D. 4 - The effects of baptism
After the Master has considered baptism in what pertains to it in itself, here he considers its effect on those receiving it. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers the effect of baptism commonly on all men; in the second, on infants in particular, at: it is also usual to ask whether a grace is given to children in baptism. (Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, 4.7 (32), 3.)
The first is divided into three parts: in the first of these he shows how some people receive the sacrament and the reality of the sacrament; in the second how some people receive the sacrament but not the reality, at: But those who approach without faith or under false pretenses, receive the sacrament, but not the thing; (Sent. IV, 4.2 (27), 1.) in the third, how some people receive the reality, but not the sacrament, at: there are also others, as we said earlier, who receive the thing and not the sacrament. (Sent. IV, 4.4 (29), 1.)
Concerning the second he does two things: first, he determines the truth; second, he objects to the contrary, at: And yet Augustine appears to say that in the case of one who approaches under false pretenses . . . all sins are forgiven at the very moment of baptism, but they return immediately after baptism. (Sent. IV, 4.2 (27), 4.) And about this he does two things: first, he objects by the authority of Augustine, who seems to prove the contrary from the Apostle’s authority; second, he resolves it: first, as to the authority of Augustine, at: But as we said earlier, Augustine does not say this by way of assertion; (Sent. IV, 4.2 (27), 5.) second, as to the authority of the Apostle, at: and so it is asked how that text may be taken: “As many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ”. (Sent. IV, 4.3 (28), 1 citing Gal 3:27.)
There are also others, as we said earlier, who receive the thing and not the sacrament. Here he considers those who receive the reality without the sacrament, and concerning this he does two things: first, he shows that some people receive the reality without the sacrament; second, he inquires what may be added afterward by a sacrament like this, when they receive the sacrament, at: it is usual to ask regarding those who are already sanctified by the Spirit, what does Baptism confer on them when they come to baptism in fiath and charity. (Sent. IV, 4.5 (30), 1.)
Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the truth; second, he excludes error, at: but some say that no unbaptized adult can believe in Christ or have charity, unless he shed his blood for the Lord. (Sent. IV, 4.4 (29), 9.) Concerning the first he does two things: first, he proves his conclusion; second, he answers a certain objection, at: but it seems to contradict the above, etc. (Sent. IV, 4.4 (29), 6.) Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that those suffering for Christ, if they are not baptized, receive the reality of the sacrament without the sacrament; second, he shows the same of those who have faith and contrition, at: nor is it suffering alone which fills the role of baptism, but also faith and contrition, where necessity precludes the sacrament. (Sent. IV, 4.4 (29), 3.)
But some say that no unbaptized adult can believe in Christ, etc. Here he excludes the error of those who say that no one can be saved by faith and contrition without baptism; and concerning this he does two things: first, he shows that this is false regarding adults; second, he shows it to be true regarding children, at: the faith of the Church is not sufficient for children without the sacrament. (Sent. IV, 4.4 (29), 12.)
It is usual to ask regarding those who are already sanctified by the Spirit, what does Baptism confer on them when they come to baptism in faith and charity. Here he examines the baptism of those who had previously received the reality of the sacrament; and concerning this he does two things: first, he shows the effect of baptism in them; second, its signification, at: if it is asked of what thing is that baptism a sacrament, which is given to one who is already justified, we say, etc. (Sent. IV, 4.7 (32), 1.)
Here there are three questions. First, about the effect that is the sacrament-and-reality in baptism; namely, the character. Second, about what is the reality alone, namely, the ultimate effect of baptism. Third, of those receiving either one or both: for the sacrament alone has been discussed in the previous distinction.
Question 1
The baptismal character
Concerning the first, four questions arise:
first, if there is a character;
- second, what it is;
- third, in what it is;
- fourth, whence it comes.
- Article 1
If there is a baptismal character
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, a. 4, qa. 1, ad 1; ST III, q. 63, a. 1; De eccles. sacram.) It seems that the character is not in the soul. For, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 1105b19–20.) everything that is in the soul is either a power, or a passion, or a habit. But a character is not a power, for powers are common to all men, but a character is not, since it is a distinctive sign, as its name shows; and besides, powers are from nature, but a character is not. Nor again is it a passion, for passions of the soul are produced with a certain bodily change, as is said in On the Soul 1; (Moos’s edition has Thomas referring to Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 9, at 1128b14–15; but there are pertinent passages in On the Soul, e.g., Bk. 1, ch. 1, 403a3ff.) and they pertain to the sensitive part, as is said in the Physics 7. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 7, ch. 2, 244b11–12.) Nor again is it a habit, for a habit is ordered to acting, as is evident from Augustine’s definition: a habit is that whereby one acts, when he does a work. (Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, ch. 21, par. 25 (CSEL 41:219). The exact words are: “Ipse est enim habitus, quo aliquid agitur, cum opus est; cum autem non agitur, potest agi, sed non opus est.”) Therefore, the character conferred in baptism is not anything in the soul.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, all that there is is reducible to some genus of being. But a character does not seem to be reducible to any category of being, except perhaps for quality. But it cannot be a quality, since it is contained under no species of quality. (As given by Aristotle in the Categories, ch. 8.) For it is not a habit, as has been proved; nor is it a disposition, since it is not easily moveable, but rather completely indelible. Nor again is it a natural power, as has been proved; nor is it an inability, since then the sacraments that imprint characters would do more to hinder than to help; nor again is it a passion, as has been proved; nor a passible quality, since it is not such as to cause a passion in the senses, nor is it born from any passion. Nor again is it a form, and a figure standing firm around anything, for a figure is a termination of quantity, but the soul does not have any quantity. Therefore, a character is nothing.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, contraries are in the same genus. But the things that belong to Christ are contrary to those things that belong to the devil. Therefore, since the character of the Beast, which is spoken of in Revelation 13, is nothing other than mortal sin, it seems that it is not fitting for any character to be stamped in the soul beyond virtue and grace.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the things that are in the sacraments of the New Law are ordered to causing grace. But a character does not seem able to cause grace, for many are said to have a character who lack grace. Therefore, it does not seem that any character is imprinted in the sacraments.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, if it is said that it is a disposition toward grace, then to the contrary: an infinite agent does not require disposed matter. But a disposition is only necessary in order that matter be disposed. Therefore, since grace is from an agent of infinite power, it seems that it is not necessary for a character to be given in sacraments in order to dispose one for grace.
On the contrary (1), Damascene includes seal in the definition of baptism. (On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 4, ch. 9 (PG 94:1122).) But a seal impressed on something is a certain character. Therefore, in the sacraments a character is imprinted.
Furthermore (2), anywhere there is a certain distinction, it is appropriate that there be a certain character distinguishing it. But through the sacraments the faithful are distinguished from unbelievers, and the faithful from each other. Therefore, it is appropriate that a character be given in the sacraments.
Furthermore (3), by a sacrament we are configured to Christ, for the sacraments have their efficacy from him, and they signify him. But configuration happens by a character of likening. Therefore, it is fitting that there be a character in the sacraments.
I answer that, nowadays all confess there to be a character imprinted in certain sacraments; but as to placing it in the soul, they differ on some things and agree on others. All of them agree in saying that the character brings with it a threefold relation. For a character is a distinctive and configuring sign. Therefore, inasmuch as it is a sign, it conveys a relation to the thing signified; but inasmuch as it is distinctive, it conveys a relation to those things from which it is distinguished; while inasmuch as it is configurative, it carries a relation to those things to which it likens.
However, they differ in this: certain ones hold that under these relations there is no absolute accident, but that these relations are founded directly in the soul. But this cannot be. For a sign, through the form it imprints on the senses or the intellect, makes something come into the understanding. In the same way too, nothing is distinguished from something else except by a certain form. A likeness is a relation founded upon oneness of quality, as is said in the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 5, ch. 15, 1021a10.) Hence it is clear that whichever of these relations a character conveys, it requires a certain underlying form; and since there is no substantial form (for a substantial form is not given in the sacraments), it remains that the underlying form be a certain quality, whose unity of consignification makes the likeness.
And therefore certain people say that it is not in any of the four species of quality, and nevertheless it is in the genus of quality, resting on that word of the Philosopher in the Categories: perhaps, he says, other modes of quality will appear. (Aristotle, Categories, ch. 8, 10a25.) But this is an evasion: for although there may be other modes of quality, nevertheless, all of them are reducible to these species, which is evident from the fact that no other species has been able to be found to this day.
And so others say that it is in the fourth species of quality: for that configuration, which character expresses in its name, conveys unity of figure, which is in the fourth species of quality. And some people say that this figure is the cross of Christ. But this cannot stand: for figure is taken either properly or metaphorically. If it is taken properly, then it conveys the termination of a dimensive quantity, which clearly does not exist in the soul. But if it is said metaphorically, then the metaphor must be traced back to a proper sense; just as it is not being said that the apostles are in the genus of quality when it is said to them, you are the light of the world (Matt 5:14). Nor could anything be found in the fourth species of quality that is in the soul in the proper sense. Hence the character of which we speak cannot be founded on a quality of the fourth species.
And so some people say that it is in the third species of quality, by the fact that it causes a certain feminine passion in one’s spiritual perception insofar as it ornaments and beautifies the soul. But this, again, cannot stand; for, as the Philosopher proves in the Physics 7, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 7, ch. 2, 244b15–245a5.) the third species of quality exists only in the sensible part of the soul; however, no one considers a character to be in this part of the soul, but in the intellective part. And furthermore, those qualities always have an order to a certain physical change, which either they bring about, or by which they are caused.
And so others say that it is in the first species of quality and is like a middle term between disposition and habit. Inasmuch as it is difficult to move, it resembles habit, while inasmuch as it is not the last perfection but disposes to grace, it resembles disposition. But this cannot stand, for according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 1105b25–26.) a habit is what orders us well or badly to passions; and to anyone who considers, this difference appears between habit and power, that a power is that by which we are able to do something simply, but by a habit we are able to do it well or badly; just as understanding is that by which we consider, but knowledge is that by which we consider well, or the concupiscible is that by which we desire, but temperance is that by which we desire well, and intemperance that by which we desire badly. And it is similar with a disposition, for a disposition is nothing other than a certain incomplete habit. Therefore, since a character is ordered to something simply speaking, not to doing it well or badly, it cannot be that the quality upon which the relation of a character is founded is a habit; it is rather a power.
Hence it remains that it is not in the first species of quality, but rather it is reduced to the second, as others say; and this is evident for the following reason. Just as anything existing in a certain nature has certain proper operations, so too in the spiritual life of one reborn, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 2 (PG 3:391).) But anywhere that there are proper operations, there need to be proper principles of those operations. Hence, just as in other things there are natural powers for proper operations, so also those reborn in spiritual life have certain powers, by which they can do those works—and these powers are like those virtues by which sacraments are endowed with efficacy, for just as sacraments cause grace instrumentally (as was said above in Distinction 1, Question 1, Article 4), so, too, those receiving the character accomplish divine things through their office. A minister, however, is like an instrument of the one of whom he is minister; hence the Philosopher says that a slave is like an animate tool. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 11, 1161b4.) And thus, the virtue of the sacrament as well as the minister and the character are instrumental.
And that a character is a power of this kind is evident if someone considers diligently the words of Dionysius, from whom the tradition of a character first came to us. For, when assigning the ministry of a certain rite that existed in the early Church when adults were being baptized—that the hierarch, that is, the pontiff, placed his hand on the one approaching baptism, and made the sign of the Cross over him, and ordered him to be inscribed among the names of Christians, so that he might be admitted to the rest of the divine things with the others—he says that the divine blessedness thus welcomes the one approaching, namely to spiritual life, into a participation in itself, just as the priest in his own light as though by a certain sign imparts to the one to be baptized, namely, participation in himself, perfecting him, namely, as someone divine and sharing in divine things, etc. Therefore, it is clear that by this sign, he means nothing other than what makes one a participant in the divine operations. Hence this sign is nothing other than a certain power by which one is capable of hierarchical actions, which are ministrations and receptions of the sacraments, and of other things that pertain to the faithful; and in order to exercise these operations well, one needs the habit of grace, just as other powers also need habits.
Reply Obj. 1: They are neither habits nor passions, but they are certain powers attendant on the soul according as it is regenerated in spiritual life; and thus they do not need to be in all men, nor do they need to be from nature.
Reply Obj. 2: It is reduced to the second species of quality, and it is a different mode from the one that the Philosopher includes there; for the Philosopher did not recognize any operations but natural ones, and thus no powers but natural ones. It is clear that for us, however, it is necessary to posit spiritual powers, like the power of consecrating the Eucharist, and of absolving, and things of that sort, and that these may be reduced to the second species of quality, just as there are infused habits in the same species of quality with natural or acquired habits.
