D. 11 - Sacrament-and-reality in the Eucharist
After the Master has considered the reality contained in this sacrament, showing that the true body is contained there, here he intends to examine the conversion of bread into the body of Christ, by which it happens that the body of Christ is contained under the sacrament. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he examines this conversion of bread into the body of Christ; in the second, he shows how the species remain when the substantial conversion has happened, at: Christ gave his body and blood under another species for three reasons. (Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, 11.3 (62). 1.)
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he inquires what the aforementioned conversion is like; second, he considers this question according to what all agree on, at: and yet I know it is not formal; (Sent IV, 11.1 (60). 1.) third, he considers what different people have different opinions about, at: to some it seems to be substantial. (Sent IV, 11.1 (60). 1.) And this is divided into three parts according to the three opinions that he cites. The second part begins at: but some say that, etc.; (Sent IV, 11.2 (61). 5.) the third at: but others held, etc. (Sent IV, 11.2 (61). 6.)
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he sets forth the opinion; second, he objects to the contrary, and resolves it at: but the following objection to this position is made by others; (Sent IV, 11.1 (60). 2.) third, he shows which statements are to be conceded or negated according to this opionion, at: and yet some do not grant that the bread’s substance is ever the flesh of Christ. (Sent IV, 11.2 (61). 3.)
Christ gave his body and blood under another species for three reasons. (Sent IV, 11.3 (62). 1.) Here he shows how the species remain when the substantial conversion has happened; and this is divided into two parts. In the first he shows why the true body of Christ is displayed in this sacrament under a different appearance; in the second he determines its use, or the distribution of the species mentioned, at: it is gathered from the foregoing that Christ gave to the disciples wine mixed with water. As for the body, he gave such a one as he then had. (Sent IV, 11.6 (65). 1.)
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he shows why the body of Christ is presented in the sacrament under a different appearance; second, why under two different appearances, at: but why is it taken under a double species? (Sent IV, 11.4 (63). 1.) Third, about the mixing in of a third element, namely, water, at: but water is to be mixed with the wine. (Sent IV, 11.5 (64). 1.)
It is gathered from the foregoing that Christ gave to the disciples wine mixed with water. As for the body, he gave such a one as he then had, etc. Here he considers the distribution of the species, and first, how Christ distributed it; second, how it should be distributed now, at: and the Eucharist is not to be given by intinction to the people “as a supplement of Communion.” (Sent IV, 11.6 (65). 2 citing from the Council of Braga (spurious), c1.)
Here there are three questions. First, concerning the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ, and the wine into his blood. Second, the matter of this sacrament, whose appearances remain after the conversion. Third, the use of this sacrament at its first institution, when Christ gave it to his disciples.
Question 1
Transubstantiation
Concerning the first, there are four things to be asked:
first, whether the bread remains there after the consecration;
- second, whether it is annihilated;
- third, whether it is converted into the body of Christ;
- fourth, the statements that should be granted in this matter.
- Article 1
Whether the bread remains there after the consecration
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 75, a. 2; SCG IV, ch. 63; Super Matt. 26; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 4.) It seems that the bread’s substance remains after the consecration, as the third opinion says. For Damascene says, since it is the custom for men to eat bread and wine, he has joined them to divinity, and made those things his own body and blood. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 4, ch. 13 (PG 94:1144).) But a joining requires that both of the things joined actually exist. Therefore, the bread remains with the body of Christ.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what remains of the bread in this sacrament after the consecration, since it is sacrament alone, must signify the true body of Christ, and also the mystical body. But this signification does not belong to bread except by reason of its substance, according to which it is made out of many grains, and according as it is able to restore and nourish. Therefore, it must remain in the substance of bread.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what leads to fewer difficulties is rather to be chosen. But this position leads to fewer difficulties, since nothing follows other than that two bodies are together in the same place, which is not unfitting to the glorified body by reason of its subtlety. Therefore, this opinion is to be preferred to the other.
On the contrary (1), this pronoun, this, since it is demonstrative in its sense, indicates the substance hidden directly under the appearances. But if the bread’s substance remained there, it alone would directly underlie the accidents, for it would be affected by them. Therefore, the demonstration of this pronoun this, when it is said, this is my body, would be directed to it, and then it would be a false statement, which is unfitting and heretical, for it is in the teaching proposed by our religion. Therefore, the position described is heretical.
Furthermore (2), if the bread’s substance remained there, then the one receiving this sacrament would not only receive spiritual food, but also physical food. But the consumption of physical food impedes one from receiving the sacrament for the rest of the day, as was said above in Distinction 8. (See d. 8, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 2.) Therefore, anyone who had consumed the body of Christ once would not be able to receive again, which is against the rite of this sacrament.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the appearance of the bread must not remain. (Parallels: below, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2; ST III, q. 75, a. 5; SCG IV, chs. 62, 63, and 65; De rationibus fidei, ch. 8; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 5.) For in the sacrament of truth there should be no deception. But since accidents lead to the recognition of what something is, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 1, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 1 (402b21).) it seems to be a deception to display the accidents of something whose substance no longer remains. Therefore, since the bread’s substance does not remain, its accidents should not remain.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the reasons assigned in the text do not seem fitting. For although faith slips away from the testing of reason, nevertheless it does not require contradicting reason: for those things that are of faith are not against reason, but above it. But what is seen under another appearance is not only against reason, but even appears against the senses. Therefore, it should not have appeared under a different species for the sake of the merit of faith.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, once we assume faith in this sacrament, by which the body of Christ is believed to be eaten without detriment to him, it would not be horrible to consume it in whatever species it should appear. But faith is necessary for receiving it. Therefore, the second reason that he assigns is null.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, what happens sometimes for the strengthening of faith, if it always happened, would not be mockery, but greater strengthening. But sometimes to strengthen the faith of someone who is doubting about this sacrament, the body of Christ appears under the species of flesh, as is read in the life of blessed Gregory (See John the Deacon, The Life of Saint Gregory the Great, Bk. 2, n. 41 (PL 75:103).) and in the lives of the fathers. Therefore, it would not be derisive if it always appeared in its proper species.
On the contrary (1), a sacrament is a sensible sign, as was said in Distinction 1. (See d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1.) But bread is the sacrament of the true body of Christ. Therefore, it should remain in its sensible accidents.
Furthermore (2), the use of this sacrament is eating, as was said above in Distinction 9. (See d. 9, a. 2, qa. 5.) But eating requires a sundering of food, which happens by chewing. But since this sundering cannot happen to the true body of Christ, which is glorified, there had to be at least other appearances there, which could be broken up.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that also the substantial form of bread should remain. (Parallels: ST III, q. 75, a. 6; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 4.) For substantial operation cannot happen without substantial form. But to nourish is the operation of a substantial form, for something nourishes to the extent that it is food, as it says in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (416b13).) Therefore, since the appearances that remain in the sacrament also nourish physically, as certain people say, it seems that the substantial form of bread remains.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is not changed into something of the body of Christ must remain after the consecration. But the bread’s substantial form is not converted into anything of the body of Christ: for if it were converted, it would have had to be converted into the soul, which is the substantial form of the body of Christ, into which nothing is converted, as is evident from the previous distinction. (See d. 10, a. 2, qa. 4.) Therefore, the substantial form of bread remains, like the accidents.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, bread is something man-made. But the forms of man-made things are accidents, as is evident in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 1 (192b27–32).) Therefore, since the accidents remain, it seems that the bread’s form, according to which it is bread, remains.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Averroes in his book On the Substance of the World, (Averroes, de Substantia orbis, ch. 1.) and in his commentary on Physics 1, (Text 63.) it is necessary in matter to understand dimensions before substantial forms in some way among generable and corruptible things, otherwise there could not be different forms in different parts of the matter, since division only happens according to quantity. But the dimensions remain. Therefore, the substantial form also remains.
On the contrary (1), once accidents and substantial form are removed, nothing remains except the shared subject. But what is shared cannot be converted into something. Therefore, no conversion can be understood to happen if substantial form remains.
Furthermore (2), the sensible appearances of bread and wine are sacrament alone in the Eucharist. Therefore, they must lead to that of which they are the sacrament, namely, the body of Christ. But if the bread’s substantial form remained there, the appearances would lead to it rather than to the body of Christ, for they are closer to it according to nature. Therefore it seems that the bread’s substantial form does not remain.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that this position, which holds that the bread’s substance remains after the consecration together with the true body, is unbecoming to this sacrament, and impossible, and heretical.
It is unbecoming because it would impede the veneration due to this sacrament, for it would be an occasion of idolatry if the veneration of latria were given to the host while the substance of bread remained there. It would also be against the sacrament’s signification, for the species would not lead to the true body of Christ by the mode of a sign, but rather they would signify the substance of bread. It would also be against the use of the sacrament, for then this food would not be purely spiritual but also physical.
But that it is impossible is evident from the fact that it is impossible for something to exist now when it did not exist before, when it has not changed and nothing has changed into it. Nor can it even happen by a miracle, like if something were a mortal rational animal and were not a human: for to be related otherwise now and before is the same thing as to be moved or to be transformed.
Therefore, if the true body of Christ were under the sacrament now and not before, it would be necessary for some motion or change to happen in between. But no change happens on the part of the bread according to this position. Therefore it is necessary that the body of Christ be changed at least in place, so that it may be said that the body of Christ is here, because it comes here by local motion; which cannot happen in any way: for since the body of Christ is consecrated at one and the same time in different places, it would be necessary that at one and the same time a body one in number would be moved to different places, which is impossible. For at the same time contrary movements would happen in the same thing, or at least different movements of the same species.
But the fact that this is heretical is seen from the fact that it contradicts the truth of Scripture, for it would not be true to say, this is my body, but rather, here is my body.
Reply Obj. 1: The word of Damascene is to be understood as to the appearances to which the body of Christ united to the divinity is joined in an ineffable way.
Reply Obj. 2: The appearances so remaining represent in a certain way the substance that they previously affected, and as a result, its properties. And in this way they have the account of signifying the true and mystical body of Christ by a certain resemblance.
Reply Obj. 3: Something more unfitting results from this position than that contradictory things are simultaneously true. For it posits a definition (namely, different now than before), and cannot posit the thing defined (namely, motion), whether in the body of the Lord or in the bread’s substance.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the accidents of the bread remain there the same in number. However, how they exist there, whether without their subject or in some other way, will be said in the following distinction, Question 1, Article 1. But the reason why they remain is assigned in the text on account of the sacrament’s use, and as to spiritual eating, which is by faith, namely so that faith would be of greater merit in sacramental Communion, and so that it would not be dreadful to us, if it were consumed in his proper appearance, and open to the derision of unbelievers. Another reason can be assigned on the part of the sacrament itself: for spiritual things in sacraments are customarily shown by physical signs. And since the true body of Christ is not physical food, but spiritual food, for this reason it was necessary that through sensible likenesses physical food would be signified, and that it would be contained by those likenesses.
Reply Obj. 1: In this sacrament there is neither deception nor pretense. For the senses are not deceived, since they only need to judge sensible species, which indeed are truly there just as they are presented to the senses. Nor is the intellect deceived, which must judge the substance of things aided by faith.
Reply Obj. 2: It is already evident from the things said that it is not against the senses, but above them, for the senses cannot attain to understanding of that substance.
Reply Obj. 3: If faith is assumed, in the consumption of the body of Christ appearing in its proper species there would not be any horror arising from abomination, but there would be horror proceeding from devotion, for man does not only recoil from touching unclean things out of abomination, but also from touching holy things out of devotion.
Reply Obj. 4: In exhibiting this kind of species, faith can be built up, but if it were consumed in this species, it would rather be for the destruction of faith, for the body of Christ, which is glorified, would be presented as vulnerable, if it were subject to chewing.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the bread’s substantial form does not remain after the consecration, and this is for three reasons. First, because in any change or conversion, the starting terminus is of the same kind as the ending terminus. Now what the conversion terminates in is not form alone nor is it matter alone, but a substance existing actually; and this is what the transubstantiating words declare that bring about what they signify. Hence since in them the pronoun this expresses a composite substance in act, it is necessary that what is converted into the body of Christ is also a composite substance, not the bread’s matter alone, and this is why the form of the bread does not remain. Second, because it would remain in vain. For accidents remain so that they can be signs, because this is what they exist for, so that we might receive the understanding of the underlying substance through them, since they are sensible, and in that way they are a path to the understanding of intelligible things. But substantial form is not sensible, but ordered to substantial being. Hence since the substance of the bread does not remain, the substantial form would be there to no purpose. Third, because the accidents would not directly lead to the body of Christ, but to the bread’s substantial form remaining, and so something of the sacrament’s signification would be destroyed.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument moves certain people to claim that substantial form remains there, but it is evident that this argument would lead rather to the conclusion that the bread’s matter remains than that its form does. For bread does not nourish, nor does any food, except as it is converted into something that is nourished; but of what is converted into something else by natural conversion, the form does not remain, but the matter does. Hence the bread’s substantial form, if it remained, would not be able to nourish more than its accidents do. But whether those appearances can nourish will be said in the next distinction. (See d. 12, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 5.)
Reply Obj. 2: The soul is not a form that uniformly perfects its perfectible in the whole and in all the parts; hence individual parts obtain from the soul a perfection proportional to them; hence although nothing is converted into Christ’s soul according as it is the perfection of the whole, nevertheless the whole substance of the bread is transubstantiated, both in its form and in its matter, into the whole body of Christ, according to which it is understood to have received congruent perfection in the individual parts, since this is the way with organic things, and the proper matter of the soul.
Reply Obj. 3: Although art cannot introduce substantial form by itself, it can, however, introduce it by the power of nature which it uses in its operation like an instrument, as is clear in the conversion of water into a vapor, and air into fire by means of fire. And likewise when an animal is killed, once the soul leaves, another substantial form replaces it, as the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. So also by the mixing of flour and water and the burning of fire a certain substantial form can result that is the substantial form by which bread is bread. But if there were not a substantial form that is instilled by art, by which bread is bread, a substantial form underpins the accident, namely, the form of flour; for the wheat has already broken down from its own species, because its operation does not remain so that it can generate something like itself.
