D. 1 - Sacraments in general
The first part is divided into two: in the first, the intention is stated; in the second, it is pursued, at a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing. (Sent. IV, 1.2.1, citing Augustine, De civitate Dei, Bk. 10, ch. 5.) Concerning this he does two things. First, he proposes the matter to be discussed. Second, he shows what will be said about it: first, at: concerning which, four things must first be considered. (Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, 1.1.2.)
A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing. Here he begins to define the sacraments in general, and it is divided into two parts: in the first, he defines the sacraments in themselves; in the second, he divides the sacraments into their parts, at: a sacrament consists of two elements. (Sent. IV, 1.5.6.) The first is in two parts: in the first, he shows what a sacrament is; in the second, the necessity of the institution of the sacraments, at: The sacraments were instituted for a threefold cause. (Sent. IV, 1.5.1.) The first is in two parts: in the first, he seeks out the genus of sacraments; in the second, the differences, at: But some signs are natural . . . others are conventional. (Sent. IV, 1.4.1, citing Augustine, De doctrina christiana, Bk. 2, ch. 1, n. 2.) Concerning the first point he does two things: first, he places the sacrament in the genus of signs; second, he defines signs, at: A sign is a thing which, over and above the form which it impresses on the senses, causes something else to come into the mind through itself. (Sent. IV, 1.3.1, citing Augustine, De doctrina christiana, Bk. 2, ch. 1, n. 1.)
But some signs are natural . . . others are conventional. Here he delineates the differences: first, one difference common to every sacrament, which is that it bears an image; second, another difference which is proper to sacraments of the New Law, in which the nature of a sacrament is perfectly realized, namely, that it acts as a cause, at: For a sacrament is properly so called because it is a sign of God’s grace and a form of invisible grace in such a manner that it bears its image and is its cause. (Sent. IV, 1.4.2.)
A sacrament consists of two elements. Here he divides a sacrament into two parts: the first is essential parts, and the second, subjective parts, at: it now remains to note the difference between the old and new sacraments. (Sent. IV, 1.6.1.) And concerning these, he does two things: first, he shows the difference between the sacraments of the Old Law and of the New Law; second, he examines a certain sacrament of the Old Law which shares the most with the sacraments of the New Law, at: And yet there was one among those sacraments, namely circumcision, which conferred the same remedy against sin as baptism does now. (Sent. IV, 1.7.1.) The first of these parts with everything preceding it is the topic of the present lecture.
Question 1
The essence of the sacraments
Here five questions arise:
first, what is a sacrament;
- second, on the necessity of the sacraments;
- third, what a sacrament consists of;
- fourth, on the efficacy of the sacraments of the New Law;
- fifth, on the efficacy of the sacraments of the Old Law.
- Article 1
What is a sacrament
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 60, aa. 1, 2, 3.) It seems that ‘sacrament’ is unfittingly defined by saying a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing. (Lombard attributes this definition to Augustine; it seems to be based on phrases in Book 10 of De civitate Dei (CCSL 47), especially ch. 5, l. 15: “sacrificium ergo uisibile inuisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum est.”) For sacraments are bonds of health, as it says in the Gloss on the Psalm: who heals the broken-hearted (Ps 147 [146]:3). (For the Gloss, see PL 113:1073.) But the idea of medicine is not that it signifies something, but only that it brings about health. Therefore, a sacrament is not a sign.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, all sensible creatures are signs of invisible divine things, as is clear from Romans 1:20, but nevertheless they cannot be called sacraments. Therefore, sacrament is wrongly defined as a sign of a sacred thing.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the brass serpent that is spoken of in Numbers 21 was a sign of a sacred thing, namely, the cross of Christ, but it was still not a sacrament. Therefore, the definition mentioned is badly written.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, there are three kinds of sign, namely the demonstrative, which concerns the present; the commemorative, which concerns the past; and the prognostic, which concerns the future. But none of these corresponds to a sacrament, since sometimes the person receiving the sacrament does not have grace, nor has had it, nor ever will have it afterward. Therefore, not every sacrament is a sign.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, sign is not in the same genus as cause. But some sacraments are causes. Therefore, not every sacrament is a sign.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a sign is wrongly defined when it is said, a sign is a reality that conveys something else to the mind, besides the appearance it presents to the senses. (Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, Bk. 2, ch. 1: “signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem uenire” (CCSL 32).) For one of two opposites cannot be included in the definition of the other. But reality and sign are divided as opposites, as is clear in Distinction 1 of Book I. Therefore, ‘reality’ should not be included in the definition of sign.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Prior Analytics, every effect can be a sign of its cause. (See Prior Analytics, Bk. 2, ch. 27: “Anything such that when it is another thing is, or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after, is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being . . . For example the proof that a woman is with child because she has milk” (70a7–14).) But some effects are spiritual, and so they present no appearance to the senses. Therefore, not every sign presents some appearance to the senses.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, every utterance is made by certain signs. But angels speak without uttering sensible words, as was said in Distinction 2 of Book II. (See In II Sent., d. 2, q. 2, a. 3.) Therefore, not every sign is sensible.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this definition is badly written: a sacrament is the visible form of invisible grace, so that it bears an image and becomes a cause. (Summa Sent. tract. 4, ch. 1 (PL 176:177). Elsewhere Lombard attributes this definition to Augustine’s De civitate Dei, where it does not appear verbatim. In Sic et Non, Qu. 117, sent. 109, l. 818, Peter Abelard cites “a certain epistle” of Augustine’s as stating: “Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma” (ed. Boyer/McKeon, 407)—a phrase frequently quoted by medieval authors such as Gratian, Berengarius, and Augustine of Dacia.) For just as it says in the text, sacraments consist of two things, namely, things and words. But just as things are visible, so words are audible. Therefore, it should have said: “visible and audible form.”
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every form is either intrinsic or exemplar. But it is self-evident that sacraments are not intrinsic forms of invisible grace; nor, on the other hand are they exemplar forms, since invisible grace does not imitate visible reality, but vice versa. Therefore, a sacrament is in no way a form of invisible grace.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the baptismal character is a sacrament-and-reality, as will be said below, in Distinction 4, Question 1. And similarly the body of Christ is a real thing existing on the altar. But neither of these is a visible form. Therefore, the definition is not well written.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, an image is what is made in imitation of something else, while an exemplar form is what something is made in imitation of. Therefore, one thing cannot be a form and an image with regard to the same thing. But a sacrament is a form of invisible grace. Therefore it is not an image with regard to the same thing.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, the definition of a genus should not include the constitutive difference of one of the species into which the genus is divided. But to be the cause of what it represents is the constitutive difference of sacraments of the New Law. Therefore, it should not be included in the general definition of sacraments.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the definition that Augustine sets down, namely, a sacrament is that in which, under the cover of visible things, divine power works our salvation in a hidden way, (See earlier note.) is unfitting. For secrecy is opposed to manifestation. But a sign is instituted to make something manifest. Since, therefore, a cover implies secrecy, it seems that it is wrongly included in the definition of sacrament.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, often those receiving the sacraments do not obtain salvation. Therefore, working salvation should not be included in the definition of sacrament.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in holy men divine power is working for their salvation, as it says, You worked all our works in us (Isa 26:12). But holy men are not called sacraments. Therefore, the same as before.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the definition of Hugh of St. Victor is inadequate. (Parallel: ST III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 2.) It goes like this: A sacrament is a corporeal or material element set externally before the eyes, signifying something by its institution, representing something by its likeness, and containing invisible grace by its sanctification. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 2: “Sacramentum est corporale vel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter propositum ex similitudine repraesentans, et ex institutione significans, et ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritalem gratiam” (PL 176:317). Part of this text is cited as the sed contra of ST q. 62, a. 3: “sacramentum ex sanctificatione invisibilem gratiam continet.”) For matter is not said of the whole, but the material element is the matter of a sacrament. Therefore, it is wrongly set down as the genus in the definition of sacrament.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in certain sacraments there is no element, but rather something made from elements, such as the oil in extreme unction. Therefore, this definition is not common to all the sacraments.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a likeness is the same quality in different things. But the same quality cannot exist in spiritual and corporeal things; therefore, there is no likeness. Therefore, it is wrong to say representing something by a likeness.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, if there is any similitude, then it is from the natural properties of the material element. Therefore, if it represents something by similitude (and to represent is the same thing as to signify, as can be seen clearly by the definition of sign set forth in the text), then a sacrament does not signify anything by its institution.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, ‘sacrament,’ according to the proper meaning of the word, seems to convey ‘sanctity’ in an active sense, so that anything that renders something sacred is called a sacrament, just as whatever renders something ornate is called an ornament. But since the actions of the things acting should be proportionate to the condition of the things acted upon, for this reason in the sanctification of man there should be a mode of sanctification befitting man according as he is rational, for this is what makes him a man. But insofar as he is rational, his knowledge arises from his senses. Thus it is necessary that he be sanctified in such a way that his sanctification also becomes known to him through the likenesses of sensible things. And in keeping with this one finds diverse ways of taking the word ‘sacrament.’ For sometimes ‘sacrament’ conveys the thing by which a consecration happens; in this way the Passion of Christ is called a sacrament. And this is the first way of taking the word that the Master mentions.
But sometimes it includes the mode of consecration that befits a man according as both the sanctifying causes and his own sanctification are made known to him through sensible likenesses. And in this way the sacraments of the New Law are called sacraments, for they not only consecrate but also signify sanctity in the way mentioned and signify the first causes of sanctification as well: for example, baptism both sanctifies, and designates purity and is a sign of the death of Christ.
However, sometimes it includes only the signification of the consecrations mentioned, as a sign of health is called healthy. And in this way the sacraments of the Old Law are called sacraments, inasmuch as they represent those things that were accomplished in Christ, including the sacraments of the New Law.
Therefore, leaving behind the first way of saying ‘sacrament,’ (since this kind of sacrament was discussed in Book III), the only way to give another common definition to ‘sacraments’ said in the second and third ways is to say: A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing, although one must understand behind the word ‘sign’ that manner of signifying which is through the likeness of a sensible thing. The Master adds this where he says that it bears an image.
Reply Obj. 1: Although signification does not belong to the notion of healing simply speaking, it does belong to the notion of the kind of healing accomplished through the sacraments, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Sensible things are not signs of divine things as things that sanctify, but as things that are sacred in themselves. But a sacrament should be understood as a sign of a sacred thing as sanctifying. And thus it is not necessary that all sensible things be sacraments.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the bronze serpent was a sign of a sacred thing sanctifying, nonetheless it was not the sign of a sacred thing actually then sanctifying; for it was not employed for the sake of reaping some effect of sanctification, but only the effect of exterior healing. And the same argument would apply to an image of a cross that is set up only as a representation.
Reply Obj. 4: Sacraments of the New Law signify three things. They signify the first sanctifying cause, as baptism signifies the death of Christ; and in this regard they are commemorative signs. They also signify the effect of sanctification that they cause, and this is their principal signification; and in this way they are demonstrative signs. Nor is it any obstacle if someone does not receive sanctity, since this is not due to anything lacking in the sacrament, which, considered in itself, is such as to confer grace. Finally, they signify the goal of sanctification, namely eternal glory, and in this regard they are prognostic signs. The sacraments of the Old Law, however, were completely prognostic signs.
Reply Obj. 5: A sign, in itself, conveys something manifest with respect to us, by which we are led to the understanding of something hidden. And since quite often effects are more manifest to us than causes, for this reason sign is sometimes divided against cause, just as a ‘quia’ demonstration is said to be through a sign of what is common, as is said in the Physics 1; (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 184a17–21.) but a ‘propter quid’ demonstration is made through the cause. However, sometimes a cause is manifest to us inasmuch as it falls under our senses while the effect is hidden, as when it is expected in the future. And then nothing prevents a cause from being called the sign of its effect.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that, as has been said, a sign conveys something recognized by us, which leads us to the understanding of something else. However, the first things we recognize are the things that fall under our senses, from which our every understanding arises; and thus ‘sign,’ as regards its first institution, signifies some sensible thing insofar as it leads us to understand something hidden; and this is the way that the Master takes ‘sign’ here. But it sometimes happens that something more known to us, even if it is not a sensible thing, is called a ‘sign’ by a kind of secondary meaning; as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, that one must take as the sign of a habit existing in us the pleasure which follows on action, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b4.) which is not a sensible pleasure, since it is rational.
Reply Obj. 1: That division is not through opposite things, but through opposite notions; hence it says in the same place that every sign is a thing.
Reply Obj. 2: Among intelligible things there can be a progression that begins from things that are more known simply, as is clear in the case of mathematics. The effects are not signs of the causes in cases like this, but only among sensible things.
Reply Obj. 3: The response concerning the speech of the angels is similar: it works through things that are more known simply, and so they cannot be called signs properly, but metaphorically, as it were.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the Master’s definition quite thoroughly conveys the notion of sacrament, as we are speaking about sacraments now. For that they effect holiness is referred to in exists as a cause, and the mode befitting man as to his understanding is indicated when he says, in the visible form of invisible grace, and the mode of signification connatural to man where he says, as it bears an image.
Reply Obj. 1: Sight is more noble than the other senses, and shows more the differences between things, as is said in the beginning of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 980a26–27.) Consequently, as Augustine says, the name ‘sight’ is extended to the other senses. (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 10, ch. 35: “Ad oculos enim proprie uidere pertinet. Utimur autem hoc uerbo etiam in ceteris sensibus, cum eos ad cognoscendum intendimus.”) And thus visible is set down here for the sensible generally.
Reply Obj. 2: Form is here taken generally for figure, according as it is in the fourth species of quality, and not for exemplar form; for we represent something in images by the changing of a figure. Or if it is taken for exemplar form, this would be inasmuch as sacraments are in a certain way causes of invisible grace. And in this way they come before invisible grace in the order of generation, even though they are patterned after it as regards their institution.
Reply Obj. 3: The baptismal character and the true body of Christ are only called sacraments insofar as they are joined to external sensible signs.
Reply Obj. 4: As was said in the response to the second objection, the form that is a figure is not opposed to image, since a figure is called an image.
Reply Obj. 5: ‘Sacrament’ is not divided into sacraments of the Old Law and of the New Law as genus is divided into species, but as an analogous term is divided into its parts, as healthy is divided into those things having health and those things signifying it. But a sacrament is, simply speaking, what causes sanctity, while something that merely signifies is a sacrament only in a certain respect. And therefore to be a cause can be included in the definition of sacrament, just as having health can be included in the definition of what is healthy.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that this definition from Augustine, if in fact he intended to define ‘sacrament’ in those words, considers a sacrament with regard to what is principal in its account, namely, to cause holiness. And since sacraments are not the proper causes of holiness but secondary and instrumental causes, as it were, therefore sacraments are defined as instruments of sanctification. But an action is not attributed to an instrument, but to a principal agent, by whose power the instruments are applied to their work inasmuch as they are moved by it. And thus he does not say that sacraments are ‘things that sanctify,’ but that the hidden divine power existing in them sanctifies.
Reply Obj. 1: A sacrament is a cause and sign. It is, of course, an instrumental cause; thus the power of the principal agent works in it in a hidden way, as the power of an art or craftsman works in a saw. But inasmuch as it is a sign, it is for the manifestation of this kind of hidden thing in such a way that before the signification it is hidden, but after the signification has been accomplished it is manifest.
Reply Obj. 2: This happens incidentally through a defect in the one receiving the sacrament. But definitions have to do with what is essential, like the fact that fire heats considered in itself, although it could be prevented on the part of what is heated.
Reply Obj. 3: God works salvation in the sacraments as in instruments through whose mediation he causes salvation; but he works salvation in men as in subjects receiving salvation, and thus the argument does not follow.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that Hugh of St. Victor’s definition is the same as the definition the Master includes in the text, except that he adds the cause of a sacrament’s signification, which is its institution, and the cause of a sacrament’s efficacy, which is its sanctification: for it is the same thing to say material element externally set before the eyes, signifying something by its institution and visible form of invisible grace; and representing something by a likeness is the same as so that it bears an image; and containing invisible grace by its sanctification is the same as so that it exists as a cause.