Reply Obj. 3: By being configured to the Beast, a man does not receive any spiritual power, as a man is assimilated to Christ by a certain spiritual power; and therefore, it is not a similar case. Nevertheless, from the text of the Apostle it is inferred that someone is configured by the character of the Beast for worldly operations; hence he says: so that no one may buy or sell who does not have the mark, etc. (Rev 13:17). And similarly, by the character of Christ, someone is configured to the actions of Christ.
Reply Obj. 4: A character is a cause of sacramental grace; and the fact that some people with the character do not receive grace is from their own indisposition to receiving grace.
Reply Obj. 5: A character is a disposition to grace by a certain dignity of fittingness. For by the fact that a man is surrendered to divine actions and numbered among the members of Christ, a certain fittingness for receiving grace happens to him: for God provides for man perfectly in the sacraments; hence at the same time as the character, by which it is given to man to be able to exercise the spiritual actions of the faithful, or the passions or receptions, grace is also given by which he can do these things well.
Article 2
What the baptismal character is
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 63, a. 2.) It seems that the definition of character attributed to Dionysius is not well-formulated, which is as follows: character is a sacred sign of the communion of faith, and of holy ordination, given by a hierarch in divine blessedness. For a sign, as was said in Distinction 1, is something that impresses a certain species on the senses and makes something beyond it come into the understanding. But a character does not impress anything on the senses. Therefore, it is not a sign.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is more fitting for the powers that are the principle of action or passion to be signified rather than to signify, for causes are signified by their effects. But character, as was said, is a spiritual power. Therefore, it is not a sign.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, some people bear a character who do not have faith, like those who crumble into heresy after baptism. But anyone who does not have faith does not communicate in faith. Therefore, the character is not a sign of the communion of faith—or else it would be a false sign, which is absurd to think of a sign that was divinely given.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the definition should fit equally everything that is contained under the defined. But to be the sign of a sacred ordination does not correspond to every character, but only the character that is imprinted in holy orders. Therefore, it is not a well-formulated definition.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, the hierarch, as was said, is the pontiff. But in certain sacraments, which are conferred by simple priests, or even by laymen, a character is imprinted. Therefore, the definition should not have said: given by a hierarch.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a certain other teacher’s definition was not well-formulated, which is as follows: (Parallel: ST III, q. 63, a. 3.) a character is a distinguishing mark imprinted from the eternal character on a rational soul according to the image, sealing a created trinity to the creating and recreating Trinity, and distinguishing from those not configured according to the state of faith. For where there is a great difference, it is not necessary for a sign of distinction to be given. But unbelievers differ tremendously from the faithful, both in life and in religious practice. Therefore, it is not necessary that any distinctive sign be given.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a sign of distinction like this is either done for the sake of men, for the sake of God, or for the sake of the angels. But this is not for the sake of men, since not only are other men incapable of recognizing this character, but even the one who has it cannot perceive that he has it, whereas a sign needs to be noticeable. Nor is this a sign for God, who knows how to discern believers from unbelievers without this sign; and likewise, neither is it for the angels. Therefore, a character is not that sign of distinction.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, man is only configured to the Trinity by image and likeness. But the first configuration is by nature, and the second by grace. Therefore, a character does not configure us in any way.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, charity is a more excellent virtue than faith. But no distinguishing sign is posited for charity, nor for the other virtues. Therefore, it should not be posited for faith.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, a contrary distinguishes sufficiently from its contrary. But faith and unbelief are contraries. Therefore, believers are sufficiently distinguished from unbelievers; and so it is not necessary that they be distinguished by a character.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question I answer that definition is nowhere found laid down by Dionysius, but it can be taken from the words of his cited above; and it may be taken more fittingly if it were said as follows: character is a sign of communion in a share of divine things and of the sacred ordination of the faithful, given by divine blessedness. And it touches upon the four causes. First, the genus of character as character, namely, sign, which pertains to the formal cause. Second, the final cause, for this sign is given for two things—namely, so that the one receiving it may be configured as inscribed in the sharing of divine sacraments and sacred actions; and with regard to this he says: of the communion in a share of divine things; and so that the one to be added to this order may be configured to the others to whom the same power has been given, which he refers to in saying: and of the sacred ordination of the faithful; which two things excommunication suspends for a time, for it deprives a man of participation in divine things and the communion of the faithful. Third, he includes the matter in which, by saying: given by a priest. (This phrase, datum a sacerdote, is not present in either the original or the rephrased definition, but it seems to parallel datum a hierarcha, discussed below.) Fourth, the efficent cause, namely by divine blessedness.
Nevertheless, the definition laid down before can also be defended, so that it amounts to the same thing as this one; so that the phrase of the communion of the faith may be referred to the participation in the sacraments and the actions of the faithful. But when he says, and of holy ordination, he lays down the ordering of one to another; given to the one approaching by the hierarch is included as to the efficient instrumental cause, which is the minister, who represents the interior agent cause by external configuration.
Reply Obj. 1: Character receives the account of a sign according as it is made outwardly visible and is signified through the sacrament.
Reply Obj. 2: With any power, some outward, visible sign of that power is given, as a crown and scepter are given to a king as a sign of royal power, and a miter and crozier and ring are given to a pontiff. And in like manner, together with the spiritual power conferred in the sacraments, an outward sacramental sign is given; and in relation to that outward sign, the spiritual power itself is called a sign, inasmuch as by it a man is configured and determined to spiritual actions.
Reply Obj. 3: The communion of faith, as is clear from the words of Dionysius, must be received by communion in the sacraments of the faith, and other actions that befit the faithful, to which no one is admitted before he received this character of spiritual power with respect to these things. Nor is it necessary that every one who has a character exercise these actions well, just as neither does everyone who has a power perform the act of that power well.
Reply Obj. 4: Ordination is not taken here for the sacrament of holy orders, but for being integrated into the order of the other believers, so that one is joined to the society of the faithful as regards those things that the faithful are said to do, or as regards those things that are done for the faithful.
Reply Obj. 5: This phrasing—*given to the one approaching by the hierarch—*cannot be taken from the words of Dionysius, but rather this one: given to the one approaching by divine beatitude, and in this way the objection ceases. But if it is taken as the minister giving it, then in that way the baptismal character is said to be given by the hierarch as to baptism’s greatest solemnity, which is sometimes celebrated by pontiffs; for in this way Dionysius hands on the rite of baptism there, placing the high priest as the minister of baptism, as is clear to anyone considering his text.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question it should be said that in that definition as well, the four causes of a character are touched upon. For the formal cause is touched upon in including the genus, when he says, distinguishing mark, i.e., distinctive sign; and it is a more proximate genus than that included in the preceding definition. The efficient cause is touched upon in saying, eternal character, i.e., the Son, who is the figure of the substance of the Father (Heb 1:3). It puts down the material cause in which, when it says: imprinted on the rational soul according to the image. But the final cause is included in two ways—namely, configuration, when it says, sealing a created trinity to the creating and recreating Trinity, i.e., configuring; and distinction, when it says, and distinguishing from those not configured according to the state of faith. And just as here a proximate genus is laid down, so also a proximate end, and a proximate subject, and an appropriated efficient cause—in which this definition surpasses the definition mentioned, as it is given rather through proximate causes.
Reply Obj. 1: A character is a sign not only as a mark of distinction, but as something causing distinction, even as the other sacramental signs are; and thus it needs this for bringing about the distinction.
Reply Obj. 2: That sign of distinction is for the sake of the very man who receives it, who takes from it a power distinct from others; for the sake of other men who admit him to spiritual actions, assessing his interior from the external sacramental seal; and toward God, who supplies its efficacy for spiritual actions.
Reply Obj. 3: That configuration is related to God according to a participation of divine power, which exists neither through the grace of the virtues nor through nature.
Reply Obj. 4: The faith of a man is something one can perceive, but charity is uncertain. For nothing is more certain to someone than his own faith, as Augustine says; but whether one has charity is not certain to anyone, and thus the definition given regards faith more than charity or the other virtues. Or it could be said that this definition chiefly deals with the operations and receiving of things that are in the sacraments, in which faith is most at work.
Reply Obj. 5: Faith sufficiently distinguishes the faithful from unbelievers with respect to the act of faith, but not as to the spiritual acts that pertain to the faithful, since for these a spiritual power must be added.
Article 3
What the baptismal character is in
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: It seems that character is in the essence of the soul as a subject. (Parallel: ST III, q. 63, a. 4.) For dispositions and habits are in the same subject. But a character disposes one for the habit of grace. Since, therefore grace is in the essence of the soul as its subject, it seems that the character is as well.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the powers of the soul have no subject but the essence of the soul. But a character, as has been said, is a certain spiritual power. Therefore, it is in the essence of the soul as its subject.
On the contrary, character configures a created trinity to the uncreated one, as is clear from the definition cited above. But the uncreated Trinity consists in powers, while its unity is in the essence, as was said in Book I, Distinction 3. Therefore, the character is not in the essence of the soul.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is not in one power, but in several. (Parallel: ST III, q. 63, a. 4.) For, as is evident from the definition given, a character is in a rational soul as an image, according to which is the configuration of man to God as well. But an image does not consist in one power alone, but in several. Therefore, neither does a character.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever has a power has an action, and vice versa, as is said in On Sleep and Waking 1. (Aristotle, On Sleep, ch. 1, 454a8.) But spiritual action, to which a character is directed, is through several powers, since both affective and intellective powers are required for it. Therefore, the character, as a spiritual power, is in several of the powers.
On the contrary, one accident is not in several subjects. But in one sacrament, one character is imprinted. Therefore, it is not in several subjects.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is in the affective power rather than the cognitive power. (Parallel: ST III, q. 63, a. 4, ad 3.) For a character disposes for grace. But grace regards the affections more. Therefore, so does a character.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a character is for the sake of likening us to God. But it is through the affections that we grow most near to God and become most like him. Therefore, a character is in the affective power.
On the contrary, Dionysius compares the character to a light. But light applies more to the intellective than to the affective part of the soul. Therefore, so also does the character.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the character is not indelibly impressed on the power in which it is. (Parallels: ST III, q. 63, a. 5; q. 66, a. 9; Super Rom. 7, lec. 1.) For accidents have endurance from their cause and from their subject. But grace is from the same cause and in the same subject as a character. Therefore, since grace can be lost, a character can likewise also be erased.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, when what is perfect has come, what is partial shall be emptied out (1 Cor 13:10). But character is partial: for it is given to distinguish one in sacramental works, which belong to the state of the wayfarer. Therefore, in the fatherland the character will cease, and thus it is effaceable.
On the contrary, if a character could be erased, it would certainly be erased by sin. But it is not erased by sin, for a wicked priest is not reordained so that he may again receive the character. Therefore, the character is indelible.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that Christ had a character. (Parallel: ST III, q. 63, a. 3.) For he himself was a priest according to the order of Melchizedek (Heb 7:17), which is the priesthood of the New Testament. But this priesthood requires a character. Therefore, Christ had a character.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing of perfection, whether in the soul or in dignity, should be denied to Christ. But a character beautifies and ennobles a soul in which it is. Therefore, in Christ there was a character.
On the contrary, a character is for those who have been regenerated, and who receive something from the sacraments. But Christ did not receive anything from the sacraments, nor again was he reborn, since, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, he alone was able to be born so that it was not necessary for him to be reborn. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity (CCSL 46), ch. 14: “qui solus potuit ita nasci ut ei non opus esset renasci.”) Therefore, he does not have a character.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
The first question I answer by saying that nature is laid out as a substratum proportionate to spirituality, as the perfectible is related to perfection. Hence, just as grace, which is the principle of spiritual life, is in the essence of the soul as its subject, so also character, which is a spiritual power, has as its subject the natural power of the soul, and not (as some people say) the essence of the soul, except indirectly through the powers of the soul.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not necessary for a disposition to be in the same genus as that to which it disposes, except when a disposition becomes a perfection afterward, as science, which was first a disposition, afterward becomes a habit; and thus science the disposition and science the habit are in the same proximate subject. But when the disposition and the perfection differ by essence, this is not necessary; rather, they can be in diverse subjects, especially when they have a different order to each other, as when a sensible operation is a disposition to an intelligible operation. And in a similar way, character is a disposition to grace.