Reply Obj. 4: The dimension which is understood before substantial form in matter does not have complete being, since it is not a terminated dimension, for the termination of dimension is by form. But the dimensions that remain after the consecration are terminated dimensions, because they have a certain measure and figure.
Article 2
Whether the bread is annihilated
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 75, a. 3; SCG IV, ch. 63; Quodl. V, q. 6, a. 1; Super Matt. 26; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 5.) It seems that the bread is annihilated once the conversion has been done. For in any change that is according to something internal to a thing, the starting terminus does not remain except in potency to the thing lying before it, as when something black becomes white, blackness does not remain except in the potency of the subject; and when fire is made from the air, the form of the air, which is the starting terminus, does not remain except in the potency of the shared matter, which is subject to the change. But in the conversion that we are discussing, the starting terminus is the whole substance of the bread. Therefore, since there is not anything to take as underlying the whole substance of the bread, since it is not in a subject as an accident, nor in matter as a form, it seems that it is entirely annihilated.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, regarding the same thing something is bound to be starting terminus and ending terminus, just as from something white, something black is made, and from something black something white is made. But of a change, of which the ending terminus is the whole substance of a thing, the starting terminus is simply nothing, as is evident in creation. Therefore likewise, since in the conversion that we are discussing the starting terminus is the whole substance of the bread, the ending terminus will simply be nothing. Therefore the substance of the bread is annihilated.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if one of two contradictories is false, the other will necessarily be true. But once the conversion has happened this is false: the bread is something, or something of the bread exists. Therefore, this is true: nothing of the bread exists. Therefore the bread is annihilated.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, something is said to be annihilated which remains neither in itself nor in another. But the bread’s substance does not remain in itself, once the conversion happens, as was said; nor does it remain in the body of Christ, for then the body of Christ would be increased. Therefore, it is thoroughly annihilated.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, formal conversion is related to form just as substantial conversion is related to substance. But in a formal conversion the form is annihilated, as is seen when fire is made out of air. Therefore, in a substantial conversion, as this is said to be, the bread’s substance is annihilated.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in the 83 Questions, Question 21: someone to whom non-being does not pertain is not a cause of tending to non-being. (Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (CCSL 44A), q. 21: “At ille ad quem non esse non pertinet non est causa deficiendi, id est tendendi ad non esse, quia, ut ita dicam, essendi causa est.”) But God is such a one. Therefore, he reduces nothing to nothingness. But the conversion mentioned is done by divine power. Therefore the substance of the bread is not reduced to nothing.
Furthermore (2), what is converted into something is not annihilated. But bread is converted into the body of Christ, as can be shown by the authorities cited in the text. Therefore, it is not annihilated.
Furthermore (3), a defect is opposed to perfection. But this sacrament is of the greatest perfection, as was said above, in Distinction 8, Question 1, Article 3, Subquestion 1. Therefore, since annihilation is a way to defect, it does not belong to this sacrament.
I answer that, this opinion places two things under disjunction: namely, that the bread’s substance is resolved into the underlying matter, or that it is annihilated; and both are false.
For if it were resolved into the underlying matter, this can only be understood in two ways. In one way, that it would be in the matter without any form at all, which indeed cannot happen even by a miracle, for this position implies self-contradiction. For matter by its own essence is being in potency, and form is its act. Therefore, if matter were posited to exist in act without form, the matter would be posited actually to be and not to be. The other way it can be understood is such that the bread is resolved into its material elements. And this also cannot be, for those material elements either would remain in the same place, and under those species there would have to be another body other than the body of Christ, and that material body would exist together with the dimensions of the bread, and many other unfitting things like this would result. Or else they would not exist in the same place, and then it would be local motion of that material element, which cannot be, because a change like that would be noticed if it happened.
Furthermore, since local motion is necessarily successive, that material element would have had to leave behind one part of the host before another. But transubstantiation happens in an instant, as will be said in the following article, Subquestion 2. Hence one of two things would follow: either sometimes under a certain part of the species there would be neither the body of Christ nor the substance of bread, nor the material element, which has already passed away from that part; or sometimes under the same part of the host there would be the body of Christ and the material element, which is impossible. And so it cannot be said that it is resolved into the underlying matter.
Likewise it cannot be said that it is annihilated, by the fact that every motion is denominated from the ending terminus, like the motion that is to whiteness is called whitening; hence only that transformation could be called annihilation whose ending terminus was nothing. However, this cannot be the case in that conversion, since this conversion must terminate in the body of Christ: for nothing can begin to be here that was not here before, except by a motion or change of itself or of something else terminating in it in some way. Hence if the conversion mentioned did not terminate in the body of Christ, then the body of Christ by its own motion would have had to be here on the altar after the consecration, where it was not before; which notion was rejected above. Hence it is clear that that opinion is false which holds that the bread’s substance is annihilated.
Reply Obj. 1: In natural changes the starting terminus is a certain form, which indeed is not converted into the ending terminus, and so it is not annihilated, unless to the extent that it remains in potency in its own subject. But what is converted into the ending terminus is the subject of the change, not indeed so that it is it, but so that it is under it; hence the subject is not said to be annihilated to the extent that it is converted into something else. Hence, since in this conversion what is the starting terminus, namely, the substance of the bread, is completely converted in itself into the ending terminus, namely, the body of Christ, not indeed so that it exists under it, but so that it is it, it is clear that there is no annihilation of the bread’s substance.
Reply Obj. 2: That argument works in opposed changes, because what is starting terminus in one is ending terminus in the other. But it does not work in changes of which one is ordered to the other as the perfect to the imperfect, as the change by which the first perfection is aquired is ordered to the one by which the second perfection is acquired. Now the conversion of bread into the body of Christ is not a change opposed to creation, but in some way perfecting it, inasmuch as the substance of bread attains a more noble being by this conversion. And so it is not necessary that there be an ending terminus in this conversion that was a starting terminus in creation.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the bread is not something, nevertheless what the bread is converted into is something once the conversion is done; and so it does not follow that the bread is annihilated.
Reply Obj. 4: Although the bread does not remain in itself or in something else, nevertheless the body of Christ into which the bread is converted remains, and so it does not follow that it is annihilated.
The fifth objection should be answered like the first.
Article 3
Whether the bread is converted into the body of Christ
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 75, a. 4; SCG IV, ch. 63; Quodl. V, q. 6, a. 1; De rationibus fidei, ch. 8; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 4 & 5.) It seems that the bread cannot be converted into the body of Christ. For a conversion is a kind of change. But in no kind of change is bread converted into the body of Christ; for that is not generation and corruption, because the matter of the bread does not remain; nor is there an alteration, because none of its substance remains in act; nor is there an increase, because nothing is added to the body of Christ, nor is there local motion, for the body of Christ itself did not descend from heaven, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 4, ch. 13 (PG 94:1143).) Therefore, it seems that the bread is in no way converted into the body of Christ.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in every conversion there must be something that is changed. Now, what is changed is what is related differently now than before. Therefore, if the bread is converted into the body of Christ, there must be something the same in number that was formerly of the substance of bread and is now of the substance of the body of Christ, which no one holds. Therefore the bread is not converted into the body of Christ.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, conversion is a kind of accident; for every accident is in a subject. However, it cannot be said that its subject is the bread, nor is it the body of Christ; for the same thing is not the subject of change and the starting or ending terminus. Therefore, the bread is in no way converted into the body of Christ.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that becomes something acquires what it is said to become. But every singular thing is incommutable. Therefore, it is impossible that some singular thing become another singular thing, although it can be joined to it, and in that way it can partake of its being as a part. But the body of Christ is a certain designated singular. Therefore it cannot be that something is converted into something else so that it becomes it, but only that it is joined to it.
On the contrary (1), Damascene says above: Christ made bread and wine his body and blood, not because the body of Christ itself descended from heaven, but because bread and wine turn into the body and blood of Christ.
Furthermore (2), what neither remains as itself nor is annihilated, must be converted into something else. But bread does not remain in itself, as was said in the first article, nor is it annihilated, as was evident from the second article. Therefore, it must be converted into something else.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this conversion happens successively. (Parallels: ST III, q. 75, a. 7; Quodl. VII, q. 4, a. 2.) For this conversion is done by the power of words. But words cannot do something except while they exist. Therefore, since they have being in succession, it seems that the mentioned conversion happens successively.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is impossible for something to be bread and the body of Christ in the same instant. Therefore, there is no single instant in which the body of Christ first exists and the bread last exists. But between two certain instants there is a middle time, as is proved in the Physics 6. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 6, ch. 3 (234a5–10).) Therefore the conversion of bread into the body of Christ is successive.
Obj. 3: In every conversion it is required that something be different now than before, since a conversion is a kind of change. But wherever there is now and before, there is succession. Therefore, in every conversion and change there must be succession; and so the same as before.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, in every making there is becoming and having-been-done. But becoming and having-been-done are not at the same time: for what is becoming does not exist, but what has been done already exists. Therefore, in this there is before and after, and so the same as before.
On the contrary (1), infinite power operates instantly. But this conversion is done by divine power, which is infinite. Therefore, it happens instantly.
Furthermore (2), in every successive change there is something in the middle before it is in the end. But in this conversion there is not found any middle between the substance of the bread and the body of Christ. Therefore, this is not a successive conversion.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this conversion is more miraculous than any other change. For the more easily our reason consents to something, the less miraculous it is. But there is no miraculous conversion that our reason consents to less than this one; for certain philosophers led by natural reason even arrived at creation, and also that matter obeys separated substances, and God most of all, for all its formation. Therefore, this conversion is more miraculous than all those changes.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, where there is more resistance, there is greater difficulty in making the conversion, and consequently a greater miracle. But in this conversion there is the greatest resistance, since a whole must be converted into a whole. Therefore, this conversion is of the greatest difficulty; therefore it is the most miraculous.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the less power there is on the part of the creature in which the miracle is done, the greater the miracle that is done by divine power. But in this conversion the power in the creature is the smallest, for in certain miraculous conversions there is natural power, like when water was converted into wine, while in others there is only potency of obedience, as when the rib was formed into the woman; and in creation, even if no potency precedes, nevertheless there is no opposition. Therefore, since in this conversion there is opposition, and no potency on the part of the creature, because something cannot be in potency with regard to a composite whole, it seems that this conversion is more miraculous than any other change.
On the contrary (1), the greater the distance between things, the more difficult it is to change them into each other. But non-being is more distant simply from being than this being from that being. Therefore, it is simply speaking more difficult to make any being from non-being than to make this being from that being; and thus creation is indicative of greater power than transubstantiation.
Furthermore (2), the higher the terminus of the change, the greater the power the change takes, just as it takes greater power to make a man than an animal. But the assumption of human nature, which is a certain change, has its end terminus in the person of the Son of God, which is something more worthy than the body of Christ, in which transubstantiation terminates. Therefore, that change is more miraculous than this one.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that among natural changes there are some changes in which nothing intrinsic to the thing varies, but only what is outside it, as is clear in the case of local motion. But in some changes what is in a thing incidentally varies, namely, quantity or quality, as is clear in the motion of increase or alteration; other changes extend even to the substantial form, like generation and corruption. But natural change cannot extend to variations of matter: for it works from the underlying matter, just like every second agent works with those underlying things that are given to him by the first agent. And these principles must remain in the operation of nature, as is said in the Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 1, ch. 7 (190a17ff.).) But just as the being of a composite, which nature produces from the underlying matter, is subject to nature’s operation, so also that matter which nature presupposes is subject to the action of the first agent, namely, God, from whom this thing receives the imperfect being (namely, being in potency) that it has. Hence divine operation can extend to the variation of matter, namely so that just as nature makes this whole to be this whole, so that it makes the whole water from the whole air, so also God may make that thing from this designated matter. And since designated matter is the principle of individuation, for this reason only by God’s operation can it happen that this particular individual thing become that particular individual thing; and that is the kind of conversion that is in this sacrament, since from this bread is made this body of Christ.
From which it is clear that this conversion differs from all natural conversions in four things. First, in the fact that it extends to the level of matter, which is not found in those conversions. And because matter is the first subject, and there is no other subject, for this reason it differs second in the fact that this conversion does not have a subject like the others have. Third, because in natural conversions a whole is converted into a whole but the essential parts are not converted into parts; for the whole air is converted into water, but the matter of the air is not converted into anything, because it is the same; form is also not converted, because one leaves and another is introduced. But here both the whole is converted into a whole, because bread becomes the body of Christ, and even the parts are converted, because the matter of the bread becomes the matter of the body of Christ, and the substantial form likewise becomes that form which is the body of Christ. Fourth, because in natural conversions what is converted and what it is converted into are both transformed. Indeed, what is converted into something else is always transformed by corruption; but what something is naturally converted into (if indeed it is a simple conversion) is transformed by generation, just as when water is generated from air. But if there is a conversion with an addition to something pre-existing, what is added is transformed according to increase, or at least by restoration of what it has lost, as happens in nourishment. But here what is converted into was pre-existing, and it is not added to, because as was said, what is converted is converted into it, both according to the whole and according to all its parts. Hence the thing that the conversion terminates in, namely, the body of Christ, is not transformed in any way, but only the bread that is converted.
Reply Obj. 1: This conversion is contained under none of the natural changes, but rather it differs from all of them, as is clear from what has already been said; however, it has a certain agreement with the transformation of nourishment, inasmuch as both are conversions into something pre-existing. Nevertheless it differs from it in the fact that here no addition is made, as it is there.
