Chapter 62 — That those who see God will see him forever

It follows from what has been said that those who obtain ultimate happiness from the divine vision never fall away from it.

Because whatever at one time is, and at another time is not, is measured by time, as stated in 4 Physics. (Physics 4.12.) Now the vision in question that makes intellectual creatures happy is not in time, but in eternity. (Ch. 61.) Therefore, no one can lose it, having once become a partaker of it.

Again. The intellectual creature does not arrive at its last end except when its natural desire is at rest. Now just as it naturally desires happiness, so does it desire perpetuity of happiness, because as it is perpetual in its substance, that which it desires for its own sake and not on account of something else, it desires to have always. Consequently, happiness would not be its last end unless it endured forever.

Besides. Whatever is possessed with love causes sorrow if it be known that at length it will be lost. Now, since the vision in question which makes the possessor happy is supremely enjoyable and desirable, it is supremely loved by those who possess it. Therefore, they could not but be sorrowful if they knew that they would lose it some time. But if it were not perpetual, they would know this, for it has been shown (Ch. 59.) that in seeing the divine substance, they know also other things that naturally are. Hence much more do they know the conditions of that vision, whether it be perpetual or about to cease eventually. Therefore, they would not possess that vision without sorrow. Consequently, it would not be true happiness, which should insure from all evil, as we have proved. (Ch. 48.)

Moreover. That which is moved towards a thing as the end of its movement, is not moved away from it except by violence; as a heavy body, when it is projected upwards. Now it is clear from what has been said (Ch. 50.) that every intellectual substance tends to that vision with a natural desire. Therefore, it cannot fall away from it except by violence. But nothing is taken away by violence unless the might of him who takes it exceed that of him who caused it. Now the cause of the divine vision is God, as we proved. (Ch. 53.) Consequently, as no might exceeds God’s, it is impossible for that vision to be taken away by violence. Therefore, it will last forever.

Further. If a man cease to see what he saw hitherto, this will be either because he loses the faculty of sight—as when a man dies or becomes blind, or is hindered in some other way —or because he wishes no longer to see—as when we turn our eyes away from a thing we saw before—or because the object is withdrawn. And this is invariably true, whether we speak of sensitive or of intellective vision. Now the intellectual substance that sees God cannot lose the faculty of seeing God; neither through ceasing to exist, since it is immortal, as we proved above; (Bk. 2, ch. 55.) nor through failure of the light by which it sees God, since that light is received incorruptibly, on the part both of the recipient and of the giver. Nor can it lack the will to enjoy that vision, for it knows its ultimate happiness to consist in that vision: even as it cannot but desire to be happy. Nor will it cease to see through the withdrawal of the object, because that object which is God is unchangeable, nor does he withdraw himself more than we withdraw from him. Therefore, it is impossible for this beatific vision of God ever to cease.

Again. It is impossible for a man to wish to give up a good which he is enjoying except on account of some evil that he thinks to be attached to the enjoyment of that good, which enjoyment, at least, is an obstacle to a greater good. For just as the appetite desires nothing except under the aspect of a good, so does it shun nothing except as an evil. But in the enjoyment of that vision there cannot be any evil, since it is the greatest good to which the intellectual creature can attain. Nor is it possible that one who enjoys that vision deem any evil to be in it, or anything to be better than it, because the vision of that supreme truth excludes any false opinion. Therefore, it is impossible that the intellectual substance which sees God ever desire to lose that vision.

Moreover. The reason why we become weary of what we enjoyed hitherto is that it causes some kind of change, by destroying or diminishing one’s power. Hence fatigue is incidental to the exercise of the sensitive powers through the action of the sensible objects on the bodily organ—in fact, the power may be altogether destroyed by too powerful an object—and after a time they are loth to enjoy that which hitherto had been a pleasant sensation. For the same reason we become weary in mind after long or concentrated thought, because powers that employ organs of the body are subject to fatigue, and in this life it is not possible to give the mind to thought without employing those organs. Now the divine substance does not corrupt but perfects the intellect more than anything. Nor does any action performed by a corporeal organ concur in the vision of him. Therefore, it is impossible for anyone to be weary of seeing him when they have once enjoyed the sight of him.

Further. Nothing can be wearisome that is wonderful to him that looks on it, because as long as we wonder at it, it still moves our desire. Now the created intellect always looks with wonder on the divine substance, since no created intellect can comprehend it. Therefore, the intellectual substance cannot possibly become weary of that vision: consequently, it cannot of its own choice desist from it.

Besides. If two things were united before, and afterwards become separated, this must be the result of a change in one of them, because just as a relationship does not begin except through a change in one of the relatives, so does it not cease except through a fresh change in one of them. Now the created intellect sees God through being, in some way, united to him, as proved above. (Ch. 51.) Consequently, if that vision ceases through the cessation of that union, this must result from a change either in the divine substance or in the intellect of the one who sees it. But neither of these is possible, since the divine substance is unchangeable, as we proved in the first book, (Ch. 13.) and the intellectual substance is raised above all changes when it sees the divine substance. Therefore, it is impossible to lapse from the happiness of seeing God.

Furthermore. The nearer a thing is to God, who is utterly unchangeable, the less changeable and the more enduring is it: so that certain bodies, through being far distant from God, cannot last forever, as stated in 2 De Generatione. (On Generation and Corruption 2.10.) But no creature can come nearer to God than one who sees his substance. Therefore, the intellectual creature that sees the divine substance, becomes, in a very high degree, unchangeable. Therefore, it can never fall away from that vision.

Hence it is said: Blessed are those who dwell in thy house, ever singing thy praise (Ps 84:4[83:5]); and elsewhere: He shall not be moved forever that dwells in Jerusalem (Ps 125[124]:1). Also: Your eyes will see Jerusalem, a quiet habitation, an immovable tent, whose stakes will never be plucked up, nor will any of its cords be broken, because only there our Lord is magnificent (Isa 33:21); and: He who conquers, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God; never shall he go out of it (Rev 3:12).

Hereby we refute the error of the Platonists who said that souls, after being separated from the body and obtaining ultimate happiness, begin to desire reunion with the body, and that when the happiness of that life is ended, they are plunged once more into this life of unhappiness. We also refute that of Origen, who maintained that souls and angels can return from bliss to unhappiness.