Reply Obj. 1: Artificial forms are accidental, and so in artificial things the whole substance is matter, and this is the basis on which it is named, as when one says, the cup is a gold thing. In the same way, since in the sacraments the form does not give the substantial being but an accidental being in the genus of cause and sign, it is not unfitting that the matter of the sacrament be predicated of it, and be included as the genus in its definition. For this happens in other accidentals as well, as is said in the Metaphysics 7, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 7, ch. 5, 1030b14.) as when it is said, a curved nose is a snub thing.
Reply Obj. 2: ‘Element’ here is taken generally for any corporeal visible thing, whether it be a simple element or something made from elements; and we speak this way because of Augustine, who says, the word is combined with the element and the sacrament is made. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 80, par. 3.) For in baptism, which is the gateway of the sacraments, the matter is a simple element.
Reply Obj. 3: Between corporeal and spiritual things we do not look for a likeness by participation in the same quality, but for a likeness by proportion, which is a likeness of proportionate things; for example, just as water is for removing corporeal stains, so grace is for cleansing spiritual ones. According to this mode of likeness, even corporeal things are applied to spiritual things.
Reply Obj. 4: A sensible thing according to the likeness mentioned is similar to many other things by its natural property; and thus in itself it can signify any of those things equally. Therefore, for it to be determined to one thing, and for its meaning to be certain, it is necessary for it to be brought together with its institution which determines it to one meaning. For, although the representation from the likeness of its natural property carries an aptitude for a certain signification, nevertheless the determination and completion of its signification are from the institution.
Article 2
On the necessity of the sacraments
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 61, a. 1; SCG III, ch. 119; SCG IV, chs. 55–56.) It seems that the human race did not need the sacraments even after the fall of man. For grace and the virtues heal the wounds of sin in us, since the saints call grace the health and the beauty of the soul. Also, the Philosopher in the Ethics 2 compares virtue to bodily health. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 2, 1104a11.) Since, therefore the sacraments were instituted as medicine for sin, as Hugh of St. Victor says, (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 8, ch. 12 (PL 176:313).) it seems that we do not need them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, contraries are healed by contraries. But man incurred the disease of sin by subjecting himself to temporal things through affection. Therefore, it seems an unfitting mode of treatment that he be humbled under sensible things, as the Master says.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing that causes concealment and error is beneficial for instruction. But to hand on spiritual things under the sign of physical things is a kind of concealment of spiritual things; hence it also causes many to err, as is evident with those who believed that God was delineated by physical features because of the symbolic mode of speaking found in the Scriptures. Therefore, experiencing the sacraments does not facilitate our instruction, as the Master says.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, physical activity is profitable only a little (1 Tim 4:8). But the activity that happens in the sacraments is physical, because the things that come into use are physical. Therefore, we do not need them for the sake of the activity, as the Master says again.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says against Faustus that every religion had some external signs, in which people came together for the worship of God. (Augustine, Contra Faustum, Bk. 19, par. 11: “in nullum autem nomen religionis, seu uerum, seu falsum, coagulari homines possunt, nisi aliquo signaculorum uel sacramentorum uisibilium consortio conligentur: quorum sacramentorum uis inenarrabiliter ualet plurimum et ideo contempta sacrilegos facit” (CSEL 25:510).) But in the church of God, wayfaring in this world after sin, there is the truest religion. Therefore, it is necessary that there be signs of this kind in it, and these are the sacraments. Therefore we need them.
Furthermore (2), medicine should be proportionate to the wound. But the wound of sin had affected the human race even as far as the body, where the law of sin lodges, as is said in Romans 7:23. Therefore, the medicine also has to be prepared for it through bodily things. But the sacraments are this kind of thing. Therefore man needs the sacraments in his fallen state.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that even before sin man needed them. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 23, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; ST III, q. 61, a. 2.) For man also needed grace before sin, as was said in Book II, Distinction 24, Article 4, Reply to the 2nd Objection. But the sacraments were instituted to confer grace. Therefore, man needed them in his state of innocence.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Dionysius gives this reason for the institution of these kinds of sensible figures in the sacraments: namely, that through sensible figures our material selves are better drawn on to spiritual things, due to the connaturality of our understanding with sensible things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 1, n. 2 (PG 3:374).) But man in the state of innocence was a material being, coming to understand by his senses, which is why even in paradise he was set to work, so that his natural powers would experience things. Therefore, he also needed sacraments like these in paradise.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, marriage is a sacrament. But it was instituted in paradise in the state of innocence, as is clear from Genesis 2. Therefore, in the state of innocence man needed sacraments.
On the contrary (1), those who are healthy do not need a doctor (Matt 9:12), nor medicine either. But Hugh of St. Victor says that sacraments are vessels of medicine. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 3 (PL 176:319).) Therefore, they were not necessary in the state of innocence, since there was no sickness.
Furthermore (2), sacraments draw their power from the Passion of Christ; hence they are also said to have flowed from his side when he was hanging on the Cross. But if man had not sinned, Christ’s Passion would not have happened. Therefore, neither would the sacraments have existed.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in the state of the law of nature, sacraments were not necessary. (Parallels: ST III, q. 61, a. 3.) For the instruction that happens through commandments is just as necessary as that which happens through sacraments. But there were no other commandments given for living well beyond those by which people were taught to live well by natural reason. Therefore, it seems that neither did the sacraments need to be instituted for that time, since natural law did not dictate them, which is clear from the fact that they are not the same for all men and in every age.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, sacraments, when they were instituted, were necessary for salvation, as is clear from John 3:5: Unless you are born again from water and the Holy Spirit, you cannot enter into the kingdom of God. But the things which appear to have been sacraments before the written law were celebrated by choice and not out of necessity, as Hugh of St. Victor says. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 11, ch. 5 (PL 176:345).) Therefore, they were not sacraments, and accordingly they were not necessary.
On the contrary, according to Hugh, anytime there was a sickness, there was also a medicine for the sickness. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 8, ch. 12 (PL 176:313).) But the sickness of sin existed in the state of the law of nature. Therefore, the medicine of the sacraments was necessary.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the other sacraments of the law of Moses need not have been added to the sacraments of the law of nature. (Parallels: ST III, q. 61, a. 3.) For what is added to something else should be closer to perfection. But the sacraments that existed in the law of nature were the closest to the perfect sacraments that are found in the New Law, as we see in the offering of Melchizedek. (See Genesis 14.) Therefore, it needed no addition from the law of Moses.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, one should only add to what is good, or change it, if it brings improvement. But sacraments of the Old Law did not have any effect that was better than the effect of the sacraments of the law of nature, for both sacraments merely signified. Therefore, they should not have been changed or added to.
On the contrary, sacraments, as the Master says in the text, were instituted for instruction. But according to Gregory, the knowledge of the holy patriarchs grew with the passing of time, (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam (CCSL 142), Bk. 2, hom. 4, n. 12: “Qua in re hoc quoque nobis sciendum est quia et per incrementa temporum creuit scientia spiritalium patrum.”) and faith also became more explicit, as was said in Book III, Distinction 25, Question 3, Article 2, Subquestion 1. Therefore, it was necessary in the law of Moses that other sacraments be added to the sacraments of the law of nature.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it does not seem that some sacraments needed to remain in the New Law. (Parallels: below, d. 2, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 1; ST III, q. 61, a. 4; SCG IV, ch. 57.) For with the coming of truth, figures cease. But grace and truth have now come through Jesus Christ, as it says in John 1:17. Therefore, we do not need sacraments representing his grace and truth.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Apostle says in Galatians 4:2–3 that the ancient patriarchs were serving under the elements of the world, like boys under a disciplinarian, until the time determined by the Father. But the time of fullness is the time of the Incarnation, as said in the same place. Therefore, since a sacrament is a material element, it seems that since that time we should not have had to look for salvation under sacraments.
On the contrary, when it is time to medicate, then medicines are more necessary. But the most appropriate time for spiritual medication is the time of grace. Hence it is called a time of mercy, a year of favor (Ps 101:14). Therefore, in the state of grace, the sacraments, which are a kind of medicine, are especially necessary.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the sacraments were not necessary by an absolute necessity, as it is necessary that God exist, since they were instituted out of divine goodness alone; but rather they are of the necessity that comes from supposing the end. Yet they are not necessary in such a way that God could not heal man without them, since he has not chained his power to the sacraments, as it says in the text (in the way that food is necessary to human life), but they are necessary because man is more fittingly restored through the sacraments, as a horse is said to be necessary for a journey because man travels more easily on a horse.
But the reason for this sort of fittingness can be found in the fact that man’s corruption through sin had especially to do with sensible things, and they held him back from being able to rise up to God. Moreover, this corruption happened with respect to the understanding: for the human mind came to be captivated by sensible things alone, to the extent that some people believed nothing but what was sensible; and even if some attained to an understanding of intelligible things, they judged them according to the mode of sensible realities. Likewise with respect to the affections: for, neglecting God, they clung to sensible things as if they were the highest goods. Likewise again with respect to their actions: for man made use of sensible things inordinately.
Therefore, it was necessary for the healing of sins that man should advance in understanding spiritual things through sensible things, and that he should transfer the affection that he had for them to God, and that he should use them ordinately and according to divine institution. And thus it was necessary that the sacraments be instituted, which instruct man about spiritual things through sensible things; and this is the second reason the Master mentions. The sacraments also redirect the affections, which are subject to sensible things, to reverence for God; and this is the first reason the Master mentions. Finally, by using them one is aroused to act for the honor of God; and this is the third reason.
Reply Obj. 1: Grace and virtues are the form of man’s healing, like health, but sacraments are its effective source, in a way, like a medicine. Hence, just as it does not follow that since health heals, medicines are therefore unnecessary, so neither does it follow that since grace heals, sacraments are therefore unnecessary; rather, the opposite could be concluded.
Reply Obj. 2: Virtue is formed and corrupted by the same things working in opposite ways, as is said in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 7, 1107a29.) Hence just as the corruption of virtue happened in man by the fact that he subjected himself to sensible things for the sake of sensible things themselves, so also the restoration of virtue happens fittingly by the fact that man is subjected to them out of reverence for God. This is how contraries are remedied by contraries, for contraries should be applied concerning the same thing.
Reply Obj. 3: Handing over spiritual things in the manner described to those stuck in sensible things is an occasion of hidden error; it is even appropriate to hide holy things from them, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 1 (PG 3:370).) But for those who are instructed by sensible things to raise their intellects to the spiritual, it is extremely appropriate, for it befits the natural process of understanding, in which the intellect receives understanding through sensible things.
Reply Obj. 4: Physical activity for its own sake is of little use compared to piety, as the Apostle means in that text; but if it is joined to piety, as happens in the sacraments, which pertain to the piety of religion, then it is extremely useful.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the benefit of the sacraments is instruction and healing. Now as regards healing, it is clear to everyone that the sacraments were not necessary in the state of innocence, since the sickness did not exist at that time. But some people say they were necessary as regards the instruction they give; for man made use of sensible things in that state as well, and so it was appropriate that spiritual things be represented to him by sensible things. But this does not seem fitting, for signification happens for the sake of understanding what is signified. Now although he would have understood sensible things in the original state, and he would have seen in them the likenesses of spiritual things, nevertheless he did not receive knowledge of spiritual things through sensible things, but rather from the influx of divine light; and so he did not need the sacraments for his instruction. And the Master even seems to indicate this in the text, for he relates what he says about instruction to the lack of understanding present in the state of sin. And thus one should say, with others, that in the state of innocence the sacraments were not necessary.
Reply Obj. 1: The sacraments were only instituted to confer grace insofar as grace is formally what heals the disease of sin; and this is not how man needed grace in the state of innocence.
Reply Obj. 2: In the state of innocence the higher parts of man had mastery over the lower parts; and thus although man always had senses, and was a material being, nevertheless his intellect did not receive knowledge from sensible things, but rather through the influx of divine light. But since the experience of things that we already know is delightful, he used his senses for the sake of experiencing the powers of nature, not so that he would gain knowledge from it but so that he would be delighted by experiencing the vision of things he already knew.
Reply Obj. 3: Marriage did not exist in the state of innocence as a remedy but as an office. And because sacraments are remedies, therefore properly speaking it was not a sacrament, except perhaps inasmuch as it represented a sacred thing. And of course in that state, man did not gain understanding of that sacred thing, namely, the union of Christ and the Church, through this kind of marriage; but rather vice versa: he understood the harmoniousness and holiness of marriage by his knowledge of that union.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that what a man does should arise from his understanding; otherwise, his acts would not be human acts. Hence it is necessary that action correspond to understanding as effect to cause. But in the state of the law of nature merely natural understanding was not enough for salvation, but it required faith in some things that were above reason; and after the fall of man it required faith in a restorer, through whom there would come medicine for the disease. And so in that state not only were the works arising from the dictates of the law of nature necessary, but other things that were protestations and signs of things related to the restoration were necessary as well. These were the sacraments of that period, such as sacrifices, tithes, offerings, and things like that.
Reply Obj. 1: The precepts that are ordered to living well are precepts of the law of nature, which correspond to natural understanding. And because natural understanding dictated them sufficiently since it had not yet been darkened by contrary habits, it was not necessary to make them explicit, as it was with the sacraments, which correspond to supernatural understanding.
Reply Obj. 2: Before the written law there were certain sacraments of necessity, like that sacrament of faith which was ordered to the removal of original sin; and likewise penance, which was ordered to the removal of actual sin; and likewise marriage, which was ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But sacrifices and offerings and things of this sort were voluntary and necessary in general, that is, it was necessary that one do something to profess one’s faith, by which one was subject to God by a religious act of worship. But as regards what to do specifically they were voluntary; for example, whether one should offer sacrifices, or offerings, or anything like that.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that since the use of the sacraments corresponds proportionally to faith, as was said, it was necessary that the sacraments be handed on in different ways according to the different states of the faith. Now, as regards the explication of its articles, the faith was always growing more and more according as the time of grace drew nearer, as was said in Book III, Distinction 25. (See q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1.) And it was correspondingly necessary that the sacraments be more and more determined.
Consequently, since in Abraham faith first had, as it were, a noticeable size—such that he was separated from others because of the religion of the faith (for which reason he is also called the father of faith)—for this reason a kind of sign (or sacrament of faith) was determined for him, namely circumcision.
And since at the time of Moses the faith had already attained such a magnitude that it no longer shone only in one man or family but in an entire nation since the people of God had multiplied, it was fitting both that they be given a law, which can only be borne by a nation (for which reason the laying down of law is a political function, not that of a household or individual), and also that sacraments be more specifically determined and multiplied. For this reason it was necessary in the law of Moses that sacrifices, offerings, and tithes be determined for every particular circumstance, that marriage be set in order, and that distinctions be made among the various satisfactions of penance.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the offering of Melchizedek perfectly represented our sacrifice as regards its matter, nevertheless it was also necessary that many other circumstances be represented, like the mode of consuming it, and the Passion of Christ, whose memorial it is, which things are explicitly signified by the paschal lamb and by other sacraments of the law.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the Old Law did not improve anything by having a new kind of effect, namely, by being a cause, nonetheless it did make an improvement with regard to the same effect, which is to signify, inasmuch as it signified the future sacraments of grace more expressly and in more ways.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that the faith of modern men and of the ancients is the same, as Augustine says, because the one whom the ancients believed was coming, we believe now to have come. (See Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tr. 45, par. 9: “Ante aduentum Domini nostri Iesu Christi, quo humilis uenit in carne, praecesserunt iusti, sic in eum credentes uenturum, quomodo nos credimus in eum qui uenit. Tempora uariata sunt, non fides. ... Diuersis quidem temporibus, sed utrosque per unum fidei ostium, hoc est per Christum, uidemus ingressos. ... In signis diuersis eadem fides ... Videte ergo, fide manente, signa uariata.”) And thus, since sacraments correspond to faith, as protestations of it and having power from it, it is fitting that just as the ancient patriarchs were made partakers of the redemption of Christ by sacraments which were signs of the future, so also among us his redemption is accomplished by the mediation of certain sacraments that signify what has already happened, which are the sacraments of the New Law.
Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, the state of the New Law is a middle one between the state of the Old Law and the state of the heavenly fatherland; (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, n. 2 (PG 3:502).) and therefore also those things that are of the New Law are both the truth in relation to the significations of the Old Law and figures in relation to the manifest and full understanding of truth that will be in heaven; and thus for now it is necessary that certain figures remain in the New Law, but in heaven, where there will be an absolute perception of truth, all figures will cease.
Reply Obj. 2: The sacraments of the Law did not contain grace; and thus the Apostle in the same place (Galatians 4:9.) calls them impoverished and empty; and because of this, all those who were subjected to them were under purely corporeal elements. But it is not the same with sacraments that contain invisible grace.
Article 3
What a sacrament consists of
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 6, ad 2; ST III, q. 60, aa. 6–7; De veritate, q. 27, a. 4, ad 10.) It seems that sacraments do not consist of words and things. For a sacrament is one thing. But one thing cannot be made from two things that are not united, nor can one be the form of the other. Since, then, the words and things are entirely separate, it seems that a sacrament could not be composed from them, such that it would have words for its form and things for its matter.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as words are required in the sacraments, so also are certain actions, as Hugh of St. Victor says. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 6 (PL 176:326).) But actions are not set down as necessary for the integrity of the sacrament. Therefore, neither should words.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, sacraments are for signifying and causing. But both of these can be done by things without words. Therefore, sacraments do not consist of these two things.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the sacraments of the Old Law were signs of our sacraments. But in them there were no certain determined words. Therefore, there should not be in ours.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, penance and marriage are sacraments. But there are no particular words required for their integrity. Therefore, what the Master says is not true of all the sacraments.
On the contrary (1), sacraments represent by a likeness the things that were done concerning Christ. Therefore, since in Christ the Word was joined to a sensible thing, it is fitting that this also be the case in the sacraments.
Furthermore (2), medicine must be proportioned to the disease. But the disease of sin infected man in his soul and body. Therefore, it is fitting that there be words in the sacraments that correspond to the soul, and things that correspond to the body.
Furthermore (3), according to Hugh of St. Victor, sacraments contain invisible grace by their sanctification. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 2 (PL 176:317).) But creation is sanctified by the Word of God. (See 1 Timothy 4:5: “Everything created by God is good, and nothing is to be rejected if it is received with thanksgiving; for then it is consecrated by the word of God and prayer.”) Therefore, it is necessary that in the sacraments there be not only things but also words.
I answer that, it is common to all sacraments that they consist in sensible things signifying invisible grace. But this is particular to the sacraments of the New Law, that they have words added to the things, for three reasons. The first is because these sacraments not only signify the work of redemption that was done by Christ, as the other sacraments do, but they also flowed from the Passion of Christ itself. And therefore, as the closest effects, they have the image of their cause as much as possible, so that namely they consist of words and things, as Christ consists of the Word and flesh. The second reason is that they are signs not only of future things, like the sacraments of the Old Law, but of present and past things, as was said before, which can be more explicitly signified than future things, just as they can be known with more certainty. And therefore, the signification of words, which is most explicit, is added to the signification of things. The third reason is that they contain grace by the sanctification that happens through the Word of God, as was said.
Reply Obj. 1: A sacrament is something one in the genus of sign or cause, both of which imply relation. For it is not unfitting that things that are distinct in themselves be united in relation to something else, as happens when many men rowing a ship are one cause of the ship’s being rowed. And just as a father and mother are one in generation, so also words and things are one in causing and signifying, and as a result they bring about one sacrament. And because the power of causing is in the things by the words signifying, as was said, therefore words are the formal component and things are the material component, in the way that everything completive is called a form.
Reply Obj. 2: As Hugh of St. Victor says, for sacraments words and things and actions must converge; but actions pertain to the use or administering of the sacraments, while words and things are of the essence of the sacrament. And thus the Master says that sacraments consist in these two things, and not in actions. Or it could be said that actions fall under the heading of things.
Reply Obj. 3: Things can have neither effectiveness in causing nor explicitness in signifying unless words are added to them, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 4: The nature of the sacraments of the Old Law and of the New Law is not the same, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 5: Marriage as an office and penance as a virtue do not have any form of words, but according as each is a sacrament to be administered by the ministry of the Church, they both have particular words; as in marriage there are words expressing consent, as well as blessings instituted by the Church, while in penance there is the absolution given verbally by the priest.
Article 4
On the efficacy of the sacraments of the New Law
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 1; ST I-II, q. 112, a. 1, ad 2; ST III, q. 62, aa. 1 & 6; SCG IV, ch. 57; De veritate, q. 27, a. 4; Quodl. XII, q. 10; De eccles. sacram.; Super Gal. 2, lec. 4.) It seems that sacraments of the New Law are not a cause of grace. For Bernard says: Just as the canon is invested with a book, an abbot with a crozier, a bishop by a ring, so also divisions of different graces are handed on in the sacraments. (See St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermo de coena Domini, n. 2: “Sicut enim in exterioribus sunt diversa signa et, ut coepto immoremur exemplo, variae sunt investiturae secundum ea de quibus investimur,—verbi gratia, investitur canonicus per librum, abbas per baculum, episcopus per baculum et anulum simul—, sicut, inquam, in huiusmodi rebus est, sic et divisiones gratiarum diversis traditae sunt sacramentis” (Bernardi Opera, ed. J. Leclercq et H.M. Rochais [1968], 5:68).) But a book is not a cause of someone becoming a canon, nor is a ring the cause of someone becoming bishop. Therefore, neither are the sacraments causes of grace.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if they are causes of grace, they must belong to some genus of causes. But it is clear that they are neither material causes nor formal causes, since they are outside the essence of grace. Nor are they the final cause of grace, for sacraments are sought for the sake of having grace, rather than vice versa. Nor are they efficient causes of grace, for only God causes grace, as evident from the fact that this causality is not even shared with the angels, who are more noble than sensible creatures. Therefore, in no way are sacraments the cause of grace.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the one acting is nobler than the one acted upon, according to Augustine in Book 12 of the Commentary on Genesis, (See Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, Bk. 12, ch. 16.) and according to the Philosopher in Book 3 of On the Soul, (De anima, Bk. 3, ch. 5, 430a18–19.) and a cause is more worthy than an effect. But both the rational soul and grace itself have greater worth than sensible elements. Therefore, a sacrament, which is a material element, as was previously said, cannot act in the soul to cause grace in it.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, every cause is either univocal or equivocal. Now in an equivocal cause something exists in a nobler way than in the things caused, as heat exists in the sun in a nobler way than in the air; in a univocal cause, something exists in the same way as in the thing caused. But grace is not in the sacraments in the same way as it is in the soul, nor is it in them in a nobler way. Therefore, they are neither univocal causes of grace nor equivocal ones, and thus they they are not causes of grace in any way.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, sacraments do not cause grace in the soul by pouring it in, for in that way they would create it; nor do they draw it forth from the potency of matter, for grace is not in the natural potency of matter. Therefore, in no way do they cause grace.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, in the sacrament of the altar, bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ, which could only happen by an infinite power, such a power as this sacrament’s form does not have. Therefore, that power does not cause the transubstantiation, and by the same reasoning neither do other sacraments cause what they signify.
On the contrary (1), this difference is commonly drawn between the sacraments of the New Law and of the Old Law, that the sacraments of the New Law effect what they represent, which the sacraments of the Old Law are not capable of doing. But sacraments represent invisible grace. If, therefore, sacraments of the New Law do not cause grace, then they are no different from the sacraments of the Old Law.
Furthermore (2), Augustine says that the water of baptism touches the body and cleanses the heart. (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tr. 80, par. 3: “unde ista tanta uirtus aquae, ut corpus tangat et cor abluat, nisi faciente uerbo, non quia dicitur, sed quia creditur? Nam et in ipso uerbo, aliud est sonus transiens, aliud uirtus manens.”) But the heart is only cleansed by grace. Therefore, sacraments of the New Law cause grace.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in the sacraments there is no spiritual power for instilling grace. (Parallels: below, d. 8, q. 2, a. 3; ST III, q. 62, a. 4; q. 78, a. 4; De veritate, q. 27, a. 4, ad 4; Quodl. XII, q. 10.) For anything that is not in a certain genus of being is not a being. But this power cannot be reduced to any of the ten categories of being: for it is not a substantial form, as is self-evident; nor is it in any of the categories outside of quality, nor is it in quality, as is clear to anyone considering the four species of quality. Therefore, it is not a being.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is apparent that sacraments do not have this power from themselves. Therefore, if it exists in them, they must have it from God; nor is it possible to specify, as it seems, when they were given it. For he could not have given it to them in the sacraments’ institution, for those things and these words did not exist at that time, and nothing is given to a non-being; nor again does he give this power to them daily, for creation is said to be occurring at this moment only with respect to rational souls and grace. Nor can it be given to them in another way, unless it were created in them. Nor again is it probable that such a noble power was created in words, which immediately stop existing; and things likewise are quickly corrupted. Therefore there is no way for a power like this to exist in the sacraments.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power mentioned cannot be counted among lesser goods, for then it would not have efficacy for instilling grace, which is among the greatest goods. Nor again among neutral things, like the powers of the soul, which man can use well or ill; and by the same reasoning, neither is it counted among the greatest goods, since it is neither grace nor a power of the mind. Therefore, it is not something good, and so it is nothing.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is received by another is in it according to the mode of the receiver; and hence it is that spiritual power cannot exist in a corporeal thing. But the power of the sacraments, which is ordered toward instilling grace, is extremely spiritual. Therefore, it cannot exist in corporeal things.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, there can be only one power in one sacrament, since it has one effect. But a single power cannot reside in different things. Therefore, since there is more than one element in a sacrament, namely, words and things, it seems that there could not be any power in a sacrament for instilling grace.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says: what is the power of water that it touches the body and cleanses the heart? (See the text cited in the preceding note.) Therefore, it has a certain power. Similarly, Bede also says that by the touch of his most immaculate flesh, Christ conferred a regenerative power on the waters. (Cf. St. Bede, In Lucae euangelium expositio (CCSL 120), ch. 3: “Baptizatus est dominus non ipse aquis mundari sed ipsas mundare cupiens aquas quae ablutae per carnem eius peccati utique nesciam baptismi ius induerent et quod tam innumera sub lege baptismata non poterant contra praeuaricationis malum uim regeneratiuae sanctificationis conciperent.”)
Furthermore (2), sacraments are a certain medicine. But every medicine has a certain power by which it becomes effective. Therefore, this power is also in the sacraments.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the sacraments do not get this power from the Passion of Christ. (Parallels: ST III, q. 62, a. 5; q. 64, a. 2, ad 2.) For Christ as man did not give the Holy Spirit, nor does he cause grace, as was said in Book I, Distinction 14, Question 3, Article 1. But the Passion belongs to him as man. Therefore, the efficacy of the sacraments’ power for causing grace cannot be from Christ’s Passion but from his divinity.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is said that he rose again for our justification (Rom 4:25). But justification happens by the infusion of grace. Therefore, the sacraments obtain the power mentioned rather from his resurrection.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the sacraments are said to have efficacy from faith. But one has faith not only concerning the Passion, but also concerning the other articles. Therefore, they do not only have efficacy from the Passion.
On the contrary (1), Concerning Romans 5:14, death exercised dominion . . . even over those whose sins were not like the transgression of Adam, who is a type of the one who was to come, the Gloss says: from the side of Christ flowed the sacraments by which the Church is saved. (See Glossa ordinaria on Romans 5:14 (PL 114:486).) But this happened during the Passion. Therefore, they have their efficacy from the Passion.
Furthermore (2), sacraments are medicine against sins. But sins are taken away by Christ’s Passion, for he died for our trespasses (Rom 4:25). Therefore, they have efficacy from his Passion.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that sacraments of the New Law do not contain grace. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 15, q. 5, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 2; ST I, q. 43, a. 6, ad 4; ST III, q. 62, a. 3; De veritate, q. 27, a. 7.) For the same thing is the subject of grace and of glory. But nothing but a rational creature can be the subject of glory. Therefore, neither can there be grace in a sacrament, which is a material element.
Obj. 2: If it were said that grace is not in the sacraments as in a subject, but as in a vessel, to the contrary: to be in a vessel is to be in a place, according to the Philosopher in the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 3, 210a24.) But an accident is not capable of being in a place. Therefore, what was said cannot be true.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if God put grace in the sacraments, he did so only for the sake of the soul, into which grace must be transfused. But the same grace that is in the sacraments cannot be transfused into the soul, for an accident does not cross over from one subject into another. Therefore, it would be there in vain; and so it is not there, for in the workings of grace less happens in vain than in the workings of nature.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 1, spiritual things, even if they exist in corporeal ones, are not said to be contained by them, but rather to contain them, as the soul is in the body and contains it. (Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. 1, ch. 5, 411a7.) But grace is a spiritual thing. Therefore, although it is in corporeal sacraments, it cannot be said to be contained by them.
On the contrary (1), is what is said in the Gloss on Galatians 3, that sacraments of the Old Law were called impoverished and empty because they did not contain grace. (See the Glossa ordinaria on Galatians 4:9; some MSS have Thomas referring to Galatians 3.) But this cannot be said of the sacraments of the New Law. Therefore, they contain grace.
Furthermore (2), this is clear from the definition of Hugh of St. Victor quoted above.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the grace that is in the sacraments does not differ from that which is in the virtues and gifts. (Parallels: below, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3; In II Sent., d. 26, a. 6, ad 5; ST III, q. 62, a. 2; q. 72, a. 7, ad 3; De veritate, q. 27, a. 5, ad 12.) For the grace that is in the sacraments is the grace that makes pleasing, which makes one worthy of eternal life, as is clear in baptism. But the grace that makes pleasing is only one reality, which is clear from the oneness of the subject, which is the essence of the soul, and from the oneness of the effect, which is to make it accepted by God. Therefore, since the grace that is in the virtues and gifts is the grace that makes pleasing, it seems that it is the same grace in both.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, one thing can only be opposed to one other thing. But the grace that is in the sacraments is opposed to sin just as much as the grace in the virtues, for both of them destroy sin. Therefore, there is only one grace.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the same thing is moved in nature from an originating terminus to a terminus of destination. But sacramental grace is directed against sin, while the grace of virtue is ordered to perfecting the soul and uniting it with God. Therefore, there is one grace in a sacrament.
On the contrary (1), in a sacrament grace is only given to someone who does not receive it falsely. But someone like that has the grace of the virtues. Since therefore it would be given to no one who already had it, it seems that the grace that is received in the sacraments is another kind of grace.
Furthermore (2), virtues and gifts are interdependent because of grace, as was said in Book III, Distinction 36, Articles 2 and 3, but the sacraments are not. Therefore, it is not the same grace in both.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
The first question I answer by saying that all are forced to consider sacraments of the New Law causes of grace in some way, because of the authorities who expressly say so.
But different ones claim they are causes in different ways. For certain people say that they are not causes as though they did anything in the soul, but are causes in the manner of guaranteed conditions, for the uncreated power—that is, God’s—which alone causes the effects pertaining to grace in the soul, assists the sacraments through a certain ordination and agreement, as it were, from God. For thus he has ordained and agreed, as it were, that whoever receives the sacraments will receive grace from them at the same time, not as though the sacraments did anything for that. And it is the same with someone who receives a lead nickel made according to an ordination such that whoever had one of those nickels would have one hundred pounds from the king: for indeed, the nickel itself does not give those hundred pounds, but only the king accepting it. And since no such agreement was made in the sacraments of the Old Law that those approaching them would receive graces, for this reason they are said not to confer grace, but only to promise it.