Reply Obj. 2: In this transformation or conversion there is something that is transformed, namely, bread; not indeed in the mode of other natural changes, so that something remains of it, but according to its whole and all its parts, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: The natural transformation of bread includes imperfect act, as is clear in the Physics 3; (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 3, ch. 1 (201a10ff.).) and since the same thing is the subject of perfect and imperfect act, for this reason the subject of natural transformation must be that which is the subject afterward of perfect act, namely, of form, to which the motion tends, and not what is already perfected. But the transformation in this conversion does not include any imperfect act, but only a certain succession of not only perfected acts, but also perfected subsistent things. However, succession is in things coming one after the other, as also order is in things that are ordered. But according to the rule given about relations in Book I, Distinction 26, Question 2, Article 3, response to the first and second objections, the relation of this order of succession will exist in reality indeed in the very bread that is changed, but not in the true body of Christ, except according to reason, for it remains unchanged.
Reply Obj. 4: Communication conveys a certain conferral, and so it requires something to receive what is conferred or given; hence it does not take place except in formal conversions where the change only extends to the form. And so since in this conversion nothing remains to which anything could be conferred, no communication takes place.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the reason why a given change is not instantaneous is the distance between what is moved and the terminus of motion. However, I say ‘distance’ not only according to the dimension of place or quantity, but according to the contrariety of form or nature. And thus where nothing is opposed to the form to be introduced, the form is received in an instant as soon as the agent presents it, as is seen in the illumination of something transparent, since in it there is nothing contrary or opposed to light; and it is the same in a form instantaneously introduced when the matter makes it necessary, once contrary dispostions have been expelled from it.
However, just as air lies under the sun to receive from it the form of light with no existing thing interposed in between, so also all created nature is subject to the divine nod, so that everything that God wills is done immediately, because whatever there is in a creature is material and not contrary to divine disposing; and so those things that he does by himself he can, when he wants, do in an instant. However, he sometimes does them successively, so that he works in us according to our own mode. Nevertheless this happens when what is transformed can be more or less distant from the terminus of transformation, because the succession in motion happens according to this.
However, since the conversion of which we speak extends to the very essence of matter, as was said, according to which, forms and dispositions having been separated by the intellect, one thing does not share more with one thing than with another, a greater and lesser distance from the terminus cannot be taken, because this singular designated thing, in respect of its being converted into the body of Christ, is as distant from another singular of its own species as it is from a singular of another species; and so the conversion mentioned happens in an instant.
Reply Obj. 1: The words of the form have sacramental power; hence they bring about nothing but what they signify, and so, since the signification of that form is only complete in the last instant, at that moment it has its efficacy.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument has been answered many ways by different people.
Some grant that one can designate the last instant in which bread exists as the first in which the body of Christ exists, because of the fact that in a certain whole time the bread existed, and so also in any instant of that time. Hence some of these people say that according to reality there is one instant in which there is bread and the body of Christ, but it differs according to reason; for inasmuch as that instant is the end of past time, the bread exists in it; but inasmuch as it is the beginning of the future, the body of Christ exists in it. But this cannot stand, because it is impossible that contradictories exist at the same time according to reality; but things that exist at the same instant according to reality exist most of all at the same time according to reality. Hence it is impossible that two contradictories exist in an instant that is one according to reality, no matter how much it differs according to reason: because by that reasoning it would have no order to what is measured and the time of which it is the terminus, but only to the soul. And since if we hold that the body of Christ and the bread exist at the same moment, it follows that two contradictories exist at the same time, since when there is bread there is not the body of Christ, for this reason it is impossible that there be one instant according to reality in which now the bread last exists and now the body of Christ first exists.
Therefore, others say that this ‘now’ is in one way one in reality, and in another way different; and they cite the example of the two lines touching each other, in which it is clear that they have two points, and nevertheless those points are joined in one point of the containing line; for things whose terminuses are together, are contiguous. And similarly they say that the being of the bread and the being of the body of Christ on the altar are contiguous; hence there is one outside measuring instant, in which the body of Christ first exists, and the bread last exists. But nevertheless there are two instants if we take it as of the two times by which are measured the being of the bread on the altar and the being of the body of Christ. And so between the two instants that are contiguous, as it were, there does not need to be a middle time, just as neither is a line necessary between two contiguous points. But that cannot stand, because since a point is a terminus of a line, which can be both an intrinsic and an extrinsic measure, it is possible to assign both an intrinsic and an extrinsic point. But an instant is a terminus of time, which is only ever an extrinsic measure. Hence an instant can only be taken as what is ordered by the mode of an outlying point. And so this position results in the same impossibility as the first.
And on account of this, others say that just as is proved in the Physics 4, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 11 (219b10ff.).) in the whole time only one now can be taken according to substance, and when two instants would be counted, this is according to the order of time to motion, and the action that they measure, namely as passing time measures some action. And in this way the beginning and end of that action is in time, and according to this two instants are numbered in time; and so the order and relation of the two instants to each other is to be considered according to the actions and motions that are measured. Hence if two instants are taken with regard to the same motion, as time measures the beginning and end of that motion, then it is necessary that there be a middle time between the two instants, as between the beginning of motion and the end there is a middle motion. But if the two instants are taken by comparison with different movements according as they measure the beginning of one and the end of the other, in that way between the two instants there is no middle time, just as neither is there a middle motion between the beginning of one motion and the end of another. And therefore when a rest is measured by time, just like with motion, the two instants are subsequent, one of them measuring the end of the period in which the bread existed, and the other measuring the beginning of the period in which the body of Christ exists. But this also cannot stand, for instants of time are distinguished by comparison with the motion that gives time unity or multitude, to which it is compared not only as a measure to what is measured, but as accident to subject; namely, the motion of the sky, because it is continuous, and does not admit of any interruption according to nature. Hence however you may designate two instants in time, a middle time can always be taken, because between any moments of the sky’s movement there is a middle movement. And so it would not bring in other motions, whether different instants are compared to the same motion or to different motions. It is also evident that this position contradicts the Philosopher’s statement in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 8, ch. 8 (264b28ff.).) where he proves that between any contrary motions there is a middle rest, which would not be necessary if two instants could follow one another in the way mentioned.
And so others say that this conversion, since it is above nature, does not have order to the motion of the sky; hence it is not measured by time, but by the instant, which is the measure of the sky’s movement. And because of this it is not unfitting if two instants succeed each other without a middle period, as was said about the angels’ movement in Book I, Distinction 37, Question 4, Article 3. But this again cannot stand; for this conversion follows the motion of uttering the words, which can be reduced to the measure of the sky’s movement, just as illumination is attendant on local motion, by which the illuminating thing is borne. And so it is necessary that instants be taken in this conversion according to the measure of the sky’s movement.
And because of this others say that one cannot designate two instants at the same time in one of which the body of Christ first exists, and in the other the bread last exists, for then there would necessarily be a middle time between them. But either of them can still be marked by themselves. But this is also nothing, because our marking does nothing to the fact that there is time in between or not; hence if there are two instants according to reality, in which one is the bread’s last instant and the other is the body of Christ’s first, whether it is marked by us or not, there must be a middle time. Furthermore, in the fact that that instant can be marked, it does not seem that its designation can be impeded by the designation of another instant, since those two designations are not contraries.
And so it should be said otherwise that one cannot mark a last instant, but a last time when there is bread. But between a time and an instant no middle time necessarily falls, as a middle falls between two instants. And the truth of this question appears from what the Philosopher says in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 8, ch. 8 (263b9–26).) that when something black is made from something white, in the whole time measuring the motion of the change it was white, but in the last instant of that time it is black. Hence, according to him, one should not think that in that whole time it is white, but in the whole time until the last ‘now’. And since before the last ‘now’ of a certain time a penultimate cannot be taken, just as neither before the last point of a line is there a penultimate point, for this reason there is not a last instant in which the thing was white, but only a last time; and it is similar with those changes that are the terminuses of motion, as generation is the terminus of alteration. For when fire is made from the air, in the whole time of the preceding alteration, it was air, up until the last instant, in which it is fire; and it is the same in illumination with regard to local motion. And so since the conversion is the terminus of a certain movement, namely, the uttering of the words, it was bread in the entire preceding time, up until the last instant, in which it is the body of Christ.
Reply Obj. 3: In any change it is necessary to designate ‘now’ and ‘before’ according to the two terminuses of change, which do not touch one another, as it says in the Physics 1; (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 1, ch. 5 (188a31ff.).) that is, they cannot exist at the same time. Hence according to the different terminuses in different changes, now and before are marked differently. For one kind of change exists when the middle of two terminuses is less distant from one of the extremes than the other; hence before it reaches the last terminus of the change, a withdrawal from one terminus and an approach to the other happen, in which the nature of this change consists; and so both belong to this change: both ‘now’, namely, when this approach and withdrawal is terminated, and ‘before’ when it began. And so a change like this is not in an instant, but in a time.
But there is another kind of change, in which a middle cannot be taken between its terminuses in the same subject, except perhaps incidentally, like between affirmation and negation: for contradiction is opposition, for which there is no middle in itself, as is said in the Posterior Analytics 1. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. 1, ch. 2 (71a12).) But a middle can be found there incidentally on the part of the negation to which something is added, which is more or less distant from affirmation, whether it is directly contrary in the same genus, or a contrary disposition; just as between one white thing and another a middle can be taken incidentally on the part of a color to which the negation of white is joined, according as it is more or less distant from whiteness; and between fire and not fire a middle is taken, according as something is more or less cold or wet. Hence in all changes in which there is only affirmation and negation, or only privation and form, speaking per se, there cannot be receding from a terminus or approaching a terminus before reaching the last terminus: and so that principle does not belong to this change, speaking per se, but only incidentally by reason of what is attached to the negation, according as incidentally the negation is received more and less, and consequently, middle. Hence, speaking per se, it belongs to the preceding motion, like the alteration that precedes generation, and to the local motion that precedes illumination, and because of this those changes are said to exist in an instant.
And since, as was said, between the bread’s substance and the body of Christ’s substance a middle cannot be taken that is closer to the body of Christ than to the bread’s substance in that it is converted into it by divine power, for this reason the judgment is the same of that conversion and the changes mentioned above. Hence the only ‘now’ that pertains to this conversion is the one in which the bread ceases to exist and the body of Christ begins to exist; but that ‘first’ pertains to the whole preceding time that measured the uttering of the words, which somehow bring about the conversion.
Reply Obj. 4: The change, as was said, is in an instant, but the preceding motion is in time. Therefore, if the preceding motion is included in the becoming as much as the change that is its terminus, as generation is of alteration, then ‘becoming’ will pertain to the preceding motion, and ‘being done’ to the terminus of motion that is the generation itself, and so becoming and being-done do not happen at the same time. But if the becoming does not extend to that change, then both are at once, both becoming and being-done; and so what ‘is becoming’ exists (if it may be called ‘becoming’ by reason of that change which is at that moment); but it ‘has become’ by reason of the term of the change; just as we say that a motion terminates and has been terminated at the same time, and that at the same time that the air is illuminated, it has been illuminated; and similarly also in the conversion of which we speak.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the more permanent something is, the more difficult it is to change over. And because the subject remains in any change, for this reason matter remains the most in all changes, since it is subject of all changes. And so that change that extends to matter itself is more difficult and displays greater power than any other transmutation, with regard to what is changed. And since creation and this conversion extend all the way to the essence of matter, as is clear from what has been said, it is clear that these changes show greater power than any others, in which substantial or accidental form is changed, or an external place. But between these two, it seems that creation, simply speaking, surpasses the other, because by it matter’s essence is produced, from which it results that it can be transformed into something else by the one who produced it through this conversion. But on the part of what it is changed into, the change that is in the union of human nature to a divine person surpasses these and all other changes in difficulty; and therefore it is the miracle of all miracles.
Reply Obj. 1: That change happens from an existing thing into an existing thing in a way beyond other changes, which also happen from existing things into existing things, and from whose examination our intellect formed its own conceptions; and that is why this conversion seems to be against the conceptions of the intellect. And because of this it is more difficult to assent to it than to creation, which is from what does not exist in any way, which sort of change our intellect does not see.
Reply Obj. 2: In any action there can be resistance in two ways. In one way on the part of the agent, when, namely, its power is weakened by a contrary agent; in another way on the part of the effect itself, when the effect is impeded by a contrary disposition. Now in every action where the agent is not acted upon, the first resistance does not take place, but only the second. Hence in divine operations no difficulty is found in resistance to the agent, but only in impediments to the effect. However, an effect is more impeded by taking away the potency of the receiver than by the opposition of a contrary disposition, because a contrary disposition does not impede an effect except insofar as it makes the potency indisposed. And so there is a greater difficulty in creation, where no matter pre-exists at all, than where there is something in the pre-existing matter that resists the effect by opposing it.
Reply Obj. 3: Natural potency is related to natural changes just as the potency of obedience is related to miraculous conversions. Hence the mode of obediential potency in the creature to be converted into something else is also according to the mode of miraculous conversion. Therefore, just as in formal conversions there is a potency of obedience to receiving this sort of form, so also in this substantial conversion there is a potency of obedience in this substance so that it may be converted into that one. Hence creation displays a greater power than this conversion, for there no potency of obedience pre-exists.
Article 4
The statements that should be granted in this matter
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 75, a. 8.) It seems that the conversion mentioned can be expressed by a substantive verb of another tense than the present, so that it might be said, “what is bread, will be the body of Christ,” or “what is the body of Christ was bread.” For Ambrose says in his book On the Sacraments that what was bread before the consecration is now after the consecration the body of Christ. (See Ambrose, On the Sacraments, Bk. 4, ch. 4, par. 15 (CSEL 73:53): “Ergo tibi ut respondeam, non erat corpus Christi ante consecrationem, sed post consecrationem dico tibi, quia iam corpus est Christi.”)
Obj. 2: Furthermore, there is more fittingness when the conversion is more perfect. But this conversion is more perfect than all others, for in it a whole is converted into a whole and parts into parts, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, since in other conversions we use this way of speaking, namely, that what was water is wine, or that what was air is fire, it seems much more that this can be said: “What was bread, is the body of Christ.”
