D. 12 - Appearance and effects of the Eucharist
After the Master has examined one of the three things in which the integrity of this sacrament consists, namely, what is reality-and-sacrament, in this part he intends to consider the other two things, namely, what is sacrament alone, and what is reality alone. Hence it is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers what is sacrament alone; in the second, the effect of the sacrament which is the reality alone, at: and this sacrament was instituted for two causes. (Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, 12.6 (71). 1.)
The first is in two parts; in the first, he considers the accidents, which are sacraments, i.e., signs of both the true body of Christ and the mystical body of Christ; in the second, he considers the act of the priest, which is a sacrament or sign of Christ’s Passion, at: after these matters it is asked whether what the priest does is properly called a sacrifice. (Sent IV, 12.5 (70). 1.)
Concerning the first he does two things: first, he considers the accidents themselves; second, the breaking that is founded on them, at: it is also usual to ask about the breaking and division into parts. (Sent IV, 12.2 (67). 1.) Concerning this he does two things: first, he examines the breaking itself; second, the meaning of the parts, at: as to what those parts may signify, Pope Sergius teaches. (Sent IV, 12.4 (69). 1.)
Concerning the first he does two things: first, he raises the question; second, he considers it, at: and so some are pleased to hold that there is no breaking there, as there seems to be. (Sent IV, 12.2 (67). 2.) Concerning this he cites four opinions, the second beginning at: but others say, etc.; (Sent IV, 12.2 (67). 3.) the third at: others teach that the body of Christ is broken and divided according to essence; (Sent IV, 12.3 (68). 1.) the fourth at: but because the body of Christ is incorruptible, it may be truly said that the breaking and division into parts is done not in the substance of the body, but in the sacramental form itself of the bread. (Sent IV, 12.3 (68). 2.) And concerning this he does two things: first, he sets down the fourth opinion; second, he confirms it, for it is true above all the rest, at: nor should you wonder or scoff if the accidents appear to be broken. (Sent IV, 12.3 (68). 2.)
And this sacrament was instituted for two causes. Here he gives the effect of this sacrament. And because from the effect of a thing, its use is taken, for this reason he does two things about this: first, he sets down the effect; second, he determines the mode of using it, at: but if it is asked whether Communion is to be received daily, hear what Augustine teaches about this.
Here there are three questions: first, about the accidents; second, about this sacrament’s effects; third, about its frequency.
Question 1
Accidents and the Eucharist
Concerning the first, three questions arise:
first, whether the accidents are here without a substance;
- second, about the operation of those accidents;
- third, about the breaking which is founded on them.
- Article 1
Whether the accidents are here without a substance
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: I Sent. d. 47, a. 4; ST III, q. 77, a. 1; SCG IV, chs. 62–63, 65; Quodl. III, a. 1; Quodl. IX, q. 3; De rationibus fidei, ch. 8; Super Matt. 26; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 5.) It seems that God cannot make accidents exist without a substance. For if a being were separated from its existence, the being would be a non-being. But God cannot do this, for he cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. Therefore, he cannot separate a being from being. But accidental being is to be present-in, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 5, ch. 30 (1025a14).) Therefore God cannot make it so that an accident is not present in something.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever separates a definition from the thing defined, holds two contradictories to be true at the same time. For this very thing that is man, is a mortal rational animal; and so if it is held to be a man and not a mortal rational animal, it is held to be a man and not to be one. But the definition of an accident is what is present in a substance; hence also in the definition of individual accidents, substance must be included. Therefore, since God cannot make contradictories true at the same time, neither could he make accidents exist without substance.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, God cannot make it that a definition is present in something, and the defined thing is not present in the same thing; nor that there be a mean between affirmation and negation. But if we posited that accidents exist without substance, one of these statements would necessarily follow. Therefore, God cannot do this. Proof of the middle: for the definition of substance is not being in a subject, but existing through itself, and it is opposed like a contradictory to what is being in a subject. But if we posited that a certain accident did not exist in a subject, either we will posit that something is a mean between being in a subject and not being in a subject, or we will posit that something is not a being in a subject, and it is not substance; for if it is substance it is not accident. Therefore if we posit that an accident exists without a subject, one of the two statements follows: either that there is a middle between two contradictories, or that a definition may be separated from what it defines, which again implies contradictories to be true at the same time.
On the contrary (1), it is said: for no word shall be impossible with God (Luke 1:37).
Furthermore (2), God can do more things than a man can understand or imagine. But certain philosophers posited that dimensions can exist without a subject, like those who posited separated mathematicals. (Thomas would have in mind here either Plato or some of the Platonists, who spoke of the circle as such or the form of the circle, the dyad, etc.) Therefore, God can do this.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is not fitting to this sacrament that accidents exist without substance. (Parallels: above, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2; ST III, q. 75, a. 5; SCG IV, chs. 62–63, 65; De rationibus fidei, ch. 8; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 5.) For in the most perfect sacrament it is not suitable that there be anything opposed to divine ordination. But the divine ordination is that accidents be in a subject. Therefore, in this sacrament it is not fitting that it be without a subject.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no fallacy is appropriate to the sacrament of truth. But this sacrament is of the greatest truth, because it contains the one who said, I am the truth (John 14:6). Therefore, since a fallacy results when accidents exist without a subject, for accidents, in themselves, signify that their proper substance is underlying, therefore it seems that it does not befit this sacrament for accidents to be without a subject.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, matter should be proportioned to form. But in the sacrament’s form it would not be fitting for there to be the accidents of the words without the essence of the words. Therefore, neither in the matter is it fitting that the accidents of the element exist without the element.
On the contrary (1), accidents correspond to their subject. But the substance of bread, which was formerly the subject of the former accidents, is changed into another state by the fact that it is converted into the body of Christ. Therefore, it was fitting that the accidents also be changed into another state, namely, so that they are there without a subject.
Furthermore (2), this sacrament is called the mystery of faith. But faith is not only above the intellect, but also above the senses. Therefore, in this sacrament there should not only be something above the understanding, like the fact that the body of Christ is contained under such small dimensions of bread; but also something above the senses, namely, that the accidents that the senses perceive do not exist in their proper substance.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that accidents are not in this sacrament without substance. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 47, a. 4; ST III, q. 75, a. 5; q. 77, aa. 1–2; SCG IV, chs. 62–63, 65; Quodl. III, a. 1; Quodl. IX, q. 3; De rationibus fidei, ch. 8; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 5.) For to be in a substance applies equally to all accidents. But whiteness is not here without a subject, which is clear from the fact that it is divided per accidens, which only belongs to something existing in a subject. Therefore, neither quantity nor any accident is here without a subject.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what the senses perceive in this sacrament is there according to truth; otherwise there would be false pretenses in this sacrament. But the senses do not only perceive there quantity or whiteness, but also a certain quantity and something white. Therefore, there are no accidents there without a subject.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, an accident is only individuated by its subject, just as form is by matter. But accidents are individuated there, or else they would not be sensible. Therefore, they do not exist without a subject.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, every form separated from matter is understanding in act, as is proved by philosophers. But if accidents are here without a subject, they will be certain forms without matter: for they do not have their own material part. Therefore, they will be understanding in act, which seems false.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, the more something approaches divine simplicity, the more simple it is. But if there are accidents here without substance, they approach divine simplicity more than the angels: for in the angels there is composition, at least of what it is and that it is, which cannot be found in these accidents. Therefore, they will be more noble than the angels, which is false.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, it is impossible for density to exist without matter, nor rarity: for this is the definition of the dense, that a lot of matter is contained under small dimensions; and the definition of the rare is the opposite. But the sense of touch perceives density in this sacrament. Therefore, there is matter here under the dimensions; therefore the dimensions do not exist by themselves, and so neither do the other accidents.
On the contrary (1), just as was said in the previous distinction, no substance exists there other than that of the body of Christ. But the accidents that appear are not in the body of Christ as in a subject, for they do not denominate it. Therefore, they are not in any subject.