But this does not seem sufficient to do justice to the sayings of the saints. For causes in the manner of guaranteed conditions, if nothing whatsoever were done to bring about the effect either by disposing or improving, will have, as to the nature of causing, no more effect than accidental causes have, as white is the cause of a house if the builder is white; and according to this, the sacraments were only accidental causes of sanctification. For that ordination or agreement which they speak of gives them nothing of the nature of a cause, but only of the nature of a sign, as also a lead nickel is only a sign indicating who should receive it. But what is accidental is ignored by art (The axiom that “no art takes notice of what is accidental” is based on Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 6, ch. 2; cf. ST I-II, q. 7, a. 2, ad 2: “Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity.”) nor is it included in a definition; hence in the definition of a sacrament no causality would be included, nor would holy men have taken the trouble to say much about it.
Nor on the other hand would the sacraments of the New Law, which differ from the sacraments of the Old Law according to the ordination mentioned, differ from them according to the nature of the cause, but only as to the mode of signifying, inasmuch as these signify grace as something to be given immediately, while the others do not.
And thus other men say that two things result in the soul from the sacraments. The first is a sacrament-and-reality, (A sacramentum is a sign of a sacred thing, while a res is the sacred thing signified. Sacramentum tantum, “sacrament alone,” means that which signifies a sacred thing but is not itself signified by anything else; it is a sacramentum and not a res. Necessarily, the sacramentum tantum is the first sign encountered, and consequently it is the sensible sign consisting of the form (words) and matter in each sacrament. Res tantum, “reality alone” or “thing alone” means a sacred thing that is signified but does not itself signify anything else; it is a res and not a sacramentum. Generally, the res tantum is the effect of the sacrament, and it may be contenta (“contained”) in the sacrament, e.g., grace; or non contenta, (“uncontained”) like union of Christ and the Church signified but not caused by marriage. Sacramentum-et-res, “sacrament-and-reality,” means a sacred thing signified that itself signifies something further, e.g., the character in baptism.) like a character, or some adornment of the soul in sacraments in which no character is imprinted; the other is a reality alone, like grace. Therefore, with respect to the first the sacraments are causes bringing about effects in some way; but with respect to the second they are causes disposing with such a disposition that it is a necessity, unless there were an impediment on the part of the person receiving; and this seems more consistent with the theologians and sayings of the saints.
For the evidence of which it should be known that an efficient cause can be divided in two ways. In one way, on the part of the effect, that is, in the disposing cause, which causes a disposition to the final form; and in a perfecting cause, which introduces the final perfection. In another way, on the part of the very cause in the principal agent, and in the instrumental agent. For the principal agent is the first mover, but an instrumental agent is a moved mover. Now two kinds of action apply to an instrument: one that it has from its own nature, and another that it has to the extent that it is moved by a prior agent; as the heat of fire, which is the instrument of nutritive power, as is said in On the Soul II, has from its proper nature the power to dissolve and consume, and effects of that kind; but as it is the instrument of the vegetative soul, it generates flesh. (Aristotle, De anima, Bk. II, ch. 4, 416b25.) But it should be known that the action of an instrument sometimes attains to the final perfection that the principal agent intends, and sometimes it does not. Nevertheless, it always attains to something beyond what it is capable of according to its own nature, whether that be the final form, or a disposition; otherwise it would not work as an instrument. And in this way the active and passive qualities of elements extend instrumentally to drawing material forms from matter, but not to the production of a human soul, which is from the outside. (See Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. 3, ch. 2.)
It should be said therefore that the principal agent with respect to justification is God, nor does he need any instruments for this on his part; but on account of the fittingness for the man being justified, as was said above, he uses the sacraments as certain instruments of justification. Now a certain action befits material instruments like this by their own nature, as water cleanses and oil makes the body sleek; but furthermore, as they are instruments of divine mercy justifying us, they attain instrumentally to a certain effect in the soul itself, which corresponds first to the sacraments, like a character or something of that sort. But to the final effect, which is grace, they do not attain even instrumentally, except dispositively, inasmuch as what they attain to as efficacious instruments is a disposition, which is necessary in itself for the reception of grace. And because every instrument, in performing a natural action of which it is capable by being that particular kind of thing, attains to the effect of which it is capable as an instrument (as an axe splitting something in its sharpness attains instrumentally to the form of a stool), thus also a material element exercising a natural action in which it is a sign of an interior effect, instrumentally accomplishes an interior effect. And this is what Augustine says, that the water of baptism touches the body and cleanses the heart; and therefore it is said that the sacraments bring about what they represent. And the Master seems to touch on this mode of justifying in the text: for he says that man does not seek salvation in sacraments as though from them, but rather through them from God. For this preposition ‘from’ denotes the principal agent: but this preposition ‘through’ denotes instrumental cause.
Reply Obj. 1: Bernard, as is clear in the same place as the foregoing, does not intend to show the likeness of sacraments to those, except as to their signification: for a ring and a crozier are signs, and so are sacraments; but sacraments are causes as well.
Reply Obj. 2: They are reducible to the genus of efficient causes, not as principal causes but as instrumental ones. For God alone is the cause of grace as principal agent, but sacraments are agents instrumentally and dispositively, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: An agent is not always more noble than what it acts upon simply speaking, but only as it is an agent. For fire or iron work upon a human body, which is simply speaking nobler, but fire is nobler inasmuch as it is heat in act, and according to this it acts on the human body. And thus it is not necessary that those material things that are in the sacraments be simply nobler than the soul, but only nobler in a certain respect, namely, as instruments of divine mercy acting for our justification. Nor again is it necessary that an instrumental agent be simply nobler than its effect, for an effect is not proportioned to the instrument, but to the principal agent, who sometimes through lowly instruments accomplishes nobler effects, as a doctor induces health through an enema.
Reply Obj. 4: Univocal cause and non-univocal cause, properly speaking and simply, are divisions of that cause to which it pertains to have a likeness with its effect; but this is a principal agent and not an instrumental one, as Alexander says according to what the Commentator tells us. (Averroes, Commentary on Metaphysics 11, text 24, giving the position of Alexander of Aphrodisias.) And thus properly speaking an instrument is neither a univocal cause nor an equivocal one. But it could be reduced to either kind of cause, depending on whether the principal agent, in whose power an instrument acts, is a univocal cause or a non-univocal cause.
Reply Obj. 5: Grace is caused by the sacraments through the mode of inflowing; but nevertheless, the sacraments are not what instill grace, but God pours grace into the soul through them as through an instrument.
Reply Obj. 6: Since transubstantiation is, as it were, a certain movement or change, there are two things in it: namely, movement away from a terminus and movement toward a terminus. Therefore, sacramental words attains to transubstantiation instrumentally as concerns the movement from the terminus of origin; but as to the movement toward the destination they do not attain instrumentally, except dispositively, as happens in the other sacraments.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that on account of the authorities cited it is necessary to consider a certain supernatural power to be in the sacraments. But those who hold the first opinion say that this power is nothing but a certain ordering to something. But this is to say nothing: for power always refers to the principle of something, particularly as it is taken here, for a cause’s power. But an ordering to something, or a relation, cannot be the beginning of an action or the terminus, as is proved in the Physics 5; (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 5, ch. 2, 225b11.) and thus in no way can that order have the name of power, or the nature of it.
And because of this we must say rather that the power of acting is proportionate to the one acting. Hence it is necessary to consider the power of acting in the chief agent in one way and in the instrumental agent in another way. For a principal agent acts according to the requirements of its own form; and thus the active power in it is a certain form or quality possessing complete being in its nature. But an instrument acts as moved by another; and thus its power is proportionate to the motion. Now motion is not a complete being but is a way towards being, like something between pure potency and pure act, as is said in the Physics 3. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 3, ch. 1, 201a10.) And thus the power of an instrument as such, according to which it acts for an effect beyond what it is capable of according to its own nature, is not a complete being having being fixed in nature, but a certain incomplete being, like the air’s power of acting upon sight, inasmuch as air is the instrument moved by the external visible object. And beings like this are commonly called intentions, and have a certain likeness to the being that is in the soul, which is a diminished being, as is said in the Metaphysics 6. (While Moos in his edition of the Scriptum (p. 35, n. 1) says the location cannot be determined, it seems Thomas is referring to Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 6, ch. 4, 1027b25–35.) And since sacraments do not cause a spiritual effect except as instruments, thus spiritual power is in them not like a fixed being, but like an incomplete being.
Reply Obj. 1: The incomplete being that is in the soul is divided against the being that is defined by the ten categories, as is clear in the Metaphysics 6; (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 6, ch. 2, 1026a35.) and thus such incomplete beings, speaking per se, are not in any category except by reduction, as motion can be reduced in its own substance to whatever category the ends of the motion are in, as the imperfect can be reduced to the perfect, although it may be placed in the category of passion according as it conveys the ordering of a mover to that which is moved, as the Commentator says. (Averroes, Commentary on Physics 3, text 4.) Hence also this power that is in the sacraments is reduced to that genus in which the complete power of the chief agent is, which is quality, or in which it would be if it were in any genus; for uncreated power is not in any genus of being.
Reply Obj. 2: The power of acting instrumentally is given to an instrument in two ways. In one way inchoatively, as it were, when it is established as belonging to the species ‘instrument’; and thus Hugh says that it contains grace by its sanctification. (See reference above.) In another way, it is given completely, when it is actually moved by a principal agent, as when a carpenter uses a saw; and similarly power is completely given to sacraments in the very use of the sacraments. Nor is this unfitting, if a power which is proportioned to a motion is given to a thing immediately or after a pause.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as the power discussed cannot be included in any genus of being except by reduction, so also it cannot be established in any level of good except by reduction. However, it is reduced to the greatest goods, among which is grace, which is in a certain way the fulfillment of the power itself, as its end.
Reply Obj. 4: In a corporeal thing there cannot be spiritual power according to complete being; but there can be being in the mode of intention, just as the power of an art is in the instruments moved by that art’s skill, and the cause of instruction existing in the audible word (as is said in the book On Sense and Sensation (Aristotle, Sense and Sensibilia, ch. 1, 437a12: “Rational discourse is a cause of instruction in virtue of its being audible, which it is, not in its own right, but incidentally, since it is composed of words, and each word is a symbol.”)) contains the intentions of the soul in a certain way; even in motion there is the power of the separated substance that is causing the motion, according to the philosophers, and the seed acts in virtue of soul, as is said in On the Generation of Animals 1. (Aristotle, Generation of Animals, in fact Bk. II, ch. 1, esp. 735a5–25.)
Reply Obj. 5: Just as a power does not exist completely and absolute in every one of the things brought together for one action which none of them can complete on its own, like in the rowing of a ship, but it is in all of them together, inasmuch as all are in the place of one agent, and in this way the power existing in them retains its own unity, so also is it with instruments when one thing is not sufficient. And in this way it is also in the many other things that are required for the sacrament: for in all of them taken together that power exists completely, but in each individual part it exists incompletely.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that an instrument does not receive power in the mode mentioned except when it is joined with a principal agent, so that his power is in a way poured out into the instrument. But the principal agent acting per se for justification is God as efficient cause, and Christ’s Passion as the meritorious cause. A sacrament is joined to this cause by the faith of the Church, which both refers this instrument to the principal cause, and refers the sign to the signified. And thus the efficacy or power of instruments or of sacraments is from three things: namely, from divine institution as from the principal agent cause, from the Passion of Christ as from the first meritorious cause, and from the faith of the Church as from the one joining the instrument to the principal agent.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ as man is the meritorious cause of our justification, but as God, he is the cause instilling grace.
Reply Obj. 2: The resurrection is the cause of justification as the final terminus; but the sacraments rather regard the originating terminus; and thus they more directly regard the Passion, which is ordered chiefly to the blotting-out of sin as a certain satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 3: Faith gives efficacy to the sacraments inasmuch as in a way it joins them to the principal cause, as was said. And thus faith in the Passion, from which the sacraments have efficacy directly and immediately, gives abundant efficacy to the sacraments.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that because every agent makes something like itself, thus it is necessary that the effect of an agent be in the agent in some way. For in some things it is the same according to species; and these things are called univocal agents, as heat is in a fire that heats another. But in certain ones it is the same according to proportion or analogy, as when the sun heats something. For there is something in the sun that makes it heat just as heat makes fire hot; and accordingly heat is said to be in the sun equivocally, as is said in the book On the Substance of the World. (Averroes, De substantia orbis, ch. 2.) From this it is clear that whatever is in the effect as a form giving being, is in the agent precisely as such, as an active power; and thus as an agent stands with regard to the active power, so it stands with regard to containing the effect.
And because an instrumental agent does not have the power of acting toward something as a complete being, but only by the mode of intention, as was said, the form introduced is also contained in it by the mode of intention, as there are species of color in the air, from which the air is said to be colored. In this way, too, grace is in the sacraments as in an instrument, not completely, but incompletely, in four respects.
First, because in an instrument the form of an effect does not exist according to the complete nature of the species, as it is in the effect once completed, and in a univocal cause.
Second, because it is in it by the mode of intention and not according to being that is complete in nature, as the form of an effect is in a non-univocal principal cause according to being that is perfect in nature, although not according to the complete account of that species or form that it instills in its effect, as heat is in the sun.
Third, because it is not in it in the manner of a reposing intention, as there are intentions of things in the soul, but by the mode of intention flowing with a twofold flow: one of which is from potency into act, as also in a moving thing there is a form that is the terminus of motion, provided that it is moved so that it flows from potency into act, and between these things there falls the middle of motion, in the power of which an instrument acts. The other is from the agent to the thing acted upon, between which there falls the medium of the instrument, as one is moving and the other is moved.
Fourth, because a sacrament does not attain even instrumentally directly to grace itself, as was said, but only dispositively.
Reply Obj. 1: Grace is not in the sacraments as in a subject, but as in a dispositive instrumental cause; but that intention which is also called power is in the sacrament as in a subject.
Reply Obj. 2: It has been said quite beautifully that grace is contained in sacraments as in a vessel, by a certain likeness. For just as what is in a vessel does not give a name to the vessel but is preserved in it, so that it could be taken from there whenever one likes, so also the grace that is contained in the sacraments does not give them a name, nor does it endow them with a quality as with some complete being, but whoever wishes to benefit from them can receive the grace in them.
Reply Obj. 3: The form of an effect either in the principal agent or in an instrument is not numerically the same form as that which is in the effect. Nor is it to no purpose on account of this fact: for its purpose is not that its very self should flow into the effect, but rather that from it or through it, something like it comes to be in the effect. For an efficient cause does not have numerically the same form as the generated, but the same form in kind, as is clear from Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 7, 198a26.)
Reply Obj. 4: They are said to contain in the sense that in some way they are the cause of it.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that, as was said in Book 2, Distinction 26, Question 1, Articles 3 and 4, sanctifying grace (Literally, “grace that makes pleasing.”) is one thing, and it is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, and from it flow the virtues and gifts for perfecting the powers of the soul, just as also the powers flow from the essence. And these powers are distinguished according to their diverse acts, for which the powers of the soul must be perfected. Similarly also from that grace which is in the essence of the soul, something issues to repair the defect that occurred by sin; and this varies according to the various defects. But since defects like this are not so well known as the acts which virtues perfect, for this reason this effect for repairing does not have a special name, like virtue, but keeps the name of its cause, and is called sacramental grace, and sacraments are directly ordered to it; and indeed it could not exist without the grace that affects the essence of the soul, as neither could virtue. But nevertheless, the grace that is in the essence of the soul cannot exist without virtues, and in this way the virtues are interconnected through it. But it can exist without sacramental grace; and so sacramental graces are not connected to one another through it. And so it is clear that the grace that a sacrament contains directly differs from the grace that is in the virtues and gifts, although they may contain that grace as well by a certain connection.
Reply Obj. 1: Sanctifying grace, as it exists in the essence of the soul, is one, but it is manifold according as it proceeds to removing defects from powers and perfecting powers.
Reply Obj. 2: The grace of the virtues is opposed to sin inasmuch as sin contains a disordered act; but the grace of the sacraments is opposed to it inasmuch as it injures the natural good of the powers.
Reply Obj. 3: Withdrawal from sin as something opposed to virtue belongs to the same grace as progress in the perfection of virtue. But withdrawal from sin as something injuring nature does not: for it requires a special medicine, as is evident also in diseases of the body.