Reply Obj. 2: That objection has to do with natural powers; but the spiritual powers must be founded on natural ones.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that something can exist in multiple powers in two ways: either such that it is equally in all of them, as the essence of the soul is in all the powers; or such that it is in one primarily and, as a result, it relates to the others by means of the one in which it first is; as choice is in the intellect and the appetite, and it is formally perfected in the appetite, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 6, ch. 2, 1139b4–5.) In the first way, therefore, no accident can exist in several powers, for an accident is numbered and distinguished by virtue of matter and distinction of subject. And thus, since a character is an accident, it cannot be in several powers of the soul in the first way, but only in the second way, for it regards one [power] first, and the others consequently.
Reply Obj. 1: Even powers have considerable order to each other, as was said in Book I; and thus, what is in one can sometimes overflow into the others.
Reply Obj. 2: When many powers are required for one action, one power is principal in that action as the mover and the one drawing all the others into its service; and the others, in a way, put on its form; and thus, from what is in the principal power, that action can be sufficiently completed.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the image chiefly consists in the cognitive power. For the will arises from memory and intelligence; hence the whole image is in the intellective part as its root. And thus, everything that is attributed to man by reason of this image chiefly concerns the intellective part, and, in consequence, the affective part. For it is from the intellective part that a man is a man, but it is from the affective part that a man is good or bad. And so, since character regards the image, it is chiefly in the intellective part.
Reply Obj. 1: Grace is neither in the intellective nor in the affective, but in the essence of the soul. Nevertheless, it concerns the affective more closely, since grace is given for acting well. Now, how well someone may act depends especially on the will. But a character is given simply for exercising certain spiritual actions; and whether they are done well or badly is by grace and by the habit of virtues. And thus, the same argument does not apply to grace and to the character.
Reply Obj. 2: Assimilation in goodness toward God is especially through willing, while assimilation in being and ability is rather from the intellectual part—since from the fact that something has immaterial being, it is intellective and has a certain infinite power, since understanding has to do with universals, which are in a certain way infinite in power; and thus, since conformity of character has to do with spiritual power, it applies more to the intellective part than to the affective part.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that the imprinting of a character is through a certain sanctification of the rational soul, just as sanctification is called an appointment of something for something sacred. Now for this sanctification, the soul to be sanctified is not more actively prepared than water, or oil, or chrism to be sanctified, except in that man subjects himself to this sanctification by his own consent, while the things mentioned are subjected to it since they lack free will; and so, no matter how the soul is changed by its proper operations, it will never lose its character, just as neither do chrism, oil, or consecrated bread ever lose their sanctification, however much they are changed, so long as they are not corrupted.
Reply Obj. 1: The cause of the indelibility of a character is on the part of the subject, which is incorruptible, and on the part of the cause, which is invariable. However, grace has in a certain way a cause that is not efficient but disposing on the part of the subject: for, according to Augustine, he who created you without you, will not justify you without you. (See Augustine, Sermon 169, n. 11 (PL 38:923): “qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te iustificat sine te.”) And thus, by the indisposition of the subject, grace is lost.
Reply Obj. 2: By a character, man is configured to what has to do with the society of the faithful, and he becomes partaker of the actions of the hierarchy. But the ecclesiastical hierarchy gives way to the heavenly one; and thus, in heaven, the character will make more perfect the communion of the faithful in the Church Triumphant, and the participation in the actions of the heavenly hierarchy. And in this way it will be for other acts, just as the virtues and gifts remain even in the damned. But it is per accidens outside the intention of the one imprinting the character that the recipient should be damned; and thus, in that case, it is not ordered to a certain end, for what happens outside the intention lacks ordering to an end. (That is, the character in a damned soul is no longer serving its essential purpose, as it would be doing in a blessed soul.) Nevertheless God, who leaves nothing disordered, draws some good out of this—namely, that the damnation of those who have neglected such a great gift would appear more just.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question it should be said that some people say that Christ did not have a baptismal character, since he received nothing from baptism, but that he did have the character of holy orders, which pertains to a certain eminent status. But it is better if it were said that Christ had no character; for he had the fullness of power in the sacraments, as the one instituting them and providing them with their efficacy. Hence, just as he could induce the effect of a sacrament in someone without an outward sacrament, in the same way no interior sacramental character was required for this on his part.
Reply Obj. 1: He himself was a priest as the one instituting the priesthood; thus to have a character does not pertain to him but to that man who receives his priesthood from elsewhere, so that he may be configured to the principal priest by the character.
Reply Obj. 2: Some things pertain to perfection in us which would not be so in Christ, like the grace of adoption. And it is similar with the character, which would put in him a spiritual power that was restricted and derived from another.
Article 4
Whence comes the baptismal character
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 63, a. 5; Super Heb. 11. lec. 7.) It seems that a character is not imprinted only in the sacraments of the New Law. For the effect of a character is to configure and distinguish. But the virtues do this: for in them the good are distinguished from the bad and made like unto God. Therefore, a character is imprinted by the virtues and not only by the sacraments of the New Law.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as by the sacraments of the New Law a faithful people is distinguished from unbelievers, so were they distinguished by the sacraments of the Old Law. Therefore, the sacraments of the New Law do not imprint a character any more than the sacraments of the Old Law.
On the contrary, someone having a character is not baptized, for the other characters presuppose baptism, which should also not be given again. But those who have virtue, and those who received the sacraments of the Old Law, were baptized. Therefore, neither by virtues nor by sacraments of the Old Law is a character imprinted.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a character is imprinted by all the sacraments of the New Law. (Parallels: below, d. 7, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 1; d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3; ST III, q. 63, a. 6; De eccles. sacram.; Super Heb. 11, lec. 7.) For in every sacrament of the New Law there is something that is purely a sacrament, and something that is purely a reality, and something that is reality-and-sacrament. But in baptism, that which is reality-and-sacrament is the character. Therefore, in any sacrament of the New Law a character is imprinted.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in every sacrament of the New Law grace is conferred, and the one receiving it is distinguished from the one not receiving it. Therefore, since a character disposes for grace and distinguishes, it seems that in any sacrament of the New Law a character is imprinted.
On the contrary, no sacrament in which a character is imprinted can be received again, for the character is indelible. But certain sacraments are received over and over. Therefore, not all sacraments of the New Law imprint a character.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in the sacrament of baptism a character is not imprinted. For baptism of blood is more worthy than baptism with water, for it merits a golden crown. (Aquinas uses the term aureola, “little crown,” to express an extra honor or distinction awarded to some of the blessed in addition to the aurea, “golden crown” or “halo” that represents the main substantial reward of heavenly beatitude. See the more thorough explanation at Dist. 49, question 5. See also Dist. 8, q. 1, a. 2, qa 1, ad 2.) But in baptism of blood, no character is imprinted. Therefore, neither in baptism of water.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the only thing baptism of water has over and above baptism of spirit is water. But baptism cannot imprint its character by reason of the water, otherwise the baptism of John would have imprinted a character, which cannot be, since those baptized by John were baptized again, as was said above in Distinction 2, Article 4. Therefore, neither does baptism of water imprint a character.
On the contrary, is the authority of Dionysius, from whom the tradition of the character is derived, for it was in the treatise on baptism that he himself brought forward those words from which the definition of character is taken.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the character is from the Son alone as its first efficient cause. (Parallel: ST III, q. 63, a. 3.) For character is a distinction imprinted on the rational soul by the eternal character, etc., as was said above in Article 2, Subquestion 2. But the eternal character is the Son alone, just as he is also the image. Therefore, the character is imprinted by the Son alone.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, by a character the soul is configured and made to be like God. But the principle of likening to God is the Son; hence Augustine names the Son ‘the Likeness’, by whom we are reformed unto oneness, as is clear from Book I, Distinction 3. Therefore, the character is only from the Son.
On the contrary, Dionysius says that the sign of a character is given by divine blessedness. But divine blessedness is common to the three Persons. Therefore, the character is not given by the Son alone.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
The first question I answer by saying that, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, virtue works those things from which it is born, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 2, 1104a27–29; that is, the kind of actions that give rise to a virtue are the very actions the virtue empowers the agent to perform.) speaking of acquired virtue; and it is similar in all virtues that are caused in some way from certain actions. Hence, since a character is a virtue or spiritual power ordered to sacramental actions, if a character should be imprinted from something that is done by us, it has to be imprinted by the sacraments of the New Law, and by them alone, for that power is directly ordered only to those actions.
Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual actions to which a character is ordered are exercised only within the Church; and thus the power for these actions would be given to someone for naught unless it were given in such a way that it might become known to those who are in the Church, so that they admitted him to such actions. But by grace and the virtues he could not become known, since they are unknown; and thus, it was necessary that the character be imprinted by the visible signs of the sacraments.
Reply Obj. 2: Sacraments of the Old Law conferred nothing by the work performed, and thus those actions did not require any spiritual power; and therefore neither from them nor for them was a character imprinted.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question it should be said that sacraments of the New Law are a kind of sanctification. But ‘sanctification’ is taken in two ways. In one way, as a cleansing, for what is holy is clean. In another way, for a dedication to something sacred, as an altar, or something like it, is said to be sanctified. All the sacraments, therefore, are sanctifications in the first way, for they are all given as a remedy against some defect, as was said before in Distinction 2; but some of them are also sanctifications in the second way, as is particularly evident in holy orders, for the ordained is dedicated to something sacred; but not all the sacraments, as is clear in the case of penance. Now anyone who is dedicated to exercising something sacred and spiritual, and only such a person, needs to have a spiritual power. And therefore not all the sacraments of the New Law imprint a character, but certain ones that are also sanctifications in the second way.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the reality-and-sacrament in baptism happens to be a character, nevertheless it is not necessary that it be a character in all the sacraments in which there is a reality-and-sacrament. But that which is the reality-and-sacrament in each will be shown further on, one sacrament at a time. (For more about the sacrament alone, reality alone, and sacrament-and-reality, see the footnote at Dist.1, q.1, a.4, qa. 1, main response.)
Reply Obj. 2: Although any sacrament may distinguish those receiving from those not receiving it, nevertheless it does not do so with such an indelible distinction, of which sort is the distinction in those sacraments that sanctify in the second way; and thus it is not the same with all the sacraments.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question it should be said that just as in natural things there is an active power and a natural passive power, so also in spiritual things there is, as it were, a passive spiritual power by which a man is made receptive to spiritual actions. And this kind of spiritual power is conferred in baptism, for the non-baptized are not able to receive the effects of the other sacraments, and hence, accordingly, they are also not able to give them to others. And this is the first distinction, by which all the faithful people, to whom it belongs to take part in the sacraments, are together distinguished from others. There is another active spiritual power that is ordered to the administering of the sacraments, and the exercise of other sacred hierarchical actions; and this power is bestowed in confirmation and holy orders, as will be clear when we treat them in their own places. And since not all are agents in the ecclesiastical hierarchy (as, for instance, perfecting, purifying, and illuminating), as all are recipients of purification, illumination, and perfecting (as Dionysius says), (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 6, PG 3:530.) therefore these two characters do not distinguish the people of God universally from others, but certain members of the people from others.
Reply Obj. 1: Baptism of blood does not have sacramental efficacy, but only meritorious efficacy; and thus, there is no spiritual power conferred there for hierarchical actions, nor is there a character as in baptism of water, which is a sacrament.
Reply Obj. 2: Neither baptism of spirit alone nor baptism of water alone suffices for a sacrament of the New Law; and thus, neither of these imprints a character.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question it should be said that every effect in creation is commonly from the whole Trinity; hence the character, too, is not only from the Son, but from the three Persons. However, it is attributed to the Son on the one hand because of the account of likeness to what is proper to the Person, since he is image and figure by appropriation, or the character of the Father; on the other hand, because the virtue of Christ’s Passion is working in the sacraments.
And by this the solution to the objections is clear.
Question 2
The effects of baptism
Next we will inquire as to the effect of baptism, which is the reality and not the sacrament; and concerning this, three questions arise:
first, its effect as to the removal of evil;
- second, its effect as to the conferral of good;
- third, whether its effect is equally partaken of by all.
