Chapter 35 — Against the error of Eutyches

We have proved in many ways that the mystery of the Incarnation is to be understood in such a way that God’s Word and man are united in one and the same person. Nevertheless, there still remains a difficulty in the study of this truth. The divine nature is necessarily accompanied by its personality. And the same would seem to apply to human nature, since ‘that which subsists in an intellectual or rational nature’ is the definition of a person. Hence it seems impossible that there be one person with two natures, divine and human.

In order to solve this difficulty, various explanations have been offered. Eutyches, in order to safeguard the unity of person in Christ against Nestorius, contended that there was also but one nature in Christ, so that although before the union there were two distinct natures, divine and human, in the very union they coalesced into one. Hence he said that Christ’s person was of two natures, but not subsisting in two natures. On this account he was condemned in the Council of Chalcedon.

The falseness of this view may be shown in many ways. We have proved above (Bk. 1, ch. 20.) that in Jesus Christ there was a body, a rational soul, and the divinity. Moreover, it is evident that Christ’s body, even after the union, was not the divinity of the Word; since that body, even after the union, was passible, visible to the eye, and confined within the lines of its members. All of this is foreign to the divine nature of the Word, as we have sufficiently proved above. Likewise, Christ’s soul after the union was distinct from the divine nature of the Word, since even after the union it was affected by the passions of sorrow, fear, and anger, which in no way can be ascribed to the divinity of the Word, as we have shown. (Bk. 1, ch. 89.) Now the human soul and body constitute the human nature. Therefore, even after the union, the human nature in Christ was distinct from the divinity of the Word, which is the divine nature. Therefore, after the union, there were two natures in Christ.

Again. A thing is said to be natural in reference to nature. Now a thing is said to be natural by reason of its having a form, even as that which is made by art. We do not call the building a house until it has the form designed by art; nor is a thing a horse until it has the form pertaining to that nature. Accordingly, the form of a natural thing is its nature. Hence we must say that there were two forms in Christ, even after the union. Thus, speaking of Jesus Christ, the Apostle says that when he was in the form of God . . . he took the form of a servant (Phil 2:6–7).

Now we cannot say that the form of God is the same as the form of a servant. For nothing takes what it has already; so that if the form of God and the form of a servant are the same, since he already had the form of God, he would not have taken the form of a servant. Nor can it be said that the form of God in Christ was destroyed through the union, because then Christ would not be God after the union. Nor again can it be said that the form of a servant was destroyed in the union, because then he would not have taken the form of a servant. But neither can it be said that the form of a servant was mixed with the form of God, because when things are made into a mixture, they lose their integrity, and each is partly destroyed. Therefore, it could not be said that he took the form of a servant, but a part thereof. Therefore, according to the words of the Apostle, we must say that there were two forms in Christ after the union, and consequently two natures.

Further. The word ‘nature’ was first employed to signify the coming into being of things by nativity, and from that it was transferred to indicate the principle of this kind of generation; and then further still to signify the intrinsic principle of movement in a movable thing. And since this principle is matter or form, ‘nature’ also stands for the form or matter of a natural thing having within itself the principle of its movement. And, seeing that form and matter constitute the essence of a natural thing, the meaning of the word ‘nature’ is made to extend to the essence of anything existing in nature; thus the nature of a thing is its essence indicated by its definition. It is in this sense that we are using the term now, and in which we say that there are a divine and a human nature in Christ.

Accordingly, if (as Eutyches maintained) the human and the divine nature were two before the union, and if through the union they combined together to form one nature, this must have been by one of the ways in which one thing is made out of many.

This happens first of all by mere coordination: thus many houses make a town, and many soldiers make an army. Second, by coordination and composition: thus a house is made of many conjoined parts coordinated and bound together. These two ways, however, do not suffice to form one nature out of several. Accordingly, things that are formed by coordination or composition are not natural things, and their unity is not unity of nature.

