D. 5 - The cause of baptism

After the Master has examined baptism in relation to its recipients, here he examines it in relation to those giving it; and this is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows by whom baptism can be given; in the second, by whom and how it ought to be given, at Distinction 6: Now let us add something about those for whom it is lawful to baptize. (Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, 6.1 (36), 1.)

The first is in three parts: in the first, he shows by whom baptism can be given, since it may be given by good men and bad; in the second, he assigns the reason, at: [This is] because they have only the ministry, not the power, of baptism; (Sent. IV, 5.2 (34), 1.) in the third, he expels a particular doubt, at: Here it is asked what is that power of baptism that Christ retained for himself. (Sent. IV, 5.3 (35), 1.)

Here, there is a two-fold question: first, about the power of baptizing; second, about those who do the baptizing.

Question 1

The power of baptizing

Concerning the first, three questions arise:

first, what power Christ, as man, had in baptizing;

• second, what power he conferred on his ministers;
• third, what power he could have conferred, but did not confer.
• Article 1

What power Christ, as man, had in baptizing

Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 64, a. 3; Super Ioan. 1, lec. 14; Super I ad Cor. 1, lec. 2.) It seems that Christ, as man, had the power of forgiving sins. For it is said: but so that you may know that the Son of Man has the power on earth to forgive sins, he said to the paralytic, “rise, and walk” (Matt 9:6). But it was not necessary to show a sign in order to prove that God had the power of forgiving sins, for the Jews professed this. Therefore, he had this power also as man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ as man is the redeemer, as was said in Book 3, Distinction 19, Question 1, Article 4, Subquestion 1. But someone cannot be freed from slavery to sin unless his sins are forgiven him. Therefore, Christ had the power of forgiving sins as man.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, concerning the passage in John: Just as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whomever he wishes (John 5:21), Augustine says he judges, and he raises bodies—not the Father, but the Son, according to the dispensation of his humanity, in which he is less than the Father. (See Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 23, n. 13.) But the raising of bodies attests to the raising of souls, which happens by the forgiving of sins. Therefore, Christ, as man, could forgive sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, his power is greater than the invocation of his name. But in the early Church, baptism and the remission of sins were granted at the invocation of Christ’s name. Therefore, Christ himself, too, could forgive sins by his own power.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Christ was held to have greater glory than Moses, for he was not in the house of God as a servant or minister, like Moses, but as lord and heir, as is said in Hebrews 3:3. But if he did not have the power of forgiving sins as man, he would not be as the lord, but only as the minister, just like all the others. Therefore, he has the power of forgiving sins.

On the contrary (1), what belongs to God alone does not belong to Christ as man. But to forgive sin is one of these things, as is clear from Isaiah: I am he who blots out your transgressions for my own sake (Isa 43:25). Therefore, it does not belong to Christ as man.

Furthermore (2), sin is forgiven no one except by the Holy Spirit. But Christ, as man, could not give the Holy Spirit, as was said in Book 1, Distinction 15, Question 5, Article 1, Subquestion 4. Therefore he, as man, cannot remit sins.

Furthermore (3), Augustine says that Christ, according as he is the Son of God, is the life that gives life to souls. But what belongs to him insofar as he is Son of God does not befit him according as he is man. Therefore, to give life to souls by the remission of sins does not belong to him as man.

I answer that, there are three kinds of power for absolving from sin in baptism. One is the power of authority, and this pertains to God alone, who forgives sins by his own power, as the principal cause of the remission of sins; hence Christ as man could not forgive sins with that kind of power. Another power is that of the minister, which belongs to those who dispense the sacraments, in which divine power invisibly works our salvation. The third is a mean between these two, which is called the power of excellence; and this Christ had above everyone else.

Now this excellence has three aspects. First, baptism has its efficacy from the merit of his Passion, but not from the merit of anyone else who baptizes; hence a baptism given by a better baptizer is not a better baptism. Second, Christ, as Lord and institutor of the sacraments, could confer the effect of the sacraments without a sacrament, which is not true of the others. Third, in the early Church, the remission of sins was given at the invocation of his name in baptism. But because the second arguments seem based on the first power, therefore they should be conceded, and the first ones should be answered. (The first arguments are the objections, the second arguments the sed contras.)

Reply Obj. 1: The Son of Man had the power of authority for forgiving sins, not insofar as he was man, but insofar as he was God; and thus, by the miracle displayed here, it is proved that that man was God, whom nature obeyed as its proper creator.

Reply Obj. 2: ‘Redeemer’ is said in two ways. In one way, because of the use of authoritative power in absolving from sins, and in this way, Christ, as God, was the redeemer. In another way, because of the effect of humility; and in this way, it applied to him as man, inasmuch as by the humility of his Passion, he merited for us the remission of sins; and this belongs to the power of excellence, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: The power of raising bodies that Christ had, according as he was man, is not the power of a mere minister, even as Peter also raised the dead; nor is it the power of authority, for this belongs to God alone; but it is the power of a certain excellence, which belongs to him by his union with God, so that he could raise the dead by command, not by prayer. And he had this power of excellence likewise in remitting sins.

Reply Obj. 4: The fact that the remission of sins in baptism was conferred at the invocation of his name pertains to the power of excellence.

Reply Obj. 5: He did not have the power of a mere minister, but a higher power, as was said.

Article 2

What power Christ conferred on his ministers

Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 64, aa. 1 & 4.) It seems that he conferred upon his ministers the power of cooperating in interior cleansing. For a certain spiritual power was given to the ministers. But for bodily cleansing no spiritual power is required; bodily power suffices. Therefore, the ministers cooperate in the interior cleansing.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as a certain sanctification is applied to the things used in the sacraments, so the same is done to the ministers of the sacraments. But things used in the sacraments contain and confer invisible grace by their sanctification, according to Hugh of St. Victor. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 2 (PL 176:317).) Therefore, sanctified ministers, in their own sanctification, work interior cleansing, which is by grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, among created things, the rational creature is more noble than any accidental form. But grace works interiorly for the remission of sins. Therefore, much more has a man the power of cooperating interiorly.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every action of a certain form is attributed to what has that form, for heat acts through whatever is hot. But the remission of fault is the action of grace. Therefore, it belongs to the one having grace to cooperate in the remission of fault.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, n. 3 (PG 3:503).) it belongs to the ministers of the Church to purify, illuminate, and perfect. But purification from the filth of the mind happens in the Church. Therefore, the ministers of the Church cooperate in the interior cleansing.

