Chapter 76 — That God’s providence cares for all individuals immediately
Now some have granted that divine providence reaches these individual things, but through certain intermediary causes. For Plato, according to Gregory of Nyssa, (Nemesius, On Human Nature ch. 8.) posited a threefold providence. The first is that of the supreme god, who cares first and foremost for his own—that is, spiritual and intellectual beings—and consequently for the whole world as regards genera, species, and the universal causes (which are the heavenly bodies). The second consists in the care of individual animals and plants and other things subject to generation and corruption, in the matter of their generation, corruption and other changes. This providence Plato ascribed to the gods who wander about heaven; while Aristotle (On Generation and Corruption 2.10.) ascribes the causality of such things to the oblique circle. The third providence he places over things concerning human life; he ascribes it to certain demons who dwell in the neighbourhood of the earth and, according to him, are in charge of human actions. Yet, according to Plato, the second and third providence depend on the first, because the supreme God appointed those of the second and third class as governors.
This opinion accords with the Catholic faith, insofar as it refers universal providence to God as its first author. But it would seem contrary to the faith in that it denies that every individual thing is immediately subject to divine providence. This may be proved from what has been already laid down.
For God has immediate knowledge of individuals not merely as knowing them in their causes, but also in themselves, as we proved in the first book. (Bk. 1, ch. 65. seqq.) Now it would seem unreasonable if, knowing individuals, he did not desire their order, in which the chief good of things consists, since his will is the source of all goodness. Consequently, even as he knows individuals immediately, so does he establish order among them immediately.
Again. The order established by providence in the things governed is derived from the order conceived in the mind of the governor: even as the art-form that is produced in matter is derived from that which is in the mind of the craftsman. Now where there are several in charge, one subordinate to another, the higher must deliver to the inferior the order he has conceived, just as a subordinate art receives its principles from the higher. Accordingly, supposing the governors of the second and third rank to be under the chief governor who is the supreme God, it follows that they must receive from the supreme God the order to be established among things. But this order cannot be more perfect in them than in the supreme God: in fact, all perfections proceed from him into other things in descending order, as we proved above. (Bk. 1, ch. 38.) And the order of things must be in the governors of the second rank, not only in general, but also as to the individual: else they would be unable to establish order in individuals by their providence. Much more, therefore, is the order of individuals under the control of divine providence.
Besides. In things ruled by human providence, it is to be observed that a head overseer has charge of general matters of great importance, and by himself devises what arrangements to make with regard to them, while he himself does not trouble about the order of minor affairs, but leaves this to others lower than himself. And this is owing to a defect on his part, inasmuch as he ignores the conditions of particular matters of less importance, or is himself incompetent to decide the order of every thing, on account of the labor and delay required for the purpose. But such defects are far removed from God: for he knows all individual things, nor does he require labor or time in order to understand them; since by understanding himself, he knows all other things, as we proved above. (Bk. 2, ch. 46.) Therefore, he himself devises the order of all individuals, and his providence is concerned about all individuals immediately.
Moreover. In human affairs the inferior officials by their own skill devise the ordering of the things subjected to their government by the chief governor. This skill they do not receive from the chief, nor its use: for if they received it from the chief, the ordering would be done by the superior, and they would no longer be devisers of this ordering but executors. Now, from what has been said (Bk. 1, ch. 11; bk. 3, ch. 67.) it is clear that all wisdom and understanding is caused in every intellect by the supreme God: nor can any intellect understand except by God’s power, even as neither does any agent act except insofar as it acts by God’s power. Therefore, God himself cares for all things immediately by his providence, and whoever is said to govern under him is the executor of his providence.
Further. The higher providence gives rules to the lower providence, even as the politician gives rules and laws to the commander in chief, who gives rules and laws to the captains and generals. Consequently, if there be other providences subordinate to the highest providence of the supreme God, it follows that God gives the second and third governors the rules of their office. Either, therefore, he gives general rules and laws or particular. If he gives them general rules, since general rules are not always applicable to particular cases (especially in matters that are subject to movement and change), it would be necessary for these governors of the second or third rank to go beyond the rules given them in deciding about matters confided to their care. Consequently, they would exercise judgment on the rules given to them as to when to act according to them, and when it would be necessary to disregard them. This is impossible, because such a judgment belongs to the superior, since the interpretation of laws and dispensation from their observance belong to him who made the law. Accordingly, judgment concerning general rules that have been given must be pronounced by the governor in chief, and this would not be possible unless he concerned himself immediately with the ordering of individuals. Therefore, on this supposition, he should be the immediate governor of such things. If, on the other hand, the governors of the second or third rank receive particular rules and laws from the supreme governor, it is clear that then the ordering of these individual matters comes immediately from divine providence.
Moreover. The higher governor always has the right to judge of the arrangements made by the lower governors, whether they be fitting or not. Consequently, if the second or third governors are subordinate to God the chief governor, it follows that God judges of the arrangements made by them: this would be impossible if God considered not the ordering of these individual matters. Therefore, he personally cares for individuals by himself.
Again. If God does not care for these lower individuals immediately by himself, this is either because he despises them or, as some say, lest his dignity should be besmirched by them. But this is unreasonable. For there is more dignity in providing for and planning the ordering of things than operating in them. Consequently, if God works in all things, as was proved above, (Ch. 67.) and this—far from being derogatory to his dignity—on the contrary belongs to his all-pervading and supreme power, it is in no way contemptible in him, nor does it besmirch his dignity if his providence extends to these individual things immediately.
Further. Every wise man who uses his power providently moderates that use in his actions by directing the purpose and extent of that use: else his power would not follow his wisdom. Now it is clear from what has been said that divine providence extends in its operations to the lowest things. Consequently, divine providence directs which and how many effects are to result from its power, and how they are to result from it, even in the very lowest of things. Therefore, God himself immediately plans the ordering of all things by his providence.
Hence it is said: Those that exist have been instituted by God (Rom 13:1), and: You have done these things and those that went before and those that followed; you have designed the things that are now, and those that are to come (Jdt 9:5).
Chapter 279 of 463