Furthermore (2), the species remain in the sacrament so that they may lead us by their signification to the body of Christ. But if they were in anything as in a subject, they would not lead us to the body of Christ, but more to the knowledge of their own subject. Therefore, there are accidents here without a subject.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that as is said in the first proposition of the Book of Causes: the first cause makes a more vehement impression on what is caused by a second cause than the second cause itself. (For the text of this proposition as well as discussion of it, see Thomas’s Commentary on the Book of Causes, 5–11.) Hence when the second cause removes its own influence from what is caused, the first cause’s influence can still remain in what it caused; just as when rational is removed, living remains, and when that is removed, being remains. Since therefore the first cause of accidents, and of everything existing, is God, but the second cause of accidents is substance, for accidents are caused by the principles of substance, God could keep accidents in being while removing their second cause, namely, substance. And thus without any doubt it must be said that God can make accidents without a subject.
Reply Obj. 1: ‘To be present-in’ does not name the being of an accident absolutely, but rather the mode of being that belongs to an accident by its order to the proximate cause of its being. And since once an accident’s order to its proximate cause is removed, its order to its first clause can remain, according to which its mode of being is not being present-in, but being from another, in this way God can make something an accident and not present-in anything; however, he still will not remove an accident’s being from the accident, but its mode of being.
Reply Obj. 2: As Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics, existing through itself is not the definition of a substance: for by this what it is is not demonstrated, but only its being; and what it is is not its being, otherwise it could not be a genus, for being cannot be shared in the manner of a genus, since the individual things contained in a genus differ from each other according to being. But the definition, or quasi-definition, of substance is a thing having whatness, for which being is acquired or due, not in another. And likewise to be in a subject is not the definition of an accident, but on the contrary, it is a thing to which it is due to exist in another. And this is never separated from any accident, nor can it be separated: for to that thing that is an accident it is always due that it exist in another, according to the notion of what it is. But it can be that what is due to something according to the notion of what it is does not apply to it by the power of a divine agent. And so it is clear that to make an accident exist without substance is not to separate a definition from what it defines; and if this is sometimes called the definition of an accident, the definition mentioned should be understood in the foregoing way: for sometimes definitions are set down by authors for the sake of brevity, not according to due order, but they touch on those things from which a definition can be taken.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as being in a subject is removed from the accidents in this sacrament, so it belongs to them not to be in a subject; hence no middle between affirmation and negation is maintained. Nor does it follow, however, that the definition applies to something to which the thing defined does not apply; for not being in a subject is not the definition of substance, as was said, but to have the whatness to which such being belongs; and this does not apply to the accidents in this sacrament because “not being in a subject” does not apply to them by reason of their whatness, but by divine power.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that it was said above in the preceding distinction how it is appropriate to this sacrament that the accidents remain. But for the accidents to exist without a subject is fitting to this sacrament in many ways. First, in signification; for species existing without substance more expressly and directly lead us to the body of Christ, which is contained under them; for if they had a subject, they would lead directly to that subject. Second, because of the effect, which is the union of the members to the head, which happens by faith; and so in this sacrament it is necessary for something to be above nature, by which our understanding grows accustomed to the things of faith that are to be believed. Third, as to its use, which is a spiritual food; and so it is fitting that no subject that could be bodily food underlies the accidents. Fourth, as to perfection, for because this sacrament is the most perfect, all the things that are in this sacrament take on their highest state, like the fact that the bread’s substance is converted into the glorified body united to the divinity; and because of this it is given to the accidents to exist without subject in this sacrament.
Reply Obj. 1: The divine disposing that orders something according to the general law also reserves to itself certain things to be done outside the general law for some privilege of grace to be communicated. Nor does any disordering follow from this, for divine disposing imposes order on every single thing.
Reply Obj. 2: Judging about the substance of a thing does not pertain to the senses, but to the understanding, whose object is what is, as is said in On the Soul 3; (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 6 (430b27–28).) and so there is no deception there, for accidents are what the senses judge about in this case; but the understanding has true judgment about the substance when helped by faith. Nor is it unfitting that without faith the understanding would err in this sacrament, for it is the same in other matters that are of faith.
Reply Obj. 3: The power of transubstantiation is in the words; and so for there to be a true transubstantiation, it is necessary that there be true words; but matter is there for signifying; and so it suffices that the accidents remain by means of which the signification is completed.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that some people said that the bread’s true substance remained under the sacrament together with the body of Christ; and according to this the accidents did not exist in this sacrament without a subject. But this opinion was disproved in the previous distinction.
The other opinion is that the substantial form remains there and in it are founded all the accidents that appear. But it is no less difficult to separate the material substantial form from the matter than to separate accidents from substances. And furthermore, quantities do not relate to form except by reason of matter, which is why immaterial forms lack dimensions. And so, since other accidents are referred to substance by means of quantity, no form existing without matter could be the subject of sensible accidents. Boethius also says in his book On the Trinity that a simple form cannot be a subject. (Boethius, Quomodo trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii [De Trinitate], ch. 2 (PL 64:1250; Loeb, “Opuscula Sacra,” pp. 8–12).)
And so others have said that those accidents are founded in the air as in their subject. But this opinion cannot stand. For it is clear that before transubstantiation, air was not existing under the dimensions of the bread. Therefore, if there is air there once the conversion has happened, air would have to have entered under those dimensions by local motion; and this motion is not perceived. And furthermore, it is unfitting that the subject be moved to the accidents by local motion, and that the accidents transfer from one subject to another. It has also been proven by philosophers that a natural body and a mathematical body cannot exist together. (See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 8 (216a26ff.).) And so, since those dimensions that did exist are not a natural body, but a mathematical one, air could not have existed together with those dimensions, nor could it be their subject, because air has its own proper dimensions. Therefore since all dimensions are of the same species in whatever matter they exist, because matter does not enter into their definition, if the dimensions of the bread are again in the air as in a subject, it follows that two accidents of the same species are in the same subject; which is for contradictories to be simultaneously true, for the numbering of accidents of the same species is only by the subject; and thus if the subject is one, it follows that those accidents are many and not many. It is also clear that air is not susceptible to accidents like these, namely, firmness, determinate shape, and others like this that appear there.
And so it should be said that the accidents are there without a subject; for it cannot be said that they are in the body of Christ as their subject. But it should be known that it belongs to bodily substance to be the subject of accidents by its own matter, to which it first belongs to be subject to another. Now the first disposition of matter is quantity; for its being divided or being undivided depends upon quantity, as does its oneness or multiplicity, which are the first things consequent on being; and because of this they are dispositions of all matter, not just this or that matter alone. And for this reason all other accidents are founded on substance through the mediation of quantity, and quantity is prior to them naturally; and so it does not include sensible matter in its definition, although it includes intelligible matter, as is said in the Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 7, ch. 10 (1036a8–9).) Hence certain people were deceived by this, so that they believed the dimensions to be the substance of sensible things; for once qualities have been removed, nothing sensible seemed to remain except quantity, which nevertheless according to its being depends on substance, just like all the other accidents. But by divine power it is conferred on the dimensions that were the bread’s that in this sacrament they subsist without a subject, which is the first property of substance. And as a result it is given to them to support other accidents, just as they did when a substance was underlying them; and this is how other accidents are in the dimensions as in a subject, but those dimensions themselves are not in a subject.
Reply Obj. 1: The first accidents consequent on substance are quantity and quality; and these two are proportionate to the two essential principles of substance, namely, form and matter; for quantity corresponds to matter, (hence Plato posited large and small as differences of matter); but quality is on the part of the form. And since matter is the first subject that is not in something else, but form is in something else, namely, matter, this is why quantity approaches more closely than quality to what is not being in something else, and consequently more than the other accidents.
Reply Obj. 2: Dimensive quantity as regards it definition does not depend on sensible matter, although it does depend on it as regards its being. And so in predicates and subjects of sentences it takes the mode of substance and the mode of accident; which is why we call a line both a quantity and how much, both a magnitude and large. And so since dimensions exist there without substance, the senses do not only see quantity, but also an amount. But it is plain with respect to the other accidents that there is something white there, for whiteness is there in a subject.