Article 5
On the efficacy of the sacraments of the Old Law
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 18, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 1; ST I-II, q. 103, a. 2; ST III, q. 62, a. 6; q. 72, a. 5, ad 3; SCG IV, ch. 57; De veritate, q. 27, a. 3, ad 20; q. 28, a. 2, ad 12; Super Gal. 2, lec. 4.) It seems that sacraments of the Old Law conferred grace. For, as was said above, sacraments are called from ‘making holy’, as ornaments from ‘making ornate’, and fortifications from ‘fortifying’. But without grace nothing can be made holy. Therefore, the sacraments of the Old Law conferred grace.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a prayer is made in the canon of the Mass, that the sacrifice of the Church may be accepted by God just as the sacrifices of the ancients were accepted. (In the Roman Canon, shortly after the consecration of the chalice, the priest prays: “Supra quæ propítio ac seréno vultu respícere dignéris: et accépta habére, sícuti accépta habére dignátus es múnera púeri tui justi Abel, et sacrifícium Patriárchæ nostri Abrahæ, et quod tibi óbtulit summus sacérdos tuus Melchísedech, sanctum sacrifícium, immaculátam hóstiam.”) And in Daniel 3 it is asked that the sacrifice of a humble and contrite spirit be received by God, like the burnt offering of rams and bulls. (Daniel 3:39–40.) But the sacrifice of the Church and the sacrifice of a contrite spirit confer grace. Therefore, also the sacraments of the Old Law conferred grace.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Hugh of St. Victor says that from the time man began to ail, God prepared a medicine in his sacraments. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. I, pt. 8, ch. 12 (PL 176:314).) But a medicine can only be applied against the disease of sin by grace. Therefore, the sacraments of the ancients conferred grace.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, man was weakened more dangerously by concupiscence in his emotions than in his intellect by ignorance. But sacraments acted against ignorance as figures of future salvation. Therefore, much more did they confer grace against concupiscence.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is impossible to make satisfaction without grace. But the sacraments of the Old Law made satisfaction; hence different sacrifices were enjoined in the law for different sins, as is clear from Leviticus 16 and 17. Therefore, they conferred grace.
On the contrary (1), It is impossible for the blood of goats and bulls to take away sins (Heb 10:4). But grace takes away sins. Therefore, the ancient sacraments did not confer grace.
Furthermore (2), The soul has life by grace. But concerning the precepts of the old sacraments it is said, I gave them precepts that were not good, and judgments by which they could not live (Ezek 20:25). Therefore, they did not confer grace.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that their use was not meritorious. For nothing is meritorious unless it is accepted by God. But those sacraments were not accepted by God; for about this verse: I did not wish the blood of . . . goats (Isa 1:11), the Gloss says, using the past tense, he shows that he never loved the sacrifices of the Jews. (Glossa ordinaria, PL 113:1234.) Therefore, their use was not meritorious.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no useless work is meritorious. But the killing of so many animals was completely useless. Therefore, it was not meritorious.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, any given thing effects only what God has established. But God imposed those sacraments as a burden, as is said in the text. Therefore, their exercise was not meritorious.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Origen says that God allowed this for the same reason he allowed the bill of divorce. (Origen, Homilies on Numbers, hom. 17, n. 1 (PG 12:703).) But a bill of divorce was always bad and never meritorious. Therefore, neither was the use of the aforementioned sacraments.
On the contrary (1), Bede says that the sacraments of the Old Law, kept in their own time, conferred eternal life. (See Bede, In Marci euangelium expositio (CCSL 120), Bk. 3, ch. 10, l. 722: “Notandum sane quia iustitia legis suo tempore custodita non solum bona terrae uerum etiam suis cultoribus uitam conferebat aeternam.”) But nothing leads to eternal life unless it is meritorious. Therefore, they were meritorious.
Furthermore (2), every act of formed virtue is meritorious. But the use of the sacraments of the Old Law was an act of adoration, which, in holy men, was with formed charity. Therefore, it was meritorious.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that they did not purge one from impurities of the flesh. For either those impurities are purely bodily, or they are spiritual. They did not cleanse from purely bodily things, but rather they seemed to soil the body more. Likewise, neither did they cleanse from spiritual impurities, for spiritual impurities proceed from the soul to the body: for according to Augustine, the body is not soiled unless the soul has been soiled first. (Augustine, De continentia, ch. 2, throughout.) However, the sacraments mentioned did not cleanse, since they did not confer grace. Therefore, neither did they cleanse the flesh.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, among all the sacraments of the Old Law, none was more purgative than the sprinkling of calf ashes. But this rendered one unclean rather than purging him: for the priest, who sacrificed the calf, was made unclean, as is clear from Numbers 19. Therefore, neither did the other sacraments purge.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, sacraments of the New Law are more efficacious than sacraments of the Old Law. But sacraments of the New Law do not purge one from irregularities. Therefore, neither did sacraments of the Old Law purge from them; which irregularities the Master here explains as impurities of the flesh. (In the time of the New Law, ‘irregularities’ refer to canonical impediments that bar a man from either receiving or licitly exercising some order or office in the Church.)
On the contrary (1), is what is said: the blood of goats and the sprinkling with the ashes of a heifer sanctifies for the purification of the flesh (Heb 9:13). (The verse reads in full: “For if the sprinkling of defiled persons with the blood of goats and bulls and with the ashes of a heifer sanctifies for the purification of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God, purify your conscience from dead works to serve the living God (Heb 9:13–14).)
Furthermore (2), just as our sacraments are called spiritual, so also those were called carnal: the first covenant had justifications of divine worship (Heb 9:1), on which the Gloss comments: not true and spiritual, but in the mode of fleshly worship. But the sacraments of the New Law purge from spiritual impurities. Therefore, those sacraments purged from carnal impurities.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
The first question I answer by saying that in a sacrament there are two things to consider: namely, the sacrament itself and the use of the sacrament. The sacrament itself is called by some people a work performed; but the use of the sacrament is its actual performance, which is called by some people a work working. Therefore, when it is called a sacrament, speaking per se, conferring grace or not, justifying or not, is to be referred to the work performed. But about the work performed in the sacraments of the Old Law, there are two opinions. For some people say that in those sacraments the work performed was a sign of the sacraments of the New Law, and of the Passion of Christ, from which they have efficacy; and thus, that work was performed with a certain declaration of faith; and thus, as a result and indirectly they were able to justify, as though our sacraments were in the middle, having been signified by those having a sanctification from God, as Hugh of St. Victor says. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 11, chs. 1–2 (PL 176:343).) But our sacraments justify directly and immediately, since they were instituted directly for this. But this opinion does not seem to fit with the words of the saints: for they say that the law was an occasion of death, inasmuch as it displayed sin, and did not confer a helping grace. Nor does it make any difference however directly or indirectly they might confer grace. And furthermore, according to this view, the preeminence of the sacraments of the New Law over the sacraments of the Old Law would be either extremely little or nothing at all, for even sacraments of the New Law derive their causal efficacy from faith and from their signification, as was said. And thus others say, and better, that in no way did the sacraments of the Old Law, that is, the work performed in them, confer grace, except in circumcision, of which we will speak later.
Reply Obj. 1: ‘Sanctification’ sometimes conveys a cleansing and spiritual strengthening, which happens through grace; and in that way the sacraments of the Old Law were not called sacraments, except as signs of things that sanctify, as was said. In another way, ‘sanctification’ conveys the dedication of someone to something sacred; and thus they were called sacraments, and things that sanctify, as it were, since a certain fittingness for sacred use, in the temple and in the vessels and in the ministers and in the people, came to be by them. And in this way, among pagans, too, ‘military sacraments’ were designated, by which a man was set apart for military office, which they considered a sacred thing, as they considered all those things that pertained to the community.
Reply Obj. 2: That prayer in the canon of the Mass is not intended as to those things enacted in the Mass, for this sacrifice is more pleasing than those; but it asks that the devotion of the one offering it should be pleasing, just as the devotion of the ancients did please. And likewise Daniel compares the sacrifice, such as he could offer at that time, to the devotion of those who had offered the sacrifices prescribed in the law in Jerusalem with great devotion.
Reply Obj. 3: The sacraments of the Old Law were called medicines as to their signification, and not as to the conferral of grace.
Reply Obj. 4: Man at the time of the law of nature was left to his own devices as to knowledge; and having fallen, he erred by ignorance into idolatry: hence, as with all things he found himself weak, it was necessary that, being instructed by the law and the signification of its sacraments, he should realize that he was powerless without the help of grace; and thus it was appropriate that those sacraments not confer grace, so that in this way salvation would be looked for from Christ alone.
Reply Obj. 5: Although those sacraments did not wash away sin as to the stain, since they did not confer grace, nevertheless they did diminish the guilt, since they were burdensome; and thus they were able to make satisfaction, presupposing the grace conferred on them by means of faith in the mediator.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that concerning the use of the sacraments, which is called by some a work being performed, there are two opinions. For some people have said that the use itself was not meritorious, even if they were done in faith and charity: and the Master seems to say this in the text. But this seems absurd, because if it were true, the labors of the holy patriarchs in sacraments of this kind would not have been accepted by God, and the work of virtue could be non-meritorious. And thus it is commonly held that their use could have been meritorious, if it were done out of charity. Some people, however, excuse the Master by saying that he understood that those works performed did not justify, however much they were done in charity, although the performance itself done out of charity could be meritorious in someone who is in a state of meriting.
Reply Obj. 1: Those sacrifices, strictly speaking, were never accepted by God, because they did not contain grace, by which anything is acceptable to God. But they were accepted or not accepted incidentally: the ones accepted were accepted on account of their signification and the devotion of their offerers, while the ones not accepted and abominable were such on account of the sins and abuse of their offerers, and because the very same things were sacrificed to idols. And so, to the extent that they were accepted by God, they could have been meritorious.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the killing of animals is useless in itself, nevertheless, it was useful as directed to the worship of God by divine institution, and its benefits are touched upon in the Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, PL 117:487.) on Romans 5: the law was given for conquering the proud man, namely, so that he would offer to God rather than to idols; for scourging the hard-hearted, as it was for a satisfaction; for instructing the foolish man, by reason of its signification; for displaying offenses and human weakness; and this corresponds to the first two; for the manifestation and witness of grace, and the signification of future things; and this explains the third.
Reply Obj. 3: According to Augustine, the law concerning such sacraments was given for the hard-hearted and proud as a scourge and a burden, so that, burdened by divine sacrifices, they would not be free to slip into idolatry. But it was given to the perfect as a sign, and to the little as a teacher: and in this respect, their use could be meritorious.
Reply Obj. 4: Origen speaks of those sacrifices according as they had a certain account of distaste from the fact that they were sacrificed to idols; and as to this they did not have the account of merit.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the intention of the Old Law was to lead men to fear and reverence for God, and to draw them from carnal things to spiritual ones little by little. And thus it established many impediments by which men were often impeded from the use of these sacraments, so that in this way they would hold them more in reverence, because anything rare is valued; and in this way also they were little by little dishabituated from their carnal observances, ultimately to be completely drawn away from them in the time of grace. And these impediments were called impurities of the flesh, by which man was made unfit for approaching the holy things bodily; and the sacraments of the law cleansed one from these impurities of the flesh.
Reply Obj. 1: Those impurities were not spiritual in the sense that they were always caused by sin, but in the sense that they prevented one from approaching the sacred things.
Reply Obj. 2: A priest washed his hands and vestments so that he would not touch other things with bloody and sooty hands; and because there should not be a commingling of sacred things with common things; hence they even wash their hands anointed with holy oil and wipe them clean. But he was considered unclean for three reasons. First, so that priests would be under the same burden as all others. Second, to take away from the priests their pride in sanctifying the others. Third, to signify that the priest of the new covenant should always consider himself unworthy because of the extreme holiness of that sacrifice.
Reply Obj. 3: In the New Law there are not so many irregularities as in the Old Law, and they are only in the ministers of the church, in whom the greatest fittingness is required because of the holiness of the sacraments; so these irregularities are not as easily wiped away.
Exposition of the Text
Ceremonial observances. They are called ceremonial which do not have an obvious reason in themselves for the actions performed, although they might have a clear reason for their institution. But the word ‘ceremony’ comes from the office of Ceres, who was the goddess of grain, because previously sacrifices to her were instituted and afterward the name was transferred to every divine cult. Or, as Valerius Maximus says, they are called from the town of Caere, in which formerly the Romans instituted their rites. (See Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia (LLA 314), Bk. I, ch. 1, n. 10.)
They also occasionally cleansed leprosy from the flesh; that is, they pointed out the one who had been cleansed, when the signs of leprosy that had appeared were stopping.
They saw God without mediation; that is, they used to receive knowledge of divine things not from sensible signs, but by infusion. And we spoke of this in Book II, Distinction 23, Question 2, Article 1, ad 1.
Question 2
Circumcision
After the Master has defined the difference between the sacraments of the Old and New Law, here he considers a certain sacrament of the Old Law, namely, circumcision, which has some affinity with the sacraments of the New Law; and it is divided into two parts: in the first, he examines circumcision; in the second, he raises a certain question about his findings, at: But if it is asked, etc. The first is in three parts: in the first, he considers the efficacy of circumcision; in the second, its institution, at: here it must be said how circumcision was instituted; in the third, he examines its transformation through baptism, at: thus however it was changed, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows what kind of efficacy circumcision could have; second, he shows that certain remedies had the same efficacy against original sin before circumcision was commanded, at: but it is asked about the men who lived before circumcision.
Here six questions arise:
first, about the necessity of circumcision;
- second, to whom it applied;
- third, about the things that were required for circumcision;
- fourth, about the efficacy of circumcision;
- fifth, its transformation;
- sixth, about the remedy that preceded circumcision.
- Article 1
About the necessity of circumcision
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 4; below, a. 2, qa. 1–2; ST I-II, q. 102, a. 5, ad 1.) It seems that it was not necessary for circumcision to be given. For it belongs to the wise man to do something as briefly as he can. But by faith and the sacraments of the law of nature, original sin was sufficiently purged. Therefore, it was not necessary for circumcision to be given as a remedy for original sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no sensible penalty is owed to original sin, since it is contracted from another; nor is there any expiation through satisfaction. But circumcision carries a sensible penalty. Therefore, it was not a fitting remedy against original sin.
On the contrary, circumcision is a seal of faith, a seal which is in the foreskin of our father Abraham (Rom 4:11). But it was fitting to represent that faith, of which we all had to become imitators. Therefore, it was appropriate for circumcision to be given.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it should not have been given before the written law. (Parallel: ST I-II, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3.) For under the law of nature there was no distinction, since that law was common to everyone. But circumcision is a distinctive sign, for, according to Damascene, it is the sign distinguishing Israel from the gentiles. (John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, Bk. 4, ch. 25 (PG 94:1214.) Therefore, it should not have been given before the written law.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, precepts that do not arise from natural reason should be delivered to the people through the office of ministers. But circumcision was not among the dictates of natural law. Therefore, since there was no distinction of ministers before the written law, it seems that it should not have been given at that time.
On the contrary, circumcision, according to the Apostle, is a sign of faith. (See Romans 4:11.) But even before the written law there was a distinction between the faithful and unbelievers. Therefore, it was fitting for it to be given to them then.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it did not need to be delayed until the time of Abraham. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 102, a. 5, ad 1; ST III, q. 70, a. 2; Super Rom. 4, lec. 2; Super Gal. 3, lec. 6.) For even before him faithful men were distinguished from unbelievers. But circumcision is a sign of faith. Therefore, it should have been given before the time of Abraham.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, circumcision has a greater efficacy than sacraments of the law of nature; otherwise it would not have been instituted after them. But the need for an efficacious remedy was not less before Abraham than after him. Therefore, it should have been given also before him.