On the contrary (1), interior cleansing from sins is done by the Holy Spirit. But the ministers of the Church do not give the Holy Spirit. Therefore, neither do they cooperate in the interior cleansing.

Furthermore (2), it is a greater thing to justify the wicked than to create heaven and earth. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 72, n. 3: “intellegat qui potest, iudicet qui potest, utrum maius sit iustos creare quam impios iustificare.”) But in the creation of heaven and earth nothing cooperates with God. Therefore, neither in the justification of the wicked.

Furthermore (3), even in hierarchical actions, man’s operation is under the operation of an angel, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 9, n. 2 (PG 3:259).) But the angels cannot make an impression on the affective part, as was said in Book 2, Distinction 8, Question 1, Article 5. (Thomas writes here affectum, but from the context it has to mean “will.” In Bk. 2, d. 8, q. 1, a. 5, ad 7, Thomas writes: “Demons are called instigators insofar as they stir up the blood, and in this way dispose the soul to concupiscence, just as certain foods provoke to sensuality. To make an impression on the will, however, belongs to God alone, which is owing to the freedom of the will, which is lord of its own acts, and is not compelled by its object as the intellect is compelled by a demonstration. Hence it is clear from the foregoing that demons make an impression on the imagination, and angels, in addition, on the intellect; but God alone on the will.”) Therefore, since the affective part has to be cleansed from sin, it seems that neither do they cooperate in interior cleansing.

I answer that, there are four ways that someone may be said to cooperate with any agent. In one way, as someone helping another to whom he offers assistance cooperates with him. In another way, by offering counsel. In a third way, in being the means by which an agent brings about his first effect, as instruments cooperate with the principal agent. In the fourth way, by disposing the matter for receiving the effect of the principal agent.

In the first two ways, therefore, nothing cooperates with God in any action, on account of his perfect power, which needs no assistance, and his perfect wisdom, which needs no counsel: who helps the spirit of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? (Isa 40:13)

But in the third way, some creatures cooperates with God in certain actions, but not in all. For since God is the first agent in all natural activities, whatever nature does, it brings about as the instrumental agent cooperating with the first agent, which is God. But there are certain things that God reserves to himself, working them without intermediaries; and in these matters, creation does not cooperate with God in the third way, but it can cooperate with him in the fourth way—as is clear in the creation of the rational soul, which God produces without intermediaries, yet nevertheless nature disposes the matter for the reception of the rational soul.

And since the re-creation of the rational soul corresponds to its creation, thus he works without intermediaries in its cleansing; nor does anyone cooperate with him for this in the third way, but only in the fourth. And this happens in two ways: either by the action of the one doing it, whether by teaching, or by meriting (and men cooperate with him in this way in the remission of sins, of whom it is said, we are God’s helpers, 1 Cor 3:9); or else by the work itself being done, like those who confer the sacraments, which dispose to grace, by which the remission of sin happens—and the latter is the cooperation of a minister, which is applicable to the ministers of the Church, of whom it is said, Let a man so consider us as ministers of Christ (1 Cor 4:1).

Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual power granted to the ministers of the Church, like sacramental power, does extend to something interior, but not to the conferral of grace that causes the remission of sins—except in the manner of administering the means whereby grace is conferred, as was also said of the sacraments.

Hence the solution to the second objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: Grace does not remit fault effectively, but formally, as whiteness removes blackness; and thus, it does not follow that it befits the rational creature, which is not a form.

Reply Obj. 4: The operation of a form is twofold: namely, first act, which pertains to the informing of the subject, e.g., knowledge, and second act, which is called use or action, e.g., considering. What has the form, therefore, does not take part by its form in the first operation, but only the second. However, to forgive fault belongs to grace as regards the first operation, just as whiteness, by the same account by which it makes something white, also removes the blackness from the subject in which it is. And thus, it is not necessary that the one having grace take part in this by grace.

Reply Obj. 5: The purification of which Dionysius speaks is purification from the darkness of ignorance, as he himself says. Hence it pertains more to the understanding than to the affection.

Article 3

What power Christ could have conferred, but did not confer

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, a. 2; ST III, q. 64, a. 4; De veritate, q. 27, a. 3, ad 17; Super Ioan. 1, lec. 14; Super I ad Cor. 1, lec. 2.) It seems that the power of cooperation could have been conferred on the ministers by God. For concerning the text, he is the one who baptizes with the Holy Spirit (John 1:33), Augustine says that John said that Christ could give the power of cleansing from sins, but he did not give it: he did, however, give the power of administering it. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 5, n. 7.) Therefore, it seems that he could have given the power of cooperating.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the power of authority is greater than the power of cooperating. But concerning the text, Has Christ been divided? (1 Cor 1:13), the Gloss says that he could have given the authority of baptizing to those on whom he conferred the ministry. (See Glossa Lombardi, PL 191:1539. Here, “authority” means the ability to institute a sacrament, not merely to confer it.) Therefore, much more could he have given the power of cooperation in interior cleansing.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is greater to expel a demon than to expel what has been sown by it, namely, sin. But God gave men the power of expelling demons, as is clear from Luke 10. Therefore, much more could he have given them the power of expelling sins.

On the contrary (1), it is necessary that every agent be simultaneous with the patient, as is proved in the Physics 7. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 7, ch. 2, 244a5ff.; cf. Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 195b16–21.) But it cannot be conferred on any created thing that it infiltrate a rational soul. Therefore, cooperation in interior cleansing cannot be conferred.