On the contrary, ‘What’ [quod] is a relative of the same supposit. But one cannot take any supposit that is at one time bread, at another time the body of Christ, as is clear from what was said. Therefore, it should not be said, “what has been bread, is the body of Christ.”
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this is true: “bread becomes the body of Christ.” For in everything making follows becoming. But Christ made them, namely, bread and wine, his body and blood, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 4, ch. 13 (PG 94:1146).) Therefore, the bread becomes the body of Christ.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that is converted into something else becomes it. But bread is converted into the body of Christ. Therefore, it becomes the body of Christ.
On the contrary, every becoming terminates in a being-done. But this will never be true: “the bread has been made the body of Christ.” For what has been made, is; however, the bread is never the body of Christ. Therefore, this is also false: “the bread becomes the body of Christ.”
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this is false: “the body of Christ comes to be from this bread.” For something comes to be and is made out of the same thing. But this is false: “the body of Christ is made from bread, or out of bread.” Therefore also this, “the body of Christ comes to be from this bread.”
Obj. 2: Furthermore, ‘from’ denotes consubstantiality, as the Master says in Book I, Distinction 36. But there is no consubstantiality of the bread with the body of Christ. Therefore, it cannot be said that the body of Christ comes to be from bread or out of bread.
On the contrary, Ambrose says, where the consecration approaches, the body of Christ comes to be from bread. (See Ambrose, On the Sacraments, Bk. 4, ch. 4, par. 14 (CSEL 73:51): “Sed panis iste panis est ante verba sacramentorum; ubi accesserit consecratio, de pane fit caro Christi.”)
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this is true: “bread can be the body of Christ.” For motion is the act of what exists in potency. But bread is changed into the body of Christ. Therefore, bread is the body of Christ in potency: therefore it can be the body of Christ.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Ambrose says that bread can be the body of Christ by consecration, which is done by the words of Christ. (This claim is pieced together from various things said by Ambrose in the preceding loci.)
On the contrary, if something can be something else, nothing prevents us from calling it that: for when what is possible is posited, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 9, ch. 4 (1047b11).) nothing unfitting follows. But something unfitting follows if it were said, “bread is the body of Christ,” or “what is or was bread, is the body of Christ.” Therefore, this is false: “bread can be the body of Christ.”
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that this conversion differs from all other changes in this, that in all other changes there is a certain shared subject. But in this one there is not, but only two terminuses of conversion. And so all statements expressing a change in which the order of a terminus to a terminus is implied, are granted in this matter, like this one: “Bread is converted into the body of Christ.” But statements that express an identity of subject are not granted, properly speaking. But because in this conversion there is something like identity of subject, namely, shared appearances, which remain here from there, although those appearances are not the subject of the change, for this reason also statements like those quoted from the saints are sometimes found, so that the identity implied is not referred to the subject but to the same appearances. Hence such statements are not to be extended, because they are improper; and the statements, “this was that,” or “what is this will be that,” expressly convey an identity of the subject of the change because of the nature of relation; and so they should not be granted simply speaking.
Reply Obj. 1: The words of Ambrose are to be explained: what was bread is the body of Christ; i.e., what is under the appearances of bread, was first bread, and afterward is the body of Christ.
Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher in On the Soul 2, in the beginning what suffers is dissimilar, but in the end it is the same. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (416b3).) Hence perfect conversion requires perfect distance in the beginning, and perfect unity in the end. But this noun ‘bread’ conveys what was there in the beginning, because it conveys the starting terminus; therefore the more perfect the conversion, the less the body of Christ can be predicated of the bread.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that when it is said, “this becomes that,” by the force of the speech the subject of the doing is conveyed in the ‘this’; hence this is per se: “a man becomes white”; and this is incidental: “black becomes white.” However, the subject of the doing is common to both terminuses; therefore it is clear that the statement mentioned conveys a shared subject, and that should not properly be granted.
Reply Obj. 1: The words of Damascene should be explained like the words of Ambrose, so that the relation conveyed by the ‘them’ designates oneness of appearances and not oneness of subject.
Reply Obj. 2: This statement, “the bread is converted into the body of Christ,” conveys only the order of one terminus to another. But this statement, “the bread becomes the body of Christ,” conveys unity of subject, and so the account is not the same for both.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that as is clear in the Physics 1, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 1, ch. 7 (190a21ff.).) we say, “this becomes this,” in things enduring in themselves, but not for things enduring incidentally; but “this comes to be out of this,” is said properly of non-enduring things. For we say, a white thing comes to be from a non-white thing. And if ever something is said to come to be from something permanent, this is inasmuch as something non-permanent is understood with the permanent thing, as when it is said, a statue comes to be out of bronze, it is understood, out of unshaped bronze.
And in this way it is clear that this statement, this becomes this, expresses identity of subject; but this statement, this comes to be out of this, principally expresses the order of terminuses to each other, and consequently, sometimes oneness of subject; hence sometimes it conveys only order without conveying subject, as when it is said, out of the morning the noon comes to be, that is, after, as it says in the Metaphysics 2; (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 2, ch. 2 (994b1).) and accordingly, this will be incongruous: bread becomes the body of Christ; but this will be granted: out of bread the body of Christ comes to be, if the out of does not denote a subject, and something like a material cause, but only the order of the terminuses of conversion to each other. But this: from bread the body of Christ comes to be is less proper, because the preposition ‘from’ denotes consubstantiality, as Ambrose mentions; nevertheless, ‘from’ is sometimes used for ‘out of’ and so it can be granted that from bread the body of Christ is made as meaning out of bread.
Reply Obj. 1: When it is said, the body of Christ has come to be from bread, the ‘from’ can convey order in being, because to have become signifies what exists right now. And so it is not granted that the body of Christ has come to be from bread, because this would signify that bread had an order to the body of Christ in being, which is false, because bread is not its matter. It can also convey an order in becoming, which precedes being done; and then as this is granted: the body of Christ comes to be from bread, so this can also be granted: the body of Christ has come to be out of bread.
The solution to the second objection is clear from what has been said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that since potency pertains to the subject, there should be no doubt that when it is said, bread can be the body of Christ, it conveys oneness of subject. And this is why it is not to be granted, because nothing of bread will ever be anything of the body of Christ. But just as this is granted: bread is converted into the body of Christ, so this can also be granted: bread can be converted; because whatever has a potency has an act, as is said in the book On Sleep and Waking. (Aristotle, On Sleep and Waking, ch. 1 (454a8).)
Reply Obj. 1: That definition does not apply to this conversion, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Those words of Ambrose are to be explained as was said before.
Question 2
The matter of the Eucharist
Next we ask about the matter of this sacrament; and concerning this, four questions arise:
first, whether bread and wine are the matter of this sacrament;
- second, what kind of bread;
- third, what kind of wine can be the matter of this sacrament;
- fourth, about the mixing in of water.
- Article 1
Whether bread and wine are the matter of this sacrament
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 74, a. 1; SCG IV, ch. 61; De sacram. altar., chs. 9 & 29; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 5.) It seems that there should not be a twofold matter for this sacrament. For the simpler something is, the more noble it is; and so the simplest things are also the most noble. But this sacrament is more noble than any others. Therefore, it should be more simple. Therefore since the other sacraments have only one matter, like water for baptism and chrism for confirmation, it seems that there should not be a twofold matter for this sacrament.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a sacrament’s matter should correspond to what is sacrament-and-reality in the sacrament, for it is a sign of that. But everything that is reality-and-sacrament, namely, the whole Christ, is contained under the appearance of bread. Therefore, bread is the whole matter of this sacrament, and so the same as before. (For more about the sacrament alone, reality alone, and sacrament-and-reality, see the footnote at Dist.1, q.1, a.4, qa. 1, main response.)
Obj. 3: Furthermore, this sacrament is ordered to the use of the faithful. But this sacrament is only administered to the people under one species, namely the species of bread. Therefore, there should only be one matter of it.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it could happen that in some land, wheat was available but not wine, or vice versa. Therefore, it seems that in such a case it would be permitted to consecrate also in only one species.
On the contrary (1), the sacrament of the Eucharist took its origin from Christ. But Christ gave his disciples two things at the Last Supper, namely, bread and wine. Therefore, they should be the matter for this sacrament.
Furthermore (2), the matter of the sacrament should correspond to the use of the sacrament. But eating, which is the use of this sacrament, as was said above in Distinction 9, Question 1, Article 1, requires food and drink. Therefore, the matter for this sacrament should be twofold, one that applies to food, and another that applies to drink.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the matter for this sacrament should not be bread and wine. For the sacraments of the Mosaic law were closer to the sacraments of the New Law than the sacraments of the law of nature. But in the Mosaic law the flesh of animals was eaten as a sacrament. Therefore, this should be the matter of this sacrament rather than bread and wine, which were consumed as a sacrament in the law of nature.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sacrament’s matter should apply to the sacrament’s use and signification. But the flesh of some animal represents the flesh of Christ more explicitly than bread: for it has greater resemblance to it, and again, it restores one more. Therefore, flesh should be this sacrament’s matter rather than bread.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, sacraments should be administered to the sick, for they are medicine. But wine is not given to the sick. Therefore, it should not be this sacrament’s matter.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, this sacrament was not only prefigured in the offering of Melkizedech, who offered bread and wine, as it says in Genesis 14:18, but also in the honeycomb that Jonathan consumed, as it says in 1 Samuel 14:27. Therefore, honey should also have been this sacrament’s matter, especially because of its sweetness.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, in this sacrament Christ is contained as food for little ones. But little ones are given milk for food. Therefore, milk should have been this sacrament’s matter.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that bread and wine cannot be the matter of this sacrament except under a determinate quantity. (Parallel: ST III, q. 74, a. 2.) For in the sacraments is required an intention conformed to the intention of the Church. But if someone wished to consecrate all the bread that is in the market and all the wine that is in the cellar, his intention would not agree with the intention of the Church, which intends to consecrate for the faithful’s use. And the words of institution also show this: for he said, take and eat. Therefore, a determinate quantity of bread is required.
Obj. 2: Furthermore the power given to the words and the minister is given for the sacrament’s veneration, not its mockery. But if an immoderate quantity of bread and wine were consecrated, it would be changed to mockery. Therefore, it cannot be consecrated except in a determinate quantity.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if anyone baptized a man in the sea, only that water is sanctified by the word of life that is used for the cleansing, and not the whole sea. Therefore, in the same way here, only as much bread and wine can be consecrated as can come into the use of the faithful.
On the contrary (1), according to the Philosopher, every determinate thing is a middle between two determinate extremes. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 8 (1108b9–12).) But the quantity of bread which can be consecrated is not a middle between two determined extremes, for there is never such a small quantity of bread that it cannot be consecrated. Therefore, there is no determinate quantity on the side of greatness, either.
Furthermore (2), it is clear that a priest having few parishioners can consecrate as much bread as one who has many parishioners, although he should not. But there cannot be taken so great a quantity of bread that it cannot come into the use of many parishioners, and particularly since one man can consume either a lot or a little in quantity. Therefore, there cannot be so much matter of bread that it cannot be consecrated also by any priest at all.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the matter of the sacrament should be suited to both the sacrament’s signification and its use, and in both ways a twofold matter is required for this sacrament. For this sacrament’s use is eating, which requires both food and drink for its completeness; and so there should also be a twofold matter for this sacrament, one that is consumed as food, and the other as drink. However, a sacrament has two significations. One, according to which it represents the past; and so in this sacrament the Passion of Christ is signified, in which his blood was separated from his body; and therefore the sign of his body and the sign of his blood should be offered separately in this sacrament, by existing in a twofold matter. The sacrament’s other signification concerns the effect brought about by the sacrament, for sacraments effect what they represent. And in this way, since this sacrament is consumed for the health of soul and body, it is necessary that it be accomplished under the appearance of bread to signify the health of the body, and under the appearance of wine to signify the health of the soul, as the Master says in the text.
Reply Obj. 1: Simplicity per se is not a cause of nobility, but perfection is. Hence where perfect goodness is found in one simple thing, the simple is nobler than the composite; but when on the other hand the simple is imperfect, but the composite is perfect, then the composite is nobler than the simple, just as man is nobler than earth. And so although this sacrament is more composite by reason of its matter, it is nevertheless more noble, for it is more perfect. And the fact that this composition is required for its perfection is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the whole Christ exists under the appearance of bread according to the truth of reality, nevertheless only his body is there by the power of the sacrament, as is clear from what has been said, (See d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 1, ad 1.) and according to that it comes into the faithful’s use.
Reply Obj. 3: The blood is not given to the people because of the danger, since one drop of blood could fall more easily than any particle of the body; hence according to the custom of some, partaking of the blood is granted to the ministers of the altar, of whom greater caution is presumed in these matters. In the Old Law, too, the ones making the offering had nothing of the libations, but only the priests, by which this sacrament’s drink was signified; however, they did receive of the sacrifices, by which this sacrament’s food was signified.
Reply Obj. 4: As it says above in Distinction 8, Question 2, Article 4, Subquestion 1, although the consecration of the bread does not depend upon the consecration of the wine, which some people claimed, nevertheless someone who did not have both should abstain from consecrating rather than consecrating in one species alone against the Church’s practice. Although even if he did consecrate in only one species, it would be consecrated. But he would sin gravely, unless he were killed after the consecration of the body and before the consecration of the blood, or he was impeded in some other way not his fault.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the reason why bread and wine among all foods and drinks are this sacrament’s matter is the divine institution. However, many reasons can be assigned for this institution. The first is on the part of the sacrament’s use: for these two things are most commonly taken as food and drink, and so we are more fittingly led by them to the spiritual food and drink. Second, from the sacrament’s effect, because as it says in the Gloss on 1 Corinthians 11, bread sustains the body beyond all the other foods, and wine delights the heart; (See the text of Lombard at d. 8, ch. 7, n. 2.) and likewise this sacrament sustains and delights those who are drunk with it by charity more than the other sacraments. Third, from the rite of its celebration: for these two things are more cleanly handled than other things that are taken as food and drink. Fourth, from the signification of this sacrament’s twofold reality: for bread is composed of many grains, and wine is collected from many grapes, which belongs to the signification of the true and mystical body of Christ, as was said above in Distinction 8. Fifth, from the representation of what preceded it: for grains are crushed on the threshing floor, and bread is baked in an oven, and wine is expressed in a wine-press, which is all fitting to represent the Passion of Christ.