Reply Obj. 3: There are two things in the concept of ‘individual’: namely, that there is a being in act, whether in itself or in another; and that it is divided from others that do or can exist in the same species, existing undivided in itself. And thus the first principle of individuation is matter, by which it acquires being in act for any such form whether substantial or accidental; and the secondary principle of individuation is dimension, for matter is able to be divided by it. And this is why it is impossible in things that lack dimension for there to be another division except by form, which makes the difference of species. And because of this among the angels there are as many species as individuals, for since they are forms or subsistent whatnesses from themselves, they have being in act and distinction; and so they do not need matter or dimension for their individuation. Therefore, if quantity without matter had being in act, it would have individuation through itself, for it has through itself that dimension according to which matter is divided. And so one part would differ from another not in species but in number, according to the order that is found in the position of the parts. And similarly one line would differ from another in number as long as it were taken in a different position. Therefore because in this sacrament we hold that dimensions subsist by themselves, it is clear that they are individuated by themselves, and the other accidents that are founded in them are individuated by them.
Reply Obj. 4: What is understanding or understood in act, according to philosophers, must be separated not only from matter but also from the individuating conditions of matter; and this is not the case here, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 5: Since those accidents have being and proper essences, and their essence is not their being, it is clear that being and ‘what it is’ differ in them. And so they have that composition that is found in the angels, and further composition on the part of quantity, which is not found in the angels; and this is how they are more distant from divine simplicity.
Reply Obj. 6: Just as the subject that is included in the definition of other accidents is not of the accident’s essence, so also matter, which is included in the definition of rarity and density, is not of their essence. For density is not more matter existing under small dimensions, but a certain property consequent on the fact that matter is so arranged; and thus God can make such a property, even if matter did not exist.
Article 2
About the operation of those accidents
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: It seems that the accidents that remain in this sacrament cannot change something outside them. (Parallels: ST III, q. 77, a. 3; Resp. 35 ad Lector. Venetum.) For those things act on each other that share in matter, as is said in On the Generation of Animals 1. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. 1, ch. 6 (322b13).) But those accidents do not share in matter with external bodies. Therefore, they cannot change them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, natural action requires natural contact, as is clear in On the Generation of Animals 1. (Ibid., 322b22.) But physical touch does not apply to mathematicals, i.e., separated dimensions, but only mathematical touch, just as also place, as it says in the same text. Therefore, since in this sacrament there are separated dimensions on which the other accidents are founded, as was said, it seems that they cannot act on anything extrinsic.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is affected, although it is contrary in the beginning, nevertheless in the end is the same. But if external bodies were changed, once they were changed they would not be forms alone but forms in matter. Therefore, they cannot be changed by dimensions that are forms alone.
On the contrary (1), nothing is sensed without changing the senses. But accidents of this sort are sensed. Therefore, they change things.
Furthermore (2), everything that has being can act in some way: for no thing is left without its proper operation. But these accidents have being. Therefore, they can act.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that these accidents cannot substantially change anything extrinsic. (Parallels: ST III, q. 77, a. 3; Resp. 35 ad Lector. Venetum.) For what generates must be like what is generated. But every generated thing is composed of form and matter. Therefore, since these accidents are only forms, they cannot change something generated outside themselves. And the Philosopher uses this reasoning in the Metaphysics 7, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 7, ch. 8 (1033b20ff.).) against Plato, who claimed that separated forms were the causes of sensible objects being generated.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing acts outside its own species, but always within it: for the effect is not nobler than the cause. But substance is nobler than any accident. Therefore, these accidents cannot generate any substance.
On the contrary, these species have the same power that they had before transubstantiation, for nothing is taken away from them, only added. But before transubstantiation, they could change something substantially. Therefore, they also can afterward.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that those accidents cannot be corrupted in any way. (Parallels: ST III, q. 77, a. 4; SCG IV, ch. 66; Resp. 35 ad Lector. Venetum.) For those accidents are only forms. But form is something that consists of an invariable essence, as it says in the book of the Six Principles. (Gilbert de la Porrée (Gilbertus Porretanus), Sex principiis (ed. Heysse), ch. 1, l. 4, pg. 8.) Therefore, species like this can never be corrupted.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every thing subsisting on its own without matter is incorruptible: for matter is the principle of corruption, as is seen in the cases of angels and souls. But these species are forms subsisting without matter. Therefore, they are incorruptible.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if they are corrupted, either their corruption is natural or miraculous. But it is not natural: for just as only composed things are generated naturally, so also only composed things are naturally corrupted. Likewise, neither is it miraculous: for this would only happen by the power of God, but God, according to Augustine, is not a cause of anything tending toward non-being. (See Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (CCSL 44A), q. 21.) Therefore, it does not corrupt in any way.
On the contrary (1), as long as sensible accidents exist, they can be sensed. But at some point accidents like this can no longer be sensed. Therefore, they can stop existing.
Furthermore (2), as long as the species remain, the body of Christ also remains under the sacrament. But at some point the body of Christ stops existing under the sacrament. Therefore, sometimes those species cease to exist.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that nothing can be generated from them. (Parallels: ST III, q. 77, a. 5; SCG IV, ch. 66; Quodl. IX, a. 5, ad 3; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 4.) For corruption is opposed to generation or making. But everything that does not have matter as part of it, if it is made, must be made out of nothing. Therefore, if it is corrupted, it must tend toward nothing, and nothing be made from it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, substance and accident are more different than body and spirit. But spirit cannot be made from a body, as is clear in the book On the Two Natures. (Boethius, Liber de persona et duabus naturis contra Eutychen et Nestorium, ch. 6 (PL 64:1349; Loeb ed., pp. 108–9).) Therefore, from those species that are accidents alone, no substance can be generated.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is impossible for many things to be made out of one thing at one and the same time. But if anything is generated, it means that substance and accident are found in it. Therefore, it cannot be generated by accident alone.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, if anything is generated, either that generation is natural or miraculous. But it is not natural, for the thing generated and what it is generated from naturally share in matter, as is clear in all natural generating; but that cannot be found here. Likewise, it is not miraculous: for the fact that worms are sometimes generated from these accidents, or they crumble into dust, shows irreverence for such a great sacrament, which is not from God. Therefore, in no way can anything be generated from accidents (Species has many meanings, including appearance, form, kind, beauty, and the species that is contrasted with genus. In reference to the Eucharist, Aquinas uses species to mean the substance of the body and blood of Christ under the appearance or accidents of bread and wine.) like this.
On the contrary (1), what appears sensibly, if it is kept for a long time, will gradually change into something else.
Furthermore (2), Innocent says, in anything where a likeness would be lacking, the sacrament would not exist, but it would betray itself and steal the place of faith. (Innocent III, De sacro altaris mysterio, Bk. 4, ch. 16 (PL 217:867).) Therefore, the species must bear a likeness to the substance of bread in every way. But something can be generated from the substance of bread. Therefore, the same is true of the species that remain there.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it cannot nourish. (Parallels: ST III, q. 77, a. 6; SCG IV, ch. 66; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 4.) For all food that nourishes changes into the body, and excesses are expelled from it. But this food does not go into the body, as Ambrose says in the text. (See Lombard, d. 12, ch. 4, n. 3, citing Ambrose, De sacramentis (CSEL 73), Bk. 5, ch. 4, nn. 24–25.) Therefore, it does not nourish.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, we are nourished by the same things of which we are made, as is said in On Generation and Corrupton 2. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 2, ch. 8 (335a10).) But we are not made from accidents. Therefore, we are not nourished by them.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that nourishes in some way breaks a fast. But if these species nourish us, then they would break our fast; and then after consuming the body of Christ someone could not receive Communion, which is false.
On the contrary (1), it says in the Gloss on this text: for one man goes hungry while another is drunk (1 Cor 11), (See Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:539.) that some people are drunk from using the species of this sacrament.
Furthermore (2), nothing takes away thirst or hunger except what nourishes. But it can be sensibly experienced that thirst is removed by this drink, particularly if it is taken in great quantity. Therefore, these species nourish.