The third way in which one thing is made of several is by mixture: thus a mixed body is formed from the four elements. Yet neither does this way apply to the case in point. First, because only those things can be mixed together which agree in matter, and which are of such a nature as to be active or passive in relation to one another. Now this does not apply to our case, since it has been proved (Bk. 1, cc. 16-17.) that God is immaterial and wholly impassible. Second, because it is impossible to mix together two things, one of which far exceeds the other. Thus if one were to put a drop of wine into a thousand gallons of water, there will be no mixture, but destruction of the wine. Thus again logs placed on a furnace are not said to be mixed with the fire; they are consumed by it, on account of its exceeding power. Now the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature of man, because God’s power is infinite, as we have proved. (Bk. 1, ch. 43.) Therefore, a mixture of the two natures is quite impossible. Third, because granted that such a mixture were made, neither nature would retain its integrity, because the ingredients do not remain entire in a real mixture. Consequently, after the two natures (namely, the divine and human) have been mixed together, neither nature would remain, but a third thing, and so Christ would be neither God nor man. Therefore, we cannot admit the explanation of Eutyches that, whereas there were two natures before the union, there was but one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ after the union, through the fusion of the two natures into one. Consequently, it must be explained by saying that only one of the natures remained after the union. Either, then, in Christ there was only the nature of God, and what in him seemed human was purely imaginary, as the Manicheans said; or the divine nature was changed into the human, as Apollinaris maintained: both of which views we have already refuted. (Chs. 28. seqq.) Therefore, it is impossible that there were two natures before, and only one after, the union.

Further. Two complete natures never combine together to form one, because each is a whole in itself; but when one thing is made out of several, these come under the heading of parts. Hence, since one thing is made out of a soul and a body, neither soul nor body can be called a nature, in the sense in which we are now speaking, because neither has a complete species, but each is a part of a nature. Accordingly, as the human nature is a complete nature, and so likewise is the divine nature, they cannot possibly combine together to form one nature, unless both or one of them be corrupted. But this is impossible, since we have shown that the one Christ is both true God and true man. (Chs. 28. seqq.) Therefore, it is impossible that there be but one nature in Christ.

Again, one nature may result from two permanent things. This may be as from bodily parts—for instance, an animal is made of various members—and this does not apply to the case in point, since the divine nature is not corporeal. Or it may be as one thing is made from matter and form—for instance, an animal from soul and body—and neither does this apply to the case, since God is neither matter, nor can he be the form of anything, as proved above. (Bk. 1, cc. 17, 27.) Accordingly, if Christ is true God and true man, as we have proved, (Chs. 28. seqq.) it is impossible that there be but one nature in him.

Further. Subtraction or addition of an essential principle diversifies the species of a thing, and therefore changes the nature, which is nothing but the essence as indicated by the definition, as we have stated. (Ch. 33.) For this reason we observe that a specific difference added to or subtracted from a definition causes a difference of species. Thus a rational and an irrational animal differ in species, and likewise in numbers, the addition or subtraction of unity gives us various species of numbers. Now the form is an essential principle. Hence every additional form makes another species and another nature, in the sense in which we speak of nature now. (Ch. 33.) Therefore, if the divine nature of the Word be added to the human nature as a form, another nature will be the result. Consequently, Christ’s will be not a human nature, but some other, even as an animate body is of another nature from that which is a body only.

Moreover. Things that do not have a common nature are not alike in species (as, for instance, man and horse). Now if Christ’s nature is composed of the divine and human natures, it is evident that other men will not have the same nature as Christ. Therefore, he will not be like us in species. And this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle: He had to be made like his brethren in every respect (Heb 2:17).

Again. Form and matter always make together one species, which can be predicated of many individuals, actually or potentially, as far as the specific ratio is concerned. If, then, the divine nature be added, like a form, to the human nature, from this combination there must result some common species that can be predicated of several individuals. But this is clearly false, since there is but one Jesus Christ, God and man. Therefore, the divine and human natures did not constitute one nature in Christ.

Moreover. The statement of Eutyches—that before the union there were two natures in Christ—also appears to be against faith. For, since human nature is composed of soul and body, it follows that either Christ’s body, or Christ’s soul, or both, existed before his Incarnation. This is shown to be false by what we have said above. It is therefore against faith to say that there were two natures in Christ before the union, and that there was one after the union.