Reply Obj. 1: This sacrament should not have been instituted in the species of any sacrament of the Mosaic law, so that it might display the cessation of the prescripts of the law, whose priesthood was more imperfect than the priesthood of Christ. And this is why the return to these species in the New Testament, namely, to the offering of Melchizedek, is fitting, for it shows that the priesthood of the New Testament surpasses the levitical priesthood, as the Apostle proves in Hebrews 7.
Reply Obj. 2: The nature of flesh does not mean anything particularly ordered to food, but a certain reality of nature. And so flesh would not signify the body of Christ as it is the food of the faithful, according to which it is contained in this sacrament, so fittingly as bread does, because bread is made to be food.
Reply Obj. 3: Although wine is not given to the sick who suffer from a feverish illness, it is nevertheless given to the weak in order to strengthen them. And likewise this sacrament is not to be given to those who are in the fever of sin, but for the strengthening of the weak who have been freed from sin.
Reply Obj. 4: Although honey has sweetness, it is nevertheless something that puffs one up, and so it signifies more the temporal sweetness that puffs up than the charity that builds up; hence in the sacrifices of the Old Law it was forbidden to be used, and so neither does it belong in this sacrament.
Reply Obj. 5: Although that food is for little ones by humility, it is nevertheless for the fully grown in faith. Hence Augustine: I am the food of the fully grown; (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 7, ch. 10.) and so it is not fitting that it be received under the species of milk.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that some people say that power is not given to the minister and the words to consecrate bread and wine under just any quantity, but under as large a quantity as can be suited to the use of the faithful, for in this way the intention of the one consecrating will be conformed to the Church’s intention. But this does not seem to be true. For it cannot be said that the quantity of the matter is determined according to the use that happens in the present moment; for then a priest living in the desert could not consecrate so many hosts as a priest of some city having many parishioners, which is false, but he can consecrate according to a use that can never happen. Therefore, as much of the bread and wine can be consecrated as can be consumed by men. However, this is not a determinate quantity, particularly since one man can consume a large or a small quantity; hence a large or small quantity does not matter.
Reply Obj. 1: Sacraments are ordered to something; hence in the sacraments there is a twofold intention. One is directed to the completion of the sacrament, and this is essential to the sacrament; hence if it is omitted the sacrament does not exist. The other is directed to the sacrament’s end; and this intention is subsequent to the sacrament. Hence, whether it is present or absent, nevertheless the sacrament is completed; just as if someone intends to baptize someone so that he may obtain temporal payment, the sacrament of baptism is valid, for according to the first intention it is conformed to the Church’s intention, although not in the second intention. And likewise in this sacrament, if the priest intended to consecrate not for the sake of consuming, but so that it might be used in sorcery, it would be the true body of Christ. Hence even if some priest intended to consecrate a large quantity of bread and wine not for the use of the faithful, but in mockery, it would be consecrated. Now I do not say that he could consecrate all the bread that is in the city at one moment, or all the bread that is in the market; because the form itself, by using a demonstrative pronoun, shows that the matter to be consecrated must be before the priest. Hence a priest while in his own home could not consecrate the bread that is on the altar, which he cannot do for all the bread that is in the market or all the wine that is in the cellar. But however great is the quantity of bread and wine that is set before the priest, I believe that it can be consecrated by him.
Reply Obj. 2: All power is from God, as is said in Romans 13:1, and insofar as it is from the intention of the one giving the power, it is ordered to good. Nevertheless nothing prevents the power received from being abused. Hence just as the bishops of the Church have power for building and not for destruction, and yet they can do many things that are destructive, so the power of consecrating is given in the word and ministers for the honor of God; nevertheless, someone can abuse it, so that he does it for mockery, or for money, or something like that.
Reply Obj. 3: The completion of the sacrament in baptism consists in the very use of the matter; and so only that water is consecrated by the word of life that comes into use. But the completion of this sacrament consists in the very consecration of the matter, and the use comes after the sacrament; hence the completion of this sacrament does not depend on use, as it does in baptism.
Article 2
What kind of bread
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 19, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3, ad 1; ST III, q. 74, a. 3; SCG IV, ch. 69; De sacram. altar., ch. 10.) It seems that it is not necessary that the bread be from wheat. For this sacrament is a memorial of the Lord’s Passion. But more suited to signifying the Passion would be barley bread, because it is hard and rough, rather than the wheat grain, which is delicate. Therefore, bread made from a different grain can be the matter for this sacrament.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in any water the sacrament of baptism can be completed, so that no one is cheated of receiving this sacrament because of a lack of the matter. Therefore, in the same way all bread should be the matter for this sacrament, so that poverty would excuse no one.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in natural things shape is a sign of species. But there are certain grains that have a similar shape to the grain of wheat, like spelt and grits. Therefore, they are of the same species as the wheat grain, and so bread confected from these grains could be the matter for this sacrament.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, bread is the matter of this sacrament, because it represents the oneness of the mystical body composed of many grains, as was said above in Distinction 8. But this is also found in bread made from other grains. Therefore, those breads can be the matter for this sacrament.
On the contrary, is the practice of the Church, and the fact that the Lord compared himself to the grain of wheat in John 12:24, and not to other seeds.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that if other grains are mixed in with the grains of wheat, the bread made from this can be the matter of this sacrament. For a mixture of dry things does not destroy the species. But a grain of wheat and other grains are dry. Therefore, if they are mixed together, the species of wheat still remains, and so the body of Christ can be consecrated from this.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, flour of wheaten grains alone is seldom found unless one tries hard. Therefore, if the bread that is this sacrament’s matter could not be made from a mixed flour of assorted grains, this sacrament would very rarely be performed, which is absurd.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, more is removed from a species by corruption than by admixture. But this sacrament can be done with corrupt bread, since we see hosts kept for an extremely long time by some people. Therefore, much more can this sacrament be performed with bread made from mixed grains.
On the contrary (1), a middle is neither of its extremes. But bread mixed from assorted grains is a middle between bread from wheat and from other grains. Therefore, it is not wheaten bread; therefore this sacrament cannot be completed with it.
Furthermore (2), this sacrament cannot be completed with wheatmeal, as some people say. But wheatmeal is pure wheaten flour. Therefore, much less can this sacrament be completed with a bread of another flour.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that we should not consecrate unleavened bread, but bread with leavening. (Parallels: ST III, q. 74, a. 4; SCG IV, ch. 69; Contra errores Graec., pt. 2, ch. 39; Super Ioan. 13, lec. 1.) For we should consecrate according to how Christ consecrated. But Christ consecrated leavened bread, not unleavened. Therefore, neither should we consecrate unleavened bread. Proof of the middle: before Passover the Jews did not use unleavened bread. But the Lord’s Supper, at which he established this sacrament, was celebrated before Passover, as is clear from John 13:1: before the day of the Passover feast, etc. Therefore, he used leavened bread, not unleavened.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the truth should correspond to the figure. But the figurative lamb was sacrificed on the fourteenth of the month, as Exodus 12:18 has it. Therefore, Christ was sacrificed on the fourteenth day of the month. But on the day before that he gave his body to his disciples to eat. Therefore it was on the thirteenth day of the month. But the Passover began on the fourteenth. Therefore, the Lord’s Supper was before the Passover, and so, the same as above.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, John 18:28 says that on the day of the Lord’s Passion the Jews would not enter Pilate’s praetorium, so that they would not be contaminated and so that they might eat the Passover. Therefore, on that day the Passover meal was eaten by the Jews, and so the Lord’s Supper was before Passover; and so the same as above.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Luke 23:55–56 says that the women went out to visit the grave and prepared spices. But this would not have been permitted on the first day of the seven when they were eating unleavened bread, because that day was the greatest feast for them, which indeed was the fifteenth day. Therefore, Christ suffered on the fourteenth day, and so the same as before.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, John 19:31 says that the day of the Lord’s burial was a great day of sabbath. But in the solemnity of unleavened bread only the first day was the most festive, and it was called ‘great’. Therefore, the day of the sabbath was the first day of the solemnity, which is the fifteenth of the month, and so the Friday was the fourteenth, and so the same as above.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to the Byzantines, artos means leavened bread. But among the Byzantines, this word artos is found where we have, Jesus took the bread. Therefore, he consecrated leavened bread, and so the same as before.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, the sacraments of the Old Law, if observed to the letter in the time of revealed grace, are deadly: for the letter kills (2 Cor 3:6). But this was one of the legal statutes, to eat unleavened bread. Therefore, it seems to be deadly to consecrate unleavened bread.
Obj. 8: This sacrament is especially the sacrament of charity. But yeast represents charity, as is clear from the Gloss on that text: the kingdom of heaven is like yeast, etc. (Matt 13). (See the Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:133.) Therefore, it should most certainly be consecrated out of yeast bread.
Obj. 9: Furthermore, just as white and red are accidents of wine, so unleavened and leavened are accidents of bread. But white wine and red wine can be equally consecrated. Therefore, we should pay no more attention to whether the bread is unleavened or leavened, than to whether the wine is white or red.
On the contrary (1), on the first day of unleavened bread nothing with yeast should have been found in the homes of the Jews, as is evident from Exodus 12:15. But the Lord consecrated on the first day of unleavened bread, as is evident from Matthew 26:17, Mark 14:12, and Luke 22:7. Therefore, he consecrated unleavened bread; therefore, we also must consecrate unleavened bread.
Furthermore (2), Christ did not come to destroy the law but to fulfill it, as it says in Matthew 5:17. But according to the law the Paschal lamb was eaten with unleavened bread, as is evident from Exodus 12:8. Therefore, Christ ate the Paschal lamb with unleavened bread. Therefore, he consecrated unleavened bread.
Furthermore (3), the matter should be fitting to the sacrament. But bread without yeast is more suited to the sacrament than bread with yeast, because of its purity: Let us not feast on the old yeast, the yeast of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth (1 Cor 5:8). Therefore the sacrament should be performed with unleavened bread.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that only wheaten bread can be consecrated, and the reason for this is divine institution, for Christ consecrated this bread. But three reasons can be assigned for this institution. The first is from the effect, because this kind of bread provides better nourishment, and so it pertains to signifying the excellence of grace that is conferred in this sacrament. The second is from the use of the sacrament: for wheaten bread is what is more commonly available for use as food, while other breads are only made when there is a lack of wheat. And so ‘bread’, simply speaking, is understood to be from wheat, as oil from olives, and so it is suited to this sacrament, whose use is in eating, as was said above. The third comes from the reality contained, which is Christ, who compared himself to a grain of wheat, saying, unless a grain of wheat falls to the earth and dies, it remains just a single grain (John 12:24).
Reply Obj. 1: In Christ’s Passion there was not any hardness on the part of Christ who was suffering, but the greatest kindness. And so the host of bread signifies and contains Christ himself, which is why barley bread, or another kind, is not so suited to this sacrament as wheaten bread, which is sweeter and more delicate.
Reply Obj. 2: All water is the same species as all other water, according to the Philosopher; (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 5, ch. 6 (1016a20).) and so it does not matter in which water a baptism happens. But not all grains out of which bread is usually made are of the same species, and so the reasoning is not the same for both. And furthermore, this sacrament is not of such great necessity as the sacrament of baptism, as was said above, in Distinction 9, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 2.
Reply Obj. 3: Some people say that the body of Christ can be consecrated out of spelt bread, because of the resemblance it has to wheat. But, as is clear upon closer inspection, in its shape barley is closer to the likeness of wheat than spelt is, when the husk is removed from either, although in color spelt is more like. But among all the other things like this wheatmeal shares the most in shape with wheat, and likewise in color. And this is why from an identical shape it cannot be held that any of these is the same species as the grain of wheat; but it can be taken for an identical species by another test. For what generates and what is generated necessarily share in species, but not necessarily in accidents, for indeed accidents are varied by extrinsic causes. And this is why since when a grain of wheat is sown anywhere, neither spelt nor barley nor wheatmeal nor anything like them ever grows, it is clear that they are entirely different in species from wheat.
Reply Obj. 4: What that objection refers to is the reason why this sacrament is done from bread, but not why it uses this bread; and this must be added as the proper to the common.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that there are two ways of mixing something extraneous into something: in one way so that the extraneous additive dissolves the species of what it was added to, either by drawing it into its own species, as when a cup of wine is added to a pitcher of water; or by making a middle species, as when both are added equally, so that the equality is not taken only according to quantity, but according to the proportion of strength. In another way such that what is added does not dissolve the species, but it is assumed into the species of what it was added to; as when a drop of water is added to a pitcher of wine. Therefore, if such an admixture of something foreign was made that the species of wheaten bread is dissolved, it could not be consecrated from that bread; but if it were just such a small admixture that the species of wheaten bread remained, and what is added is converted to the nature of wheat, then the sacrament can be consecrated from this. Now the sign of this can be taken from the accidents, namely, color, flavor, and things like that; for the accidents contribute the greatest part to knowing what something is, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 1 (402b21).)
Reply Obj. 1: Although dry things, while they remain whole, do not lose their species by combining, nevertheless, when they are ground up and stirred together, as happens in bread, they can lose their species.