Quaestiuncula 6
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that no liquid could be mixed with those species. (Parallels: ST III, q. 77, a. 8; Quodl. X, q. 1, a. 3.) For as the Philosopher proves in On Generation and Corruption 1, accidents do not mix with substance. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 10 (327b20–23).) But any liquid is a kind of substance. Therefore, since those species are only accidents, it seems that nothing can be mixed with them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as this sacrament is consecrated under a certain form of words, so also is holy water. But if water is mixed with holy water, it makes all of it holy. Therefore, if any liquid can be mixed with consecrated wine, it would make all of it consecrated; and then that liquid would have changed into the blood of Christ without the form of the words, which is false.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, wet mixtures form one surface. Therefore, if any liquid were mixed into those species, one surface is made of the added liquid and the pre-existing species. But the surface of a liquid is in a subject, while the surface of the species is not in a subject. Therefore, the same surface will be in a subject and not in a subject, which is impossible.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the body of Christ is not under the sacrament by there being another substance under those species. But if some thin liquid, like wine or water, were mixed into those species, since it is not contained under its own boundaries, it is necessary that it flow out to the limits of the dimensions under which the body of Christ existed. Therefore, the body of Christ would cease to be there. But as long as those species exist, the body of Christ does not cease to be there. Therefore, the species would cease to exist there: therefore they would be corrupted and not mixed in.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as white and black are different colors, so large and small are different quantities, or things related to quantity. But the same color is not white and black. Therefore, neither are the same dimensions large and small. But if any liquid were added, those dimensions would be made large. Therefore they are not the same as before; therefore they have not been mixed together.
On the contrary (1), according to the Philosopher in On Generation and Corruption 1, things that are divisible into the tiniest parts are very mixable. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 10 (328a35ff.).) But this is the case with these species. Therefore, etc.
Furthermore (2), it is a bigger thing to be corrupted than to be mixed into something. But those species can be corrupted. Therefore, they can also be mixed into something.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that to act only belongs to a thing subsisting on its own; and so neither matter nor form acts, but only a composite, which nevertheless does not act by reason of its matter, but by reason of its form, which is act, and the principle of action. And since quantity holds itself on the part of the matter, and quality on the part of the form, for this reason quantity acts only by means of quality, which is per se the principle of action; hence qualities are sensible first, quantities second. Therefore, because in the sacrament quantities retain the same mode of being that they had when the bread’s substance existed, for this reason they have the same mode of acting, so that they change and act naturally as before. For the quantity, which has a different mode of being since it is not in a subject, only acts by means of quality.
Reply Obj. 1: The matter of an accident is its proximate subject, but the proximate subject of corporeal quality is quantity, like the surface of a color; and so quality which is the principle of action shares in some way in matter with those things that are outside, because on both sides quantity is found to be underlying.
Reply Obj. 2: Mathematics abstracts not only from matter but also from sensible accidents. And because the dimensions in this sacrament are not separated from sensible accidents, for this reason they not only have touch in a metaphorical sense, like mathematicals, but also physical touch: for by reason of those accidents they can change and be changed.
Reply Obj. 3: As to accidental change it is found to be similar enough on both sides, because just as in this sacrament there is no separate whiteness, but a white thing that acts, so also outwardly by this change whiteness does not come about, but rather something white; and so insofar as it is this kind of thing, what is effected in the end is the same.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that in natural actions substantial forms are not an immediate and proximate principle of action, but they act by means of active and passive qualities as by their proper instruments; as it says in On the Soul 2, natural heat is that by which the soul acts. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (416b25–30).) And so qualities do not act only in their proper power, but also in the power of substantial form. And for this reason their action terminates not only in accidental form, but also in substantial form; and because of this, generation is the terminus of alteration. However, they receive instrumental power of this kind by the very fact of being caused by essential principles. And so just as when the substances are removed the same being remains in the accidents according to species by divine power, so also the same power remains in them that they had previously; and thus just as before they could change a substantial form, so too now.
Reply Obj. 1: We do not at all posit separate qualities like this, as Plato posited natural forms, since we posit for the subject what was first their proximate subject; and so it is not the same argument here as there. Nevertheless, what generates here is also not at all similar to what is generated: for what is generated is substance, but what generates is not. But the reason this happens is because, as was said, qualities like this have an instrumental power of generating. But what is generated need not resemble the instrument, but only the chief thing generating, as the Commentator says in the Metaphysics 11, (Averroes, Metaphysics, Bk. 11, text 13.) for an instrument does not act by its own power, but by another’s power, and it resembles that thing, not the instrument; which is why the generated here resembles the substance that was formerly there. But Plato did not consider separated forms as things that generate instrumentally, but as first and chief causes of generation.
Reply Obj. 2: Nothing acts by its proper power outside its own species; but by the power of another, whose instrument it is, it can act outside its own species, as a saw acts to form a stool.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that each and every thing has being proper to its own species. For being is not of one species in all things, just as neither is animality of one species in all animals, nor is humanity the same in number among all men, just as also each thing has its own proper action. Hence, just as in the qualities that remain in the sacrament there remains an action like the action of the substance that previously existed, so also the subsistent being that shares the dimensions that remain is like that being that the bread’s substance formerly had. Hence just as the quality performs the same action that it performed before, when the substance of the bread and wine existed, so the being in which the dimensions subsist is destroyed by the same occurrences that would have destroyed it before, when the same substance existed. And because of this the remaining accidents are corrupted in the same way as they would have been corrupted before.
Now there are two ways they could have been corrupted before. In one way, with the substance of the subject remaining, by a certain accidental change: as according to a certain alteration in the qualities, the wine could change color or flavor; and then the color that had been there before, or the flavor, would have been corrupted. But quantities could not have been corrupted in the way mentioned by a movement in quantity, namely, increase, for wine and bread are not animate bodies that can be the subjects of increase and diminution, except by addition and division. For according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 3, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 3, ch. 5 (1002b1).) in the addition of one quantity to another, one quantity begins to exist when two cease to exist, and the reverse happens in division. In the other way, by the corruption of the substance, which does indeed happen by the transformation of accidents, either on the part of the qualities, for, like generation, corruption is a terminus of change; or on the part of the quantity: for since each natural thing has a determinate quantity, inasmuch as a division could be made that species will not remain.
And this is why sometimes in this sacrament when a certain alteration is made in the qualities, that being of the dimensions still remains conformed to the former substance; and then by reason of this corruption of accidents, the body of Christ does not cease to exist under the sacrament. But sometimes the change comes to its terminus, and then the being mentioned is destroyed, and that is how the sacrament ceases to exist. And likewise on the part of quantity: for if a division is made into parts of such great amount that it is enough for the appearance of bread or wine, there are indeed other dimensions, for the continuous parts that existed in potency, become actual. But the being remains like the pre-existing substance, and therefore the sacrament still exists. However, if the quantity of the parts is not sufficient for this, both the dimension and the being mentioned cease to exist. And then the body of Christ ceases to exist under the sacrament.
Reply Obj. 1: A form is said to be invariable because it is not subject to variation; however, it is destroyed by variation, as is clear in the case of change and increase; and so in a broad way they are said to be corrupted, as everything that ceases to exist can be said to be corrupted.
Reply Obj. 2: The dimensions that are the closest dispositions of the matter retain the place of the matter in this sacrament; and so they are related to the being in which they subsist as matter to substantial form, and they are underneath the qualtities like a subject under accidents. And in this way they can be a principle of corruption, just as matter would also be. Also, the parts of the dimensions, since they exist in potency, have a certain character of matter by reason of the whole dimension. And so a certain corruption happens on their part in the whole dimension by division.
Reply Obj. 3: It is miraculous for species to remain in this way, but the fact that as they remain they are corrupted, is natural; just as it is miraculous for a blind man to receive his sight, but that he sees once he has received sight, is natural. For a certain mode of composition remains in these accidents, as long as the quantity retains the character of matter, and the qualities retain the character of form, as was said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that some people say that although those species can be corrupted and spoiled, nevertheless, worms and the like are not generated by this spoiling or corruption. But this is nothing. For it is clear that when the accidents are corrupted, they do not cease in such a way that they disappear altogether, as if they were entirely destroyed, but something sensible replaces those accidents, and this must be something newly generated. Nor does it make a difference what it is—-whether it is worms, or dust, or anything like that—-for there is the same difficulty with all of them.