- Article 1
Baptism’s effect as to the removal of evil
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: In II Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 1 and a. 2, ad 3; below, d. 12, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 3; d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 3; d. 17, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 6, ad 3; ST III, q. 69, a. 1; q. 79, a. 5, ad 1; SCG IV, chs. 69 & 72.) It seems that baptism does not remove actual fault. For baptism does not take away actual sin unless contrition is present: for no one who is constituted arbiter of his own will, which is the only place actual sin can be, can embark upon a new life unless he repents of his old life, as it says in the text. But contrition in and of itself, even without baptism, blots out actual fault. Therefore, baptism does nothing toward the effacement of actual fault.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, there are different medicines for different things: since what heals the heel does not heal the eye, as Jerome says. (See Pseudo-Jerome, Expositio Euangelii secundum Marcum, ch. 9: medicina cuiusque uulneris adhibenda est ei. Non sanat oculum quod calcaneo adhibetur (CCSL 82:42).) But baptism is directly ordained as a medicine against original sin. Therefore, it cannot heal from actual sin.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, someone who plans to continue sinning cannot obtain the remission of sin. But it does happen that someone sins venially while being baptized, or deliberately remains in venial sin; but he is not considered insincere on that account. Therefore, baptism does not take away actual guilt even among those who are not insincere.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in the Enchiridion: the baptized die not only to one sin, but to many more, or even to all, whatsoever they have now committed by their own acts, whether in thought or speech or deed. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 13, l. 39 (CCSL 46), where the text reads: “sed ideo etiam ipsi mori peccato plerumque dicuntur cum procul dubio non uni sed multis peccatis omnibus que moriantur quaecumque iam propria commiserunt uel cogitatione uel locutione uel opere.”) But these things are actual sins. Therefore, baptism takes away actual fault.
Furthermore (2), baptism is ordered to the removal of original fault. But original sin cannot be removed without actual sin, even for him who has both: for it would be impious to hope for half-forgiveness from God, as will be said below, in Distinction 15. Therefore, baptism takes away actual fault.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it does not take away all the temporal punishment due to actual sin. (Parallels: below, d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 3; d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 2; In III Sent., d. 19, a. 3, qa. 2 and exposition of the text; ST III, q. 49, a. 3, ad 2; q. 68, a. 5; q. 69, a. 2; q. 79, a. 5, ad 1; q. 86, a. 4, ad 3; SCG IV, chs. 59 & 72; Super Rom. 11, lec. 4.) For as Augustine says, either man punishes sin, or God does. (See Augustine, Exposition of Psalm 58 (CCSL 39), n. 13: “iniquitas omnis, parua magna ue sit, puniatur necesse est, aut ab ipso homine paenitente, aut a deo uindicante.”) Therefore, if man did not punish a sin that he himself had committed, it would be punished by God; and in this way, the punishment for actual sin is not completely taken away by baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, guilt can only be ordered by punishment. But God leaves nothing disordered. Therefore, he does not forgive anything without inflicting a certain penalty for the fault; and thus baptism does not absolve from all punishment.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Eucharist is a more perfect sacrament than baptism, for it is a special re-presentation of the Passion of Christ, from which the efficacy of the sacraments comes. But the Eucharist does not absolve from all punishment even those who are receiving not unworthily. Therefore, much less does baptism.
On the contrary (1), Ambrose says on that verse of Romans: for the gifts of God are without repentance (Rom 11:29). He says, the grace of God in baptism does not require groaning or weeping or any work, but it pardons all things freely. (Ambrosiaster, Commentarius in Pauli epistulam ad Romanos, on 11:29 (CSEL 81.1:385), which reads: “verum est, quia gratia Dei in baptismate non quaerit gemitum aut planctum aut opus aliquod nisi solam ex corde confessionem.” A variant is given in Gratian’s Decretals, Part 2, On Penance, dist. 1, can. 87: “Gratia Dei in baptismate non requirit gemitum uel planctum, non opus aliquod, sed solam confessionem cordis, et omnia gratis condonat.” Cf. Decretals, Part 3, On Consecration, dist. 4, can. 99.)
Furthermore (2), as is said in the Gloss on Romans 6:6, by suffering his single death as punishment, Christ consumed two deaths in us, namely, of fault and of punishment. But in baptism, man is configured to the death of Christ, as the Apostle says in the same place. Therefore, he is absolved from both fault and punishment.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it also removes every punishment of original sin. (Parallels: below, d. 46, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 3; In II Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 2; d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2 & 3; ST I-II, q. 85, a. 5, ad 2; q. 87, a. 7, ad 1; q. 109, a. 9; ST II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 1; ST III, q. 49, a. 3, ad 3; q. 52, a. 5, ad 2; q. 69, a. 3 and a. 7, ad 3; SCG IV, ch. 55; De malo, q. 4, a. 6, ad 4; Quodl. VI, q. 9, a. 1.) For the gift of Christ is more efficacious than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle says in Romans 5. But every punishment for original sin was incurred through the sin of Adam. Therefore, every punishment is taken away by the gift of Christ, which is most at work in baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, baptism is ordered more directly against original sin than against actual sin. But it takes away all the punishment due to actual sin, as Ambrose says. (In the reference just above.) Therefore, it also takes away all the punishment for original sin.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, once a cause ceases, the effect ceases. But the cause of punishment is fault. If, therefore, it takes away original fault, it also removes the punishment as a result.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one to whom a certain punishment is due flies free right away. But a baptized person who dies flies away at once into heaven. Therefore, to him no punishment is due; and thus, baptism absolves one also from all punishment for original sin.
On the contrary (1), even among the baptized, the flesh lusts against the spirit (Gal 5:17). But this fight is the consequence of original sin. Therefore, not all punishment for original sin is removed by baptism.
Furthermore (2), the necessity of dying, and of being reduced to dust, and the sufferings of this life, are all punishments for original sin. But these things still remain among the baptized. Therefore, baptism does not take away all punishment for original sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
The first question I answer by saying that in the generation of anything, the introduction of a form drives out all contrary forms, and even the disposition to the contrary form—except sometimes when it remains from an indisposition of the thing receiving the form. Hence, since baptism is a regeneration unto spiritual life, everything that is contrary to spiritual life, i.e., that cannot coexist with grace which is the principle of spiritual life, is removed by baptism; and thus, baptism wipes away both original sin and actual mortal sin, and considered in itself even wipes away venial sin, which disposes to a privation of grace, although sometimes when mortal sin is removed, venial sin may remain after baptism because of an indisposition of the one receiving baptism.
Reply Obj. 1: For the destruction of actual sin, baptism does not require contrition as a co-cause as though it were not sufficient for this by itself, but it requires contrition only to avoid its being received insincerely, which is a contrary disposition impeding baptism’s effect.
Reply Obj. 2: Baptism is not ordained against original sin alone, otherwise in the early church it would not have been necessary for those who had already been circumcised. Rather, it is ordered toward destroying all sin that it finds and to regenerating someone into a new life, once all the oldness of sin has been destroyed. And therefore it is like a potential whole, having complete potency for destroying sin entirely. But repentance shares in something of this potency, as a potential part ordered against other sins, namely, actual sin; for baptism cannot be received more than once.
Reply Obj. 3: Baptism, of itself, as has been said, removes all sin, original and actual, and not only mortal but also venial. For venial sin, although not opposed to grace simply speaking, is nevertheless opposed to baptismal grace, which should be perfect by reason of the newness of life. But baptism’s effect can be impeded on the part of the one receiving it, if he is indisposed because of insincerity. But since pretending is a sin, just as mortal sin is sin simply speaking, it thus makes it false, simply speaking, and completely impedes the effect of baptism for the remission of fault. But a venial sin, whether actual or in the intention, makes it false in a certain respect, and is a sin in a certain respect, as a disposition to sin; and thus, it impedes baptism’s effect not simply, but only regarding the remission of that venial sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that by his own death Christ sufficiently satisfied for the sins of the entire human race—even if there had been many more of them. And since by baptism man is baptized into the death of Christ, and dies and is buried together with him, as it says in Romans 6, for this reason baptism, considered in itself, imparts the whole efficacy of the Passion to the baptized; and because of this it absolves not only from fault, but from the punishment for satisfaction.
Reply Obj. 1: By baptism man is incorporated into Christ and made his member; thus, the punishment that Christ underwent is reputed as satisfaction for him, for if one member suffers, all the others suffer with it, as is said in 1 Corinthians 12:26. And thus, God in Christ punished those sins, as is said: the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us all (Isa 53:6).
Reply Obj. 2: Punishment orders fault in two ways. In one way, as satisfying for it; and in this way the fault remains ordered by Christ’s satisfaction. In another way, as a medicine curing or checking the curable member; and in this way, fault in the baptized is ordered as cured by the opposing grace.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the Eucharist is a memorial of the Passion of Christ, nevertheless it is not for the sake of a man being regenerated by it as a member of Christ crucified, but that someone already regenerated may cleave to him and be perfected in him; and thus baptism and the Eucharist do not have the same account.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that in original sin the progression was such that a person corrupted the nature, and the nature corrupts the person. Hence, one thing is considered in this sin that pertains to the nature, and another that pertains to the person. Now, Christ’s Passion sufficiently took away original sin as to both. But since the sacrament is applied to persons, for this reason baptism takes away from man whatever redounded into the person from the corruption of the nature; and because of this, baptism removes the very infection of fault insofar as it affects the person, and that punishment which the person’s act incurred, namely, the loss of the divine vision; but it does not actually remove the infection as it affects the nature, which is clear by the fact that a baptized person transmits original sin to his offspring by the act of nature. Likewise, neither does it remove the punishments that follow upon the principles of nature when stripped of the grace of the first state of innocence, of which sort are the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, death, and other penalties like that, which follow from the fact that man is composed of contraries both as regards his body and, in a certain way, as regards his soul, namely, in the sensual appetite and the intellect. But by baptismal grace it is brought about that these remaining punishments do not dominate in the person but rather are subjected to him, and they fall to his benefit, inasmuch as they are the matter of virtue, and the occasion of humility and discipline.
Reply Obj. 1: The Passion of Christ, in the manner of a cause, sufficiently removes both that evil which is of the person and that which is of the nature. But since all men share in nature, the effect, according to the shared law of the healing of nature, will not be until the end of the world, when, with all the elect already gathered, together with them the rest of insensible creation will also be freed from its servitude to corruption, as it says in Romans 8:21.
Reply Obj. 2: Those things that pertain to actual sin belong only to the person, since actions are of individuals, according to the Philosopher; (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 981a17.) and so it is not the same with the punishment for original sin as for actual sin.
Reply Obj. 3: Original fault is removed by baptism insofar as it infects the person, but not insofar as it infects the nature through the act of generation; and so the punishment that pertains to the corruption of nature is also not taken away.
Reply Obj. 4: A baptized person flies away immediately to heaven because punishment is due to him not by reason of his person but only by reason of human nature, which, after death, does not remain in that state in which punishment is due to it.
Article 2
Baptism’s effect as to the conferral of good
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 47, a. 14, ad 3; ST III, q. 69, a. 6.) It seems that by baptism, grace and virtues are not conferred on children. For Augustine says in his book On the Baptism of Infants: the faith that exists in the will of believers does not make infants members of the faithful, but rather the sacrament of faith does. (See Augustine, Epistle 98, to Boniface, n. 10: “Itaque parvulum etsi nondum fides illa, quae in credentium voluntate consistit, iam tamen ipsius fidei sacramentum fidelem facit” (CSEL 34.2:531).) But the faith that is a virtue exists in the will of believers, as was said in Book III, Distinction 23, Question 2, Article 3, Subquestion 1. Therefore, baptized infants do not have the virtue of faith, and by the same argument neither do they have other virtues that also exist in the will.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if anything is newly received into something, either the recipient or the one infusing must be different than before. But the soul of a baptized child does not carry itself differently after he is baptized than before, for he has no proper motion, lacking the use of free will; nor does God, who is the one infusing grace and virtues. Therefore, children do not receive grace and virtues in baptism.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Damascene says that no substance is without its proper operation. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 23 (PG 94:950).) But it is evident that in a child there are no operations of virtue, for it does not have choice, as is clear in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 3, 1111b8.) and this is required for the work of virtue. Therefore, it does not have virtues.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, virtues, since they are habits, enable certain acts. But children are not capable of doing the things that are according to virtue. Therefore, they do not receive virtues in baptism.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says that faith is given and nourished in baptism: it is given to infants, and it is nourished in adults. (Moos offers no citation, and the text as given here does not appear in Augustine’s works. Thomas cites this text only in this one place.) But faith is a virtue. Therefore, virtues are given to infants in baptism, and by the same argument, other virtues as well.