Reply Obj. 2: The solution is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: If there is so much corruption that the species of bread does not remain, then the sacrament cannot be consecrated from this; but if there were a certain disposition to corruption while the species remained, it can be consecrated from this bread, although he would sin gravely who knowingly consecrated bread like that, because of irreverence for the sacrament. And that the species remained can be recognized by this, that continuity has not dissolved, nor are the other accidents entirely taken away. And since wheatmeal is made from wheat flour, which indeed by grinding and sifting and mixing in steam seems to have lost the appearance of flour, or to be entirely disposed to corruption, this is why it should not be made out of it, nor can it, according to certain people. However, some people say that when wheatmeal is raw, it cannot be the matter for this sacrament, just as neither can dough. But if it is cooked, it could be made from this, because wheatmeal is made from the most purified flour.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that in this there seems to be a difference between Latins and Byzantines: for the Byzantines consecrate bread with yeast, while the Latins consecrate unleavened bread. Now the reason for this difference is that the Lord consecrated unleavened bread, as is manifestly known from the three Gospel writers, and this is how the apostles celebrated it in the early Church, which practice the Roman church received from the apostles, who founded it, as Innocent III says. (Innocent III, De sacro altaris mysterio, Bk. 4, ch. 4 (PL 217:857–58).) But afterward, as Pope Leo says, (Leo IX, Epistle to Michael, Emperor of Constantinople.) at the threat of the heresy of the Ebionites, who said that the prescripts of the law had to be observed together with the Gospel, the holy fathers, lest they seem to agree with the Ebionites, at the prompting of the Holy Spirit wanted the sacrament to be consecrated from yeast bread for a time. After that heresy had ceased, the Roman church returned to the original practice.
The Byzantines wished to preserve the practice introduced by the fathers for a time, and they added further that only yeast bread can be consecrated, and to prove this they wished to assert that the Lord had consecrated yeast bread. And because three Gospel writers say in agreement that the Lord instituted this sacrament on the first day of the feast of unleavened bread, some of them have charged into such disgrace as to say that those Gospel writers wrote something false, and they were corrected by John who says that the Lord supped with his disciples on the day before Passover.
But it will be shown how this does not contradict. For once it is supposed that the Lord celebrated the Last Supper on the thirteenth of the month, as they say, it is obviously shown that he still consecrated unleavened bread, for as Chrysostom comments on Matthew, the Lord demonstrated most openly that from the beginning of his own circumcision until the last day of the Passover he was not the opponent of divine laws, among which it was commanded that the paschal lamb be eaten with unleavened bread. (John Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, ch. 26 (PG 56:730).) And so it should be said that the Lord consecrated unleavened bread, and unleavened bread is to be consecrated, although yeast bread can also be consecrated; however, whoever did consecrate it would sin by not observing the practice of the Church.
Reply Obj. 1: The Byzantines understand those words of John in the way that the objection proceeds. But this understanding cannot stand, for it is contrary to the other Gospel writers, which is not right to say about Sacred Scripture. Furthermore, it is not found in the Law that it was permitted in any case to anticipate the fourteenth day of the month, as they say the Lord did in foreseeing his Passion. And this is why certain people say that the Supper at which the Lord washed his disciples’ feet and at which he consecrated his body, were not the same, but one preceded the other, and John speaks of the first, while the other Gospel writers speak of the second. But this is against the practice of the Church, which celebrates the washing of the feet on Holy Thursday; and it is also against the text of the Gospel, for just as appears from the sequence of John’s Gospel, (Chapter 13.) at the same late hour that he washed the feet, he was betrayed by Judas after he took the morsel of food. And so it should be said that the feast day of Passover was called the first day of the seven that were the high feast, and this was the fifteenth of the month, and on the previous evening the lamb had been sacrificed and eaten, the fourteenth of the month, with unleavened bread. And that was when the Lord had a supper with his disciples, and the other Gospel writers call this day the first day of unleavened bread, and John calls it the day before the Passover feast.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not necessary that truth correspond to a figure in all things, otherwise it would be necessary for us to say that the Lord suffered in the evening, because that was when the lamb was sacrificed, which is against all the Gospel writers. But truth corresponds to the figure in something, for although before Christ’s resurrection the days were calculated from one morning to another, as was said in Book II, Distinction 13, yet this was specific to solemnities of the law that a day is calculated from one evening to the next. Hence the evening of the fourteenth day was counted for the solemnity in the number of days with the fifteenth, on which the Lord suffered. And also his sacrifice began in a certain way on the evening of the fourteenth day, for he was handed over then, and that was when his sweat became like blood, as it says in Luke 22:44.
Reply Obj. 3: Passover is taken there for the paschal foods, like unleavened bread, which were eaten for all seven days. Nevertheless Chrysostom comments on John (John Chrysostom, Commentary on John, homily 83, n. 3 (PG 69:367).) that it is understood of the paschal lamb which they ate on a different day from the one that the law instituted, and they observed the law, so that their souls would be filled with longing for the death of Christ. However, Christ did not go beyond the time of Passover, namely, the Thursday, but on that day ate the Passover.
Reply Obj. 4: No day was so solemn in the exemption from work as the day of the sabbath. And this is why on the first day of the solemnity it was permitted to cook food and do other things like that, which would not be permitted on the sabbath. And so the women prepared spices on the sixth day, seeing that those prepared by Nicodemus were not enough, and they rested on the sabbath according to the law, and once the sabbath was over they bought spices, i.e., they prepared the spices they had bought or even bought more, seeing that those they had prepared before on the sixth day were not enough, and they came to the tomb. Or, according to some people, works of mercy are not considered servile work, and so they were allowed to prepare spices for a tomb on a solemn day, because this was a work of mercy.
Reply Obj. 5: On whatever day of the seven days of unleavened bread the sabbath should come, it was called a great day of sabbath because of the twin solemnities, namely, the sabbath and Passover.
Reply Obj. 6: Artos among the Greeks is sometimes also defined as unleavened bread; and thus in Exodus 12 in Greek it says artos where we have unleavened bread.
Reply Obj. 7: To do something that was done under the law, as Anselm says, (Anselm, De fermentato et azymo, ch. 4 (PL 158:544).) is not to live like a Jew; otherwise those who consecrated yeast bread, too, are living like Jews, because in the law it was commanded that they offer the breads of first leavening. But to do something with this intention, that the prescripts of the law should be observed, is to live like a Jew. However, we do not consecrate unleavened bread so that we may keep the law, but so that we might be conformed to Christ, observing what befits this sacrament instituted by him. For unleavened bread signifies purity of life, which must always be observed, just as also incensing signifies devotion of prayer; and so both of these are retained in the New Law.
Reply Obj. 8: In this sacrament Christ is contained as victim: and since purity was particularly required in the victim, even according to the law, for that reason it was more fitting to this sacrament that Christ’s purity be signified by unleavened bread than that the fervor of charity be signified by yeast bread.
Reply Obj. 9: White and red do not make such a difference in the signification of the sacrament concerning the wine as unleavened and yeast concerning the bread; and so the argument is not the same for both.
Article 3
What kind of wine can be the matter of this sacrament
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 74, a. 5; SCG IV, ch. 69.) It seems that Christ’s blood does not have to be consecrated only from wine from grapes. For baptism can happen in any water. But wine is this sacrament’s matter just as water is baptism’s. Therefore, this sacrament can also be done with any wine, like the wine of pomegranates, or mulberries, or the like.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in some lands there are no grapevines, nor can wine be easily carried to them. Therefore, it must have been provided by divine wisdom that some other liquor can be taken in this sacrament in place of grape wine.
On the contrary, just as the Lord compared himself to a grain of wheat, in John 12:24, so he also compared himself to a vine, in John 15:1. Therefore, just as nothing but wheat bread should be taken in this sacrament, so also no wine but grape wine.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it can also be consecrated from vinegar. For according to Isidore, vinegar is a species of wine. (Isidore, Etymologiarum siue Originum (ed. Lindsay), Bk. 20, ch. 3, n. 9.) But this sacrament can be consecrated from wine of the vine. Therefore also with vinegar.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if consecrated wine turned into vinegar, it would not cease to be Christ’s blood. Therefore, by the same reasoning if it be vinegar before the consecration, Christ’s blood can be consecrated from it.
On the contrary, Innocent says that wine befits this sacrament: for the heart of the one drinking is enlarged and exhilarated. (Innocent III, De sacro altaris mysterio, Bk. 4, ch. 3 (PL 217:854).) But vinegar does not do this. Therefore, the blood of Christ cannot be consecrated from vinegar.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the blood of Christ may be consecrated from verjuice. (Agresta or verjuice is the juice of unripe grapes. Thus verjuice has not attained the maturity of grape juice, which is needed for the first step in the wine-making process.) For just as verjuice does not have the complete species of wine, so neither does must. But the blood of Christ can be consecrated from sweet must, for it is said in the Decretals, On Consecration, Distinction 2, if it were necessary, a bunch of grapes may be pressed in the chalice. (Gratian’s Decretals, Part 3, De consecratione, d. 2, ch. 7 (PL 187:1733).) Therefore, by the same reasoning, also verjuice.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, verjuice only differs from wine in that it is immature. But maturity and immaturity are accidents. Therefore, it does not differ according to species, and so it seems that the blood of Christ can be equally consecrated from verjuice as from wine.
On the contrary, what is still becoming, is not yet, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 5, ch. 1 (225a27).) But verjuice is in the process of generation toward wine. Therefore, it is not yet wine, and therefore the blood of Christ cannot be consecrated from it.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the blood of Christ can be consecrated only from wine of the grapevine, for that is properly wine. But other things are called wine by their likeness to this wine. This wine is also taken more commonly as a drink, just as wheat bread as food. And it has properties more fitting to the sacrament’s effect inasmuch as it warms and delights; and this is why the Lord consecrated wine of the grapevine, as is clear from what is said, from now on I shall not drink of the fruit of the vine (Matt 26:29).
Reply Obj. 1: All water is of the same species, but that is not how it is with wine.
Reply Obj. 2: There is no land to which enough wine cannot be carried for celebrating Mass, and so that argument is not compelling.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 8, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 8, ch. 5 (1044b34–1045a6).) vinegar comes to be from wine in the same way that something dead comes to be from something living. Hence, just as a living animal and a dead one are not of the same species, so neither are wine and vinegar. And the contrary properties show this: for wine is warm, but vinegar is cold; and there is no return from vinegar to wine, just as there is no returning to life from death. And so it should be said that if the wine has become entirely vinegar, it cannot be consecrated. But if it is acid as though in the process of turning sour, the judgment is the same as of bread that is in the process of corrupting. And so just as that bread can be consecrated, but the one consecrating sins because of irreverence, so also here.
Reply Obj. 1: He takes wine in a broad way for any liquid that arises from grapes.
Reply Obj. 2: If consecrated wine that has been reserved becomes vinegar entirely, the judgment would be the same of it as of bread that is completely corrupted; hence just as the body of Christ does not remain in that case, so neither does the blood remain in this one. But it is otherwise with bread that is in the process of corrupting, and wine that is in the process of going sour.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that nothing receives its species except at the terminus of generation: but verjuice is still on the way to generating wine, just as blood when it begins to come together is on the way to generating an animal. And so just as that blood is not an animal, so verjuice is not wine; and because of this the blood of Christ cannot be consecrated from it.
Reply Obj. 1: Must has already arrived at the complete species of wine: for its sweetness attests to a maturation that is a species of digestion. Now digestion is the completion of natural heat, as is clear from the Meteorology 4, (Aristotle, Meteorology, Bk. 4, ch. 2 (379b18).) and so one can consecrate with must, but it is not as seemly, because of its impurity, that it be consecrated, unless the necessity arises.
Reply Obj. 2: Maturation is natural digestion, by which what is digested is brought to its final natural perfection, so that it also is able to generate something else like itself, as is said in the Meteorology 4. (Ibid., ch. 3 (380a14–15).) And so mature and sour differ as complete and incomplete: which in fact is not merely an accidental difference.
Article 4
About the mixing in of water
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 74, a. 6; Super Matt. 26; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 6.) It seems that water should not be mixed into the wine. For from the Lord’s side when hanging on the Cross, blood and water flowed out, as is said in John 19:34, by which two things the sacraments are especially understood, as Innocent says. (In his letter Cum Marthae to John, Archbishop of Lyons, November 29, 1202: “For it seems to some that, since from the side of Christ two special sacraments flowed—of the redemption in the blood and of regeneration in the water—into those two the wine and water, which are mixed in the chalice, are changed by divine power” (http://www.geocities.ws/caleb1x/documents/cummarthae.html, accessed January 23, 2015).) But water pertains to the sacrament of regeneration, namely, baptism. Therefore, blood alone pertains to the sacrament of redemption, the Eucharist. And so it should be wine without water.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, wine and water are different species. Therefore, if water is mixed into the wine, there will be a threefold matter for this sacrament, not only a twofold one, as was said.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, this sacrament is celebrated under the species of bread and wine, as it says in the text. But nothing is added to the species of bread. Therefore, neither should anything be added to the wine.
On the contrary (1), Pope Alexander says: in the offerings of the sacraments let bread alone and wine mixed with water be offered. (Gratian’s Decretals, Part 3, De consecratione, d. 2, ch. 1 (PL 187:1731).) Therefore, it should be mixed with water.
Furthermore (2), the matter of the sacrament should be suited to the reality signified. But the water signifies the people, who belong to the mystical body, which is the ultimate reality of this sacrament. Therefore, the water should be added.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that without water the blood of Christ cannot be consecrated. (Parallels: ST III, q. 74, a. 7; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 6.) For Cyprian says: the Lord’s chalice cannot be water alone and wine alone unless the two are mixed, since neither can the body of the Lord exist from flour, unless both, that is, flour and water, have been united into one thing. (Quoted by the Lombard; from Cyprian, Epistle 63, ad Caecilium (CCSL 3), ch. 13, par. 4.) But it is clear that from flour without water the body of Christ can in no way be consecrated. Therefore, neither from wine without water.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, signification is of the essence of the sacrament. But water signifies something that is central in the sacrament, namely, the union of the mystical body to its head. Therefore, water is necessary to this sacrament, so that without it it cannot be consecrated.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, this sacrament is the memorial of the Lord’s Passion. But from the Lord’s side during his Passion not only blood flowed out but also water. Therefore, from wine without water the sacrament cannot be consecrated.