On the contrary, the faith that gives sacraments the efficacy of signifying is faith in the mediator, as was said above. But it was to Abraham that promises of a mediator to be born from his seed were first made. (See Galatians 3:16.) To him first, therefore, a distinct sign of faith ought to have been given, in the member of generation.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that circumcision first and principally was necessary for a more explicit signification than the preceding sacraments had. For it was necessary that with the passing of time, as faith became more explicit, so the sacramental signs should become more distinct. Now circumcision has an express likeness to the removal of original sin in four ways. First, as regards the member of generation, through which original sin is transmitted. Second, in its circular figure, in which is represented the cycle that is in the process of original infection, according to which a person corrupts a nature, and a nature a person. Third, as to the pain involved in circumcision, which was opposed to the pleasure of concupiscence, in which the power of kindling sin particularly thrives. Fourth, as to the shedding of blood, in which the Passion of Christ is signified, by which satisfaction would be made for original sin. And it is in regard to this benefit that circumcision, which is the seal of the cure from original sin, is defined. But as a consequence, circumcisions had another benefit, namely, the distinction of a faithful nation from unbelievers, on account of the faith for which circumcision was given; and in relation to this Damascene defines circumcision thus: circumcision is the sign determining Israel from the gentiles among whom it dwelt. (See the citation above.) It also had mystic signification: a moral signification, because it was a sign of the chastity to be kept; an allegorical signification, inasmuch as it signified future purgation by Christ; and an anagogical signification, as it were, inasmuch as it signified the laying aside of corruptible flesh and blood in the resurrection.
Reply Obj. 1: Circumcision had these benefits beyond the sacraments of the law of nature; and so it had to be instituted after them.
Reply Obj. 2: That pain was not for satisfaction but only for signification.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that God could only have given the written law to a faithful nation; and so it was necessary that a faithful nation first be brought together, and distinguished from others, before the law was given to them. But this could only happen through a certain sign by which the faithful resembled each other and by which they were distinguished from others, which pertains to circumcision; and thus circumcision had to be given before the giving of the law.
Reply Obj. 1: Circumcision belonged, in a way, to the law of nature, inasmuch as it was given during the time of the law of nature, and belonged, in a way, to the written law, inasmuch as it prepared for it. But dispositions have distinction belonging to those things to which they dispose.
Reply Obj. 2: We do not have original sin from ourselves but from someone else, and so it has a remedy completely from someone else, namely from God, without our contributing. And on account of this, any sacrament that was a remedy for original sin had to be commanded by God immediately, like circumcision and baptism. It is different with legal sacraments, however, which were instituted to satisfy for actual sins.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question it should be said that by the corruption of original sin, the human race around the time of Abraham had arrived at the deepest of sins, namely, infidelity, and the most shameful vices against nature; and so at that point in time it became fitting for the promise to be first made about the offspring to be born, in whom all nations would be blessed and cleansed from their sins. It was also fitting for a certain example of faith to be set down at that time in signification for men against infidelity, and also at that time, for a sign of chastity to be given against the most corrupt concupiscence; and thus circumcision was given first to Abraham as a sign of fatherhood, as the one out of whom the destroyer of sin was to be born, and as a sign of faith and of distinction from unbelievers, and as a sign of chastity and purity.
Reply Obj. 1: Before Abraham nearly all were faithful; for idolatry is said to have begun around his days.
Reply Obj. 2: Since at that point in time the corruption had gathered more strength, it was also fitting for an efficacious remedy to be given then.
Article 2
To whom circumcision applied
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallel: Super Rom. 4, lec. 2.) It seems that circumcision should have been given to all peoples. For it was given as a remedy against original sin. But that disease was common to all men. Therefore, also the medicine should have been common.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, circumcision was given as a sign of faith. But all men were bound to imitate Abraham’s faith; and besides, faith was always of necessity for salvation. Therefore, circumcision should have been given to all men.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it says in Genesis: This is the covenant that you will observe between me and you, and your seed after you. Every male among you shall be circumcised (Gen 17:10). But from the seed of Abraham many nations came forth besides the sons of Israel, like the Ishmaelites, the Idumaeans, etc. Therefore, circumcision did not apply just to the sons of Israel.
On the contrary (1), circumcision was a sign of faith. But there was only one people in which faith and the worship of God remained, once the rest were corrupted by idolatry. Therefore, circumcision applied to them alone.
Furthermore (2), circumcision represented a future medicine through Christ. But Christ was to be born from only one nation, namely, Israel. Therefore, circumcision applied only to that nation.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this remedy should have been given to women as well. (Parallel: ST III, q. 70, a. 2, ad 4.) For circumcision was given as a medicine against the first transgression. But the first transgression began with a woman. Therefore, the remedy should have been given also to women.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, where the same cause exists, there is the same effect. But in men the same cause for giving circumcision exists as in women: for they too belong to the people of God, and the corruption of original sin is in them. Therefore, the remedy should have been given to them.
On the contrary, Hugh of St. Victor says that the circumcision of the flesh was given to men alone, for the Sacred Scriptures customarily represented the soul by the masculine sex, but the flesh by the feminine, so that it would be manifest that circumcision conferred sanctification on souls, but did not remove the corruption of the flesh. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 12, ch. 2 (PL 176:350).)
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it did not apply to Christ to be circumcised. (Parallels: ST III, q. 37, a. 1; q. 40, a. 4.) For the observance of the Sabbath was closer to the moral precepts, among which it is even counted, than circumcision is. But Christ did not observe the Sabbath according to the letter; hence they said of him, This is not a man from God, who does not keep the Sabbath (John 9:16). Therefore neither should he have observed circumcision.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Gloss on Hebrews 7 says that Christ did not pay tithes in the loins of Abraham, for a tithe represented the medicine for original sin, which was not in Christ. But similarly circumcision, as has been said, signified cleansing from original sin. Therefore, it did not apply to Christ.
On the contrary, God sent his son, born of a woman, made under the law (Gal 4:4). But to those who were under the law, circumcision applied. Therefore, also to Christ.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that just as through Adam sin had passed into all men, so it was necessary that through Christ sanctification from sin should pass into all men; hence, to point out his sanctity’s prerogative, it was necessary that everything pertaining to Christ exert power by a special sanctity. And thus in the nation from which Christ was to be born, it was especially fitting for the worship of God to exist, and for him to be represented among them. And since circumcision is a sign distinguishing the people of God from others, it was fitting that circumcision be given particularly to the nation of Israel—not only as to those who were of the shoot of Jacob, but as to all who belonged to that people in any way.
Reply Obj. 1: Circumcision was a remedy against original sin together with the signification of the sanctification of an offspring to be born, on account of which it was in the generative member; and thus this remedy applied only to that nation from which Christ was to be born. But among others there still remained the same remedies that existed before circumcision was given, because to them it was not necessary to give special remedies and lessons of holiness.
Reply Obj. 2: Although all men were bound to holding the faith that Abraham held, nevertheless not all were bound to imitate Abraham in faith: for neither did the knowledge of Abraham come to all, nor was he given to all as an example to be imitated, except by means of his seed, in whom all the nations were to attain the blessing of Abraham. And thus circumcision, which was a sign of the faith of Abraham, did not apply to all people.
Reply Obj. 3: As for the promise made to Abraham, Isaac was set aside from Ishmael by God’s choice, as was Jacob from Esau, as is clear from Romans 9, while no such segregation was made among the sons of Israel; and thus, all the sons of Israel belonged to God’s own particular people. And because of this, circumcision applied only to those who had never been separated, as it were, from the family of Abraham. But Ishmael and Esau were bound to circumcision as long as they were in the family of their forefathers, but not after departing from them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that original sin, as was said in Book II, Distinction 31, Question 1, Article 1, descends from father to sons as far as fault and culpability are concerned; but as concerns the penalties, it descends from the woman: for the father is the efficient cause in generation, and the mother contributes the matter. But circumcision was given against original sin in order to take away fault, but not for taking away the corruption of the flesh; and thus it was given to men and not to women: and this is the reason that is touched upon in the objection. By this it is also shown to be an imperfect sacrament, and its imperfection draws us to look forward to the perfect.
Reply Obj. 1: Although transgression began from a woman, nevertheless the cause of the transmitting of original sin was not the woman, but the man: for if the man had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted; and so the Apostle says: by man sin entered the world (Rom 5:12).
Reply Obj. 2: It is already clear that there is not the same cause in both men and women as regards the fact that circumcision is directed against original sin; likewise also not as regards the fact that it is a sign of the nation of the faithful and distinguishes them from unbelievers. For the distinction of this nation is chiefly on the part of the men, for the women are subject to the men; and therefore among the Hebrews geneologies were not reckoned from the woman’s side, but from the man’s side.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that circumcision applied to Christ not because of his need, but because of its becomingness: for which many reasons can be assigned in Christ. The first is that he might show himself to be a son of Abraham, to whom the precept of circumcision was given as well as the promise of offspring to be born; and in this way, he implied the fulfilment of God’s promise. Second, so that by undergoing circumcision, as with all the other legal prescriptions, he would free us from the burden of the law. Third, so that he would show himself to be a brother of the Jews, lest they have just occasion to reject him.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ was set apart from others in no way during his childhood as far as external behavior went; and thus all those things that pertained to boys in the Old Law, he wished to fulfill in himself. But when he had arrived at the age of adulthood, he had to show that he was master of the law, and that the law had been imposed up until he came. And thus in some matters he worked above the law, as in the observance of the Sabbath and in touching lepers.
Reply Obj. 2: Paying tithes was a purely figurative act as concerned those who paid tithes in the loins of Abraham; and thus it did not apply to Christ, for he was immune from original sin. But circumcision also has other reasons besides signification in those who are circumcised; and thus the two things do not have the same account.
Article 3
About the things that were required for circumcision
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 102, a. 5, ad 1; ST III, q. 70, a. 3, ad 3; Super Rom. 4, lec. 2.) It seems that the eighth day was not required for circumcision. For other remedies given against original sin, whether in the law of nature or in the law of grace, did not have a determinate time. Therefore, neither did circumcision have to take place at the time given.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it could happen that the eighth day was the day of the Sabbath. But on that day it was commanded to rest from external works. Therefore, there was no necessity that circumcision happen on the eighth day.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, those who wandered in the desert were not circumcised on the eighth day, but afterwards, in the time of Joshua in Gilgal (cf. Joshua 5); and the circumcision counted for those men, nor does it seem to count as a transgression for those who died in the desert uncircumcised. Therefore, the determination of time is not a necessary part of circumcision.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as a determinate time is missed if it is forestalled, so also if it is delayed. But proselytes were circumcised after the eighth day, and it was valid for them. Therefore also, boys could be circumcised before the eighth day, and it would be valid for them.
On the contrary (1), circumcision only had efficacy or obligation by God’s command. But he commanded circumcision according to a determinate time: every male infant of eight days among you shall be circumcised (Gen 17:12). Therefore also, a determinate time was a necessary part of circumcision.
Furthermore (2), signification is a necessary part of a sacrament. But the eighth day contributes to the signification. Therefore, it is a necessary part of it.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the determination of the member was not a necessary part of circumcision. (Parallels: above, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 1; ST I-II, q. 102, a. 5, ad 1; ST III, q. 66, a. 7, ad 3; q. 70, a. 3, ad 1; Super Ioan. 7, lec. 2; Super Rom. 4, lec. 2.) For in the sacraments the sign must correspond to the thing represented. But the cleansing of original sin that is represented by circumcision is not according to any determinate part of the body, but according to the whole. Therefore, neither should circumcision have any determinate part.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, sacraments should have the greatest propriety in them. But generative members seem to be base and shameful. Therefore, it was not becoming that some sacrament be given determinately in that member.
On the contrary, it is said: you shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskins (Gen 17:11).
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a stone knife would be necessary for circumcision. (Parallels: below, in the exposition of the text; ST III, q. 70, a. 3, ad 2; Super Rom. 4, lec. 2.) For baptism is the successor to circumcision. But a determinate instrument of washing, namely water, is of necessity for baptism. Therefore, a determinate instrument of incision should be also of necessity for circumcision, and particularly because of the signification that is set down in the text; for signification is of the account of a sacrament.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory comments on Ezechiel: in the lives of the saints we recognize what we should understand in Scripture. (See Gregory, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam (CCSL 142), Bk. 1, hom. 10, l. 684: “Vel certe rotae animalia sequuntur, quia in sanctorum patrum uita cognoscimus quid in sacrae scripturae uolumine intellegere debeamus.”) But the saints and particularly the lawgivers did circumcision with a stone knife, as we read in Joshua 5 and of Moses in Exodus 4. (See Joshua 5:2–3; Exodus 4:24–26.) Therefore, a stone instrument was a necessary part of the command.
On the contrary, circumcision only had force except by divine institution. But in its institution, which is touched upon in Genesis 17, no mention is made of a stone knife. Therefore, it was not a necessary part of circumcision.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
The first question I answer by saying that circumcision was both a precept and a sacrament. Therefore, the eighth day was a necessary part of it as to the obligation of the precept, so that whoever did not observe that time was guilty of transgression. But it was not of necessity as regards the efficacy of the sacrament: for circumcision done at another time also had its own sacramental effect. Something similar happens with the ministers of our sacraments, who keep the due form and matter, and omit something of the rite instituted by the Church for the solemnity of the sacrament. Now the reason for the determination of this time is both mystical, which is touched upon in the text, and literal, which is touched upon by Rabbi Moses: for a boy before the eighth day is as tender as he was in his mother’s womb; and thus as animals were not offered before the eighth day for the reason given, so neither was a boy circumcised.
Reply Obj. 1: The remedy that preceded circumcision is counted simply among the sacraments of the law of nature, which, according to Hugh of St. Victor, (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 11, ch. 3 (PL 176:343).) were not as fully determined as the sacraments of the written law, among which circumcision belongs in a certain way. But the remedy that follows circumcision, namely baptism, is more general and perfect, nor ought it to be so restricted. And thus there is not a similar argument for circumcision as for the others.
Reply Obj. 2: The Sabbath day did not prevent circumcision, for it was not a purely bodily work, but a sacramental one, as also were sacrifices, which were permitted to be offered on the Sabbath; and thus it is said, a man receives circumcision on the Sabbath, and the law of Moses is not broken (John 7:23).
Reply Obj. 3: For those who were wandering in the desert a dispensation from the precept was made on account of necessity, which is touched upon in Joshua 5—namely, they did not know when the camp would be moving. And again, because it was not necessary for them to have any sign of distinction at that time, as Damascene says, when they were living far away from any other people; (John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, Bk. 4, ch. 25 (PG 94:1211).) and yet, as regards those who omitted it from negligence or contempt, Augustine says that they were guilty of disobedience. (Augustine, Quaestionum in heptateuchum libri septem (CCSL 33), Bk. 6, Quaest. Iesu Naue, qu. 6, l. 101: “quidam enim de aegypto exeuntium filii in illo populo incircumcisi erant, quos potuit circumcidere iesus; illorum scilicet filios, qui genuerunt in deserto et contempserunt eos circumcidere, quod inoboedientes erant legi dei.”) But it is not certain that any of those who were born in the desert died there, and it seems probable that they did not: for it is said: there was no sick one among the tribes (Ps 105[104]:37). Hence those who left from Egypt, who were circumcised, died. And thus there was no one there who died uncircumcised. But if some did die uncircumcised, the same thing is to be said about them as of those who died before the institution of circumcision.
Reply Obj. 4: In the text, the Master seems to hold that it was permitted to circumcise in advance when there was a danger of imminent death. But certain people say, following Hugh of St. Victor, (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 12, ch. 3 (PL 176:350).) that there was no need for circumcising early: since the remedy that existed before circumcision, which had efficacy up until then, availed for the salvation of those who died before the eighth day; and they confirm this by the Jews who live today, who are never circumcised before the eighth day, and by the Gloss on Proverbs 4: as an only son in the sight of my mother (Prov 4:3), which says, the little one is not counted as another son of Beersheba, for since he died before the eighth day, he was not named, and as a result he was not circumcised. (See the Glossa ordinaria, PL 113:1086.) They likewise confirm it by this likeness: no animal was offered to God before the eighth day. Therefore, according to this opinion it should be said that acting early and delaying are not the same thing: for no one should transgress a precept, as one would do by acting too early; but if he has transgressed by delaying it, he should, as much as he can, fulfill it whenever he can.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that circumcision was a sign of cleansing from original sin, and a sign of the distinction of the people from whom Christ was to be brought forth, and a sign of preserving chastity, as was said. And regarding all these things, it was fitting that it be done to the generative member, for by the act of generation both original sin is contracted and Christ descended from that nation; and in that act chastity consists. And thus the generative member was a necessary element of circumcision, both as to the efficacy of the sacrament and as to the obligation of the precept.