And so other people have said that the substance of bread remains there, from which other things can be generated materially. But this opinion was disproved above. (See d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1.) And so others have said that by the mutual action of the sacrament’s accidents and the surrounding bodies worms are generated from the air around. But this does not seem to be true, for those accidents do not have any other action there than they would have if the substance remained; but when the substance existed, it could not generate worms out of the air, or dust, by such an action; and so neither can it now.
And furthermore, it appears to the senses that in the place where the body of Christ existed, something exists that was generated; and the previous change appears in the same place. Now air was not in that place before the last instant of the species’ corruption; for then it would have entered under the dimensions that the body of Christ was existing under, which is impossible. Nor was it moved to that place, since perhaps it remained still. And so it follows that all the air’s movement, and its alteration and corruption, and the generation of worms or dust is at the same instant, which is impossible.
And furthermore, the same thing would happen if the body of Christ were conserved among other solid bodies, which air could not enter, and no change would appear to be made in the solid bodies surrounding it.
And furthermore, if the body of Christ were consecrated in great quantity, the same thing could happen; and so much contact with the air could not happen easily without its sensible change.
And therefore others say that when the sacrament has been completed, the bread’s substance returns under the appearances that it was under before, and worms are generated from it, or something like that. But this cannot be. For as long as the body of Christ is there, the substance of the bread does not return, for then the body of Christ would exist under the appearances along with the bread’s substance; which is the third opinion, which is not supportable. Now as long as the appearances exist there, the body of Christ remains under those appearances; and so as long as the appearances remain, the substance of bread does not return. But once those appearances have been removed, the substance of bread is still not there, but the substance of worms or dust, or other things like this. For the substance of bread never exists without the appearances of bread, and therefore the substance of bread cannot return.
Unless perhaps it were said to return only as to its matter, for that same matter that was previously under the form of bread, afterward comes to be under the form of dust or the like; and this could stand with the second opinion touched on earlier, which held that the substance of the bread is resolved into the underlying matter, which cannot stand, as was proved above. (See d. 11, q. 1, a. 2.)
But as to the other side, which held that it would be annihilated, that cannot stand; for what returns to nothing cannot be taken up again in the same number.
But as to the first opinion, which is commonly upheld, it cannot stand in any way, for what is converted into something else cannot return, unless the other thing is converted back into it. But the substance of bread is converted into the body of Christ, and this substance, namely, the bread’s, has become that one, namely, the body of Christ’s, as is clear from what has already been said. (See ibid.) And therefore it cannot be that the bread’s substance returns, whether in whole or in part, unless the body of Christ is converted back into the substance of bread, which is impossible. And so it is impossible to say that the substance of bread returns, whether as a whole or as a part, if “to return” is taken properly so that what returns is the same in number.
But if the matter of the bread is said to return, not so that it returns the same in number, but as a different matter of the same description, then it will be necessary to say that that different matter would be newly created. And perhaps this is what was meant by those who said the substance of the bread returned; therefore by this mode the opinion can be probably enough upheld, so that it may be said that God creates matter for this, that the sacrament will not be disgraced and so that faith would not lose its merit. But the physical matter created in the beginning is not increased; for as much matter is newly created now as was converted into the substance of the body of Christ.
However, it can also be said otherwise that those species, just as they have from the fact that they subsist that they can do whatever they could have when the substances of bread and wine existed, so they have that they can be converted into whatever the pre-existing substances could have been converted into, which can be understood thus. For as the Commentator says about the Physics 1, and in his book On the Substance of the Earth, (Averroes, Physics, Bk. 1, text 63; idem, De substantia orbis, ch. 1.) in the matter of generable things and corruptible things it is necessary to understand unbounded dimensions before the advent of substantial form; otherwise a division of matter could not be understood such that in different parts of the matter there would be different substantial forms. Now after the advent of substantial form, dimensions like this receive a limited and complete being. But whatever is understood in matter before the advent of substantial form, this remains the same in number in what is generated and in that from which it is generated; for once what comes after is removed, what comes before must remain. Now those unbounded dimensions are related to the genus of quantity as matter is to the genus of substance.
And so just as in any complete thing in the genus of substance one can take matter, which is incomplete being in its genus, so also in the completed dimensions that exist in this sacrament, one can take incomplete dimensions. And by means of these the matter of the bread would receive the form of whatever would be generated from the bread, if the bread had not been converted into the body of Christ. And so just as to these dimensions it was given that they would subsist and exist under both that being that is like the being of the prior substance, and the termination of quantity, and all other accidents; so also it is given to them that they can exist under another natural form, and other accidents. For they do not have from their nature that they exist only under an accident, but also a substantial form, as was said; and then either matter will also come consequently because of the natural concomitance of form with matter, as because of the natural concomitance of Christ’s soul with his body, the soul was under the sacrament; and this in a certain way returns to the first thing said, so that namely, matter is made anew; or the nature of matter will be given to the dimension itself by divine power because of the closeness to it, so that in this way what is generated is a composite of matter and form.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the penultimate opinion those species inwardly pass away into nothing; but by the substance returning in the way mentioned something is generated that takes its place. Nor is it said to be generated out of the species, where the ‘out of’ means a material cause, but only as it means an order, as noon happens out of morning, which is to say, after. But according to another opinion that sensible whole that was shown to be in the sacrament had something (namely, a part of it) like matter, namely, unbounded dimensions; and that does not pass away into nothing, but remains as it also would remain if it were the substance of bread.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not out of the question that God could change a body into a spirit; and yet in a certain regard unbounded dimensions are closer to bodily matter than a body is to a spirit.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as when air is converted into fire, it is not said that the matter of the air becomes two things, namely, the matter of fire and the form of fire, but only one thing, namely that it becomes fire; so also, those dimensions are not said to become two things, but only one, namely, matter dimensioned in this way, and this is done by divine power.
Reply Obj. 4: According to any position it is necessary to hold that something in this generating is miraculous, and something is natural. For the return of substance, whether the creation of matter, or the conversion of dimensions into matter, is miraculous. But that matter already existing should receive a form like this, whose dispositions preceded in the dimensions, this is natural.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that some people have said that these species do not nourish us, but refresh and inebriate by accidental change alone, just as some people are inebriated by the odor of wine, and they are refreshed and lose their hunger from the flavor and odor of food. But this cannot be, for a change like this, although it might refresh one for the moment, nevertheless cannot sustain one; which nevertheless those species would do if they were consumed in great quantity. And so others have said that the substantial form of the bread remains and it has the same operation as bread does, and so it nourishes just like bread would. But this cannot be, for the operation of form is not to suffer but to act; however, nourishment does not nourish unless it is converted into the substance of what is nourished, and so it nourishes according as it suffers, and according as something is generated from it, which cannot be said about form. And so it should be said that since something is generated from those species by the way mentioned, they can also nourish in the same way.
Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that this does not change into the body, this is to be understood of the reality contained under the sacrament, namely, the true body of Christ, which is not changed into the one eating it, but changes that person into itself spiritually. But the species are converted into the body of the one eating, just as also they can be converted into some other body, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: The accidents remaining do not nourish in their own accidental being, but in the same way that they are converted into something else; either something else is created under them or returns to them.
Reply Obj. 3: That nourishment is not entirely according to the order of nature, as has been said; and so this kind of eating does not break a fast.
Response to Quaestiuncula 6
To the sixth question, it should be said that certain people say that if any liquid is added to the species of wine in any quantity whatsoever, the body of Christ immediately ceases to exist there. For those dimensions do not remain the same, and added liquid is diffused throughout the whole. And so since the body of Christ does not exist under the species with another body, the body of Christ must cease to exist in all of it.
But this position cannot stand. For it is clear that the body of Christ remains as long as those accidents remain; but those accidents are not corrupted in any way other than the substance of bread and wine would be corrupted. But it is clear that wine would not be destroyed by having a little liquid added to it, and so neither would the species of wine that remain. For the arguments given are not compelling. First, because not every destruction of dimensions destroys the sacrament, for just as addition makes new dimensions, so does division, as is evident from what the Philosopher has said. But division does not take away the truth of the sacrament, as is clear in the fact that the bread is broken. Therefore, neither would addition, for the kind of difference in dimensions that an addition or division like this causes, has to do with their very determination, not their indeterminate being according to which it belongs to them to subsist, nor the being by which they subsist like the former substance. In the same way, it is clear that a little liquid cannot be diffused throughout all the dimensions, unless it were thinned out and transformed into another species. Hence it is not necessary that it occupy all the dimensions.