On the contrary (1), the Byzantines do not add water, as the Master says, but they still consecrate. Therefore, without mixing in water this sacrament can be consecrated.
Furthermore (2), nothing is of the sacrament’s substance that does not remain in the sacrament. But water does not remain in its proper species in the sacrament. Therefore, it is not of the sacrament’s substance.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that manmade water should be added. (Parallels: ST III, q. 74, a. 7; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 6.) For the sacrament is said to be uniform. But on the part of the body there is something manmade, namely, bread. Therefore, on the part of the blood there should be manmade water.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if bread were made from manmade water, like rose-water, the body of Christ could be consecrated from this. Therefore, likewise artificial water can be added to the wine.
On the contrary, baptism is a sacrament of greater necessity than the Eucharist. But in baptism nothing but natural water can be used, as was said above. (See d. 3, a. 3, qa. 2.) Therefore, neither in the Eucharist.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it should be added in great quantity. (Parallels: ST III, q. 74, a. 8; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 6.) For what does not exist cannot signify anything. But what is corrupted does not exist. Since therefore water is included to signify, it seems that there should be added so much that it is not corrupted, and that means as much as the wine, or more, because wine is more active.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as blood flowed perceptibly from Christ’s side, so also did water. But if only a little water is included, it cannot be perceived. Therefore, it should be added in greater quantity.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if it suffices for water to be added in a small quantity, by the same argument it would suffice for the sacrament if a drop of water were put into a whole cask. But this seems ridiculous. Therefore, it is not enough that a small quantity be added.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is said to be the custom of some people in lands where wine does not grow, that they take a cloth dipped in red wine and dried, and wash it with water, which, since it has taken the redness of the wine, they consecrate as Christ’s blood. Therefore, it seems that water can be added in great quantity.
On the contrary (1), what comes from two things is neither of them, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:987).) But if a large amount of water were added, it would be a kind of mixture. Therefore, it would not be wine, and so the blood of Christ could not be consecrated from it.
Furthermore (2), it is necessary that the water be consumed by the wine so that there will be only one species on the part of the blood, just as on the part of the body. But it cannot be consumed if water is added in a large amount. Therefore, it should not be added in great quantity.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that water should be added to wine because of the sacrament’s institution: for the Lord is believed to have probably added some by the practice of that country: for wine there without water is never drunk because of the strength of the wine, although no mention is made of water in the Gospel, because it is not the chief matter in this sacrament. But its addition pertains to this sacrament for both the representation of the Passion of Christ and the signification of the reality behind this sacrament, which is the mystical body signified by the water, because the many waters are many peoples (Rev 17:15). And so the addition of water to wine signifies the union of the members to the head by reason of its mingling; and the love of the suffering head for his members, by the fact that from two things joined, one is made; and the progress of redemption from the head to his members, by the very transformation of water into wine. Hence on this text, Jesus took the bread (Mark 14:22), the Gloss says, no one is permitted to offer either water alone or wine alone, lest it seem that the head is separated from the members, or that Christ could suffer for our redemption without love, or that we could be saved without his Passion. (See Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:231.)
Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says in his Commentary on Job, because the nature of any one thing is composed of a diversity, in sacred speech a given thing rightly signifies different things. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 5, par. 21.) Therefore, according as water has the power of cleansing, its signification is suited to baptism; but according as it runs uninterrupted over the earth, it can signify people: we all die and like water will we be spilled on the ground (2 Sam 14:14). And in this way its signification is suited to this sacrament.
Reply Obj. 2: There are two opinions about the water added. For some people say that the water remains in its own nature, and only the wine is transubstantiated; hence water is not added for anything but the signification. But others say that the water added is converted into wine, and so the whole is transubstantiated into Christ’s blood. Whichever of these opinions is true, water will not be this sacrament’s matter, for according to the first, it is not converted into the body or blood of Christ; while according to the second it does not remain in its proper species but in the species of wine. Nevertheless, the second opinion appears more true, both according to natural reason, because a small amount of water mixed into wine, which is more active, is corrupted by the wine and passes over into the species of the wine; and as to the rite of the sacrament, because if the water remained in its proper nature, then the consecrated chalice would not be only a spiritual drink, but also a physical one; and so it would not be permitted after the first consumption of the blood to receive it again.
Reply Obj. 3: Water is added to bread in its very making; and so it is not necessary that it be added afterward. Or it should be said that the effect of the redemption reaches the members from the head by the shedding of blood; and so it is added to the blood to signify the union of the people rather than to the body.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the matter is proportionate to the sacrament; hence it belongs to the essence of the sacrament according as the matter signifies what is of the sacrament’s essence. However, it was said above (See d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1.) that the completion of this sacrament consists in the very consecration of the body and blood of Christ, and not in the use of the consecrated matter, as is the case in baptism and confirmation. And so on the part of the matter, that alone is necessary to the sacrament which signifies the body and blood of Christ, namely, bread and wine. However, what signifies the use and effect of this sacrament, namely, water, is not necessary to this sacrament; hence wine without water can be consecrated, but the one doing this sins.
Reply Obj. 1: The words of Cyprian are to be explained thus: it cannot, that is, it must not; for we can do what we can do by right, and so as to what should be done, it is the same on the part of the body and blood; but not as to what can be done: for water is of the substance of the bread, but not of the substance of the wine.
Reply Obj. 2: Water does not signify anything that is of the substance of this sacrament, as was said, but the effect or the resulting use.
Reply Obj. 3: The shedding of blood in Christ’s Passion directly pertains to the Passion itself but the emanation pertains even more to the effect of washing from sins.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that without water the blood can be consecrated, and as to what can be done it does not matter what kind of water is added, so long as it is a kind that can be converted into wine; but as to what should be done, only natural water should be added; for those waters are not of the same species, and they are only called water equivocally, just as also was said about the wine and bread.
Reply Obj. 1: Manmade bread is of the same species as that bread that Christ consecrated; whereas artificial water is not of the same species as the water. And so the reasoning is not the same.
Reply Obj. 2: Certain people say that it is similar on the part of the bread, which can be consecrated as the body of Christ from bread made with rosewater, although whoever did consecrate it knowingly from such bread would have sinned. But it seems more probable that he would not be able to consecrate it: for this sacrament’s chief matter is bread, whose substance and composition includes water. And so a different species of water makes a different species in the matter of the sacrament. But the water is not part of the substance of wine, which is the chief matter in this sacrament.
The response is also clear to what is objected in opposition: for water is the chief matter in baptism, and so if a different species of water is added, it does not preserve the due matter, and because of this the sacrament does not exist; but here it is different, as was said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that as was said, the water added to the wine is converted into wine, and this is how the whole is converted into blood. And this is why not so much water should be added that the wine is converted into water, or into some third thing by mixture. And so it is always safer to add a small amount, because however little is added, the signification is preserved.
Reply Obj. 1: By the very fact that water is converted into wine, it has its own signification: for we are changed into Christ, not he into us.
Reply Obj. 2: This sacrament represents Christ’s Passion as to our redemption, which was accomplished by the shedding of his blood. But baptism represents Christ’s passion as to cleansing, and so in baptism it is necessary that water remain sensibly, just as also the wine that corresponds to the blood here; but the water added to the wine here is absorbed, like our mortality by the power of Christ’s Passion.
Reply Obj. 3: If water were added to a cask, it would not signify anything, and so this would not suffice. But to complete the sacrament it would have to be added when the offering was about to be made.
Reply Obj. 4: Since that is more red water than wine, the blood of Christ cannot be consecrated from it; and so this custom is condemned in one of the canons of On Consecration, Distinction 2. (Gratian’s Decretals, Part 3, De consecratione, d. 2, ch. 7 (PL 187:1733).)
Question 3
The Eucharist at the last supper
Next it is asked how Christ used this sacrament at its first institution: and concerning this, four questions arise:
first, whether he ate his own body;
- second, whether he gave it to Judas;
- third, whether he gave his own body as suffering, or impassible;
- fourth, if the body of Christ had been reserved in a pyx, whether it would have died there.
- However, under what form he consecrated it was discussed above, in Distinction 8. Article 1
Whether Christ ate his own body
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 81, a. 1; q. 84, a. 7, ad 4.) It seems that Christ himself did not eat. For with regard to the Lord’s deeds, no others are to be asserted beyond those which are recounted for us in the Gospel. But in the Gospel is contained that Christ took the bread in his hands, and gave it to his disciples to eat. Therefore, we should not assert that he himself ate.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that is eaten is taken as food. But the one taking is not what is taken, as it says in Book III, Distinction 5. (See Bk. 3, d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3.) Therefore, Christ could not eat his own body.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, this sacrament is ordered to spiritual restoration. But he did not need spiritual restoration. Therefore, he did not take this sacrament, for he would have received it to no purpose.
Obj. 4: As was said above in Distinction 9, (See d. 9, a. 1, qa. 3.) there are two modes of eating, namely, spiritual and sacramental. But it did not pertain to Christ to eat sacramentally, since he was a true comprehensor, and could reach to the reality behind the sacrament without the veil of figures. Nor again did it pertain to him to eat spiritually, for grace did not increase in him. Therefore, he did not eat.
On the contrary (1), Jerome says, and it is quoted in On Consecration, Distinction 2: the Lord Jesus himself was a banqueter with his apostles, and the banquet; he was eating and the one who was eaten. (Jerome, Epistle 120 (CSEL 55:480); Gratian’s Decretals, Part 3, De consecratione, d. 2, ch. 87 (PL 187:177).) Therefore, he ate his own body.
Furthermore (2), just as Christ instituted baptism, so also this sacrament. But he himself was baptized. And likewise he had to receive this sacrament.
I answer that, there are two opinions about this. For some people say that Christ did not eat his own body at the Last Supper, but only took it in his hands; and to resolve the authoritative texts of the saints who say the contrary, they say that he ate and drank at the Last Supper before the consecration, but not his own consecrated body. But it expressly says in the Gloss on this text, and when he had eaten, and drunk, and was merry (Ruth 3:7), that Christ ate and drank at the supper, when he handed down the sacrament of his body and blood to his disciples. Hence, because children have shared in the flesh and blood, and he himself partook of the same (Heb 2:14). And on this account it is more commonly held that he ate, in accordance with what the saints seem to say explicitly; hence the ancient verse: the king sits at supper, encircled by the crowd of twelve: he holds himself in his hands, he eats himself for food. But he did not eat so as to obtain any effect from the sacrament, but so that he might give an example of eating to others.
Reply Obj. 1: In taking the bread, both can be understood, namely, both taking it in his hands and eating it.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ under his proper species stands apart in a certain manner from himself under the species of the sacrament; so for example now in his proper species he is in heaven, but under the species of the sacrament he is on the altar. And in keeping with this manner it is not unfitting that he take himself.
Reply Obj. 3: That eating did not bring about a spiritual restoration in him, but it signified one: for no one is so perfectly restored in him as he himself.
Reply Obj. 4: Christ ate, it would seem, both sacramentally and spiritually. Sacramentally, indeed, for he received his true body under the sacrament. For he could have looked at the reality behind the sacrament in the sacrament but not from it, as God also sees causes in their effects, but not from their effects. He ate spiritually, however, inasmuch as he delighted spiritually in the reality of the sacrament. Nevertheless this spiritual restoration was not caused or increased by the sacrament, which is why neither spiritual eating nor sacramental eating was in him as it is in others. And so some people said that he ate neither sacramentally nor spiritually. And others say sacramentally but not spiritually.
Article 2
Whether Christ gave his body to Judas
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 81, a. 2; Super Matt. 26; Super Ioan. 13, lec. 3 & 4.) It seems that Christ did not give his body to Judas. For he fulfilled what he commanded. But he had commanded that holy things not be given to dogs (Matt 7:6). Therefore, he did not give his most holy body to Judas.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine, God is not the cause of anyone becoming worse. (See Augustine, de Diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (CCSL 44A), q. 3.) But if Judas took the body of Christ, it caused him to become worse, for he sinned in taking it. Therefore, Christ did not give his body to him to eat.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as was said above in Distinction 9, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 1, for this reason the priest should give to a sinner, because he is not the Lord, but the steward, and renders what is required of him. But Christ was the Lord of the sacrament, nor could Judas have had any right there, unless Christ gave it to him. Therefore, he should not have handed over his body to Judas.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Lord said that the disciples drinking were to drink it anew with him in the kingdom of his Father, and that it was for them for the remission of sins (Matt 26:28–29). But neither applied to Judas. Therefore, he did not receive it; and this is Hilary’s argument. (Hilary, Commentarius in Matthaeum, ch. 30, par. 2 (SChr 258:222).)
On the contrary (1), Dionysius says, the creator of symbols shares not only sacred things with him, but the holiest things with the one dining with him, namely, Judas. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 3, p. 3, n. 1 (PG 3:427).) However, by “the holiest things” Dionysius means his body and blood, as is clear in the same place. Therefore, he gave Judas his body.
Furthermore (2), without exception it is said, take and eat, all of you (Matt 26:26). Therefore, he also gave it to Judas.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that he gave his body to him in the morsel of bread. For Augustine says, the morsel that was given to Judas by the Lord was not bad. The doctor gave health, but he, who was unworthy, took it to his ruin. (See Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 6, par. 15: “Num enim mala erat buccella quae tradita est Iudae a Domino? Absit. Medicus non daret uenenum: salutem medicus dedit; sed indigne accipiendo, ad perniciem accepit, qui non pacatus accepit” (cf. Tract. 26, par. 11); Gratian, Decretals, Part 3, De consecratione, d. 2, ch. 66 (PL 187:1763).) However, he would not have been unworthy, if that morsel were only bread. Therefore, that morsel was the body of Christ.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, for the devil to enter into a man is an effect of sin. But it says that after the morsel, Satan entered into him (John 13:27). Therefore, by taking the morsel, he sinned: therefore the morsel was the body of Christ.