Furthermore (2), no one is admitted to glory unless he has the nuptial garment, which is charity. But baptized children, if they die, go immediately to heaven. Therefore, they have charity, which is the instructress of virtue, and as a result, the other virtues.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in adults, virtues are not increased by baptism. (Parallels: above, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3; below, d. 9, a. 1, qa. 2; d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1; ST III, q. 69, a. 4.) For the increase of virtues happens by merit, since, according to Augustine, charity merits an increase so that once increased, it may merit also to be perfected. (See Augustine, Epistle 186, ch. 3, n. 10: “ipsa gratia meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici” (CSEL 57:53).) But in baptism, no merit of the baptized works for the work being performed. Therefore, by this work being performed, the virtues are not increased in baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the one who has already reached his determinate quantity, physical food does not cause growth. But it can be that someone before baptism reaches the quantity of baptismal grace that a child receives, in whom there is no impediment. Therefore, baptism adds nothing above grace.
On the contrary, commenting on the Psalm: he has led me beside waters of refreshment (Ps 23 [22]:2), the Gloss says: he has led me by the increase of virtue and good works in baptism. (See Lombard, Commentarium in Psalmos, Ps. 22:2 (PL 191:242).) Therefore, baptism increases the virtues in those who have them.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the effect of baptism is not illumination. (Parallels: above, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 4, ad 3; a. 3, qa. 1; d. 5, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2; d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 1; ST III, q. 69, a. 5.) For illumination relates to teaching. But the teaching of the faith happens through catechising, which precedes baptism. Therefore, it is not the effect of baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, illumination is ordered against ignorance. But according to some, baptism is not directed against ignorance, but rather holy orders is. Therefore, illumination is not an effect of baptism, but rather of holy orders.
On the contrary, Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 4, ch. 9 (PG 94:1122).) includes illumination among the effects of baptism, as is clear from his definition cited in the previous distinction.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that making one fruitful is not an effect of baptism. (See the preceding qa. 3.) For that by which one actively generates and that by which one is passively generated are not the same. But baptism is the passive regeneration of the baptized. Therefore, since fruitfulness implies active generation, it seems that it does not pertain to baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, fruitfulness is a property that results from something attaining its own perfect state, for, as is said in Meteorology 4, (Aristotle, Meteorology, Bk. 4, ch. 3, 380a14–16; cf. On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 415a26–30.) a thing is perfect when it can generate another. But according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, p. 1, n. 3 (PG 3:503).) baptism is not ordered toward perfecting, like the Eucharist and confirmation, but rather toward illuminating and purifying. Therefore, baptism does not have fruitfulness as one of its effects.
On the contrary, the Gloss says on that phrase of the Psalm: on the water of refreshment (Ps 23 [22]:2): the souls of sinners, barren with drought, are made fruitful through baptism. (See Lombard, Commentarium in Psalmos, Ps. 22:3 (PL 191:242).)
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that being incorporated into Christ is not an effect of baptism. (See the preceding qa. 3.) For someone is incorporated into Christ and his members by formed faith, as the Master said in Book III, Distinction 23. But even before baptism, someone might have formed faith. Therefore, incorporation is not an effect of baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, incorporation is an effect of the Eucharist. But different sacraments are not ordained to the same effect. Therefore, this is not an effect of baptism.
On the contrary, Augustine says to Boniface, that in baptism one is made a member of Christ. (See Augustine, Epistle 98, n. 1: “hoc est baptismi salutaris esse uirtutem in sancta compage corporis christi” (CSEL 34.2:520).) But this is to be incorporated into Christ. Therefore, incorporation is an effect of baptism.
Quaestiuncula 6
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the opening of the door of heaven is not an effect of baptism. (Parallels: In III Sent., d. 18, a. 6, qa. 3, ad 2; ST III, q. 39, a. 5; q. 69, a. 7; SCG IV, ch. 59.) For before Christ’s Passion, some people were baptized. But the door was not open to them at that time, for if some of them then died, they did not enter the kingdom. Therefore, baptism does not open the door of the kingdom of heaven.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, baptism represents Christ’s Passion, not his resurrection, as it seems. But in the resurrection the door is opened, as is clear from the Collect that is said on Easter: O God, who, on this day, through Thine Only-begotten, hast, by having conquered death, unsealed to us the entrance to eternity. Therefore, this effect should not be attributed to baptism.
On the contrary, is the authority of Bede cited above, Distinction 1, that circumcision differed from baptism in the fact that it did not open the entrance to the heavenly kingdom.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that there are several opinions about this. For certain people have said that no virtues at all are given to infants in baptism, but they are only cleansed from original sin; but afterward, when they die or when they arrive at adulthood, virtues are conferred on them, if they have preserved their innocence. But this opinion cannot stand: for wood, when it has been cut, will stay where it falls (Eccl 11:3). And therefore if virtues, as well as operating and cooperating grace, were not conferred on children before they died, neither will they be conferred on them in death, and then they would not be saved, which is false. However, this opinion seems to have come from believing virtues to be only their acts, which is false, as was said in Book II, Distinction 27, Question 1, Article 1.
And thus, others say that grace and virtues are given to children in baptism, not in themselves, but in their root, namely, grace, which is the root of all the virtues, just as the essence of the soul is the root of the powers of the soul. But afterward, when the powers are released, once the organs are completed, the virtues flow out into those powers from the very essence of the soul. But this cannot be so for many reasons, since then if the child should go mad before reaching adulthood, the powers would never be released in him, and then he would never have the virtues explicitly; and furthermore, because if the powers were bound by some impediment, it would impede the act, not the habit, for people who are sleeping and drunk have habits, but those habits are hampered.
And thus, others say, and better, that grace and virtues are given to children in baptism, but those habits are hampered by their childhood, just as they are hampered by sleep in someone sleeping. But once childhood has ended, they incline the person toward acting well, except for someone who resists the Holy Spirit.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks of actual faith and will, which cannot be in infants.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the principal agent is unchangeable, nevertheless, the instrumental agent is not ordered to the child in the same way now as before; for now baptism is applied to him, but before it was not. Even without any mutability, however, God could confer grace on any child, even without the administration of a sacrament, if from eternity he had been disposed to give it to him, as is seen among those sanctified in the womb.
Reply Obj. 3: The actuality of virtues is twofold. One is first actuality, which is to perfect the soul and its powers, and this actuality even children have. The other is second actuality, which is to operate with choice; and they do not always have this actuality, for their operations are voluntary, and the will need not always be acting, even among adults.
Reply Obj. 4: A habit makes one capable of acting by taking away the incapacity that comes from the imperfection of the power; but it does not take away any incapacity on the part of the body, as is clear from the case of sleepers.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, I answer that a virtue is generated and increased by the same causes, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103b7.) and thus, since it belongs to baptism to confer virtue and grace on those who do not have them, it must also increase them in those who do have them.
Reply Obj. 1: Although in baptism the merit of the baptized is not at work, nevertheless the merit of Christ is at work there, which is more efficacious.
Reply Obj. 2: Grace does not have any determinate limit to which it extends, or beyond which it cannot continue, such as constrains the quantity of an animal; therefore, there is no parallel.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it must be said that light is that by which we are led to the vision of a certain thing. Now, baptism leads to external and interior spiritual vision: interior, inasmuch as baptism is called the sacrament of faith, which makes the eye of the mind suited to seeing divine things; and external, because it is granted to the baptized and not to others to gaze upon the sacred Eucharist, as Dionysius says; (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 3, n. 7 (PG 3:436).) and thus both Damascene and Dionysius attribute illuminative force to baptism.
Reply Obj. 1: Faith comes chiefly from infusion, and in this regard is given by baptism; but as to its determination, it comes from hearing; and thus man is prepared for faith by catechism.
Reply Obj. 2: ‘Science’ says more than ‘illumination’. For it implies comprehension of those things toward which illumination directed one’s vision; and therefore science pertains to perfection. Hence Dionysius calls the learned ‘perfected’, and teachers ‘perfecters’: and in this way holy orders is established against ignorance, so that those ordained may be learned, and also the teachers of others.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be answered that fruitfulness is said in two ways. In one way, with respect to the fruit produced in whatever is said to be made fruitful, as operations of the virtues are called certain fruits of good; and in this way the soul is made fruitful in baptism, since in it the virtues are given to those who do not have them and are increased in those who do have them. In another way, fruitfulness is said with respect to the fruit produced in another, as when someone brings about fruit in the people of God by teaching and pastoral care; and in this way fruitfulness does not pertain to baptism but more to the sacrament of Orders.
Reply Obj. 1: That by which something has generation in a certain nature is that by which it performs the operations of that nature. And thus, since by baptism man is regenerated unto spiritual life, by it man is also made actively fruitful, and, as it were, a generator of spiritual works.
Reply Obj. 2: That argument deals with the second kind of making fruitful.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be answered that to be incorporated into Christ happens in two ways, namely, by merit, and in number. For by merit someone can indeed be made part of the Church (which is to be incorporated into Christ) even before actually receiving baptism, although after the time of revealed grace this does not happen before a person plans to be baptized or is baptized. But someone cannot be made a member of the Church in number except by baptism; hence no one is admitted to the reception of the Eucharist and the other sacraments before he has been baptized, as was said before.
Reply Obj. 1: That objection deals with the first kind of incorporation.
Reply Obj. 2: The reception of the Eucharist absolutely presupposes incorporation into Christ: for the powers of the head are not shared with a member unless it is already united to it. But by the Eucharist the influence of the head over the member is perfected; and with respect to this perfection, incorporation is an effect of the Eucharist.
Response to Quaestiuncula 6
To the sixth question, it should be said that for the gate of the heavenly kingdom to be opened is nothing other than to remove the impediment by which the entrance to the heavenly kingdom was blocked for the whole of human nature. This impediment, therefore, was absolutely removed for all men sufficiently by the Passion of Christ; but that removal happens effectively in any particular person according as he is now made a participant of Christ’s Passion by baptism; and so baptism, in the manner of an instrumental cause, opens the gate of the heavenly kingdom with respect to that particular person, but the Passion does so as a satisfactory cause with respect to all.
Reply Obj. 1: The reason for this was that Christ’s Passion, by the power of which baptism acts, had not yet happened; nor had the entrance to heaven been opened by it. Hence, this argument proves that baptism would not have this power as a principal cause.
Reply Obj. 2: The entrance to heaven is opened in three ways. In one way, as to the glory of the soul; and in this way it was opened by the Passion. Hence it was said to the good thief: today you will be with me in paradise (Luke 23:43). In a second way, as to the glory of the body; and in this way it was opened by the resurrection. In a third way, as to the place suited to that glory; and in this way it was opened by the ascension. And in these three ways, baptism instrumentally opens the entrance with respect to an individual, for it acts by the power of the Passion, the resurrection, and the ascension, inasmuch as man is configured to the suffering Christ by immersion, in which he is in a way buried with Christ; and to the risen Christ as to the shimmering that comes from the water; and to the ascending Christ as to the elevation of the baptized from the sacred font. Hence baptism is appropriated to the Passion, for the glory of the soul is more important and, in a way, the cause of the other things; and as a sign of this, when the Lord was baptized the heavens were opened above him (Matt 3:16).
Article 3
Whether baptism’s effect is equally partaken of by all
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 69, a. 8.) It seems that baptism does not have an equal effect on all as to the removal of evil. For in adults it removes actual and original sin; but in children, only original sin. Therefore, it effects more in adults than in children as to the removal of evil.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the mitigation of the kindling for sin is an effect of baptism. But after baptism this kindling is found to be more mitigated in certain people than in others. Therefore, baptism is more efficacious in them for removing evil.
On the contrary, baptism has efficacy for removing evil according as it has a certain likeness of death. But among the dying, no one dies more than another. Therefore, baptism takes away evils equally for all.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in baptism equal grace, too, is conferred on all who do not receive it insincerely. For in baptism Christ’s Passion is at work, which has, in a way, infinite efficacy. But something finite added to the infinite does not make anything greater. Therefore, since the devotion of the one approaching baptism, which is greater in one person than in another, is a certain finite good, it seems that neither devotion nor anything else of the sort could make it so that all did not obtain an equal grace in baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a cooperating cause is not required for obtaining the effect of baptism, but only for the removal of any impediment. But no one receives grace in baptism unless impediments be removed from him. Therefore, all receive equal grace.
On the contrary, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 4, ch. 9 (PG 94:1122).) that the remission of sins is given equally to all in baptism, but the grace of the Holy Spirit is given proportionate to one’s faith and through purification. But all do not receive baptism with equal faith, nor equally prepared. Therefore, all do not obtain equal grace.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that neither do infants obtain equal grace in baptism. For among the angels, grace was infused according to the quantity of natural endowments. But one child has better natural endowments than another. Therefore, he also receives greater grace in baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, some people, who preserve their baptismal innocence until the end, receive final grace in baptism, but others do not. (“Final grace” is what we would call today the grace of perseverance.) Therefore among infants, too, some obtain greater grace than others.