Furthermore (2), grace is a certain beginning of glory. But it cannot be shared with any creature that glory be from it, as neither that it be the supreme good. Therefore, the power of cooperation in bestowing grace, by which the remission of sins happens, could not be conferred on any man.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that neither could the power of excellence be conferred. For it is said in Matthew 25 that he gave to each according to his own strength (Matt 25:15). But he did not give the power of excellence to any but Christ alone. Therefore, he could not confer it on others.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the power of excellence belongs to Christ according as his merit works unto the remission of all sins, as was said. But this belongs to Christ only according as his merit has a certain infinity, as was said in Book 3, Distinction 18, Question 2, Article 6, Subquestion 1, and Distinction 19, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 1. Therefore, since having infinite efficacy in meriting could not be conferred on any mere creature, it seems that neither could the power of excellence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power of excellence belongs to Christ according as he is the Church’s head, of whose fullness we all receive. But this belongs to him because he is the Only-begotten Son of the Father, as is said in John 1:14. Therefore, it could not be shared with any mere creature.

On the contrary (1), whatever belongs to Christ as man can also be shared with other men. But the power of excellence, as was said, belongs to Christ as man. Therefore, it can also be shared with other men.

Furthermore (2), it belongs to the power of excellence that the remission of sins be given at the invocation of Christ’s name in baptism. But God could also have conferred this on Peter or Paul, such that at the invocation of his name baptism would be conferred, as the Gloss on 1 Corinthians 1 says. (See Glossa Lombardi, PL 191:1538.) Therefore, the power of excellence could have been conferred on others.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the power of creating could have been communicated to a creature. For God can do more than man can understand; since no word is impossible with God (Luke 1:37). But some philosophers posited a power of creating in certain creatures, like Avicenna, who says that the first intelligence produces the second intelligence, and so on in succession. (Here Thomas refers to Avicenna’s theory of the emanation of spiritual creatures or pure intellects from the highest to the least, each coming from the one before.) Therefore, God could communicate this to a creature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing should be withdrawn from the scope of divine power, understood absolutely, unless it implies self-contradiction or defect. But that some creature should have the power of creating implies no contradiction, as it seems; nor does it convey any defect, but rather, more the divine perfection, for the perfect is what can make another like itself, as is said in Meteorology 4; (Aristotle, Meteorology, Bk. 4, ch. 3, 380a14–15.) and in this way, that the Creator himself should establish other creators posits no imperfection in God. Therefore, this should not be withdrawn from his power.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, form is more noble than matter. But it was conferred on other creatures that they be able to produce forms. Therefore, it could also have been conferred that they produce matter, and this is to create. Therefore, the power of creating could have been shared with a creature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the greater the resistance, the more difficult the act. But a contrary resists action more than non-being, which cannot act. Therefore, if it was conferred on a creature to be able to make something out of its contrary, much more could there be conferred the ability to make something out of non-being, which is to create.

On the contrary (5), it cannot be conferred on a creature that it have infinite power, since it is of finite essence. But creation is a work of infinite power, which is clear from the infinite distance that there is between being and non-being. Therefore, the power of creating could not be communicated to a creature.

Furthermore (6), adoration is owed to the Creator. But it cannot be shared with a creature that adoration be owed to it, just as neither can it be communicated to it that it be God. Therefore, the power of creating cannot be communicated to a creature.

Furthermore (7), nothing acts except to the extent that it is in act. But it cannot be communicated to a creature that it be pure act. Therefore, it cannot be shared with it that it act wholly from itself; therefore, neither can it be that it enact everything that is in a thing, which is to create.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that there are two ways of saying that something cannot be shared with any created thing: either because it can be communicated to no creature, or because it can be communicated to some creature, but not this one. For anything that, once communicated to another, would draw it outside the bounds of its own species, cannot be communicated to it, as it cannot be communicated to a horse that he have reason, although this could be shared with a man. But that which, communicated to something, draws it outside the bounds of creation cannot be shared with any created thing. Therefore, the power of authority communicated to another would draw him beyond the bounds of creation—for it cannot be that a creature be the principal agent with respect to the noblest effect, by which we are joined to the last end, and that is the kind of thing grace is, through which the remission of sins happens. And thus, all say that the power of authority could not be shared with any creature.

But there are two opinions about the power of cooperation. For the Master seems to say in the text that the power of cooperation in interior cleansing could be conferred on some creature, although it was not conferred—which cannot be understood of the cooperation that happens in the manner of disposition, since this was conferred on the ministers of the Church, as was said. However, others say the opposite, that it could not have been conferred. Now both opinions can be supported in a certain way. For something cooperates with God instrumentally in two ways. In one way, so that by a certain power having absolute and complete being in nature, it may work to produce not only a secondary effect but a principal one, as fire cooperates with God in the generation of another fire. And in this way of taking cooperation, it could not be conferred on man that he cooperate with God in the interior cleansing that happens by grace, for grace elevates man to a certain life that is above the condition of all created nature; indeed, the being of grace is above the natural being of both men and angels, who are the highest creatures. And thus, the agent, who by his own power likens the soul to himself by grace, must be above all created power, and so this kind of cooperation surpasses the creature’s limits. In another way, something cooperates with God not by a power that has being perfect in nature, nor by extending directly to the final principal effect, as was said of the sacraments in Distinction 1, Question 1, Article 4; and in this way, to cooperate with God in interior cleansing by (as some say) disposing, could have been conferred on man without the sacraments, just as he does it by offering the sacraments; and to cooperate in this way belongs to the power of excellence in Christ, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: This is understood concerning the power of excellence, which Christ had also as man, which includes the second kind of power of cooperation mentioned, but not the first kind of power of cooperation mentioned.

Reply Obj. 2: Authority is taken here not with respect to cleansing, but with respect to the institution of the sacraments, furnishing efficacy to them by the merit of the one baptizing, which belongs to the power of excellence; and this he could have conferred upon them. Or it could be said that it is not speaking of primary authority, but of subauthority, which is clear from what follows in the Gloss: namely, such that he himself would exist as principal author.