And so it should be said rather that any liquid is mixed with those species in the same way that it would be mixed with the substance of wine. But if the added liquid were of equal or greater amount, it would permeate all the dimensions of the wine; and so if it were of another species, it would make a different third species of liquid. But if it were of the same species, it would make the wine into a different wine in number, especially as to the accidents. But if the liquid added were of lesser amount, it would not permeate the dimensions of all the wine, but only some, and those it would change into a different liquid in the ways mentioned, and it might change according to species if it were of another species. However, it is clear that in this sacrament the body of Christ only remains as long as those species remain the same in number; and so if a little liquid were added, it would corrupt part of the species, and under that part the body of Christ would cease to exist. But it is not probable that one drop of water would be diffused throughout the whole goblet. But if it were added in a large amount, then it would corrupt the species according to the whole, and so the body of Christ would completely cease to exist there.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher understands of an accident whose subject is a substance that it is not mixed into it; but this is not the case here.
Reply Obj. 2: In holy water no substantial change happens to that water, as is the case in this sacrament, but rather it acquires a certain power from being blessed. And so that power can extend to the added water. But in this sacrament the wine is substantially converted into something else by the power of the words, and so it is not necessary that the added wine also be converted into the sacrament; but it can be that it is converted into wine by virtue of the wine’s accidents that remain, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not unfitting for one dimension to be not in a subject in this sacrament according to one of its parts and according to another to be in a subject; for although the many parts of the dimension are one dimension in act, they are nevertheless many in potency.
Reply Obj. 4: The solution is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 5: Large and small follow quantity according as it is determined to a certain measure. But in the sacrament of the altar it is not necessary for dimensions to remain the same according to the same boundaries, for then the same dimensions would not remain when the species are divided, and consequently it would not be the same sacrament; but it suffices for the subsistence of the sacrament that the dimensions remain the same according as they are understood to be unbounded.
Article 3
About the breaking which is founded on the accidents
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 77, a. 7; SCG IV, ch. 67; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 5.) It seems that the true body of Christ is broken in the sacrament. For everything that is eaten is chewed and broken. But the true body of Christ is eaten: who eats my flesh, etc. (John 6:57). Therefore, it is also broken.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, this sacrament is a memorial of the Lord’s Passion. But in the Passion, the body of Christ itself was pierced by nails and by a lance. Therefore, in the sacrament the body of Christ is broken.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as the body of Christ exists whole in every part of the species, so does the substantial form. But substantial material form is incidentally divided through the division of the species. Therefore, also the body of Christ.
On the contrary (1), what is broken does not remain whole. But the body of Christ remains whole, as is said in the text. Therefore, it is not broken.
Furthermore (2), every breakable body can suffer. But the body of Christ is impassible, since it is glorified. Therefore, it is not broken.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that neither are the appearances broken. For the sign must correspond to what is represented. But the species are the sign of the body of Christ. Since therefore the true body of Christ is not broken, neither are the species themselves broken.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Meteorology 4, (Aristotle, Meteorology, Bk. 4, ch. 9 (386a14ff.).) corporeal things are said to be breakable and crumbleable according to the particular disposition of their pores. But those species do not have pores, for under all the species’ parts the body of Christ exists equally, and under no part does anything else exist. Therefore, those species can neither be broken nor crumbled.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, any time a breaking is completed, the different parts each contain something different. But what is contained under the different parts of the species is entirely the same, no matter how they are disposed. Therefore, they are not properly said to be broken.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Matthew 26:26 that the Lord blessed it and broke it. But the words of the Gospel cannot be false. Therefore, there was a true breaking, but not in the body of Christ, as was proved. Therefore, it was in the species.
Furthermore (2), it belongs to quantity to be divided more than to be corrupted, or to be converted into something else. But this happens to the dimensions that remain there, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, also to be broken or divided.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the signification of the breaking of the parts is unfittingly assigned in the text. For the parts of the breaking correspond to the breaking. But the breaking signifies the Passion of Christ, as is said in the text. Therefore, the parts of the breaking should signify the parts of the true body of Christ, into which his body was divided by the Passion.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, this sacrament is the supreme sacrament of union. But the distinction of parts is opposed to union. Therefore, it does not befit this sacrament for the different parts of the mystical body to be signified.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, this does not seem to be according to the common practice of the Church that a certain part be reserved until the end of Mass. Therefore, the signification of any part should not be taken according to this.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Innocent (Innocent III, De sacra altaris mysterio, Bk. 6, ch. 3 (PL 217:907).) and Hugh of St. Victor (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 2, pt. 8, ch. 10 (PL 176:468).) say that the part reserved outside the chalice represents the blessed; and so it seems wrong to say that it represents those who are in their graves.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, the blessed do not need any remedy. But the Church’s sacraments are directed to being a remedy. Therefore, there should not be any part that represents the blessed.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as there is a diversity among the dead, so also among the living. But two parts are set down for the dead. Therefore, two parts at least should be set down for the living.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, just as the members are distinguished from each other, so also the head is distinguished from its members. Therefore, since there are three parts for representing the diversity of the mystical body’s members, there would have to be added also a fourth to signify the head.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that, as was said above, the body of Christ is not related to the species under which it is contained by means of its own dimensions; on the contrary, its dimensions are there somehow as a result. And so whatever applies to the body of Christ by means of its own dimensions does not apply to it according as it is under the sacrament. Therefore, since quantitative division cannot apply to it except by means of its proper dimensions, it is evident that in the breaking of the species, the body itself is neither divided nor broken, even if it were passible, as it was at the Last Supper.
Reply Obj. 1: In eating there are many things, both breaking or chewing, as well as swallowing down into the stomach, and nourishing. However, the first belongs to these species alone; but the second applies both to the species containing and to the body contained: for wherever the species are, there is the true body of Christ. But the third, if we are speaking spiritually, applies to the body of Christ, but if we are speaking physically, to the species, as has been said. And so eating does apply to the body of Christ in a certain way, but not breaking or dividing.
Reply Obj. 2: Because this sacrament is a sign of Christ’s Passion, and not the Passion itself, for this reason the Passion that the breaking signifies must not exist in the body of Christ, but in the species, which are its sign.
Reply Obj. 3: Material substantial form has an order to the dimensions in a certain way, since unbounded dimensions are understood in matter before substantial form, as was said; but the body of Christ by no means; and so it is not the same for the body of Christ and those forms.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that some people said that the breaking, according to the truth of things, did not exist in this sacrament. But this cannot be, because breaking implies something that happens to something else, or a certain motion, and a multitude in which the motion terminates; and either of these is sensible in itself. For there are common sensible objects which are divided against things that are incidentally sensible in On the Soul 2; (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 6 (418a7ff.).) and so the judgment of these things pertains to the sensitive part. And that is why since the senses judge there to be a breaking, if there were not a breaking, it would be a false judgment, which does not befit the sacrament of truth. And therefore others have said that there is a breaking there without a subject. But this cannot be said, for a breaking, since it is a certain motion according to the definition of its species, requires a starting terminus and an ending terminus. And so it is necessary that it be one thing that is divided into many, and this is the subject of the breaking. And furthermore, action and passion have weaker being than quality; and so since we posit qualities to exist in this sacrament in the subject, much more should passion. And so, since breaking cannot be in the body of Christ as in a subject, as was said, it is necessary that it be in the species.
Reply Obj. 1: The sign corresponds to what it represents in what it was, but not as to what it is, for this sacrament is a commemorative sign with regard to the Lord’s Passion.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as density remains in this sacrament, so does hardness, which is its effect; and because of this also those species are bound to make a sound, and this is also how a porousness is found there.