On the contrary, baptismal grace in infancy is not opposed to anything but original sin. But one child does not have more original sin than another. Therefore, neither does one receive greater grace than another.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that baptism, in anyone who does not receive it insincerely, universally removes any guilt infecting the person that it finds, as has been said, and in this way it attains an extreme. (Parallels: below, d. 6, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3, ad 2; d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3, ad 2; d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; d. 34, a. 4, ad 1; ST I-II, q. 113, a. 3, ad 1; ST III, q. 68, a. 12; De veritate, q. 28, a. 3, ad 2.) Now things that are in the extreme cannot receive extension, and therefore as to the removal of guilt, baptism has an equal effect in all; and it is the same with the personal punishment, which corresponds to original sin as it infects the person, namely, the loss of the divine vision. But against any other punishment following upon the principles of corrupted nature, such as concupiscence or the kindling for sin, a remedy is applied in baptism, so that through the grace conferred in baptism they may not dominate. And so it is the same with that punishment as with grace.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not from baptism’s efficacy that it does not destroy as many sins in one person as in another, but it is because it did not find as many in one person as in another; for in anyone it destroys all the sins that it finds.
Reply Obj. 2: That objection concerns the second kind of punishment, which can be curbed by baptism through the grace conferred.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the acts of active things are received in a passive thing according to its own disposition; and so, although baptism in itself (as also Christ’s Passion, which is at work in it) is related equally to all, nevertheless, since some people approach baptism with a greater preparation of faith and devotion than others, for this reason some people obtain greater grace. For no one receives a maximum grace such that it could not be extended by baptism.
Reply Obj. 1: The devotion of the baptized is not added in the manner of a cooperating cause, such that it would act efficiently for the reception of grace; but it is added in the manner of a material disposition. And therefore the effect of baptism is participated in according to this diversity.
Reply Obj. 2: When an adult is baptized, in order to receive baptism’s effect not only is it required that whatever prevents it be removed, such as insincerity, but also necessary is a kind of material disposition, which is the devotion and faith of the one receiving baptism. And, according as he is found more or less disposed, he receives the effect of baptism differently.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that for the baptism of infants, nothing is required on their part; but for a disposition to salvation, they have, as it were, the faith of the Church, and for the bringing about of salvation, the power of Christ’s Passion, which is at work in baptism. And these two things are equally related to infants, and thus they do not differ in receiving the effect of baptism, but all receive equal grace.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not the same with infants as with angels, for the angels differ in species, according to the opinion of many, but infants do not; hence there is not such a great difference in natural endowments among infants as among angels. Or it could be said that among the angels the proportion of exertion that was required on their part was also in proportion to the level of their natural endowments, and therefore they received grace according to the proportion of their natural endowments; but among infants no act is required on their part, so it is not the same.
Reply Obj. 2: Grace received by infants does not bring about in them a necessary bond to the good, but only an inclination; and thus, after they have attained a mature age, they can use the grace received in many different ways; and this is why some people advance and persevere, but others fall away—not because of receiving different amounts of grace in baptism.
Question 3
The recipients of baptism
Then inquiry is made about those receiving baptism; and about this, three questions arise:
first, about infants and others lacking the use of reason, who everyone agrees do receive the sacrament and the reality of the sacrament;
- second, about the insincere, who receive the sacrament and not the reality of the sacrament;
- third, about those baptized with the baptism of the spirit and of blood, who do not receive the sacrament but do receive the reality of the sacrament.
- Article 1 About infants and others lacking the use of reason, who everyone agrees do receive the sacrament and the reality of the sacrament
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 9, a. 5, qa. 4, ad 2; d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1; ST I-II, q. 113, a. 3, ad 1; ST III, q. 68, a. 9; De malo, q. 4, a. 1; Quodl. IV, q. 7, a. 1 and q. 12, a. 1.) It seems that infants cannot receive the sacrament. For it says at the end of Mark (16:16): whoever believes and is baptized, will be saved; from which it is evident that believing is presupposed for baptism. But children cannot believe, for they are not able to think about anything with assent. Therefore, infants cannot receive the sacrament of baptism.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in baptism there comes to be a certain obligation in a man to those things that are to be kept in the Christian faith. But an obligation cannot arise except in someone who is established as arbiter of his own will. Therefore, infants cannot receive the sacrament of baptism.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, by baptism, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 2 (PG 3:391).) one becomes a participant in the sharing of divine things. But it is not fitting to share sacred things with infants. Therefore, the sacrament of baptism is not fitting for them.
On the contrary (1), Dionysius says: our divine leaders, that is, the Apostles, certified that infants were to be received unto baptism. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 7, n. 11 (PG 3:566).) Therefore, infants can receive the sacrament of baptism.
Furthermore (2), baptism replaces circumcision. But circumcision was conferred on infants. Therefore, baptism should also be conferred on infants.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it would be better if baptism were deferred, rather than being given right away in infancy, unless a necessity of imminent death arose. (Parallels: below, d. 6, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 1; d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 4; ST III, q. 39, a. 3, ad 1; q. 68, a. 3.) For every action of Christ is for our instruction. But Christ willed to receive baptism in the thirtieth year of his life, as is said in Luke 3:23. Therefore, among us it should likewise be deferred until adulthood.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, effective medicine should be taken when it will help most. But baptism would help most at the end of one’s life, or at least in adulthood; for then it would wash away all the crimes of adolescence and youth. Therefore, it should be deferred until then.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a man is more affected by what he acquires for himself than by what he receives from another; hence, too, those who have wealth of their own acquiring are not as spendthrift as those who have received it from others, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 2, 1120b10ff.) But infants who are baptized receive baptism in a certain way from others, whereas adults approach baptism of themselves. Therefore, they are more affected by the Christian faith that they receive in baptism if they were baptized as adults than if they were baptized as infants.
On the contrary (1), medicine should be applied to a disease as quickly as possible. But baptism is a medicine against original sin, which is even in infants. Therefore, it should be given to them right away.
Furthermore (2), it is better to impede evil lest it occur, than to destroy it when it has already occurred. But by baptism the kindling of sin is weakened, so that it does not dominate in us, and it will not fling us into actual sin; and in this way, being baptized impedes future sins. Therefore, it is better for baptism to be given at that time than afterward to destroy past sins.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that baptism should not be given to adults lacking the use of reason. For in adults, not only is original sin washed away through baptism, but also actual sins as well. But against actual sin that someone has committed himself, the proper movement of free will is required [as a condition for baptism]. Therefore, to these adults who do not have the use of free will, baptism should not be given.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a sacrament should not be administered to anyone speaking against it. But sometimes the mentally disabled and insane speak against it. Therefore, baptism should not be given to them.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, sleepers live the life of plants. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 779a1–3.) But baptism is given only to those living a human life, which is according to the rational soul. Therefore, baptism should not be given to someone sleeping.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in Confessions 4, (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 4, ch. 4.) about his friend, who, since he was despaired of, was baptized without knowing it; and nevertheless the baptism had efficacy in him, which was evident by the fact that afterward he spoke out against Augustine’s perverse persuasion. Therefore, baptism can also be given to those lacking the use of reason.
Furthermore (2), infants who never had the use of reason are baptized. Therefore, much more should those be baptized who had it at one time, although they no longer have it.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that different states of the world are compared to the different ages of one man, as Augustine says in the Eighty-Three Questions. *(Augustine, de Diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (CCSL 44A), qu. 58: *”sunt enim aetates sex etiam in uno homine: infantia, pueritia, adolescentia, iuuentus, grauitas et senectus.”) Hence as there was no state of the world in which the path of salvation was closed off to the human race, so too there is no state of a man in which the path of salvation is closed off to him. Hence, since there is original sin in infants, by which they are prevented from obtaining eternal salvation, it is necessary that some remedy be applied to them to remove this impediment. But this is baptism. Hence, whoever denies that baptism can be administered to infants speaks against divine mercy; and thus to say this is heresy.
Reply Obj. 1: Although infants do not have the act of faith, nevertheless, they have the habit that they receive in baptism, just as they also have the habit of other virtues. But if the word of the Lord were understood about the act of faith, then it is to be referred to those only who were to be instructed by the teaching of the Apostles, of whom it is said, preach the Gospel to all creation (Mark 16:15); for none of those to whom the Gospel was preached should have been baptized unless he believed.
Reply Obj. 2: The obligation in baptism does not arise with regard to anything to which not every man is bound.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as it is not fitting to send a man into battle immediately after he has been conscripted into military service, but rather when the time is right; so neither is it fitting that someone who is conscripted to divine actions in baptism should be admitted to them immediately, but rather when the right time has come.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that it is more praiseworthy that infants be baptized as soon as conveniently possible, not waiting for a mature age, for three reasons. First, because, on account of the weakness of nature, they can easily die and be damned; hence, in order to avoid the danger of damnation, baptism should come to them beforehand. Second, on account of the attacks of demons, who do not have as much power, whether for spiritual harm or for bodily harm, among baptized children cleansed of original sin as they do among those who still have it. Third, because in infancy a man can be more easily led to something and it will stick with him more firmly, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, Chapter 1: to have been accustomed to something immediately from youth makes no small difference, but a great one; or rather, all the difference; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 1103b23–25.) and Dionysius gives this reason at the end of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, where he says: however the high priest hands the child to the sacred symbols, that is, sacramental signs, so that he may be familiar with them, and may not form any other life than the one that always contemplates divine things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 7, n. 11 (PG 3:567).)
Reply Obj. 1: Christ received baptism as the one instituting it and consecrating it. To announce the way of salvation, however, pertains to the office of teacher or priest; and thus, he could not be baptized before the age of maturity that befits a teacher or priest. Nor is it the same with others who receive baptism so that they might be helped by it.
Reply Obj. 2: In baptism grace is conferred for living well and past sins are taken away, while future ones are impeded; and so, although baptism received at the end of life would take away more past sins, nevertheless it would impede fewer sins and would advance fewer goods; and thus it would be less beneficial. Furthermore, human life is exposed to many chances, and it could happen that someone who looked forward to receiving baptism in the end was thwarted in his expectation by a sudden death.
Reply Obj. 3: Baptismal grace is not through man’s acquisition but by the gift of God. Furthermore, a state of poverty before the acquisition of riches does not incline the affections so that a man pursues poverty, but rather so that he flees it, whereas the state of sin before grace or virtue, because of habituation, leaves behind an inclination in the soul so that it more easily slips into sin; and thus, it is not the same with the acquisition of money as with grace and virtue.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that a distinction must be made about the mentally disabled. For some have been mentally disabled from birth, and never have any lucid intervals; and for these, the same judgment holds as for infants. But some have incurred mental disability from an illness or something of the sort, and they do have certain lucid intervals; and for these people it should be said that if before they incurred mental disability, or during lucid intervals, they had planned to receive baptism, then they can be baptized if there be necessity, and they can receive the sacrament of baptism as well as the reality of the sacrament, even if, at the moment they are baptized, the mental disability has returned and they actually dissent. However, if they spoke against baptism before the mental disability, they do not receive either the sacrament or the reality of the sacrament.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as in an adult who has the use of reason, the movement of free will, which he has while he is baptized, disposes him to receive baptismal grace, so also does the movement of free will in a mentally disabled person, which he had when he was of sound mind.
Reply Obj. 2: The effect of baptism is received in the mind, nor is it impeded except by the mind’s contradiction. However, those who do not have the use of their mind do not mentally contradict, but rather are led by imagination. And thus, a contradiction of this kind does not impede the effect of baptism, when the mind’s consent has gone before.
Reply Obj. 3: People are not to be baptized while sleeping, unless they are in danger of death; and then the same distinctions would be made about sleepers as about those who became mentally disabled after a state of sound mind.
Article 2
About the insincere, who receive the sacrament and not the reality of the sacrament
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 3; d. 12, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 3, ad 3; ST III, q. 69, a. 9; q. 87, a. 3, ad 2.) It seems that no indisposition of the human will could impede the effect of baptism. For things that are by nature are more permanent than things that are by will. But original sin is a sin of the nature, yet it does not impede baptism’s effect. Therefore, neither can any indisposition of the will impede baptism in its effect.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in natural things an indisposition of matter does not completely impede an agent’s effect, except when the contrary disposition in the matter is stronger than the agent’s power, as is seen when the wetness of wood is compared to the heat of a fire. But divine power, which is invisibly working our salvation in the sacraments, as Augustine says, (Cf. Isidore, Etymologiarum (ed. Lindsay), Bk. 6, ch. 19, par. 40.) is more powerful than any indisposition whatsoever of our will. Therefore, the effect of baptism cannot completely be taken away because of an indisposition of the will.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, baptism, like all the other sacraments, is an instrument of divine mercy working salvation. But divine mercy working salvation also turns the will to good by prevenient grace. Therefore, baptism removes the indisposition of the will rather than being impeded by it.