Reply Obj. 3: To men is given the power of expelling demons as to the effect of the physical harm they cause in those they trouble, but not as to the effect of spiritual harm, which is the power to expel sin and to free someone from slavery to the demon: if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed (John 8:36).

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that God could have conferred the power of excellence on a mere man, but nevertheless it was not fitting, lest hope should be placed in a man, and so that he might show that there was one head of the Church, from whom all the members would receive spiritual sensation and movement.

Reply Obj. 1: This is understood concerning those things that are necessary for man’s perfection, whether as to the being of nature or as to the being of grace. For it was not necessary that God give man every gratuitous grace that he can give: for there are divisions of graces, and he gives to each as he wills (1 Cor 12).

Reply Obj. 2: In order for a mere man to cooperate with God in the interior cleansing in the way just mentioned, it is not necessary that he have infinite efficacy in meriting, although Christ had, in a certain way, infinity in meriting; for a mere man would not be cooperating with respect to all things, nor so fully as Christ.

Reply Obj. 3: The grace of headship in Christ is distinguished from the grace of union, although from that very union, by a certain congruence, came the fullness of all grace, both of headship and of the singular person in that soul. Nevertheless, it does not follow that, if the power of excellence were conferred on someone for some purpose—for example, baptism were given in his name, or his merit somehow worked toward the effect of baptism in a particular baptized person—then he would be the head simply speaking.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the common opinion holds that creation cannot be communicated to any creature: for it is a work of infinite power, because of the infinite distance there is between simply being and simply non-being, which the change of creation must cross. However, infinite power cannot be in a finite essence. Hence, by the very fact that infinite power is claimed to be communicated to something, it means consequently that that thing would have an infinite essence, and by this fact it would have being that was not received, but pure and simple. This is how it is placed outside the bounds of creation, and so, according to the common opinion, such power can be communicated to no creature.

Reply Obj. 1: Those philosophers who posited this did not understand fully the notion of creation, and how it requires an infinite power of acting; and thus, they did not understand the inconsistency of their position.

Reply Obj. 2: This also implies contradiction, inasmuch as a creature is posited to have infinite essence, and consequently not to be a creature; and it conveys a defect in divine majesty to claim that something can equal it in infinity of essence. For it is not necessary that what belongs to perfection in us, namely, to be able to make something equal to oneself, be a perfection in God, such that he could make something equaling himself.

Reply Obj. 3: No created agent makes a form, for forms are not made, as is proved in the Metaphysics 7, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 7, ch. 8, 1033b5–6.) but rather they are drawn out of the potency of matter. But matter cannot be drawn out of any other potency; and thus, it is not the same with form as with matter.

Reply Obj. 4: The contrary from which generation occurs only impedes the action of the agent in two ways. In one way, by weakening the agent’s power—and that is not even universally the case, but only in those things in which there is mutual action and suffering, from which this occurs. (In those things that are acted upon when they act, namely material things, to act upon another is, at the same time and per accidens, to suffer something; for example, a stove’s electric heating element is slightly cooled when a pot of cold water is placed on it, even though in itself, it is the heating agent and the water is the heatable patient.) In another way, speaking per se, by diminishing the passive power of the one suffering, through an indisposition to receive the agent’s effect. And this is found in all cases of receptivity. It is clear, however, that no indisposition can so remove the passive potency from receiving the agent’s effect as to take this potency away completely; and thus, it takes much more power to make something out of nothing than out of a contrary, simply speaking; although in some respect, the latter has a certain difficulty that is not in the former.

Since, however, the Master says in the text that the ministry of creation can be communicated to a creature, but not the ministry of authority, if anyone wanted to support him in this, he could say that something is created, properly speaking, at the moment that it comes to be out of no pre-existing thing. Hence, it is clear that creation in its very notion excludes the presupposition of anything pre-existing.

Now this happens in two ways. In one way, such that it excludes everything pre-existing, both on the part of the agent and on the part of the thing made, such that it is called ‘creation’ when neither the agent acts by virtue of some prior agent nor the thing made comes from any pre-existing matter: and this is the power of authority in creating, and it is infinite, and so can be communicated to no creature.

In another way, such that it excludes anything pre-existing on the part of the thing made, but not on the part of the agent, such that it is called ‘creation’ (but less properly) when something acting by the power of a prior agent produces an effect from non-presupposed matter; and in this way, it will be the ministry of creation. And thus, some philosophers posited that certain creatures create; and in this manner, the Master says that the power of creating could have been shared, but it was not shared with anyone.

Reply Obj. 5: In keeping with this, therefore, it would be said to the fifth, according to the Master, that the distance between being and non-being absolutely requires infinity of power in him who makes something out of non-being simply. For the reason that, in motions, the power of the mover is proportionate to the distance between the two terminuses is because motion takes its quantity from that very distance. For as great as the path is, so great is the movement, as is said in the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 11, 219a9ff.) Now motion is more properly the effect of the power of the mover, as such, proportioned to it.

But in creation it is not thus, for pure non-being is not a per se terminus of creation, but stands to it only per accidens—for something is said to be ‘made from non-being,’ that is, after non-being. Hence, creation does not have quantity from a distance of non-being to being, but by the being that is created. And thus, it is not necessary that the power of the one creating be proportionate to the distance that is between being and non-being, but only to what is created, which is not infinite. And thus, a power that is simply infinite is not required, but one that is infinite in a certain respect, namely, not commensurate with any determinate matter, as all natural and material agents are; for fire does not have an effect except in a certain determinate matter, since its power is material. And thus, even the philosophers did not posit creation in the second way except among incorporeal and immaterial substances.

