Chapter 40 — Objections against faith in the Incarnation

This view of the Incarnation, as laid down by the Catholic faith, is beset with a number of difficulties which have led the enemies of the faith to impugn this mystery.

It has been proved (Bk. 1, ch. 20.) that God is neither a body nor a force in a body. But, if he took flesh, it follows that either he was transformed into a body or that he became a force in a body after the Incarnation. Therefore, it would seem impossible for God to be incarnate.

Again. Whatsoever acquires a new nature is subject to substantial change, because when a thing is generated, it acquires a nature. Hence, if the person of the Son of God became subsistent in human nature, it would seem that he was substantially changed.

Further. No hypostasis extends beyond the nature in which it subsists; rather does nature extend beyond the hypostasis, seeing that it includes many hypostases. And thus, if by the Incarnation the hypostasis of the Son of God became a hypostasis of human nature, it would follow that, after the Incarnation, the Son of God was not everywhere, since human nature is not everywhere.

Moreover. One and the same thing has only one quiddity, for this is its essence, which is one in each one thing. Now the quiddity of a thing is its nature, because its nature is indicated by its definition. Therefore, it seems that one hypostasis cannot subsist in two natures.

Again. In things devoid of matter, the quiddity is not distinct from the thing, as we proved above. (Bk. 1, cc. 21-22.) This is especially true of God, who is not only his own quiddity, but also his own being. Now human nature cannot be the same as a divine hypostasis. Therefore, it seems that a divine person cannot subsist in human nature.

Again. Nature is more simple and more formal than the hypostasis that subsists in it, since the common nature is confined to a particular hypostasis by the addition of something material. If, then, a divine hypostasis subsists in human nature, it would appear to follow that human nature is more simple and more formal than the divine hypostasis: and this is altogether impossible.

Further. It is only in things composed of matter and form that the singular differs from its quiddity, in that the singular is individualized by signate matter, which is not included in the quiddity and specific nature: for this or that matter is included in the designation of Socrates, but not in the definition of human nature. Consequently, every hypostasis that subsists in human nature is constituted by signate matter, and this cannot be said of a divine hypostasis. Therefore, it would seem impossible for the hypostasis of the Word of God to subsist in human nature.

Moreover. In Christ the soul and body were not less effective than in other men. Now in other men, they constitute suppositum, hypostasis, or person by their union. Hence, in Christ, a suppositum, hypostasis, or person likewise results from the union of soul and body. But this is not the suppositum, hypostasis, or person of the Word of God, because this is eternal. Therefore, in Christ there seems to be another suppositum, hypostasis, or person besides the suppositum, hypostasis, or person of the Word of God.

Further. As human nature in general consists of a soul and body, so do this soul and this body make this man, or a human hypostasis. Now in Christ there were this soul and this body. Therefore, from their union there seemed to result a hypostasis, and so the same conclusion follows as above.

Again. This man Christ, considered as formed merely of soul and body, is a substance. But he is not a substance in general. Therefore, he is a particular substance; and consequently a hypostasis.

Moreover. If in Christ there is but one suppositum of both human and divine natures, it follows that the divine hypostasis is included in the definition of this man Christ. But it is not included in the definition of other men. Therefore, ‘man’ is predicated equivocally of Christ and of other men, so that he would not be of the same species as we are.

Further. We have proved (Chs. 28. seq.) that in Christ are these three: body, soul, and divinity. Now the soul, being a more noble thing than the body, is not the body’s suppositum, but its form. Neither, therefore, is something divine a suppositum of human nature. Rather, we ought to say that it informs human nature.

Further. Whatsoever accrues to a thing that is already complete in being is accidental to it. Now, since the Word of God is eternal, it is clear that the flesh assumed by him accrued to him when he was already complete in being. Therefore, he came by it accidentally.