On the contrary (1), Ambrose says about this text, the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance (Rom 11:29), that the grace of God in baptism requires nothing but faith and contrition. (See Ambrosiaster, Commentarius in Pauli epistulam ad Romanos, on 11:29 (CSEL 81.1:385).) But by these two things, all of the will’s contrariety toward grace is removed. Therefore, it is required for baptism that the will’s indisposition be removed.
Furthermore (2), according to Augustine, he who created you without you will not justify you without you. (See Augustine, Sermon 169, n. 11 (PL 38:923).) But someone who has an indisposed will does not cooperate with God, but rather works against him. Therefore, he is not justified in baptism.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that an indisposition of the will like this should not be called insincerity. For the will can be indisposed to receive baptismal grace by every genus of sin. But insincerity is a special sin, because it is opposed to a special virtue, namely, truthfulness, as is clear from what the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 7, 1127a20.) Therefore, it should not be called the universal impediment to baptismal grace.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says that he is insincere who does not believe. (Augustine, On Baptism Against the Donatists, Bk. 1, ch. 12, par. 18 (CSEL 51:162); cf. Bk. 7, ch. 53, par. 101 (CSEL 51:372).) But just as faith is given in baptism, so too are the other virtues, and especially charity, by which one becomes a child of God. Therefore, insincerity should not be considered an impediment to baptism, any more than what is opposed to the other virtues.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Ibid.) it is insincere in a certain way if someone approaches baptism without devotion. But lack of devotion can exist without mortal sin; yet such a person does not have any impediment to baptism. Therefore, the impediment to baptism should not be called insincerity.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Ibid.) in another way, someone is called insincere who celebrates differently. But whoever does not preserve the Church’s form does not confer the sacrament, nor does he receive it. Therefore, this kind of insincerity is not an impediment to the sacrament.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, in another way someone is said to be insincere by Augustine if he scorns to receive the sacrament. But such a person does not receive the sacrament. Therefore, this kind of insincerity does not impede the effect of the sacrament.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that baptism would not have its effect once the insincerity has ended. (Parallels: above, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 1, ad 3; d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3, ad 2; ST III, q. 69, a. 10.) For the work of the dead is never to be brought to life, as will be said later in Distinction 14. But whatever happens in mortal sin is called the work of the dead. Since, then, someone who approaches baptism insincerely is in mortal sin, that baptism will never bring him to life such that it would confer grace on him.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the effect of baptism is to absolve from all fault and punishment. But this does not happen when the insincerity has ended, for such a one is not absolved from the punishment of the sins he has committed after baptism, otherwise it would be of greater efficacy to people receiving it insincerely than to others for whom it does not accomplish the wiping out of subsequent sins. Therefore, baptism does not have its effect once the insincerity has stopped.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as someone may approach baptism insincerely, so also may he approach the Eucharist. But someone who approached it insincerely before does not secure the Eucharist’s effect once the insincerity has passed. Therefore, neither would someone receive baptism’s effect once the insincerity has passed.
On the contrary (1), when a cause is removed, the effect is removed. But the cause impeding the effect of baptism was insincerity. Therefore, once the insincerity is removed, baptism will have its effect.
Furthermore (2), a remedy can be applied to any fault in the wayfaring state. But against original sin there is no other remedy than baptism. Therefore, since original sin is not remitted in those who approach insincerely, it would be necessary for baptism to be repeated if, once the insincerity had been removed, baptism did not have its effect—which is unfitting and heretical.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that there are two effects of baptism. The first is the reality-and-sacrament, which is the character. And because the character is not imprinted for preparing man’s will so that something might be done well, since it is not a habit, but a power, as has been said, for this reason an indisposition of will does not impede this effect, as long as the will to receive the sacrament exists in some way. The other effect is that which is reality and not sacrament, namely, grace and the things that follow from it, by which man’s will is prepared to cooperate well; and thus, to receive this effect, not just any will to receive the sacrament suffices, but it requires the kind of will from which all indisposition contrary to baptismal grace is removed, for contrary things cannot coexist; hence, while a contrary disposition remains, baptism could not have its final effect. (For more about the sacrament alone, reality alone, and sacrament-and-reality, see the footnote at Dist.1, q.1, a.4, qa. 1, main response.)
Reply Obj. 1: By the very fact that original sin is not something voluntary in a person’s will, it is not capable of causing a certain disposition in the will, wherein the final effect of baptism should be effected; and thus, it cannot impede the effect of baptism.
Reply Obj. 2: It is in the nature of the will that it cannot be forced; and thus, no parallel argument can be made between the indisposition of the will and the indisposition of other natural things that, by the violent action of an agent, admit contrary dispositions.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as in what looks to the being of nature, God works certain things by the mediation of natural things, but certain things he has reserved to himself, so too among those matters that pertain to grace, he works certain things by means of the sacraments, but certain others he works without intermediaries, and sometimes outside the law of nature, as he also performs miracles beyond seminal or natural reasons. And one of these things is changing the will not only of those who have their wills contrary to grace habitually (which sometimes happens among people who do not approach baptism insincerely, disposing themselves for grace, which they receive in the very moment of baptism), but even of those who actively hold their wills contrary to grace, as happened in the case of Paul (cf. Acts 9).
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that for someone to receive the effect of a certain agent, it is necessary that he have the due disposition to the acting cause, as well as to the effect to be received. And thus, there are two kinds of indisposition of the will that impede the final effect of baptism: one in its ordering to the sacrament itself, the other in its ordering to the sacrament’s effect.
Now toward the sacrament itself, the will can be indisposed in two ways: one way by the removal of what is necessary; another way, by the lodging of something contrary. Since every action is by contact, however, the one receiving the sacrament must somehow make contact with it, both by the intellect, which makes contact through faith, as well as by the affections, which make contact through devotion. And thus, someone is considered indisposed who does not believe, as is he who approaches without devotion. Likewise, there are two contraries that must be taken away. One is on the part of the things that are done outwardly; and indisposed in this way is he who celebrates otherwise than the Church does. The other is on the part of the internal power that secretly works salvation; and this is how someone who scorns the sacrament is indisposed.
Again, in like manner, if we look to the effect of baptism, it is necessary that someone be disposed by bringing to bear what is necessary, that is, faith, which purifies the heart, and what removes what is contrary, that is, sin, through contrition; and thus, Ambrose says that nothing is necessary on our part except faith and contrition, since contrition is also included in devotion.
Reply Obj. 1: Insincerity, properly speaking, is when someone shows something in his words or deeds that is not there in the truth of the matter. Now this happens in two ways. In one way, when something is said or done with the intention of showing something other than the truth of the matter; and then insincerity is a special sin, which is not the way it is taken here. The other way is when something is shown that, in word or deed, does not possess the truth of the matter, even if it is not said or done with that aim; and this is the way insincerity is taken here. For whoever approaches baptism shows himself as having renounced his old life and begun a new one; hence, if his will still remains in the oldness of life, he shows something different from the truth of the matter; and thus, it is insincerity.
Reply Obj. 2: Faith is at work above all in the sacraments, for in a way it connects the sacraments with their principal agent cause as well as with the person receiving them; and thus, a lack of faith pertains more especially than the lack of other virtues to the kind of insincerity that affects the sacraments.
Reply Obj. 3: Devotion is here taken as the will to receive baptism completely, both as to the sacrament and as to the reality of the sacrament; and such devotion cannot be lacking without mortal sin—although one could lack devotion insofar as it implies the fervor of charity in reverence for God and divine things without mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes the one who celebrates a sacrament differently does not vary the things that are essential to the sacrament, and in that case the sacrament is conferred; but the recipient does not obtain the reality of the sacrament unless he is immune from the fault of the one celebrating it that way.
Reply Obj. 5: We are not speaking here about the contempt of someone who rejects a sacrament by not receiving it, but of someone views it as unimportant, not considering it to be efficacious for salvation.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, I answer that in baptism a character is imprinted, which is the immediate cause disposing one to grace; and thus, since insincerity does not take away the character, once the insincerity that was impeding the effect of the character has ended, the character, which is present in the soul, begins to have its effect; and in this way, baptism obtains its effect once the insincerity has ceased.
Reply Obj. 1: Baptism has efficacy not only by the action of the one doing it, but still more from the action itself being accomplished, which is a work of God and not of man; and thus, it cannot be a work of the dead.
Reply Obj. 2: Once the insincerity has ceased, baptism has that effect that it would have had before, if there had been no insincerity; and thus, it remits the sins that preceded baptism as to both fault and punishment; but the sins following baptism are remitted as to fault by virtue of the contrition that drove away the insincerity, but not entirely as to punishment.
Reply Obj. 3: In the Eucharist, no character is imprinted by virtue of which someone could receive the effects of the sacrament once his insincerity had ceased; and thus it is not the same.
Article 3
About those baptized with the baptism of the spirit and of blood, who do not receive the sacrament but do receive the reality of the sacrament
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 66, a. 11; Quodl. VI, q. 3, a. 1; Super Ioan. 3, lec. 1.) It seems that, besides baptism of water, there should not be other baptisms. For in all things that are of one species, there is one manner of generation. But baptism is regeneration unto spiritual life, which has the same account in all who are generated. Therefore, there should not be regeneration except in one manner, and so there should be only baptism of water.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, baptism is condivided against the other sacraments of the New Law. But the other sacraments do not exist in multiple forms, for there are not several confirmations or priesthoods, and the same holds for the others. Therefore, besides the baptism of water, there should not be any other baptism.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, sacrament is the genus of baptism. But the other things that are called baptisms are not sacraments, because the due form and due matter are not observed. Therefore, they are not baptisms.
On the contrary (1), Damascene defines several kinds of baptism. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 4, ch. 9 (PG 94:1124).)
Furthermore (2), commenting on the text instruction about baptisms (Heb 6:2), the Gloss states: it speaks in the plural because there is baptism of water, repentance, and blood. (Cf. Glossa Lombardi on Hebrews 6:2: “fundamentum etiam doctrinae baptismatum, pluraliter dicit, quia est baptismus in aqua, in poenitentia, in sanguine, quia sic mundatur homo a peccatis per poenitentiam vel sanguinis effusionem, sicut per lavacrum baptismi” (PL 192:440).) Therefore, there are several kinds of baptism.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that baptism of repentance does not suffice for salvation. (Parallels: ST III, q. 66, a. 11; Quodl. VI, q. 3, a. 1; Super Ioan. 3, lec. 1.) For the baptismal character seems to be one of the things pertaining to salvation, in the fact that by it the people of God are distinguished from those not of the people of God. But no character is imprinted by the baptism of repentance. Therefore, it does not suffice for salvation.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, once a sufficient cause is given, it seems superfluous to add other causes. If therefore baptism of repentance sufficed for salvation in cases of imminent need, then once the emergency was over, the person would not have to be baptized with the baptism of water, which is false.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the age of childhood inclines one to mercy more than the age of maturity, as is clear in the Gloss on that text: one would hardly die for a just man, though perhaps for a good man one will dare even to die (Rom 5:7). (Cf. Glossa Lombardi on Romans 5:7: “Justus autem bonum naturae suae exercitio melioravit, et licet justus secundum modum quo hic accipitur melior sit quam bonus, innocentiae tamen causa est miserabilior quam justitiae, quia non est hujusmodi justitia sine severitate.”) But original sin is not remitted in children by the faith and contrition of others unless the baptism of water is administered to them. Therefore, it seems that original and actual sin are also not remitted in adults without the baptism of water.
On the contrary (1), the salvation of man, since it is one of the greatest goods, cannot be withdrawn from man against his will. But it is within man’s power to impede another from being baptized with water. Therefore, there can be salvation by faith and contrition alone, without the baptism of water.