Or it could be said that there is not an infinite distance between a being and non-being on the part of the being itself, unless the being is infinite; for, to the extent that something is distant from one of two opposites, it is closer to the other; hence the only thing infinitely distant from not being is what has infinite being, namely, God, and to the degree that the remaining beings are closer to him, so much more are they distant from non-being, just as Augustine says in Book 12 of the Confessions that an angel is made close to God, matter close to nothing. (See Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 12, ch. 7: “tu eras et aliud nihil, unde fecisti caelum et terram, duo quaedam, unum prope te, alterum prope nihil, unum, quo superior tu esses, alterum, quo inferius nihil esset.”)

But it is true that the distance mentioned is in a way infinite on the part of non-being simply, by the fact that it transcends every determinate distance from any being represented, since nothing can be more distant from being than non-being. For it happens that a certain distance is infinite from one side and finite from the other, as whenever a comparison is made between the finite and the infinite. For unless there were such a finite distance in some way, one creature would not be less distant from God than another; and unless there were in some way an infinite distance, something might be understood more distant from any creature than from God. Creation, however, does not regard this distance from the side of non-being, but rather from the side of being, which is the terminus of creating.

Reply Obj. 6: Adoration is due to the Creator inasmuch as he is the first agent, with whose power all others act, while he himself does not act by virtue of another; and this cannot be shared with any creature.

Reply Obj. 7: Although there is no creature in which there is not something of potency, at least as far as its nature is ordered to the being that it receives from God as potency is ordered to act, nevertheless, there is a certain creature in which no potency remains that is not completed by act, as an angel. And so, such a creature can wholly act from itself, although the first beginning of its action is something other than it, namely, God, who is the first agent.

Question 2

Who can baptize

Next is asked who can baptize; and concerning this, three questions arise:

first, whether the non-ordained can baptize, as well as the ordained;

• second, whether the bad can baptize, as well as the good;
• third, whether angels can baptize, as well as men.
• Article 1

Whether the non-ordained can baptize, as well as the ordained

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 2, ad 3; d. 20, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 3; d. 23, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 1; ST I-II, q. 100, a. 2, ad 1; ST III, q. 67, a. 3.) It seems that no one could baptize unless he has holy orders. For no one can exercise a hierarchical act unless he takes part in the hierarchy. But those who do not have holy orders are not partakers of the hierarchy, for they do not have any sacred rulership. Therefore, since baptizing is a hierarchical act (because baptism is a purification and illumination, as Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, n. 3 (PG 3:503).)), it seems that no one could baptize except unless he had holy orders.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as baptism is a necessary sacrament, so also is penance. But no one can absolve someone sacramentally in penance except someone with holy orders. In like manner, therefore, no one who is not ordained can baptize.

On the contrary, Isidore says that when extreme necessity compels, even lay members of the faithful are permitted to baptize. (Isidore, De ecclesiasticis officiis (CCSL 113), Bk. 2, ch. 25, n. 9: “Cuiusque ministerium nec ipsis diaconibus explere est licitum absque episcopo uel presbitero, nisi his procul absentibus ultima langoris cogat necessitudo, quod etiam et laicis fidelibus plerumque permittitur, ne quisquam sine remedio salutari de saeculo euocetur.”) But laymen do not have holy orders. Therefore, etc.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that baptizing is proper to the order of deacon. (Parallel: ST III, q. 67, a. 1.) For, according to Dionysius, deacons have purifying power. But baptism was instituted chiefly for purifying. Therefore, baptizing belongs to the deacon as proper to his office.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the duty of baptizing is enjoined at the same time as the preaching of the Gospel, as given at the end of Mark (cf. Mark 16:15–16). But the preaching of the Gospel pertains to deacons as proper to their office. Therefore, so does baptism.

On the contrary, Isidore says that deacons are not permitted to fulfill the ministry of baptism. (See the text given just above.)

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the unbaptized may not baptize. (Parallel: ST III, q. 67, a. 5.) For it is a smaller thing to receive a sacrament than to confer one. But the unbaptized cannot receive any sacrament: for, according to Dionysius, they are not suited to spiritual and hierarchical acts. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 2, p. 1 (PG 3:391).) Therefore, neither can they confer the sacrament of baptism.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if an unbaptized person could baptize, and he himself needed baptism, then he could baptize himself. But this is impossible, both because, according to Augustine, nothing gives birth to itself so that it may be, (Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate (CCSL 50), Bk. 1, ch. 1: “nulla enim omnino res est quae se ipsam gignat ut sit.”) while baptism is a certain regeneration; and because the form of the Church could not be preserved in that case. Therefore, an unbaptized person cannot baptize.

On the contrary, is what is said in the text, that the Roman pontiff judges that it is not man who baptizes, but the spirit of God, even if it is a pagan who baptizes. But a pagan is not baptized. Therefore, a non-baptized person can baptize.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that baptism is the most necessary of all the sacraments: both because children cannot be rescued any other way, and because neither can even adults as to the remission of all guilt; and thus, those things that are required as necessary for the sacrament must be the most common both on the part of the matter, namely, water, which can be had anywhere, and on the part of the minister, such that any man may baptize. And in this way, the sanctification of the matter and the blessing preceding baptism are not necessary for the sacrament, but only for its solemnity, which, on account of the Church’s institution of it, one is not permitted to omit. Thus, even the ordination of the minister is not necessary for the sacrament, but only for its solemnity; and if, apart from a case of imminent need, someone not ordained baptized, he would sin, yet nevertheless would confer the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1: A hierarchical act does not belong to a man by his own nature, but by divine institution and sanctification; and although, simply speaking, he did not confer the hierarchical degree on every man, nevertheless he conferred this particular hierarchical act on all men on account of necessity, just as he gave regenerative power to all waters.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not the same with the sacrament of penance as with the sacrament of baptism: for in a case of necessity someone can be saved without the absolution of the sacrament of penance, nor again does priestly absolution absolve from all punishment. But there is nothing else among children by which they may be saved, nor among adults by which they may be freed from all punishment; and thus, it is of greater necessity than penance.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that among ordered powers it is such that whatever a lower power can do, the higher power can as well, but not vice versa. Hence, since the power of an ordained priest is above the power of a deacon, the priest has purifying power together with illuminative, but a deacon has only purifying power, without the illuminative. And because in all the sacraments of the New Law there is the illumination of grace together with purification, for this reason, the deacon is not the proper minister of baptism or of any sacrament, but rather, of certain sacramentals, like exorcism and the banishment of those unclean from divine things, as when he says: If anyone is a Jew, let him depart, (In some of the ancient liturgies is found a proclamation by the deacon at the end of the Mass of Catechumens, to the effect of “Let all the unbaptized depart.” One celebrated formula from a Missal of the 11th-12th century read: “If anyone is a catechumen, let him depart; if anyone is a heretic, let him depart; if anyone is a Jew, let him depart; if anyone is a pagan, let him depart; if anyone is an Arian, let him depart; anyone for whom this is not his concern, let him depart.”) and the instruction of those who do not know how they should behave toward divine things, as when he says: Let us kneel, and Humble yourselves for the blessing, or anything like this.

