Chapter 65 — That God preserves things in existence

From the fact that God governs things by his providence, it follows that he preserves them in existence.

For everything whereby certain things obtain their end comes under the government of those things, because things are said to be governed or ruled according as they are directed to their end. Now things are directed to the ultimate end intended by God (that is, the divine goodness) not only in that they operate, but also in the very fact that they exist, because inasmuch as they exist they bear a likeness to the divine goodness, which is the end of all things, as we have proved. (Ch. 19.) Therefore, it belongs to divine providence that things be preserved in existence.

Again. The cause of a thing must be the same as the cause of its preservation, because preservation is nothing else than continued existence. Now we have shown above (Bk. 2, ch. 23. seqq.) that God is the cause of every thing’s existence by his intellect and will. Therefore, by his intellect and will he preserves things in existence.

Besides. No particular univocal agent can be the cause of its species simply: thus an individual man cannot be the cause of the human species, for then he would be the cause of every man, and consequently of himself, which is impossible. But properly speaking, the individual is the cause of the individual. Now the individual man exists insofar as the human nature is in this particular matter, which is the principle of his individuality. Therefore, the human individual is not the cause of a man except in the point of his being the cause of the human form being in this particular matter: and this is to be the principle of the generation of this particular man. It is consequently evident that neither the individual man, nor any other natural univocal agent, is a cause except of the generation of an individual. Now there must be some per se active cause of the human species: as is evidenced by his composite nature, and the order of his parts, which is always the same, unless it be hindered accidentally. And the same applies to all other species of natural things.

This cause is God, either mediately or immediately: for it has been shown (Bk. 1, ch. 13; bk. 2, ch. 15.) that he is the first cause of all. Consequently, he stands in relation to the species of things as in nature the individual generator to the generation of which he is the per se cause. But generation ceases when the generator’s action ceases. Therefore, all the species of things would cease if the divine operation were to cease. Therefore, he preserves things in existence by his operation.

Moreover. Although movement may accidentally belong to an existing thing, it is something additional to the thing’s being. Now nothing corporeal is the cause of any thing except insofar as it is moved; because no body acts except through movement, as Aristotle proves. (Physics 7.11.) Therefore, no body is the cause of a thing’s existence, as such, but it is the cause of a thing’s being moved towards existence (that is, of its becoming). Now the existence of a thing is participated existence, since no thing save God is its own existence, as we proved above. (Bk. 1, ch. 22; bk. 2, ch. 15.) Consequently, God, who is his own being, must be first and per se the cause of all being. Accordingly, the divine operation stands in the same relation to the existence of things as the movement of a corporeal mover to the being made and the being moved of things made or moved. Now it is impossible that a thing continue to be made or to be moved if the movement of the mover cease. Therefore, a thing cannot possibly continue to exist except through the divine operation.

Further. As the operation of art presupposes the operation of nature, so the operation of nature presupposes the creative operation of God, because art takes its matter from nature, and nature receives its matter from God through creation. Now the products of art are preserved in being by virtue of the products of nature (a house, for instance, by the solidity of the stones). Therefore, all natural things would not continue to exist except by the power of God.

Again. The impression of the agent does not remain in the effect after the action of the agent has ceased, unless it merges into the nature of the effect. For the forms of things generated, and their properties, remain in them to the end after generation, because they become natural to them. In like manner, the reason why habits are hard to remove is that they merge into the nature: whereas dispositions and passions, whether in the body or in the soul, remain for a time after the action of the agent, but not forever, because they are in their subject as preparing a way to nature. On the other hand, that which belongs to the nature of a higher genus in no way remains after the action of the agent: thus light does not remain in the diaphanous body after the illuminant has been removed. Now existence is not the nature or essence of any created thing, but of God alone, as was proved in the first book. (Ch. 22.) Therefore, nothing could continue to exist if the divine operation were to cease.

Further. There are two explanations of the origin of things. One is that proposed by faith, that things were first brought into being by God; the other is that of certain philosophers holding that things emanated from God from eternity. (Cf. bk. 2, ch. 31.) According to either explanation, it is necessary to say that things are preserved in existence by God. For if things were brought into being by God after not being, their existence as well as their nonexistence must result from the divine will, because he permitted things not to be when he so willed, and caused them to be when he so willed. Therefore, they exist so long as he wills them to exist. Therefore, his will is the preserver of things.

If, on the other hand, things emanated from God from eternity, we cannot assign a time or an instant when they first emanated from God. Either, therefore, they were never produced by God, or their existence is always emanating from God, as long as they exist. Therefore, he preserves things in existence by his operation.

Hence it is said: upholding the universe by his word of power (Heb 1:3). Augustine also says: The potency of the Creator, and the power of the Almighty and the upholder of all, is the cause of every creature’s subsistence. If this ruling power were withdrawn from his creatures, their form would cease at once, and all nature would collapse. When a man is building a house, and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and has gone: but the world would not stand for a single instant, if God withdrew his support. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 12.)

Hereby is refuted the statement of certain authorities quoted in the law of the Moors, (Cf. Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, bk. 1, ch.73.) who, in order to be able to maintain that the world needs to be preserved by God, held that all forms are accidents, and that no accident lasts for two instants, so that things would always be in the process of formation: as though a thing did not need an active cause except while being made. Therefore, some of them are stated to have maintained that the indivisible bodies of which, they say, all substances are composed, and which alone have any permanency (according to them), would be able for a time to remain in existence if God were to withdraw his government from things. Some of these say indeed that things would not cease to exist unless God caused in them the accident of ceasing-to-be. All of which is plainly absurd.