Chapter 73 — That divine providence does not exclude free-will

Therefore, it is clear that providence does not exclude free will.

For the government of any prudent governor is directed to the perfection of the things governed, as regards its attainment, increase or preservation. Therefore, whatever pertains to perfection is to be safeguarded by providence rather than what savors of imperfection and defect. Now in inanimate beings, the contingency of causes arises from imperfection and deficiency, because by their nature they are determined to one effect which they always produce, unless there be an impediment due either to weakness of power, or some extrinsic agency, or indisposition of matter. For this reason natural causes are not indifferent to one or other result, but more often produce their effect in the same way, and seldom fail. On the other hand, it is owing to the perfection of the will that it is a contingent cause, because its power is not confined to one effect, and it is in its power to produce this effect or that, so that it is indifferent to either. Therefore, it belongs to divine providence to preserve the freedom of the will more than contingency in natural causes.

Moreover. It belongs to divine providence to use things according to their mode, and the mode of a thing’s action is in keeping with its form which is the principle of action. Now the form through which a voluntary agent acts is not determinate, because the will acts through a form apprehended by the intellect, since the apprehended good moves the will objectively; and the intellect has not one determinate form of the effect, but is of such a nature as to understand a multitude of forms, so that the will is able to produce manifold effects. Therefore, it does not belong to divine providence to exclude freedom of the will.

Again. The things governed are brought to a becoming end by the government of providence. Hence Gregory of Nyssa says of divine providence that it is God’s will from which all existing things receive a fitting end. (Nemesius, On Human Nature, ch. 43.) Now the last end of every creature is to attain to God’s likeness, as we proved above. (Ch. 19.) It would therefore be inconsistent with divine providence if any thing were deprived of that whereby it attains to a likeness to God. But the voluntary agent attains to God’s likeness in that he acts freely, for we have proved that there is free will in God. (Bk. 1, ch. 88.) Therefore, providence does not deprive the will of liberty.

Besides. Providence multiplies good things among the subjects of its government. Therefore, any thing that would deprive things of many good things does not belong to providence. Now if the will were deprived of freedom, many good things would be done away with. For no praise would be given to human virtue, since virtue would be of no account if man acted not freely. There would be no justice in rewarding or punishing, if man were not free in acting well or ill. There would be no prudence in taking advice, which would be of no use if things occurred of necessity. Therefore, it would be inconsistent with providence to deprive the will of liberty.

Hence it is said: It was God who created man in the beginning, and he left him in the power of his own counsel (Sir 15:14); and again: Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him (Sir 15:17[18]).

Hereby we refute the opinion of the Stoics who held that all things happen of necessity according to the order of infallible causes, which order the Greeks called eimarmevn.