Reply Obj. 3: Whatever of the species that exists in one portion is not in the others, for it is the species that are broken. But the body of Christ is not broken since the whole remains under every part, and the reason for this has been said above, in Distinction 10. (See d. 10, a. 3, qa. 3.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that just as in this sacrament there is a twofold reality of the sacrament, namely, the true and the mystical body of Christ, so also the breaking signifies two things, namely the very division of the true body, which happened in his Passion, and this signification is referred to in the text; and the distribution of the power of Christ’s redemption through the diverse members of the Church, and Dionysius refers to this signification in Chapter 3 of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 3, p. 3, n. 13 (PG 3:443).) And according to this the signification of the parts is taken according to the different states of the members. For some people are still living, and these are represented by the part that is eaten; for they are ground by different penalties, and they are in this very motion so that they may be incorporated into Christ. Certain others are dead; and these are in two states. For some are in the full participation of blessedness; and this is the body of Christ that has already risen, like Christ himself and the Blessed Virgin; and these are represented by the part placed into the chalice, for they are inebriated with the richness of the house of God (Ps 35:9). But some others are in the expectation of full blessedness, who either have only the soul’s garment, or neither, like those who are in purgatory; and these are represented by the third part which is reserved until the end: for these people will receive perfect glory at the end of the world, and meanwhile they rest in appearances.
Reply Obj. 1: The true body of Christ itself signifies the mystical body of Christ; hence parts of the true body signify parts of the mystical body.
Reply Obj. 2: That union happened by Christ’s Passion; and so it is necessary that there be a breaking that signifies the Passion in this sacrament.
Reply Obj. 3: This kind of practice existed in the early Church, which has now ceased, however, because of the danger; nevertheless the same signification of parts remains.
Reply Obj. 4: It is not unfitting if different things are signified by the same thing according to its different properties; hence also the chalice signifies the Passion in that it inebriates, and this is how the signification that Innocent gives proceeds: for the part outside the chalice signifies those who are outside the passion of this present misery, and the part placed in the chalice represents those who are oppressed by the passion or sufferings mentioned. But inasmuch as a drink of the chalice delights, it represents the joy of eternity, and in this way the signification that is set down in the text proceeds, which is contained under these verses: the host is divided into parts. The dipped part is the fully blessed; the dry part symbolizes the living, the reserved part, those buried.
Reply Obj. 5: This sacrament is not only for a remedy, but also for thanksgiving; and so although the blessed do not seek any remedy in this sacrament, nevertheless, because it is still in thanksgiving for their glory, it was fitting that they too be signified in this sacrament.
Reply Obj. 6: All the living need this sacrament as a remedy, but not all the dead; and so two parts are placed for the dead, but for the living, only one. Or it could be said that two parts are set down for the living in this world, and another for those living in glory, who have risen; and for all who have not yet risen, only one.
Reply Obj. 7: The resurrection of the members is like the resurrection of the head; because he shall reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of his glory (Phil 3:21); and so by the same part is signified both the head and the members perfectly configured to it.
Question 2
The effects of holy Communion
Next this sacrament’s effect is considered. And concerning this, two questions arise:
first, its effect in bringing about good;
- second, its effect in removing evil.
- Article 1
The effect of the Eucharist in bringing about good
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 79, a. 1.) It seems that virtues are not increased by this sacrament. For different effects come from different causes. But the increase of virtue is an effect of baptism, and also confirmation, as was said above. (See d. 4, q. 2, a. 2; d. 7, q. 2, a. 2.) Therefore, it is not an effect of the Eucharist.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, by the increase of charity one comes to the perfection of charity. If therefore charity and the other virtues are increased by this sacrament, it could be received so many times that a man might arrive at perfect charity and its highest degree in this life; which only happens in the heavenly fatherland, as Augustine says. (Augustine, De perfectione iustitiae hominis (CSEL 42), ch. 3.)
Obj. 3: Furthermore, all virtues increase together. If therefore the increase of virtues were the effect of this sacrament, the effect could not include a greater increase in charity than in the other virtues.
On the contrary (1), nothing is spiritually perfected without the increase of virtues. But according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 3 (PG 3:423).) the Eucharist has a perfective power. Therefore, its effect is the increase of virtue.
Furthermore (2), this sacrament’s effect is the fullness of grace, as is clear from the prayer in the canon of the Mass: that as many of us at this altar shall partake and receive, shall be filled with every heavenly blessing and grace. But one attains the fullness of grace by an increase of virtue. Therefore, the same as before.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this sacrament could also benefit the blessed in the increase of glory. For in the collect of the Mass of blessed Pope Leo, as Innocent says, it is said thus: favor us, Lord, that this offering may benefit the soul of your servant Leo. (See the Decretalium Gregorii papae IX compilationis, Bk. 3, title 41, ch. 6, “Quum [cum] Martha,” retrieved from http://www.hs-augsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lspost13/GregoriusIX/gre_3t41.html on January 30, 2015.) But it is clear that blessed Leo is in glory. Therefore, it benefits the blessed in an increase of glory.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, this sacrament is offered also for those children who die in baptismal innocence. But it is obvious that they pass on to glory. Therefore, this sacrament also benefits them in an increase of glory.
On the contrary, the sacraments of the Church do not benefit anyone who is not in the state of progressing. But the saints in the fatherland are not in the state of progressing, since they are at the terminus of progress. Therefore, the Eucharist does not benefit them.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that this sacrament’s effect cannot be impeded by anything but mortal sin. (Parallel: ST III, q. 79, a. 8.) For just as Ambrose says in the text, he eats spiritually who bears his innocence to the altar. (In the text of Lombard this saying is not attributed to any particular author. The Moos edition gives as its source Ivo of Chartres, Decretum, p. 2, ch. 4 (PL 161:137).) But whoever approaches without mortal sin, bears his innocence to the altar, for venial sins do not destroy innocence. Since, then, whoever receives Communion spiritually receives the sacrament’s effect, it seems that the sacrament’s effect cannot be impeded by anything but mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, baptism is not a nobler sacrament than this one. But nothing impedes baptism’s effect except mortal sin. Therefore, not this sacrament’s effect either.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, venial sin does not make someone a fake. But only false pretenses impede the effects of the sacraments. Therefore, only mortal sin impedes the sacrament’s effect.
On the contrary (1), no one receives this sacrament’s effect unless he approaches as it should be approached. But someone must approach this sacrament with a careful examination of his conscience, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 11:28. Therefore, since this can be omitted without mortal sin, it seems that without mortal sin the effect of this sacrament can be impeded.
Furthermore (2), for an adult to receive grace, he must have prepared himself for having grace. But this preparation may be impeded without mortal sin. Therefore, this sacrament’s effect may be impeded without mortal sin.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that the proper effect of any sacrament should be gathered from a likeness to the matter of that sacrament; just as the purification of the old life is the effect of baptism, signified by the cleansing of water. And so since the matter in this sacrament is food, the sacrament’s proper effect must be taken from a likeness to the effect of food. Now physical food is first converted into what has been fed, and by this conversion it restores what has been lost, and increases quantity. But spiritual food is not converted into the one eating it, but converts him to itself. And this is why the proper effect of this sacrament is a man’s conversion into Christ, so that he may say with the Apostle, I live; not I but Christ lives in me (Gal 2:20). And for this two effects follow: increase of spiritual quantity in the increase of virtues, and restoration of what has been lost in the remission of venial sins, or the reparation of any previous defects.
Reply Obj. 1: Increase can be said in two ways. In one way, commonly, as it is found in living things and non-living things, according to which any addition makes an increase; and in this way the virtues are increased by all the sacraments that find grace in the subject, by the fact that it is their nature to cause grace. In another way, increase is said properly, as it exists in living things by the union of nourishment; and this kind of increase of the virtues is more proper to this sacrament.
Reply Obj. 2: There are two kinds of perfection in charity, namely, in this life, and in the fatherland; and although this sacrament cannot bring those who are wayfaring to the perfection of the fatherland because of their difference in state, it can however lead them to the perfection of the wayfarer. For we cannot arrive at the perfection of heaven by an increase in charity while we are in this life.