Furthermore (2), it is said, the grace of God is eternal life (Rom 6:23). But contrition is not without grace. Therefore, whoever has faith and contrition may be saved even without baptism of water.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that baptism of blood does not take the place of baptism of water. (Parallels: ST III, q. 66, a. 11; Quodl. VI, q. 3, a. 1; Super Ioan. 3, lec. 1.) For baptism of water has its efficacy by the work done, but baptism of blood only by the work of the one doing it; hence, without charity it would be no benefit, as is said in 1 Corinthians 13:1–3. But in children, nothing has efficacy by the work of the one doing it, because they do not have the use of free will. Therefore, in them, baptism of blood cannot take the place of baptism of water.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the baptism of blood, there is nothing but suffering and the reason for it. But sometimes the suffering is not proportionate to taking away the whole punishment due to sins; nor would even devotion to the reason for the suffering, when someone suffers for God, suffice for doing this. Therefore, baptism of blood does not always take away the whole punishment due to sin, and so, it would not take the place of baptism of water in everything.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, there are many other things in the genus of the supererogatory, like virginity, to which a special reward is also given, and teaching, and other things of that sort. (See note below, in qa. 4, on the vocabulary of aurea and aureola.) But these do not take the place of baptism. Therefore, neither does martyrdom, as it seems.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says of Cyprian, that if anything had to be purified in him, it was taken away by the scythe of his suffering. (Augustine, De unico baptismo, ch. 13: “Sic et in martyre gloriosissimo Cypriano, ... si quid habebat purgandum, si nulla re alia, certe passionis falce ultima tolleretur” (CSEL 53:22).) Therefore, baptism of blood purifies completely, and even takes the place of baptism of water.
Furthermore (2), baptism of water has efficacy from the Passion of Christ, to which it conforms us. But baptism of blood likewise conforms us to the Passion of Christ. Therefore, it takes the place of baptism.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that baptism of water is more powerful than baptism of blood. (Parallels: ST III, q. 66, a. 12; Super Heb. 6, lec. 1.) For baptism of blood has its effect by the work of the one doing it, who is the one suffering. But baptism of water has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ. Therefore, since the Passion of Christ is more effective than the work of some mere man acting, baptism of water will be nobler than baptism of blood.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, by baptism of water, grace is given to man through which the golden crown is owed to him, but by baptism of blood a man is owed a special reward. (The “golden crown” or aurea refers to the essential reward of heaven, the beatific vision, while the “special reward” or aureola, literally the little golden crown, refers to an additional reward given for some outstanding manifestation of Christian virtue.) Therefore, since the golden crown is nobler than any special reward, baptism of water will also be nobler than baptism of blood.
On the contrary, on this text: Take the meat and the unleavened cakes, and put them on this rock, and pour the broth over them (Judg 6:20), a Gloss says, baptism in blood makes them purer than baptism of water.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
The first question I answer by saying that, properly speaking, there is only one baptism, which is celebrated in water under a determinate form of words, of which the Lord says: teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit (Matt 28:19). The other kinds are called baptisms by their order to this baptism, and this in three ways.
In the first way, something is called a baptism as being a sign of this baptism; and this is the way the Flood is called a baptism, inasmuch as it signifies our baptism with respect to the salvation of the spiritual life by the salvation of the human race that happened then in the ark, as is clear from 1 Peter 3:20; and the crossing of the Red Sea, which signifies our baptism with respect to liberation from slavery to demons, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 10:1–2; and the washings that were done under the law, which signify our baptism in the purification of sins that happened in it.
In another way, something is called baptism as if a certain cause of our baptism; and this is the way the baptism of John is called baptism, as disposing toward our baptism; and the baptism with which Christ was baptized, as giving efficacy to our baptism.
In another way, something is called baptism either according to its proportion to the same effect, which is the way baptism of repentance and baptism of blood (of which the Master is speaking here) are called baptisms; or as regards its secondary effect, namely, consummation in good, which is the way baptism of the spirit, spoken of in Acts 1:5, is called baptism. And Damascene lists these nine kinds of baptism; (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 4, ch. 9, (PG 94:1123).) but the Master is here discussing only those that resemble the sacrament of baptism in its principal effect.
Reply Obj. 1: Baptism of blood and baptism of repentance have the same force of regenerating as baptism of water; for baptism of blood and of repentance do not avail for regeneration except in someone who intends to be baptized in water—namely, when necessity and not contempt of religion excludes the sacrament, as is said in the text. And this is how, in a way, they act by force of baptism of water.
Reply Obj. 2: Other sacraments are not so necessary as baptism, and thus it is not necessary that they have certain replacements when necessity prevents the sacrament.
Reply Obj. 3: The two baptisms that the Master mentions in the text do not resemble the sacrament of baptism in signifying, but only in causing; and thus, they cannot properly be called sacraments. And for this reason it is said in the text that such people receive the reality of the sacrament without the sacrament.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, I answer that something is said to be sufficient for salvation in two ways. In one way, simply and absolutely; and in this way, baptism of repentance without baptism of water is not sufficient for salvation. In another way, in a certain respect and in certain cases; and in this way, it is sufficient, when a moment of dire need prevents the sacrament from being actually received. For at times like that, although there is repentance without actual baptism, it is nevertheless with the desire and intention of baptism; and the will is counted in place of the deed for someone who does not have the time to act.
Reply Obj. 1: The account of the baptismal character is the same as of the outward washing with water: both are, simply speaking, necessary for salvation, but in certain cases the intention suffices, when a moment of dire need prevents the sacrament.
Reply Obj. 2: That argument would proceed well if baptism of repentance were sufficient for salvation, simply speaking and absolutely.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the age of children makes them more deserving of mercy, nevertheless if they should be saved, there would have to be some cause of salvation in them. And since they cannot be saved by a proper movement of free will, they have to be saved through the sacrament of baptism. For an adult’s own faith avails more for him than someone else’s faith avails for a child. For if, at one time, the faith of another person, along with some profession, was sufficient for a child’s salvation, it was to the extent that that profession had the power of the sacrament that baptism of water now has.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, I answer that baptism of water has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ, inasmuch as it represents the Passion sacramentally; however, baptism of blood conforms one to the Passion of Christ not by a sacramental representation, but in reality. And therefore, in those things that are sacramental, like the imprinting of the character and things of that sort, baptism of blood does not supply the place of baptism of water; but in the fact that it is the reality alone, it completely supplies the place of baptism of water, when a dire need prevents the sacrament. For just as man is freed from all existing fault and punishment by the baptism of water, so too in the baptism of blood.
Reply Obj. 1: Baptism of blood does not have this efficacy only by the work of the one doing it—neither as regards the punishment by which someone completes martyrdom, which sometimes happens to be not sufficient for satisfying for sins, nor as regards the devotion of a just will, for it sometimes happens that someone with a will informed by greater charity cannot be freed from all punishment without martyrdom; but rather, it has this efficacy by its imitation of the Passion of Christ. Hence it is said of the martyrs, they have washed their robes in the blood of the Lamb (Rev 7:14); and thus, although children do not have the use of free will, if they are killed for Christ, they are saved, baptized in his blood.
Reply Obj. 2: Although that suffering, considered in itself, would not be enough to free one from every punishment for sin, nevertheless, when it is referred to the reason for the suffering, it receives efficacy from the Passion of Christ, to which someone is conformed by such suffering; and by that fact, he can be absolved from every punishment.
Reply Obj. 3: In other works or states of supererogation or perfection, and even in baptism of repentance, there is not such an explicit conformity to the Passion of Christ as there is in baptism of blood; and therefore it is not fitting that all one’s punishment should be dismissed in these things. Nevertheless, in the Lives of the Fathers it is said that a certain father saw the same grace descending on the one who assumed a religious habit as upon the one who was baptized. But this is not the case because someone like that is absolved from making satisfaction, but because by the very fact that he rendered his own will in servitude for the sake of God, he has now satisfied fully for every sin, since he holds God dearer than all the things of the world, of which he could give so much that by almsgiving he would redeem all his sins, even as to the punishment.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it is to be said that either of these baptisms has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ, according as each conforms one to it. And since baptism of water conforms someone to the Passion by sacramental signification, but baptism of blood does it in reality, for this reason, in regard to sacramental things, like the imprint of the character and such, baptism of water is superior. But in regard to those things that are the reality of the sacrament, baptism of blood is superior, for in baptism of blood the grace is both increased more in the one who has it, and given more to the one who does not have it, if there is no impediment to it; and although the remission of sins is no greater, since both baptisms take away all fault and punishment, nevertheless, it is more efficacious and fruitful in the baptism of blood, since one is not soiled by second stains, as Damascene says. (In the text cited immediately above.) For what some people say, that in baptism of blood grace is not conferred, appears to be false in the case of the children who are killed for Christ, and also the adults, to whom grace can be given in the very act of suffering, just like in the baptism of water, if they are disposed to it and do not place any obstacle to the Holy Spirit. And this is clear from Augustine, who, comparing these baptisms, says: the baptized person professes his faith before the priest, the martyr, before his persecutor; the former is sprinkled with water after his profession, the latter, with blood; the former receives the Holy Spirit by the imposition of the hands of the bishop, the latter is made a temple of the Holy Spirit. (St. Thomas attributed this quotation to Augustine’s Ad Fortunatus, but it is found in Gennadius Massiliensis, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, ch. 41 (PL 58:1220).) But no one is made a temple of the Holy Spirit except by receiving grace.
Reply Obj. 1: Baptism of blood, too, has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ, to which it conforms more expressly than baptism of water.
Reply Obj. 2: In baptism of blood one merits not only a special reward, but also the golden crown by the grace conferred or increased at that moment.
Exposition of the Text
All children who in baptism are cleansed from original sin, receive both the sacrament and thing. (Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, 4.1 (26). 2.) However, not only little ones, but also sometimes adults. Nevertheless, with infants there is no doubt that they receive it; there is, however, with adults, for they can impede it by insincerity; and therefore he uses children in his example instead.
“Unless he repent of his old life.” (Sent. IV, 4.2 (27), 2, citing Pseudo-Augustine, Sermo 351 or Liber de poenitentia, ch. 2, n. 2.) To the contrary: then baptism is not the first sacrament, but repentance. And it should be said that he speaks of repentance as a virtue, not as a sacrament.
For . . . sins which have been forgiven return, etc. (Sent. IV, 4. 2 (27), 4, citing Augustine, De baptismo contra Donatistas, bk.1, c. 12, n. 20.) How this is true will be said below, in Distinction 22, Question 1, Article 1.
“Men put on Christ sometimes”, etc. (Sent. IV, 4.3 (28), 1, citing Augustine, De baptismo contra Donatistas, Bk. 5, ch. 24, n. 34.) ‘To put on Christ’ is nothing other than to assume the likeness of Christ, which happens outwardly by sacramental representation, and inwardly by real imitation.
Nor is it suffering alone which fills the role of baptism, but also faith and contrition, where necessity precludes the sacrament. (Sent IV, 4.4 (29). 3.) Contrition does not completely substitute, for it does not always absolve from all punishment, although it may absolve from all fault.
“For that thief was not crucified for the name of Christ.” (Sent. IV, 4.4 (29), 3, citing Augustine, De baptismo contra Donatistas, Bk. 4, ch. 22, n. 29.) Against this is what Jerome says, that Christ made that thief’s punishment for homicide into martyrdom. (Jerome, Epistle 58, to Bishop Paulinus: “At e contrario latro crucem mutat paradiso et facit homicidii poena martyrem” (CSEL 54:528).) And it should be said that it did have something of martyrdom, namely, suffering, and a just will; and it also lacked something of martyrdom, namely, the reason for the suffering—even as the Holy Innocents were lacking a just will, but they had both the suffering and the reason for it.
“I lost the one whom I was about to bring to new life.” (Sent. IV, 4.4 (97), 5 citing Ambrose, De obitu Valetiniani, nn. 29–30.) He says he ‘lost’ him, for the joy and merit that he was about to have from his baptizing, he lost by the deferral of his baptism until the time of a solemnity, according to the custom of the Church in those days, or until his instruction was complete. However, that man did not lose the grace of baptism, since he died longing for it; and this is true as to the remission of guilt, but not as to the remission of all punishment.
“In which all the sacraments of baptism are accomplished.” (Sent. IV, 4.4 (29), 9 citing Gennadius, Liber sive diffinitio ecclesiasticorum dogmatum, ch. 74.) It is true as to what is the reality alone in the sacrament.
Will be punished by an eternal punishment. (Sent. IV, 4. 4 (29), 12, attributed to Augustine but actually Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, c. 27, n. 70.) *‘*Punishment’ is not the proper word for the suffering of loss that is all children will endure, as was said in Book 2, Distinction 33, Question 2, Article 2.
These are not separated from the fellowship of the faithful when the Church prays for the faithful who have died. (Sent. IV, 4.4 (29), 13.) Nevertheless those prayers are not offerings on their behalf, but thanksgiving.
Chapter 140 of 186