Reply Obj. 1: Baptism is not only for purifying, but for illuminating, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, p. 1, n. 3 (PG 3:502).) and thus it belongs not to the deacon but to the priest.

Reply Obj. 2: It pertains to the deacon to preach the Gospel, and to read aloud in the church, which is like speaking in tongues; but it pertains to the priest to interpret and to exhort, which is like prophesying.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that just as water without any sanctification is the matter of baptism, so also a man without any sacramental sanctification is the minister of baptism, regarding what is necessary for the sacrament; hence, the non-baptized person can baptize, as long as he preserves the form of the Church and has the intention of baptizing.

Reply Obj. 1: The reception of other sacraments is not of such great necessity as the conferral of this one; and thus, someone who cannot receive the other sacraments can still confer this one.

Reply Obj. 2: Although someone unbaptized could baptize someone else, he is nevertheless not able to baptize himself, for the reasons cited in the objection. But what Innocent III says in a certain decretal—A Jew who immerses himself in water, saying, “I baptize myself in the name of the Father, etc.,” if he should pass away, will go straight to heaven—should be understood on account of the force of his contrition and devotion, from the greatness of which this seems to proceed, namely, that living among Jews he would so to speak expose himself to danger of death.

Article 2

Whether the bad can baptize, as well as the good

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 7, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 2; ST III, q. 64, aa. 5 and 9; SCG IV, ch. 77; Super Heb. 7, lec. 2.) It seems that bad men cannot confer the sacrament of baptism. For just as form and matter are required for baptism, so also is a minister. But if there is undue matter or form, there will not be baptism. Therefore, it is the same if there is an undue minister. But the wicked are not the due ministers: for as Augustine says, it must be just men who baptize. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 15, n. 5.) Therefore the wicked cannot confer this sacrament.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a withered member does not partake in any action of the body. But to baptize is an action of the Mystical Body. Therefore, since the wicked are like withered members, lacking the oil of charity and grace, it seems they cannot confer baptism.

On the contrary, are the multiple reasons in the text.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the reality of the sacrament is not conferred by them: What can be made clean by the unclean? (Sir 34:4) But every sinner is unclean. Therefore, no one can be made clean by one. Therefore, since cleansing is the reality of the sacrament of baptism, it seems that the reality of the sacrament is not conferred.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, priests are mediators between God and the people, presenting divine things to the people in sacred rites and teaching, and representing to God the needs of the people by prayer. But the prayers of wicked priests do not benefit the people, for, according to Gregory in his pastoral letter, when someone displeasing is sent to intercede, the spirit of the angry one is provoked to worse things. (Gregory, Regula pastoralis (CCSL 141), p. 1, ch. 10.) Therefore, neither are sacraments given by wicked ministers beneficial for the effect of salvation.

On the contrary, is what is said in the text: when a wicked man baptizes, what is given is one, nor is it inferior because of the inferior ministers. But when good men baptize, they confer the sacrament and the reality of the sacrament. Therefore, so do wicked men.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that baptism given by a better minister has a greater effect. For when the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. But baptism confers grace by the very work being accomplished: similarly also it is clear that holy men merit grace for others by their own work. Therefore, if the work of the one baptizing is added to the efficacy of baptism, a greater grace will be given.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, baptism is more ordered to spiritual health than to bodily health. But someone baptized by a holy man sometimes obtains bodily health by the merits and intercession of the one baptizing, which is not from the work itself being performed, since baptism does not have efficacy for this. This is how it happened with Constantine, whom Silvester baptized. Therefore also, for spiritual health baptism by good ministers can have a greater effect.

On the contrary, is what is said in the text: The baptism that is given by a better minister is not better, but the gift of God given through unequal ministers is equal.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that when a wicked minister baptizes, he sins. (Parallels: below, d. 24, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 5; ST III, q. 64, a. 6.) For, as Augustine says in the text, it must be just men who baptize. (See citation just above.) Therefore, if they are not just when they baptize, they do what is not fitting. Therefore, they sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sacrament of the Eucharist is not of greater efficacy than baptism. But a priest who unworthily approaches that sacrament, sins, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 11:27. Therefore, he also sins by baptizing if he is bad.

On the contrary (3), he is able to baptize by his office. Therefore, he does not sin in executing his office.

Furthermore (4), he is bound to baptize. Therefore, if he sinned by baptizing, he would be trapped; which cannot be the case.

Quaestiuncula 5

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone who receives a sacrament for himself or another from a bad priest, sins. For anyone consenting to sin sins. But in a certain case the priest baptizing unworthily sins. Therefore, also the person receiving or requesting baptism from him sins.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, when a priest refuses to baptize without payment, it is clear that if payment is given him, simony is committed; which cannot happen without sin. Therefore, in some cases the one receiving the sacrament of baptism from a bad minister sins.