Reply Obj. 1: Although original sin is not attached to any particular part of the body in its essence, nor in its effect, nevertheless it is as to its cause, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: The generative member, which was noble of itself, was made ignoble because of concupiscence, which is especially strong in that part. And so it was fitting that especially in that member the medicine should be administered: for our less respectable members are treated with greater respect, as it says in 1 Corinthians 12:23.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that a sacrament that is a sign and cause brings about what it represents; and so that signification which points to the effect of the sacrament is necessary to the sacrament; however, that signification that points to the principal cause of the effect is not necessary, but concerns rather its optimal being. Now a stone knife is not necessary for the incision by which circumcision signifies its effect, namely, the cleansing of original sin; but it has a certain likeness to the principal meritorious cause of the remission of original sin, namely, Christ. (Since Christ is the “stone rejected by the builders” (Ps 118:22; Acts 4:11; 1 Peter 2:4; etc.) and is also the “rock” (1 Cor 10:4).) And thus it was not necessary to circumcision, neither in its obligation as a precept, nor in its efficacy as a sacrament, that it be done with a stone knife, which the rite of the Jews, even to the present, shows. But in the principal circumcisions, in which it was necessary that Christ be represented, such an instrument was employed.
Reply Obj. 1: Water, of itself, has the greatest usefulness for washing, by which baptism signifies what it effects; but stone is not the most useful for cutting; and thus it is not the same.
Reply Obj. 2: This is to be understood concerning those things that the saints observe as though obligated by the law; however, it is not this way in the case mentioned, and thus the argument does not follow.
Article 4
About the efficacy of circumcision
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 63, a. 1, ad 3; q. 70, a. 4; q. 72, a. 5, ad 3.) It seems that circumcision imprinted a character on the soul. For in the sacraments the effect corresponds to the figure. But external circumcision was a distinguishing sign, not only a cleansing one. Therefore, it also imprinted a distinguishing character interiorly.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the New Law, every sacrament that cannot be received more than once imprints a character. But in the Old Law circumcision could not be received more than once. Therefore, it imprinted a character.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, some adults could have received circumcision deceitfully, and if they did, then they did not receive the effect of circumcision; but after they had relinquished their deception, circumcision availed them: for otherwise it would not have been a way of salvation, since it could not be received again. Therefore, it had some effect remaining in the soul, by reason of which the ultimate effect of circumcision came about, and this is a character. Therefore it imprinted a character.
On the contrary (1), in sacraments of the New Law, only the most perfect ones imprint a character. But circumcision was inferior by far to the sacraments of the New Law. Therefore, it did not imprint a character.
Furthermore (2), a character configures us to the Trinity. But this applies indifferently to men or women. Therefore, since circumcision did not apply to women, it seems that a character was not imprinted in it.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that circumcision did not cleanse from sin: by the works of the law no flesh shall be justified before him (Rom 3:20). (Parallels: below, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 2, ad 5; ST III, q. 33, a. 3, ad 3; q. 62, a. 6, ad 3; q. 70, a. 4; De veritate, q. 28, a. 2, ad 12; Super Rom. 4, lec. 2.) But other works of the law, like sacrifices, do not seem to have been less honorable than circumcision. Therefore, neither did circumcision justify from sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if it cleansed from any sin, it seems it would particularly cleanse from original sin. But it did not cleanse original sin, which is evident from the fact that John the Baptist, who was circumcised on the eighth day, as it says in Luke 1, said to Jesus, therefore I should be baptized by you (Matt 3:14). And the Gloss on this says, to be cleansed from original sin. (See Bede, Homeliarum euangelii (CCSL 122), Bk. 1, hom. 12, l. 46: “Ab illo debuit ipse iohannes baptizari, id est a peccati originalis contagione mundari, qui quamuis nullo inter natos mulierum minor tamen quasi natus ex muliere culpae naeuo non carebat ideo que cum ceteris mulierum natis ab eo qui natus ex uirgine Deus in carne apparuit opus habebat ablui.”) Therefore, in no way did it cleanse from sin.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing prevents the entrance into eternal life except sin. But circumcision did not open the gate to eternal life, as it says in the text. Therefore, neither did it cleanse sins.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever takes away one sin, takes away all: for it is impious to hope for half forgiveness from God. But it is never found among the sayings of the saints that circumcision took away actual sin. Therefore, neither did it take away original sin.
On the contrary stand the authorities cited in the text.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that circumcision did not confer grace. (Parallels: ST III, q. 62, a. 6, ad 3; q. 70, a. 4; De veritate, q. 28, a. 2, ad 12; Super Rom. 4, lec. 2.) For a sacrament effects only what it figures. But circumcision does not signify the conferral of grace, but only removal of guilt. Therefore, it does not confer grace.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, baptism does more than circumcision only by taking away guilt and conferring grace. If, then, circumcision did these very things, baptism would not surpass circumcision in any way.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Old Law was said to kill because it did not confer grace against concupiscence. But this would not have been the case if circumcision, which was in a certain way a sacrament of the law, conferred grace. Therefore, it did not confer grace.
On the contrary (1), it says in the text that circumcision furnished the same remedy as baptism, except that it did not open the gates of heaven. But baptism confers grace; it does not merely take away sin. Therefore, circumcision also did the same.
Furthermore (2), darkness is not expelled except by the presence of light. But grace is opposed to fault, just as light is to darkness. Therefore, since circumcision expelled guilt, it seems that it conferred grace.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
The first question I answer by saying that a spiritual character is a certain distinctive sign—distinctive in that it constitutes man in some state of perfection, as in baptism, confirmation, and holy orders, as will be clearer further on. Circumcision, however, was chiefly a sign established for cleansing; and therefore in it man was not placed in any other state, and in this way it did not belong to it to confer a spiritual character.
Reply Obj. 1: In itself, circumcision chiefly signifies removal, but consequently and incidentally it signifies distinction, inasmuch as some were circumcised and others were not; and thus it was necessary that the effect correspond to it as to its principal signification, but not as to its secondary one.
Reply Obj. 2: Circumcision cannot be repeated because its cause, namely, original sin, could not be repeated; and not because a spiritual character is imprinted in it.
Reply Obj. 3: As in baptism a spiritual character remains, by reason of which someone who has falsely received it receives the effect of baptism once he has relinquished his deception, so also the external character remained in circumcision, which effected the same thing.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the sin that is contracted from another is fittingly taken away by another; and thus in every state after sin there was some remedy by which original sin would be taken away by virtue of the Passion of Christ. And again, because no child born could prepare himself for grace before he had the use of his free will, lest he be left without any remedy at all, it was necessary for some remedy to be given which would obliterate sin by the very act having been done; and circumcision was this kind of remedy. And thus it is conceded by all that it took away sin, just as it signified removal; and in this, it agrees with the sacraments of the New Law, because it brought about what it represented. But circumcision worked the forgiveness of sins retroactively. For there are three things in original sin, namely, fault, the sentence of losing the divine vision, and the kindling of sin. The first two are totally taken away, but the third is diminished by the sacrament. And thus circumcision, which was a particular cutting-away, directly signified and caused the diminishment of the kindling of sin, and as a result it took away the sentence of losing eternal vision, and, as a result, the guilt. (In his edition of the Scriptum, Moos offers the following note: “Here St. Thomas appears to grant that circumcision conferred grace even ex opere operato, but this opinion he withdrew later on, in ST III, q. 62, a. 6, ad 3, where the holy Doctor expressly says of this opinion: ‘And so at one time it seemed to me. But if the matter be considered carefully, this too appears to be untrue,’ and adds: ‘And therefore it seems better to say...’ See also ST III, q. 70, a. 4, and Super Rom. 4, lec. 2.) In baptism, though, it is the opposite: for first it destroys guilt, whose removal the external cleansing signifies and also causes, and as a result it destroys the other two.
Reply Obj. 1: Sacrifices were instituted to satisfy for actual sins, which man perpetrated on his own; and thus it was not necessary that sins be taken away by sacrifices, as original sin was by circumcision.
Reply Obj. 2: Although circumcision freed one from original sin, nevertheless one could not perfectly attain the fruit of liberation through it, because the gate was not opened; and according to this aspect, John the Baptist, though circumcised, still needed to be cleansed from original sin, namely by baptism.
Reply Obj. 3: By circumcision the impediment on the part of the person was withdrawn, for original sin was removed, inasmuch as it was the infection of this person. Nevertheless there still remained the impediment on the part of the nature, for the price had not yet been paid. And thus it was incidental that it did not open the gate of heaven; for even if baptism had existed at that time, conferring the same grace in itself that it presently confers, it would not have opened the gate; and if circumcision had any place now, it would open the gate.
Reply Obj. 4: Circumcision was directly ordained against original sin, but as a result it also removed actual sin wherever it was found. But nevertheless the saints do not speak about this, for circumcision was not chiefly instituted for this.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
I answer the third question by saying that concerning this matter there are several opinions. For some people have said that circumcision, such as it is, took away fault, but did not confer grace, drawing on a certain Gloss on Romans 4 which says: in circumcision sins were forgiven, but grace was not supplied by it. For they said that since original sin is nothing other than intense concupiscence with a lack of due justice, circumcision without the ability to confer grace could take away the debt, though not the culpability, as is evident from the fact that if a man did not have that justice, it would not be imputed to him for penalty. But this cannot be: for as long as the disordering of fault remains, in no way can it not be imputed by God for penalty, since the disordering of fault is put in order by the penalty. And thus it is necessary, if the imputation for penalty is removed, that the disorder is removed; which cannot happen without grace.
And therefore others say that circumcision took away fault by its own power, and grace was conferred by the circumcision, not by the force of the circumcision, but by divine generosity once the impediment to grace had been removed. But this cannot be: for although on the part of the recipient the expulsion of the contrary comes before the introduction of the form, nevertheless on the part of the agent cause the introduction of the form comes first. For a contrary cannot be expelled except by the introduction of a form; and thus unless circumcision conferred grace in some way, it would in no way remove guilt.
And so others say that circumcision conferred grace as to its privative effect, which is precisely to remove guilt, but not as to its positive effect. But this is no answer: for the final positive effect of grace is to make one worthy of eternal life; which happened by circumcision, just as now it happens by baptism.
And thus others say, more probably as it seems, that it gave grace as to the privative effect of removing guilt and culpability, and as to certain positive effects, like ordering the soul and making one worthy of eternal life, but not as to all the things that baptismal grace does. For baptismal grace is sufficient for completely repressing concupiscence and acting meritoriously, things that the grace given in circumcision was not strong enough to do; and according to this reading the Gloss cited should be understood. (Moos again furnishes a note at this point: “Here St. Thomas admits that circumcision conferred grace solely as to its privative effect, namely, the demerit of eternal life. But, weighing this matter more maturely afterwards, in ST III, q. 62, a. 6, ad 3, and q. 70, a. 4, and Super Rom. 4, lec. 2, he repudiated that opinion, and said that circumcision is a solely a sign of justifying faith.”)
Reply Obj. 1: Just as in the sacrament of the altar there is something from the power of the sacrament, but something of natural concomitance, as will be said later, (See d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 1.) so also circumcision was principally ordered to the removal of guilt, but as a result to the conferral of grace.
Reply Obj. 2: In baptism grace is given more fully, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: The grace of circumcision did not sufficiently repress concupiscence, as grace of the New Testament does; and thus the argument does not follow.
Article 5
The transformation of circumcision
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 103, a. 3; SCG IV, ch. 57; Super Rom. 2, lec. 4; ibid., ch. 4, lec. 2.) It seems that circumcision should not have ended. For in Genesis 17:13 it says that circumcision is given as an eternal covenant. But the eternal is what is never closed by an ending. Therefore, circumcision should not have ended.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, something that did not begin with the law need not end with the law. But circumcision began before the law: for it is not from the law but from the patriarchs, as is clear from John 7:22. Therefore, it did not need to end with the law.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, figures that signify what should always be done should not end, as is clear in the example of using incense, which signifies devotion. But circumcision of the heart . . . whose praise is not of men but of God, is always to be done, as it says in Romans 2:29; and this is what external circumcision signifies. Therefore, it should not have ended.
On the contrary (1), If you let yourselves be circumcised, Christ will be of no benefit to you (Gal 5:2).
Furthermore (2), once the perfect comes, the imperfect that is ordered to the same thing would remain in vain. But baptism does more perfectly what circumcision was ordered to than circumcision does. Therefore, once baptism comes, circumcision had to end.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that also the other legal prescriptions should not have ended. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 103, a. 3.) For Christ, as it says in Matthew 5, did not come to abolish the law but to fulfill it. But the law consisted not only in moral prescriptions, but also in the sacraments of the law. Therefore, he did not come to abolish them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, there is no change in God (Jas 1:17). But it is a sign of a change of will if a precept that was formerly given is afterward revoked. Therefore, since God commanded these sacraments, it seems they should not have ended.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a precept can only be revoked by an equal or superior. But we never read that God in the New Law revoked a precept of the sacraments of the law. Therefore, they are still in effect.
On the contrary (1), The law has only a shadow of the good things to come (Heb 10:1). But once the truth comes, the figure ceases. Therefore, with Christ having come, the legal prescriptions had to cease.
Furthermore (2), When there is a change in the priesthood, there is necessarily a change in the law as well (Heb 7:12). But in Christ there was a change of priests, as the Apostle proves in the very same place. Therefore, the legal prescriptions had to end.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in the time of grace the prescriptions of the law could be observed without sinning. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 103, a. 4; q. 107, a. 2, ad 2; ST II-II, q. 93, a. 1; Super Rom. 14, lec. 1; Super Gal. 2, lec. 3; Super Col. 2, lec. 4.) For every deed of Christ was for our instruction. But Christ observed them in the time of grace, as is seen in many examples. Therefore, it is permitted to keep them during the time of grace.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, they were also observed at the time of the apostles, as is clear in the case of Paul, who in Acts 16 circumcised Timothy, and also in Acts 21, who having purified himself according to the law, entered the temple and offered sacrifices (Acts 21:29)—which he would not have done to avoid scandal if it were a sin; because the truth of life is not to be set aside because of scandal. Therefore, the legal prescriptions could be observed without sin in the time of grace.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, every act that is not in itself evil can be done without sin, and even meritoriously, if it is done with the right intention. But to sacrifice and be circumcised are not evil in themselves, otherwise they would never have been allowed. Therefore, if they are done with good intentions, they will even be meritorious now, let alone without sin.
On the contrary (1), If you let yourselves be circumcised, Christ will be of no benefit to you (Gal 5:2). But everything that impedes the benefit that comes from the redemption of Christ is a sin. Therefore, circumcision in the time of grace could not be done without sinning, and by the same argument, neither could the other sacraments of the law.
Furthermore (2), concerning the verse: now that you have come to know God . . . how can you turn back again to the weak and needy elements, whose slaves you want to be once more? (Gal 4:9), the Gloss says: therefore he says “once more,” to show that now the law, after Christ, is not far from ancient idolatry. But idolatry could never be observed without sin. Therefore, neither can the legal prescripts after Christ.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that we are bound even still to observe some legal prescriptions. (Parallels: Super Col. 2, lec. 4.) For we are bound to observe the precepts of the New Testament and the statutes of the Church. But the precept of the apostles in the New Testament was about certain legal prescriptions to be observed: It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us to impose on you no further burden beyond that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication (Acts 15:28). Therefore, we are bound to keep these prescriptions of the law still.
Obj. 2: But if it were said in reply that the permission of the apostles was only for that time, one may argue to the contrary: the Gloss says in the same place that these things were necessary. (The Gloss of Rabanus Maurus, PL 114:458.) But necessary things are those without which there is no salvation, and no permission is given about those things, but rather a precept. Therefore, we are bound to observe them still.
