: for the action, which is the agent’s as proceeding from it, is the patient’s as residing in it. Therefore, matter is required by an agent that it may receive the agent’s action, since the agent’s action received in the patient is the patient’s act and form, or some beginning of a form in it. Now God does not act by an action that must be received in a patient, because his action is his substance, as already proved. (Cc. 8–9.) Therefore, he requires no preexisting matter in order to produce an effect.

Further. Every agent that requires preexisting matter in acting has a matter proportionate to its action, so that whatever is in the potency of the agent, is all in the potency of the matter. Otherwise, it could not bring into act everything in its active power, and thus would have that power to no purpose with regard to such things. Now matter has no such proportion to God. For matter is not in potency to any particular quantity, as the Philosopher declares in Physics 3, (Aristotle, Physics 3.6.) whereas the divine power is simply infinite, as we proved in the first book. (Bk. 1, ch. 43.) Therefore, God requires no preexisting matter as necessary for his action.

Again. Of different things there are different matters: for the matter of spiritual things is not the same as that of corporeal things, nor that of heavenly bodies the same as that of corruptible bodies. This is evident from the fact that receptivity as a property of matter is not of the same kind in the aforesaid. For receptivity in spiritual things is intelligible. Thus the intellect receives the species of intelligible objects, but not according to their material being, while heavenly bodies receive newness of situation, but not newness of being, as lower bodies do. Therefore, there is not one matter that is in potency to universal being. But God’s activity regards all being universally. (Ch. 15.) Therefore, no matter corresponds proportionately to him. Therefore, he does not require matter of necessity.

Moreover. Wherever certain things in the universe are in mutual proportion and order, one of them must proceed from the other, or both from some one. For order must be founded in one by its corresponding with another: otherwise order or proportion would be the result of chance, which is inadmissible in the first principles of things, because it would follow yet more that all else are from chance. (Aristotle, Physics 2.4, 196a19–b9.) If, then, there be any matter proportionate to the divine action, it follows that either the one is from the other, or both from a third. But since God is the first being and the first cause, (Bk. 1, ch. 13.) he cannot be the effect of matter, nor can he be from any third cause. Therefore, it follows that if there be matter proportionate to God’s action, he is the cause of it.

Again. That which is the first of beings must be the cause of the things that are: for if they were not caused they would not be set in order by it, as we have already proved. (In the preceding paragraph.) Now there is this order between act and potency: that, although in the one and same thing which is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act, potency precedes act in point of time, whereas act precedes by nature, act must nevertheless precede potency simply speaking, which is evidenced by the fact that potency is not reduced to act save by a being in act. But matter is a being in potency. Therefore, God, who is pure act, must be simply prior to matter, and consequently the cause of it. Therefore, matter is not necessarily presupposed for his action.

Again. Prime matter is in some way, for it is a being in potency. Now God is the cause of all things that are, as we have proved. (Ch. 15.) Therefore, God is the cause of prime matter, to which nothing is preexistent. Therefore, the divine action needs no preexisting nature.

Divine Scripture confirms this truth, saying: in the beginning God created heaven and earth (Gen 1:1). For to create is nothing else than to bring something into being without preexisting matter.

By this is refuted the error of the ancient philosophers who asserted that matter has no cause whatever, because they observed that in the actions of particular agents something is always preexisting to action: thus they drew the opinion common to all that from nothing, nothing is made. (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a26.) This is true in particular agents. But they had not yet arrived at the knowledge of the universal agent, which is the active cause of all being, and of necessity presupposes nothing for his action.