On the contrary, Augustine says in the text: I fear neither the adulterer nor the murderer. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract 5, n. 18.) But if he would sin by receiving the sacrament from them, that would be something to be feared. Therefore, the one receiving the sacrament from them does not sin.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that in the sacraments there is something that belongs to the substance of the sacrament, and something that belongs to its fittingness and solemnity. Therefore, if something were taken away that belonged to the sacrament’s substance, it would not be a valid sacrament; but if something were taken away that was required for the sacrament’s solemnity or fittingness, it would not cease to be a sacrament because of this. Hence since the goodness of the minister does not belong to the sacrament’s substance, for it is not at all certain, but sometimes it is unknown; yet those things that belong to the sacrament’s substance need to be certain; it is clear that if the goodness of the minister is taken away, there is still a sacrament, as long as the other things that belong to the sacrament’s substance are observed.

Reply Obj. 1: ‘Due’ is said in two ways. In one way, what is necessarily due; and in this way the due minister of baptism is any man. In the other way, what is due for fittingness and harmony: and in this way the minister should be a good man, just as it is fitting that the water in which the baptism happens should be clean out of reverence for the sacrament; but if it were dirty, the baptism would happen in it nevertheless. And it is the same way if the minister is wicked; the baptism is conferred nevertheless.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two kinds of bodily action. One is internal, like sensing, living, and things like that; and a withered member does not partake in actions like these. And similarly neither does a bad man partake in the action of the virtues, which is proportionate to this. The other kind of action is outwardly directed; and this kind of action can be done well by withered members, like striking, which can even be done by an entirely inanimate thing, like a stick; and this corresponds proportionally to the administering of the sacraments.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that there are two kinds of agents: one is the principal agent, and the other is instrumental. But a principal agent, since it makes something like itself, must have the form which it imposes by its own action, among univocal agents, or some nobler form, among non-univocal agents. But an instrumental agent does not need to have the form that it imposes as something disposing itself, but only by the mode of intention, as we see regarding the form of a stool in a saw, as was said in Distinction 1, Question 1, Article 4, Subquestions 1 and 2. However, the principal agent in baptizing is God himself by authority, and Christ himself as man, whose merit is at work in baptism; and from the fullness of divine goodness and the grace of Christ grace reaches the baptized. But the person baptizing is only an instrumental agent; hence it makes no difference to receiving the reality of the sacrament whether he has grace himself or not.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher, an action is not attributed properly to an instrument, but to the principal agent. (See Aristotle, Generation of Animals, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 734b28–30: “And just as we should not say that an axe or other instrument or organ was made by the fire alone, so neither shall we say that foot or hand were made by heat alone.”) Hence, speaking properly and per se, that wicked minister is not the one who cleanses, but Christ is, of whom it is said, He is the one who baptizes (John 1:33).

Reply Obj. 2: In prayer, the one praying is like the principal agent, not only like an instrumental one; and hence it is required for the effectiveness of the prayer that it bring about its effect by the work of the one doing it, not only by the work itself having been done, as it is in the sacraments. And for this reason the prayers of the wicked are unfruitful, inasmuch it is from them; but they can be fruitful for the others for whom they pray, because of the others’ devotion, or inasmuch as they pray in the person of the Church.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that something can be called the effect of something else directly or incidentally. A direct effect of something is what is produced by it as ordered to this, as a house is of a housebuilder. An incidental effect is what is joined to the direct effect, as when living in the house is called the effect of the builder. Therefore, this is how I say that the direct effect of baptism is equal, no matter whom it is given by, whether a bad man or a good man, all other things being equal on the part of the one baptized.

But along with baptism’s effect, something else, other than the effect of baptism, whether pertaining to the health of the body or of the soul, can be conferred on the baptized, by the merit of the one baptizing—and this is not, properly speaking, baptism’s effect: for baptism is only an instrumental cause, and it is not an instrument acting by the power of the minister, who is himself also an instrument, acting by the power of Christ and of God.

And by this the solutions to the objections are clear.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that according to the more probable opinion of certain people, anyone in mortal sin who presents himself as minister of the Church in anything spiritual, sins, and this is confirmed by the authority of Dionysius, as will be shown better later on in Distinction 24, Question 1, Article 3, Subquestion 1. And thus a priest, baptizing with solemnity, presenting himself as the minister of the Church, does sin mortally. But if he baptizes simply in a moment of dire need, not as the minister of the Church, but just as any old woman could baptize, he does not sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The text from Augustine does not have much force, since he is speaking about the situation of greatest congruity; and furthermore he speaks of those who baptize as ministers of the Church; hence he adds: it is fitting for the ministers of such a judge to be just.

Reply Obj. 2: It is different with the Eucharist, for that sacrament can never be accomplished without ministers of the Church; and thus anyone celebrating that sacrament presents himself as minister of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: Although it applies to the one baptizing by his office, nevertheless, his office must be justly exercised, as is said in Deuteronomy 16:20: Justly shall you carry out what is just.

Reply Obj. 4: This is not a trap, for someone can be contrite for his sin, and then baptize and consecrate.

Response to Quaestiuncula 5

To the fifth question, it should be said that either a wicked minister is cut off from the Church, or he is not. If he is cut off from the Church, then whoever takes the sacrament from him sins, except in the kind of dire need in which one could even receive it from a Jew or pagan. But if he is not cut off from the Church, then one does not sin by receiving the sacrament from him, unless incidentally, when one shares in his sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Granted that a wicked priest sins by baptizing, it is, however, not necessary that the one who receives or requests baptism from him should sin, even apart from the case of dire need; and this is for two reasons. First, because he cannot be certain that the priest is in mortal sin, since the Holy Spirit may work the justification of the wicked in an instant. Second, because he asks what is right, for one should receive the sacraments from one’s own priest. Nor does this force or induce the priest to sin, since he could render what he should without sinning.

Reply Obj. 2: The person who is baptized is either an adult or not. If he is an adult, it is enough for his salvation for him to seek baptism, since he is baptized by baptism of the spirit; nor does he have to commit simony because of this. But if it is a child who is baptized, then it is better for the one requesting baptism to baptize the child himself than to give money to a simonist priest to baptize. But it is nevertheless permitted for him to buy the water, if it could not be had any other way, for water is not sacred in itself: and if it is holy water it does not work in baptism by the fact of having been blessed, but only as water; and therefore one does not buy holy water, but water. But some people say that one can give money to the priest, since this is not committing simony but compensating him for his disturbance. But the first argument seems better.

