Chapter 38 — Refutation of those who hold that in the person of Christ there are two hypostases or supposita

In order to avoid the absurdities involved in the foregoing opinion, some others held that in our Lord Jesus Christ one substance resulted from the union of soul and flesh, namely, a man of the same species as other men. They say that this man is united to the Word of God not indeed in nature, but in person, so that there would be one person of God’s Word and of this man. But, since this man is an individual substance—that is to say a hypostasis and suppositum—they draw a distinction between this hypostasis and the Word of God, although they admit that both are but one person. On account of this unity, they admit that we say that this man is the Word of God, or that the Word of God is this man, the sense being that the Word of God is a man—that is, the person of the Word of God is the person of the man, and vice versa. For this reason they state that whatever may be predicated of the Word of God may be predicated of this man, and vice versa: but with a qualification, so that when it is said: God suffered, the sense is: The man who is God, by reason of the unity of person, suffered; and when it is said: A man created the stars, the sense is: He who is a man.

This opinion, however, must necessarily fall into the error of Nestorius. If we observe the difference between hypostasis and person, we shall see that they do not differ altogether. In fact, person is a kind of hypostasis, since it is a hypostasis of a particular nature (namely, rational). This may be seen from the definition given by Boethius: A person is an individual substance of rational nature. Hence, though not every hypostasis is a person, every hypostasis of rational nature is a person. Accordingly, if from the mere union of soul and body there resulted in Christ a particular substance which is a hypostasis (namely, this man), it follows that from this union there resulted a person. Consequently, there would be two persons in Christ—the newly constituted person of this man, and the person of the eternal Word. And this is the error of Nestorius.

Again. Even if the hypostasis of this man were not a person, still the hypostasis of the Word of God is the same as his person. Hence, if the hypostasis of the Word of God is not the hypostasis of this man, neither will the person of the Word be the person of this man; and so it will be false that, as they say, the person of this man is the person of the Word of God.

Moreover. Granted that there be a distinction between the person and the hypostasis of the Word of God, or of this man, the only conceivable difference would be that the person adds some property to the hypostasis. For it cannot add anything of the genus of substance, since hypostasis is the chief thing in the genus of substance, being called a first substance. Accordingly, if the union be effected in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that it is effected in an accidental quality. This again is the error of Nestorius.

Further. Cyril says in a letter to Nestorius that was approved in the Council of Ephesus: If anyone does not confess that the Word of God the Father was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with his flesh is one, the same person being both God and man, let him be anathema. (P. 1, ch. 26, can. 2.) In fact, nearly all the decrees of the councils declare that this savors of the error of Nestorius, who said that there were two hypostases in Christ.

Again. Damascene says: We acknowledge the union of two perfect natures, united not only in the prosopon, (Greek: προσῶπον.) that is, person, as Nestorius, the enemy of God, maintained, but hypostatically. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 4.) From which it is clear that Nestorius maintained that there was one person, but two hypostases.

Further. Hypostasis and suppositum must be the same, since, according to the Philosopher, (De Praedic., cap. De Substantia.) all the other things are predicated of the first substance (that is to say, hypostasis)—namely, both universals in the genus of substance, and accidents. Consequently, if there are two hypostases in Christ, there are also two supposita.

Moreover. If the Word and this man have different supposita, neither suppositum presupposes the other. Now, if the supposita be distinct, things predicated of them are also distinct, since divine predicates do not apply to the suppositum of the man, except by reason of the Word, nor vice versa. Consequently, we must make a distinction in the things that Scripture says of Christ—that is to say, between divine and human predicates. Now this is against the declaration of Cyril, which was confirmed in the Council: If anyone ascribe to two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by himself of himself, and applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and others (as though they were true of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema. (Council of Ephesus, P. 1, ch. 26, can. 4.)

Again. According to this view, things that are applicable to the Word of God by reason of his nature could not be predicated of the man save on account of their being associated in one person. And this they indicated by inserting a qualifying phrase, where they explain the sentence, ‘This man created the stars,’ as ‘The Son of God (who is this man), etc.’ And so on in like manner with other such sentences. So that when we say, ‘This man is God,’ the sense is, ‘The Word of God, who is this man, is God.’ Now Cyril condemns these expressions: If anyone dare to say that the assumed humanity is to be co-adored, and co-glorified, and co-named God, together with the Word of God, as one with another (since the prefix ‘co-’ always signifies this) instead of giving one and the same adoration and one and the same glory to the Emmanuel, as the Word made flesh, let him be anathema. (Council of Ephesus, can. 8.)

Further. If this man differs in suppositum from the Word of God, he can have no association with the person of the Word except through the fact of his being assumed by the Word. But this is foreign to the right sense of faith. Thus Pope Felix the martyr is quoted in the Council of Ephesus, as saying: We believe that Jesus our God, born of the Virgin Mary, is the eternal Son and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there be another besides him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there was another besides him; but while he remained perfect God, he became a perfect man, and took flesh of the Virgin. (P. 2, Act. 1.)

Again. Things that differ in suppositum are several simply, and they are not one except relatively. If, then, in Christ there are two supposita, it follows that he is simply two, and not one, except relatively. In that case Jesus would be no more, since a thing exists insofar as it is one: so that whatsoever is not one simply is simply nonexistent.