Obj. 3: If it were said that it was revoked by Paul, as when it says: nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving (1 Tim 4:4); to the contrary, someone lower in rank cannot revoke the precept of the superior. But Paul was below the whole council of apostles congregated in Jerusalem. Therefore, he could not revoke it.
On the contrary, Peter says in the same place that in the New Law we are saved by the grace of Christ without the burden of the law, just as also our fathers were (Acts 15:11). Hence this yoke is not to be imposed on the faithful. But the yoke he refers to is the observance of the ceremonial laws. Therefore, we are not bound to keep them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
The first question I answer by saying that when what is perfect has come, what is partial should be discarded, if it is ordered to the same thing: for grace does not accomplish by two things that which can be done by one, just as neither does nature. Now in comparison with baptism, circumcision was imperfect in three ways. First, as to its signification, for it did not signify so explicitly the cleansing of the whole man from the uncleanness of all of original sin, as the washing of baptism does. Second, as to its efficacy, for the grace that was given in circumcision was not so abundant for working virtuously and for repressing the kindling of sin as it is in baptism. Third, as to benefit, for its benefit was not as widespread as baptism’s, since it had a particular people, a particular sex, and a particular time, which does not happen in baptism; and thus, once the time of fullness arrived, circumcision had to end, to be replaced by baptism.
Reply Obj. 1: Here ‘eternal’ is taken as an era, which does indeed have an end, but not one that is determined by us. Or it may be said that physical circumcision could be an eternal covenant as to its meaning, and as to what succeeds it; just as also faith can be said to remain always by reason of the vision that will succeed it in the fatherland.
Reply Obj. 2: Although circumcision did not begin with the law, nevertheless it did begin because of the law, as a sort of preparation for the law; and thus it had to end when the law ended.
Reply Obj. 3: The principal signification for which circumcision was instituted is the removal of original sin, for a sacramental signification is referred to the effect. But this did not always need to be done by circumcision, and thus it was not necessary that circumcision always remain. Moreover, the other signification was a result of the first, and considering it does not lead one to a definite judgment about the duration of circumcision. But the use of incense was never for signifying something as an effect of that something; and so the argument is not the same.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that there were three main reasons for the cessation of the legal prescriptions. The first is that the law was instituted to signify the grace of the New Testament, which came about through Christ. Thus, when Christ came, they had to end, just as a shadow ends when a body comes; and the Apostle touches on this reason: the law having the shadow of good things to come (Heb 10:1).
Another reason is from its imperfection: for in the legal prescriptions grace was not conferred to the extent that it was fitting for it to be given in the New Testament. For just as a natural power is proportionate to a natural thing, so also sacramental power is proportionate to a sacrament. Hence it was necessary for other sacraments to be instituted in which a more ample grace was conferred; and the Apostle touches on this reason: there is indeed a setting aside of the earlier commandment because it was weak and ineffectual (Heb 7:18).
The third reason is taken on the part of those to whom the law was given, who were little ones; and so they needed to be withdrawn gradually from their former custom of idolatry, so that in this way it would be granted to them to offer to God the same things that they had once sacrificed to idols or had seen offered, as Rabbi Moses says. But afterward, when human race had reached maturity, it had to be free from these observances. And the Apostle touches on this reason in Galatians 3 and 4, and Peter touches on it in Acts 15, where he shows that those legal requirements were imposed as a burden on an unschooled people.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ fulfilled the law inasmuch as he added to the moral precepts and elucidated those precepts more. But he displayed the very truth that was in the figures of the ceremonies and assumed them in himself.
Reply Obj. 2: That a lawgiver sets down different precepts suited to different times, as is the case here, is not owing to the changeability of the one giving the precepts, but rather to their prudent dispensation.
Reply Obj. 3: The Lord revoked it by the fact that he fulfilled in himself what he had commanded to be observed in figure; and thus during his Passion he said: it is consummated (Jn 19:30).
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that this question seems to pose a difficulty due to certain contrary statements that are found concerning it both in the canon of scripture and in the words of the saints. For sometimes the legal prescripts are found to be observed in the time of grace, but sometimes they are prohibited; and even Peter and Paul seemed to argue back and forth about this (cf. Gal 2).
And as a result Jerome and Augustine seemed to have reached different opinions. For Jerome contended that for those to whom the grace of the New Testament had been plainly disseminated, the legal prescriptions were deadly, immediately after the Passion of Christ; yet the apostles, as a kind of pious exception to the rule, observed them in order to avoid scandalizing the Jews. And thus Peter did not sin by living like a Jew, doing it as an exception, according to which it is also said: I have become all things to all men (1 Cor 9:22). (Dispensatorie could also be rendered “economically,” that is, in the manner of the divine economy, which adapts universal truths to particular circumstances.) And likewise Paul’s rebuke of Peter was an exception to Paul’s own practice, lest by Peter’s example, the gentiles of whom he himself was the apostle might seek the sacraments of the Old Law as though they were necessary; for Paul himself is found to have observed the same things by a pious pretense. And in this way, according to Jerome, both are excused—Peter from fault and Paul from impudent criticizing. (See Jerome, Epist. 112 ad Augustinum (PL 22:921); In Gal., Bk. 1, on Galatians 2:11 (PL 26:364ff.).)
But since it does not seem fitting for the apostles to have done something against the truth of doctrine to avoid scandalizing the Jews, nor again does it seem fitting that Paul would have said something disingenuous in his letter to the Galatians, where he says that Peter was blameworthy. So Augustine says something else, and better, (See Augustine, Epist. 82 ad Hieron., ch. 2 (PL 33:280–1).) that before the Passion of Christ the legal prescripts were to be observed out of the necessity of divine command, and they had an effect until then. But after the Passion of Christ, yet before the dissemination of the Gospel, they could be observed by Jews converted to the faith—not placing any hope in them, as though they had some power, or as if the grace of Christ would not suffice for salvation without them, but lest the Old Law would seem to be altogether rejected, if all of a sudden it were shunned like idolatry. And thus, in this way, mother synagogue was to be led to her tomb with honor.
But after the dissemination of the Gospel, the legal practices were not only not salutary, but deadly. Therefore, in the meantime Peter and Paul and the other apostles observed the legal prescriptions not in a dissimulating way, but truly. Nevertheless, Peter behaved incautiously in his observance of the legal prescriptions, catering too much to those Jews who said the legal prescriptions were to be observed, so that others were led by his example to observe them as though they were necessary. And in this way he was indeed to be criticized, and he incurred some light fault; and Paul reprimanded him truly and not as an exception.
And from this the solution to the first and second objections becomes clear: for before the Passion of Christ, when Christ kept these laws, they were neither dead nor deadly, but salutary; while in the time of the apostles, before the dissemination of the Gospel, they were indeed dead, like things having no benefit, but not deadly.
Reply Obj. 3: One changed circumstance makes an act good in its genus or bad; and thus the legal prescriptions, which are indifferent apart from the consideration of the time of their observance, were made good in their own time, but when they were observed not in their own time, they became bad; and thus they cannot be made good by a good intention.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that concerning this matter there are three opinions.
One opinion has said that that precept which is written in Acts is to be understood literally, and its obligation remains until now. But this plainly goes against the words of Paul, who said that nothing was common, that is, unclean, through Christ, except to someone who considers something to be common (cf. Rom 14). Then again, it is against reason: for since this precept is not moral, because natural reason does not dictate it, it must be ceremonial; and thus its obligation does not remain any more than the others’.
And thus, others have said that it is not to be understood literally of the blood of animals and strangled animals, but of the shedding of blood that happens in murder, and the strangling of the poor. (See Guilelmus Altissiodorensis, Summa aurea, pt. 4, tr. 1, q. 2.) But this cannot stand: for in Jerome’s commentary on Ezekiel 18, after that mystical explanation he sets down the literal explanation, which he says the apostles also intended. (This is found rather in Jerome’s comments on Ezekiel 44:31; see Commentarii in Ezechielem (CCSL 75), Bk. 13, ch. 44, l. 1875.)
And thus others say that the letter of the apostles was not preceptory regarding abstaining from sacrificed animals, and blood, and strangled animals; but it was a certain warning to preserve the peace and the shared life of gentile and Jewish members of the faithful. And thus they prohibited fornication as something evil in itself, which among the gentiles was not considered a sin. But they prohibited sacrificed animals as something that could arouse, in the hearts of the Jews, a suspicion of idolatry on the part of the gentiles; while blood and strangled animals were held in abomination by the Jews because they had a contrary custom—just as even today if someone wants to live sociably together with others, he has to abstain from those things that the other abominates.
And by this the response to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: They are said to be necessary either with respect to the mystical sense already mentioned or with respect to the common life that had to be observed among Jews and gentiles.
Reply Obj. 3: Paul did not revoke it but rather explained the intention of the apostles, as someone who was present when the judgment was handed down. Hence it is said, now concerning those things that are sacrificed to idols, we do not all have knowledge (1 Cor 8:1): for not all were understanding in what respects they were prohibited.
Article 6
About the remedy that preceded circumcision
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the sixth we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 4, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 2, ad 3; ST III, q. 70, a. 4, ad 2; De Malo, q. 4, a. 8, ad 12.) It seems that before circumcision existed, faith alone was not sufficient for remitting the original sin of children. For charity is more efficacious than faith. But another person’s charity was never enough for someone to merit. Therefore, neither would faith suffice for justification.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if someone else’s faith sufficed, then by the same argument their unbelief would also harm—and so a child would be punished for the actual sin of his parents, which is unfitting.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, faith does not help someone else more than it helps the one who has it. But those who had faith were not always helped by it: for it could be that their faith was unformed. Therefore, neither would the faith of the parents benefit the child by removing his original sin.
On the contrary (1), is what Gregory says in the text. (The text—from Gregory, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 4, preface, l. 69—is given in Lombard’s Sentences.)
Furthermore (2), sin which was contracted from another can have treatment by another. But the original sin of a child was contracted from another. Therefore, he could be cleansed from it by another’s faith.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that faith was not sufficient without some external sign. (Parallels: below, d. 4, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 2, ad 3; ST III, q. 68, a. 1, ad 1; q. 70, a. 4, ad 2.) For Augustine says against Faustus that in no religion, whether true or false, could men be united together without any visible sign. (Augustine, Contra Faustum, Bk. 19, par. 11 (CSEL 25:510).) But men are united in the true religion through that by which original sin is removed, since there has to be a remedy like this for those entering. Therefore, it had to happen by some visible sign.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, an act of the mind can extend equally to children born and to those conceived but unborn. Therefore, if faith sufficed for the removal of original sin without an external sign, it seems that even children yet unborn could be cleansed from original sin by faith.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, today faith is not sufficient for salvation without any external sign. Therefore, if it was sufficient back then, it seems that it would have had greater efficacy then than now.
On the contrary (1), according to this there would be no difference between children and adults, which nevertheless Gregory asserts.
Furthermore (2), all the sacraments of that age had their whole efficacy from faith. Therefore, faith worked as much without external signs as with them; and in this way external signs were not required, as it seems.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in adults a sacrifice would not be required, or anything like it. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 103, a. 1, ad 1; ST III, q. 68, a. 1, ad 1.) For someone’s own faith is not less beneficial to him than someone else’s faith. But someone else’s faith was sufficient for children without any external sign, as was proved. Therefore, also for adults.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Hugh of St. Victor says that no one was obligated to the sacraments of that age, but they were celebrated by choice. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 11, ch. 3 (PL 176:343).) But something like that is not necessary for salvation. Therefore, without sacrifices someone could have been cleansed of original sin.
On the contrary, is what Gregory says in the text, that for small children faith alone sufficed, but for adults sacrifices and oblations were needed.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, original sin is a sin of nature, but nature could not be repaired except through Christ. And thus, someone’s original sin could only be remitted if the one to be cured were brought into relation to Christ and in a certain way joined to him, which happened through faith. And thus, faith in the Mediator was always efficacious for curing original sin—among those who had the use of free will, their own faith; for others, someone else’s faith, so that they would not be lacking the divine remedy entirely.
Reply Obj. 1: Faith is in the intellect, but charity is in the affections. Now affection pertains to what is good for one, while knowledge pertains to what is true simply. And for this reason, faith, more than charity, could look towards the Mediator as the cause of salvation for another; and because of this, the justification that happens in the sacraments is attributed more to faith than to charity.
Reply Obj. 2: Someone else’s faith did not help inasmuch as it was an act of that person, but rather, on the side of that by which it regarded its object, Christ, who was the medicine of the whole of nature. In this, it had a certain likeness to our sacraments, inasmuch as it justified by its object, as if by the work performed, but not by the act of the one doing it.
Reply Obj. 3: And from this, the solution to the third is clear: for whether faith is formed or unformed is a condition on the part of the one acting, not on the part of the object; and thus, unformed faith in a parent did not impede the effect of salvation in the son, but it did impede it in himself, for its unformedness arose from something that was contrary to salvation, namely, from mortal sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that concerning this there are two opinions. For certain people say that faith was not sufficient without a profession of faith made by some external sign; and there was a difference between children and adults only in that for children the faith of another was sufficient with an external sign made by another, but for adults their own faith was necessary with a sign made by themselves. But since this does not seem to agree with the words of Gregory quoted in the text, others say, with greater likelihood, that faith alone was sufficient for children, without any external sign; but not just the habit of faith, but a movement of it related to the salvation of the child by the force of some profession of interior faith, no matter who it was who, in whatever way, referred his profession of faith to the child. However, this pertained more to the parents, who should have had care of the child, and from whom he had contracted original sin.
Reply Obj. 1: What brought men together in true religion in the time of the law of nature only had power through faith; and thus it was not of necessity, but it was celebrated by choice, so that one man would become known to another.
Reply Obj. 2: The child still in the womb of his mother, as far as he pertains to human understanding, does not have being distinct from his mother, and thus it cannot happen by an act of man that he is either cleansed from original sin by baptism today, nor that he was cleansed by the faith of his parents back then: but he can be cleansed by divine power, as appears among those sanctified in the womb.
Reply Obj. 3: The efficacy of faith is not diminished, since all sacraments have their efficacy from faith, but there is something added to it that must be observed, even as the moral law is not of less efficacy for a religious than for someone living in the world (although the moral precepts are sufficient for salvation to the one living in the world), but in a religious there may be required counsels to which he obligated himself by his own choice.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that those sacraments of the law of nature did not oblige by divine command, but were celebrated by choice, according as the mind of each dictated, so that each might profess his faith to others by external signs and do so for God’s honor, according as the habit of charity inclined to external acts. And in this way we say of charity that an interior movement suffices. When, however, it has the opportunity to act, external acts are also required. So, too, for adults under the law of nature, faith alone sufficed, since also nowadays it would suffice for someone who, through no contempt, lacked the sacraments. But faith itself, when the opportunity arose, would agitate to demonstrate itself by some external signs. When those signs were displayed, however, the efficacy of the remission of fault was not from those exterior things, but from the interior faith; and this is how the words of Gregory are to be understood.
And by this the answers to the objections are clear.
Exposition of the Text
In the bosom of Abraham. (Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, 1.7. 1 citing Bede, Homeliarum evangelii libri duo, bk1 hom.11.) The bosom of Abraham is called the limbo of the fathers, in which the saints were set apart from all others; and because Abraham is said to have first separated himself from unbelievers by place and practice, it is called the bosom of Abraham.
With a stone knife (Sent. IV, 1.9.4.) is to be understood not always as an element of the rite of circumcision but in certain notable circumcisions, as is read in Exodus 4 and Joshua 5.
And so circumcision was commanded to be done in the flesh of the prepuce because it was instituted as a remedy against original sin. (Sent. IV, 1.9. 3.) The flesh of the foreskin is called the skin protecting the flesh: for in flesh where concupiscence most resides no amputation could happen without danger.
But perhaps under the Law, if the necessity of death was pressing, they circumcised their sons before the eighth day without sin. (Sent. IV, 1.10.1.) The Master here speaks according to his own opinion; however, the other opinion, which was set down above, seems to be more probable.
Chapter 137 of 186