Chapter 49 — Reply to the objections given above against the Incarnation

Bearing these things in mind, we can now easily reply to the above objections against faith in the Incarnation. (Ch. 40.)

We have shown that the Incarnation of the Word does not mean that the Word was changed into flesh, or united to the body as its form. (Ch. 41.) Therefore, from the fact that the Word became incarnate, it does not follow, as the first objection maintained, that God is really a body, or a bodily power.

Likewise, from the fact that the Word assumed human nature, we cannot conclude that he was substantially changed. No change took place in God’s Word himself, but only in the human nature assumed by the Word. It was in reference to that nature that the Word was both begotten and born in the course of time, but not in reference to himself.

The third objection proves nothing. A hypostasis does not extend beyond the nature from which it has its subsistence. Now the Word of God does not derive subsistence from human nature; nay, rather he draws human nature to his own subsistence or personality, since he subsists not through it, but in it. Hence nothing prevents the Word of God from being everywhere, although the human nature assumed by the Word of God is not everywhere.

This helps us to reply to the fourth objection. Every subsistent thing must have but one nature, through which it has being simply: therefore, the Word of God has being simply through the divine nature alone, and not through human nature. It is owing to the latter that he has a particular kind of being, namely that he is a man.

The fifth objection is solved in the same way. It is impossible that the nature through which the Word subsists be other than the person of the Word. Now he subsists through the divine and not through the human nature, drawing the latter to his own subsistence so as to subsist therein, as we said before. It does not follow, then, that the human nature is identified with the person of the Word.

Therefore, the sixth objection also is answered. For the hypostasis is less simple, either in reality or as existing in the mind, than the nature whereby it has being: in reality, when the hypostasis is not its own nature; in the mind only, in those things where the hypostasis is identical with the nature. Now the hypostasis of the Word is not constituted simply by human nature, so as to exist by it; by it, the Word only had that he was a man. Hence it does not follow that the human nature is more simple than the Word, considered as Word, but only inasmuch as the Word is this man.

Hence follows the reply to the seventh objection. It does not follow that the hypostasis of God’s Word is simply constituted by signate matter, but only inasmuch as he is this man. For it is only in this sense that he is constituted by human nature, as stated above.

That the human soul and body in Christ were drawn into the personality of the Word without constituting another person besides the person of the Word proves not that they were less effective, but that they had greater excellence. For a thing has better being when united to its betters than when it is by itself. Thus the sensitive soul has better being in man than in other animals, for in these it is the principal form, but not in man.

Hence again we gather the reply to the ninth objection. This soul and this body were truly in Christ, and yet they did not give him another personality from that of the Word of God, since they were assumed into the personality of the divine Word. Even so the body, when it is without the soul, has its own species; but when it is united to the soul, it takes its species from the soul.

Hereby is indicated the reply to the tenth objection. It is clear that this man Christ is not a universal, but a particular, substance. Also that he is a hypostasis, and yet not a distinct hypostasis from that of the Word, because human nature was assumed by the hypostasis of the Word, that the Word might subsist in the human as well as in the divine nature. Now that which subsists in human nature is an individual man. Therefore, when we say, ‘this man,’ the Word is indicated.

If, however, someone were to apply this same argument to human nature so as to say that it is a substance, not universal, but particular, and consequently a hypostasis, he would clearly be in the wrong. For human nature, even in Socrates or Plato, is not a hypostasis: it is that which subsists in human nature that is a hypostasis.

When it is said that it is a substance, and a particular substance, the sense is not the same as when we say that a hypostasis is a particular substance. According to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.8.) substance has a twofold signification. In the first place, it may indicate a subject in the genus of substance (namely, a hypostasis); second, it may mean ‘what a thing is’ (namely, its nature). Nor are the parts of a substance called particular substances as though they subsisted of themselves, but they subsist in the whole. Hence they cannot be called hypostases, seeing that none of them is a complete substance: otherwise there would be as many hypostases in a man as there are parts.

The eleventh objection is answered thus. Equivocation consists in applying the same name to various forms, but not to different supposita. Thus there is no equivocation if ‘man’ stands at one time for Plato, at another time for Socrates. Accordingly, the term ‘man,’ whether applied to Christ or to other men, always indicates the same form (namely, human nature), and consequently the predication here is univocal. The only way in which it has a different signification is that when it is applied to Christ, it stands for the uncreated hypostasis, whereas when it is applied to other men, it stands for the created hypostasis.

And yet the hypostasis of the Word is not said to be the suppositum of the human nature as though it were the subject, and the latter were its form, as the twelfth objection suggested. This would indeed be necessary if the hypostasis of the Word were constituted in being simply by the human nature, which we have shown to be false. The hypostasis of the Word is said to be the suppositum of human nature, as drawing it to his own subsistence; thus a thing is drawn to something better to which it is united.

From the fact that the Word already existed from eternity, it does not follow that human nature is joined to the Word accidentally, as the last objection concluded. The Word assumed human nature in order to be truly man. Now to be a man is to be a kind of substance. Since, then, the hypostasis of the Word is a man through being united to human nature, this nature is not joined to him accidentally: for accidents do not give substantial being.