Article 3

Whether angels can baptize, as well as men

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 3: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 64, a. 7.) It seems that a demon appearing in the figure of a man could baptize. For Augustine says in his Tractates on John, that baptism is as good as the one in whose power it is given. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 5, par. 6: “baptisma enim tale est, qualis est ille, in cuius potestate datur; non qualis est ille per cuius ministerium datur.”) If therefore the devil should baptize by invoking the power of the Trinity, then the baptism is good.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the person baptizing, no assimilation to God by grace is required, for even the wicked can baptize; nor is even any assimilation by the character needed, for even pagans can baptize. Therefore, the assimilation that we have by nature suffices. But this is also in the demons. Therefore, they can baptize.

On the contrary, there is a certain conformity to Christ in the minister of baptism. But there is no conformity to Christ in the devil, as is clear from 2 Corinthians 6:15. Therefore, the devil cannot confer the sacrament of baptism.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a good angel appearing in the figure of a man could baptize. For baptism is a hierarchical act, for it is illumination and purification, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, p. 1, n. 3 (PG 3:503).) But angels exercise hierarchical acts for us, for they purify, perfect, and illuminate us. Therefore, they can baptize.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, among hierarchical acts it is such that anything that an inferior can do, a superior can do, so that whatever a deacon can do, a priest can do. But according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 12, n. 1 (PG 3:292).) any angel is greater than the highest priest among us, who is called an angel by a partaking in their power (cf. Malachi 2:7). If therefore a human priest can baptize, much more can an angel.

On the contrary, baptism is an act of the Church Militant. But angels are not members of the Church Militant, whether in act or in potency. Therefore, they cannot baptize.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that the devil appearing in the figure of a priest can immerse someone in water, but he cannot confer the sacrament for two reasons. First, because administering the sacraments is only granted to men, who share with the Incarnate Word, from whom the sacraments flowed, in the nature he assumed; and also with the sacraments, in which there is a spiritual power in physical elements, just as men are also composed of a spiritual and physical nature. Second, if he pretended to baptize, it would always be feared that he did not act with the intention of baptizing, which is required for the sacrament, but with the intention of deceiving: for it would not be probable that he would procure so great a good for man as spiritual rebirth.

Reply Obj. 1: Where baptism is given, it is as great as the One in whose power it is given. But the devil cannot give it in any way.

Reply Obj. 2: A human sinner has a resemblance not only to God’s divine nature by his image, but also to his assumed nature; and again it is possible for there to be a likeness by grace in wicked men, but not among the demons. And furthermore the fact that the power of baptizing is granted to all men derives from the necessity of this sacrament, so that a person who can baptize may be easily found by everyone. But the devil does not have fellowship with men; hence it would not be helpful for the necessity of this sacrament if its power were granted to him.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the power of baptizing is not conferred on the good angels for two reasons. First, because they do not have the conformity mentioned above with the sacrament, and with Christ, who is the author of the sacrament. Second, because if this power were granted to them it would be of no avail for the necessity of the sacrament, since they are not seen by men, so that men could be baptized by them. But just as God did not bind his own power in the sacraments, so neither did he restrict the power of consecrating sacraments to certain ministers; hence he, who gave this power to men, could give it to angels as well. Nor would a good angel baptize anyone except by power divinely granted to him; hence if he did baptize, one would not need to be rebaptized, as long as it was certain that he was a good angel; just as it was also judged that a temple that was consecrated by angels did not need to be consecrated by man, as is read in the story of the dedication of St. Michael’s. (The legend of St. Michael the Archangel’s apparition at Mount Gargano is related in the Breviarium Romanum for May 8 as well as in the Legenda Aurea of Jacobus de Voragine. Around the year 490 St. Michael appeared several times to the Bishop of Sipontum near a cave, asking that the cave be dedicated to Christian worship and promising protection of the nearby town of Sipontum from invaders. Pope Gelasius I (492–96) directed that a basilica be erected enclosing the space.)

Reply Obj. 1: Angels can perform the hierarchical acts proportionate to them, namely, the invisible ones; but it is not proportionate to them that they perform hierarchical acts through physical things.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not necessary that a greater power work in the same way as a lower power, but in a higher way; and thus it is not necessary if human priests perform hierarchical acts through sacramental symbols, that angels be able to do this, but rather in a higher way.

Exposition of the Text

What did John the Baptist know? The Lord. (Sent. IV, 5.2 (34), 1, citing Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 5, ch. 11.) It should be known that before John entered the wilderness, he knew Christ personally by spending time with him, since he was his relative in the flesh, and he also knew his dignity from the prophetic revelation, but because of the long delay he had lost the memory of his face; hence he did not recognize him in person. And thus when Christ came for baptism, John learned three things, according to several saints: for according to John Chrysostom, (John Chrysostom, Homilies on John, Homily 17, n. 3 (PG 59:378).) he learned that this man in person was the one he had been preaching would come; according to Augustine, (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 5, n. 6.) he learned that Christ had the power of excellence which he reserved to himself, although he could endow his servants from it, which John had known before in a general way, but now he understood it about this specific person; but according to Jerome, (Jerome on Ezekiel 47:3, in Commentary on Ezekiel, Bk. 4 (PL 25:469).) he learned that by Christ’s baptism not only would there be conferred a grace that cleansed from sin, but also a grace that absolved from all punishment, which came from his Passion.

There would be as many baptisms as there are servants. (Sent. IV, 5.2 (34), 2, citing Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 5, n. 7.) This does not seem to be unfitting, since these baptisms would not differ according to species, since they would have the same form and the same effect, but they would differ only according to matter, just as they differ now. And it should be said that should they differ according to power, and according to invocation, then in that way there would be the chance of schism in the church, so that one person would say, “I am of Paul,” and another would say, “I am of Peter.”