Chapter 48 — That we must not say that Christ is a creature

It is also evident that, although the human nature assumed by the Word is a creature, it cannot be said, without qualification that Christ is a creature.

To be created is to be made. Now, since being made terminates in being simply, it belongs to that which has substantial being, and this is the complete individual substance, which, if it be of intellectual nature, is called a person or again a hypostasis. On the other hand, forms, accidents, even parts are not said to be made, save in reference to something, because they are not self-subsistent, but subsist in something else. Hence when a thing is made white, it is said to be made not simply, but relatively. Now in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person besides that of the Word of God, who is uncreated, as proved above. (Ch. 33.) Therefore, we cannot say simply that Christ is a creature, although we can say so with a qualification: for instance, that he is a creature, as man, or in respect of his human nature.

Now, although the statement that an individual substance is made one of its proper attributes—accidents, for instance, or parts—cannot be made simply, but only relatively, nevertheless we can predicate of a subject simply whatever results naturally and appropriately from its accidents or parts. Thus ‘seeing’ is predicated of a man simply, as a consequence of his having eyes; ‘curly haired,’ by reason of his hair; and ‘visible,’ because he is colored. Hence whatsoever results properly from human nature can be predicated simply of Christ—for instance, that he is a man, that he is visible, that he walked, and so on—whereas whatever is proper to the person cannot be attributed to Christ in reference to his human nature, except with a qualification, expressed or implied.