On the contrary is what the Gloss says about John 13:26: he it is to whom I shall extend the bread I have dipped, etc. (See Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:406.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that according to Augustine (The points may be gathered from Epistle 44 (CSEL 34.2), n. 5 and In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 62, par. 3.) Christ gave his body to Judas at the Last Supper with the other disciples, so that he might give an example to us that the sacraments should not be denied to hidden sinners, and that he might remove from him every occasion for doing evil, which he could have taken if he had been singled out from the other disciples in anything before his malice was made known. However, Hilary seems to say the contrary. (In the passage cited just above.) But the first is more commonly held.
Reply Obj. 1: Although Judas was a dog in the truth of reality, nevertheless, it was not publicly known; and so he did not wish to expose him before the other disciples, lest he be driven to despair and so sin more freely.
Reply Obj. 2: Christ did not give Judas cause or occasion for sinning but rather for avoiding sin by displaying his meekness to him; but he took the danger of death from lifegiving medicine.
Reply Obj. 3: That is not the only reason, but also so that he would not expose a hidden sinner.
Reply Obj. 4: Judas drank sacramentally with the others, but not spiritually; hence neither did he obtain remission of sins, nor does he drink with him in the kingdom of the Father; for that drink is only due to those drinking spiritually.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that Christ first gave Judas his body with the other disciples, but afterward when he dipped the morsel and offered it to him in recognition of his betrayal, it was simply bread, as is clear from the Gloss cited.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is not speaking of the dipped morsel, but of what he had taken before with the other disciples. Or it could be said that he is said to have received it to his ruin, because while Christ had offered the morsel for his salvation, so that seeing that he was caught he might cease from his wicked plan, he was more irritated by it.
Reply Obj. 2: In eating the dipped morsel, Judas’s sin was increased either by the fact that he was more aggravated, or because of the presumption with which he put his hand into the bowl with his master, so that by his boldness he might feign a good conscience, as Matthew 26:23 says about that: whoever dips his hand with me, etc., and by reason of this increase, it is said that the devil entered into him after the morsel; for it was already mentioned in the Gospel that the devil had gone into the heart of Simon Iscariot, so that he would betray him.
Article 3
Whether Christ gave his own body as suffering, or impassible
Obj. 1: It seems that Christ gave his disciples an impassible body at the Last Supper. (Parallel: ST III, q. 81, a. 3.) For about that text, he was transfigured before them (Matt 17:2), the Gloss says, that body that he had by nature, he gave his disciples at the Last Supper, not the mortal and corruptible one. (See Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:143.)
Obj. 2: Furthermore, about that text, if your offering is grain prepared in a pan (Lev 2:7), the Gloss says: the flesh of Christ which before the Passion did not seem suited to eating, the Cross, strong above all things, made suitable afterward. But Christ gave his flesh at the Last Supper as suitable for eating. Therefore, he gave it such as it was after the Passion. But after the Passion it was impassible. Therefore, he gave his body as impassible.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is passible is drawn into the nature of what is active. But at the Last Supper, Christ gave his body as food, not such as would be changed into others, but such as would change others into himself. Therefore, he did not give his body as passible.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, every passible body suffers from contact. But the body of Christ was not injured by the disciples eating it. Therefore, it was not passible.
On the contrary (1), Innocent says, the body that he gave was such as he had at that time, (Innocent III, De sacro altaris mysterio, Bk. 4, ch. 12 (PL 217:866).) namely, passible.
Furthermore (2), it is clear that Christ gave his true body to his disciples. But his true body was passible. If therefore the body he gave was impassible, the same thing was passible and impassible, which is not possible.
I answer that, concerning this there are two opinions. For Hugh of St. Victor (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 2, pt. 8, ch. 3 (PL 176:462).) wanted to say that Christ while still existing in mortal flesh is read to have taken up sometimes one quality [of a glorified body], sometimes another, like clarity in the Transfiguration, subtlety in the Nativity, agility when he walked on water; and likewise impassibility when he gave his body at the Last Supper. Nor indeed was it simply speaking impassible at that moment, but it was impassible as it was given in the sacrament, for chewing did not hurt it; just as he was also visible in himself, but as he was given in the sacrament he was invisible. But that cannot stand: for the substance of the body of Christ is the same in the sacrament and in its proper species; but by relation to the outside it is not the same; for in its proper species it is related to the exterior according to the location of its proper dimensions, but in the sacrament, according to the location of the dimensions of bread. Hence it is necessary that those properties that are absolutely in the body of Christ be in it in the same way as it is in the sacrament, and according as it is in its proper species; but those that apply to it by its relation to another body outside it, not in the same way, as is evident from the example of sight. But passibility is an absolute property of this body; hence since it was passible in its proper species, it was also passible in the sacrament, as others say, although it did not suffer there.
Reply Obj. 1: The body of Christ is not said to be mortal in the sacrament, nor passible, because by sacramental consumption it did not suffer, nor did it die.
Reply Obj. 2: The flesh of Christ is only suited to eating as it exists under the sacrament; and since this sacrament is representative of the Passion of Christ, for this reason it is said that the Cross made it ready for eating.
Reply Obj. 3: The body of Christ is able to convert others into itself, not by reason of passibility, but by virtue of being united to the divinity.
Reply Obj. 4: Chewing conveys a relation of the body of Christ to something outside it; and so as to this it is not related to the one chewing according to its proper dimensions, but according to the dimensions of bread; and this is how it is not hurt by chewing, if not by reason of the impassibility that is now in the body itself.
Article 4
If the body of Christ had been reserved in a pyx, whether it would have died there
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 10, a. 2, qa. 1; ST III, q. 81, a. 4; SCG IV, ch. 64; Quodl. V, q. 6, a. 1, ad 1; Super Ioan. 6, lec. 7; Super ad I Cor. 11, lec. 6.) It seems that if the body of Christ had been kept in a pyx, it would not have died there. For the body of Christ only died by crucifixion. But it was not crucified there. Therefore, it would not have died there.
Obj. 2: The Jews’ actions were the cause of Christ’s death and the shedding of his blood. But he would not have shed his blood there, nor would the actions of the Jews have taken place there. Therefore, he would not have died there.
On the contrary, one and the same body would have been in the pyx and on the Cross at that moment. But he died on the Cross. Therefore, he would also have died in the pyx.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that if after Christ’s death one of the apostles had consecrated this sacrament, the soul of Christ would have been there; (Parallel: above, d. 10, a. 2, qa. 1.) for otherwise it would have been an incomplete sacrament. But the sacrament’s completion requires not only the body, but also the soul; for the whole Christ is contained in the sacrament. Therefore, the soul would have been there.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the words of the form would not have had less power at that time than they do now. But now the body is consecrated with the soul by the force of the form. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, the body of Christ is not more perfect under the sacrament’s species than under his proper species. But at that time the body of Christ was lifeless. Therefore, it would also have been so under the sacrament.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that God could have caused at that moment the soul to be united to the body of Christ existing in the sacrament. For the soul of Christ belonged more with his proper body than in hell. But when Christ’s body lay in the tomb, his separated soul was in hell. Therefore likewise it could have been in that place where the body of Christ was preserved under the sacrament.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the body of Christ, because it is united to divinity, can exist in the sacrament and in its proper species. Therefore, the soul, too, since it is united to the divinity, could be at the same time in hell and in the body of Christ under the sacrament.
On the contrary, this would result in contradictories being true at the same time, if the body of Christ were at the same time animate and inanimate. But God cannot do this, as Augustine says against Faustus. (Augustine, Contra Faustum, Bk. 26, par. 5 (CSEL 25:733).) Therefore, neither can he do the first thing.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that no words that signify suffering inflicted from without can be attributed to the body of Christ as it exists under the sacrament; and the reason for this is apparent from what has been said. And this is why it cannot be said that in the pyx he would have been crucified or flogged, or anything like that. Nor does it follow from this that two contradictory things are true at the same time; for the body of Christ is not related to what is outside it in the same way in both cases. For all the words that signify suffering from within do apply to it, such as, he sorrows, he suffers, and others like this; and likewise it can be said that he dies on the altar; hence the verse: you could collect inward suffering while held in the pyx; but inflicted pain does not apply to this.
Reply Obj. 1: Outward sufferings pertain to the substance of the body of Christ by means of his proper dimensions, but not by means of the dimensions of the bread. And so because of outward impressions that belong to the species of bread, no inward suffering is attributed to the body of Christ, but because of external impressions belonging to its proper dimensions, suffering is attributed to the body of Christ, both externally under its proper species alone, and inwardly also under its foreign species. And so because of the crucifixion that happened on Calvary, the true body of Christ preserved died under its proper species and under the sacrament.
And by this the answer to the second objection is clear; for the Jews’ actions were external, and the flow of blood also belongs to local motion, and so it conveys a relation to something outside.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that since being animate is an intrinsic property, it is clear that just as the body of Christ was lifeless in its proper species, so also under the sacrament. Hence if the body of Christ had been consecrated by any one of the disciples, his soul would not have been there. However, some people say that the form was suspended during that Triduum; and if what had been consecrated before had been reserved, it would have ceased to be there when Christ died. But these are silly things to say, for they are confirmed neither by reason nor by authority.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as was said above in Distinction 10, (See d. 10, a. 2, qa. 1.) the soul is not there by the force of the sacrament, but because of its concomitance with the body; and so when the body exists without its soul, there is no injury to the perfection of the sacrament if the soul is not contained there.
Reply Obj. 2: This is not because of a defect of the words’ power, but because of the different dispositions of the body of Christ.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that while Christ’s body was lying in the tomb, God could have easily caused Christ’s separated soul to be in a place where his body was under the sacrament, for this conveys a relation to without; but under the sacrament it would not have been united to Christ’s body as its form, because this pertains to the interior disposition; hence it would inevitably result that two contradictories exist at the same time.
Reply Obj. 1: That argument concludes only that it would be there as in a place, and this God could easily do.
Reply Obj. 2: And the second objection should be answered in a similar way. Nevertheless, the fact that it is united to divinity is not the reason why the body of Christ can exist in a certain way in different places, but by reason of the conversion of another body into it, which is not a conversion into his soul.
Exposition of the Text
It is formed of some matter of which it was not made at conception. (Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, 11.1 (60). 2.) It is evident that these proceed from equivocation on the preposition ‘from’: for when it is said, ‘the body of Christ is made from bread,’ the ‘from’ does not denote the condition of material cause, but only the order between the terminuses of the change.
“It cannot be healthfully investigated,” (Sent IV, 11.2 (61). 2 citing Lanfranc, Liber de corpore et sanguine Domini, c10.) namely so that someone strives to comprehend it: for presumption is also dangerous, when someone does not wish to believe more there than he can see with his reason; but to investigate for the defense of the faith is useful.
“Which of the faithful can have any doubt that at the very moment of immolation, the heavens open at the priest’s voice?” etc. (Sent IV, 11.2 (61). 8 citing Gregory, Dialogi, bk 4 c58.) The heavens are said to be opened at the very moment of immolation because of the efficacy of divine power, which works in the sacrament; the highest is said to be joined with the lowliest, because out of the species and the body of Christ one sacrament is made; and again the members are united with the head; and again the body of Christ is taken up into heaven, inasmuch as the devotion of the faithful does not stop at the species of the sacrament, but it is drawn on through longing to Christ, according as he is in heaven under his proper species.
The wine becomes blood, in which the seat of the soul is said to be. (Sent IV, 11.4 (63). 1.) This can be understood in three ways. In one way as the conservation of life, which is by the blood, may be called the seat of the soul. In another way, because the blood is potentially everything, because it is converted into the members by the act of nutritive power. In the third way because by the blood generated in the heart the vital operation is diffused among all the members, as the Philosopher says in the History of Animals. (Aristotle, History of Animals, Bk. 3, ch. 19 (521a9–10).)
The flesh is offered for our body. (Sent IV, 11.4 (63). 1 citing Lev. 17, 11; Deut. 12, 23.) This is to be understood as by a certain adaptation for the salvation of the body, which will take place through the glory of resurrection, toward which this sacrament works.
Nor is the sacrament to be repeated, (Sent IV, 11.4 (63). 3.) as to what is principal in this sacrament, namely, the consecration of the matter, although it may be received again as to its use.
”This joining . . . is to be so mixed . . . that the commixture cannot be separated.” (Sent IV, 11.5 (64). 1 citing Cyprian, Epistola 63 (ad Caecilium), c13.) But to the contrary. Alchemists say that it can be separated by filtering it through a peeled rush. And it should be said that the substance of the water that is there is taken away from the wine, because of the likeness of the rush, which is also porous; nevertheless, that water that had been added may not be separated, because it has already become wine.
”But we cannot be pardoned,” (Sent IV, 11.5 (64). 2 citing Cyprian, Epistola 63 (ad Caecilium), c17.) i.e., our sin would not have in itself any cause for forgiveness, since it would not proceed from ignorance.
But water without the wine can never be offered in sacrifice. (Sent IV, 11.5 (64). 3.) However, if by mistake it should happen that water was used in place of wine, if this is perceived before the consecration of the wine, the water should be poured out and wine poured in. If it is perceived after, however, the consecration of the wine should be repeated with other wine poured in, with contrition for the previous negligence; or also one could begin the canon of the Mass from the start, using new hosts, while the host previously consecrated is set apart, as Innocent says. (Innocent III, De sacro altaris mysterio, Bk. 4, ch. 22 (PL 217:872).)
Chapter 147 of 186