Chapter 71 — That divine providence does not entirely exclude evil from things

From the foregoing it is also clear that divine providence, which governs things, does not prevent corruption, defects and evil from being in the world.

For the divine government by which God works among things does not exclude the operation of second causes, as we have already shown. (Ch. 70.) Now, a fault may occur in an effect through a fault in the secondary active cause without there being any fault in the first agent: thus there may be a fault in the work of a craftsman who is perfect in his craft on account of some defect in the instrument. And in the same way, a man with strong motive power may limp through no fault in the motive power, but because his leg is not straight. Accordingly, in the things moved and governed by God, defect and evil may be found on account of defects in the secondary agents, although there is no defect in God.

Moreover. Perfect goodness would not be found in things unless there were degrees of goodness, namely, so that there be some things better than others: else all the possible degrees of goodness would not be fulfilled, nor would any creature be found like to God in the point of being better than others. Moreover, this would do away with the chief beauty in things if the order resulting from distinction and disparity were abolished; and what is more, the absence of inequality in goodness would involve the absence of multitude, since it is by reason of things differing from one another that one is better than another: for instance, the animate than the inanimate, and the rational than the irrational. Consequently, if there were absolute equality among things there would be but one created good, which is clearly derogatory to the goodness of the creature. Now the higher degree of goodness is that a thing be good and unable to fail from goodness, and the lower degree is of that which can fail from goodness. Therefore, the perfection of the universe requires both degrees of goodness. Now it belongs to the providence of the governor to preserve and not to diminish perfection in the things governed. Therefore, it does not belong to the providence of God entirely to exclude from things the possibility of failing from goodness. But evil results from this possibility, because that which can fail, at times does fail; and this very deficiency of the good is evil, as we have proved. (Ch. 7.) Therefore, it does not belong to the divine providence to ward off evil entirely from things.

Again. In every government the best thing is that provision be made for the things governed, according to their mode: for in this consists the justice of the regime. Consequently, even as it would be contrary to the right notion of human rule if the governor of a state were to forbid men to act according to their various duties—except perhaps for the time being, on account of some particular urgency—so would it be contrary to the notion of God’s government if he did not allow creatures to act in accordance with their respective natures. Now, corruption and evil result in things through creatures acting thus; since by reason of the contrariety and incompatibility that exist in things, one thing is corruptive of another. Therefore, it does not belong to divine providence to exclude evil from things altogether.

Besides. An agent cannot possibly produce an evil except by reason of its intending some good, as we proved above. (Ch. 4.) Now it does not belong to the providence of one who is the cause of all good to exclude from creatures all intention of any particular good, for thus many goods would be banished from the universe. Thus if fire were deprived of the intention of producing its like (a consequence of which is the evil of burning combustible things), the good consisting in fire being generated and preserved in its species would be done away. Therefore, it is not part of divine providence to exclude evil altogether from things.

Further. There are in the world many good things which would have no place unless there were evils. Thus there would be no patience of the righteous if there were no ill-will of the persecutors, nor would there be any place for vindictive justice were there no crimes. Even in the physical order, there would be no generation of one thing unless there were corruption of another. Consequently, if evil were entirely excluded from the universe by divine providence, it would be necessary to lessen the great number of good things. This ought not to be, since good is more powerful in goodness than evil is in malice, as was shown above. (Ch. 12.) Therefore, evil should not be utterly excluded from things by divine providence.

Again. The good of the whole is of more account than the good of the part. Therefore, it belongs to a prudent governor to overlook a lack of goodness in a part that there may be an increase of goodness in the whole: thus the builder hides the foundation of a house underground so that the whole house may stand firm. Now if evil were taken away from certain parts of the universe, the perfection of the universe would be much diminished, since its beauty results from the ordered unity of good and evil things. This is because evil arises from the lack of good, and yet certain goods are occasioned from those very evils through the providence of the governor, even as the silent pause gives sweetness to the chant. Therefore, evil should not be excluded from things by divine providence.

Further. Other things, especially those of lower degree, are directed to man’s good as their end. But if there were no evils in the world, man’s good would be lessened considerably, both in his knowledge and in his desire or love of the good. For his knowledge of the good is increased by comparison with evil, and through suffering evil his desire of doing good is kindled. Thus the sick know best what a great good health is, and they also burn more for it than those who have it. Therefore, it does not belong to divine providence to exclude evil from the world altogether.

Hence it is said: I make peace and create evil (Isa 45:7); and: Does evil befall a city, unless the Lord has done it? (Amos 3:6).

Hereby we refute the error of those who said that there is no God through observing the presence of evil in the world. Thus Boethius introduces a philosopher who asks: If there be a God, whence comes evil? (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 1.) On the contrary, he should have argued: if there is evil, there is a God. For there would be no evil if the order of good were removed, the privation of which is evil; there would be no such order if there were no God.

Moreover, by what has been laid down, an occasion of erring is removed from those who denied that divine providence extends to this corruptible world because they observed that many evils occur in it. They said that incorruptible things alone are subject to God’s providence, because no defects and no evils are to be found in them.

Also, we remove an occasion of error from the Manicheans, who posited two first active principles, good and evil, as though evil could have no place in the providence of a good God.

Also, the doubt of some (namely, whether evil deeds are from God) is solved. For, since we proved (Ch. 66. seqq.) that every agent produces its action insofar as it acts by the power of God, and that therefore God is the cause of all effects and actions; and since again we proved (Ch. 66.) that evil and defect in things ruled by divine providence result from the condition of the secondary causes, which may be themselves defective, it is evident that evil deeds, considered as defective, are not from God, but from their defective proximate causes. But insofar as they possess activity and entity, they must be from God, even as a limp is from the motive power insofar as it has movement; but insofar as it has a defect, it is from the crookedness of the leg.