Reply Obj. 3: It is proper to charity for the lover to be transformed into the beloved, for it is charity that brings about ecstasy, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 13 (PG 3:711).) And since the increase of virtues in this sacrament happens by the eater being converted into his spiritual food, for this reason the increase of charity more than the other virtues is attributed to this sacrament.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that glory encompasses the reward of the saints, which is twofold: namely, the essential prize, the joy that they have in the divinity; and the incidental prize, which is the joy that they have in any created good. As to the essential prize, according to the more probable opinion, their glory cannot be increased; but as to the incidental prize, it can be increased up until the day of judgment, otherwise their joy would not be increased on that day with the glory of the body. And this is why glory grows in them from every benefit, for there is joy among the angels of God over the repentance of one sinner (Luke 15:10). And thus also they rejoice in everything that is done to honor God, and especially those things whereby we thank God for their glory. And so, simply speaking, with regard to the essence of glory, this sacrament does not increase the glory of the blessed; but in a certain respect, namely, the incidental reward, it does increase it.
Reply Obj. 1: As Innocent resolves it, wherever such a mode of speaking is found, it should be understood as benefiting him such that he is glorified by the faithful more and more on earth.
Reply Obj. 2: The solemn Masses are celebrated for baptized children, not because they assist them by the remission of any guilt, or as to the increase of their glory, but for other reasons: both for the consolation of the living, and in order to show that little ones belong to the unity of the mystical body, since the same manner of funeral rites is observed for them as for others; and also to remind people of the mystery of redemption, which is commemorated in this sacrament, by which little ones obtain eternal salvation without their own meriting.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that every perfection to be acquired is impeded by the removal of its proper disposition. But just as material dispositions are ordered to the perfection of form, so acts are ordered to the perfection of the end. And therefore since this sacrament perfects by uniting to the end, as was said above, in order for it to have its own effect fully in the one who receives it, there must be actual devotion present. And since sometimes actual devotion can be impeded without mortal sin, since various distractions impede it, and venial sins destroy the act of the virtues, this sacrament’s effect can be impeded without mortal sin so that someone does not receive the increase of grace; but neither would he have become guilty of mortal sin, but perhaps guilty of venial sin, by the fact that he approaches the sacrament without proper preparation.
Reply Obj. 1: Someone bearing his innocence eats spiritually in habit, but not always in act. And in order to receive the effect of the sacrament, one must eat spiritually in act.
Reply Obj. 2: In baptism the first spiritual existence is given, and so its effect is not impeded by anything but the intention of committing a mortal sin, which is directly opposed to the spiritual life. But in this sacrament the union with the end happens, which should be by the due operation, and so a defect of this kind of operation impedes the effect of this sacrament.
Reply Obj. 3: Although venial sin does not make one a fake simply, it nevertheless makes one a fake in a certain respect. Nor, however, should it be said that every venial sin impedes the effect of this sacrament, but only one that takes away the actual devotion that is demanded in this sacrament.
Article 2
The effect of the Eucharist in removing evil
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 79, a. 4; q. 87, a. 3.) It seems that venial sins are not forgiven by the power of this sacrament. For if one thing is forgiven, by the same reasoning another should be. But all sins are not forgiven, for then someone would be without any venial sin often; which is against what is said: if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves (1 John 1:8). Therefore, it does not erase any venial sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, sin is only blotted out by what is opposed to it. But venial sin is not opposed to grace, which this sacrament confers. Therefore, venial sins are not forgiven by the power of this sacrament.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, baptism, which forgives all sins, mortal and venial, does not require outward sorrow. Therefore, if venial sins were forgiven by this sacrament, it would not be required that after receiving this sacrament someone should do penance for his venial sins, which is false.
On the contrary (1), Innocent says that this sacrament removes venial sins and guards against mortal ones. (Innocent III, De sacro altaris mysterio, Bk. 4, ch. 44 (PL 217:885).)
Furthermore (2), as can be drawn from the words of Ambrose quoted in the text, this sacrament is given as a remedy for daily infirmity. But daily sins are called venial. Therefore, this sacrament takes away venial sins.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that also mortal sins are forgiven by the power of this sacrament. (Parallels: above, d. 9, a. 3, qa. 2; ST III, q. 79, a. 3.) For it is said in one collect of the Mass: May the sacraments we receive purify us, we beg, Lord, and then, Grant that this your sacrament may be for the cleansing of crimes. (These phrases are found in the third Lenten postcommunion, “for the Living and the Dead,” found in missals printed prior to the reduction of orations to one set only.) But crimes mean mortal sins. Therefore, it takes away mortal sins.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, this sacrament represents Christ’s Passion more explicitly than baptism. But baptism takes away mortal sins by the power of the Passion working in it. Therefore, so does this sacrament.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the slightest grace suffices to take away all mortal sins. But this sacrament confers grace. Therefore, it takes away mortal sins.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, this sacrament works more in the one receiving it than in another; otherwise, he would receive it in vain. But the sacrifice of the Church is offered for certain sinners that they be converted, and not in vain. Therefore, also in the person who receives it, it removes mortal sins.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says to one reborn: who offers the body of Christ except on behalf of those who are members of Christ? (Augustine, De natura et origine animae [also known as Ad Renatum and De origine animae], Bk 1, ch. 9, par. 10 (CSEL 60:311).) But those who are members of Christ do not have mortal sin. Therefore, mortal sins are not blotted out by the power of this sacrament.
Furthermore (2), this sacrament does not have any effect in those who approach it unworthily. But anyone who approaches it with mortal sin approaches unworthily. Therefore, he does not receive the effect of this sacrament, and so it does not remove mortal sins.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that it remits the punishment for mortal sin. (Parallels: above, d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 3; ST III, q. 79, a. 5.) For God is more prone to having mercy than to punishing, as the Gloss on the beginning of the book of Jeremiah says. (From Origen’s Homilies on Jeremiah, Hom. 1 (PG 13:225).) But someone approaching this sacrament unworthily is culpable for the punishment of mortal sin. Therefore, someone approaching worthily is absolved of it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, this sacrament is not less effective for the living than for the dead. But it avails the dead for the remission of punishment, for it is offered for this on their behalf. Therefore, much more for the living.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, truth is of greater efficacy than figure. But the sacrifices of the Old Testament were offered in satisfaction for mortal sins. Therefore, much stronger is this sacrifice, of which those were the figures. And thus it remits mortal punishment.
On the contrary (1), anyone who does not owe punishment goes straight to heaven when he dies. Therefore, if this sacrament remitted the punishment of mortal sin, anyone departing this life fortified by this sacrament would go straight to heaven, which is false.
Furthermore (2), satisfaction is only required for the forgiveness of punishment. Therefore, if punishment were forgiven by this sacrament, all other satisfaction would be taken away, which is unfitting.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that by the power of this sacrament a certain transformation of the person into Christ is made by love, as was said, and this is its proper effect. And since by the fervor of charity venial sins are forgiven, because of the fact that they are contrary to this fervor, as a result by the power of this sacrament venial sins are wiped away.
Reply Obj. 1: The fervor of devotion can be so great that it wipes away all venial sins. Nor is it unfitting that at some moment a man should be free of all venial sin; although this cannot last very long because of the difficulty of avoiding venial sin. Nor, however, is it necessary that all venial sins be erased, but only according to the measure of devotion, for the removal of venial sins is not its proximate effect, but something following on its proximate effect, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: In this sacrament not only is habitual grace conferred, but the fervor of actual devotion is excited. And so the grace of this sacrament is not only opposed to mortal sins, but also to venial ones.
Reply Obj. 3: Baptism has for its chief effect the removal of sin; and so when it is not impeded, it removes all of them. But it is not the case in this sacrament, and so the argument does not follow.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that a sacrament’s effect, as was said, corresponds to the outward gestures in the sacrament. Now outwardly this sacrament’s use is by eating, which activity is only due to a living thing. And so this sacrament’s effect presupposes life in the one receiving it. And since mortal sin destroys spiritual life, for this reason this sacrament is not for washing away mortal sin in those who receive it, but only those defects that can coexist with life.
Reply Obj. 1: As Innocent says, speech like this seems improper. For this sacrament is said to take away or cleanse wicked deeds or crimes inasmuch as it impedes them, by administering strength against them. Or it should be said that there can be mortal sin in a person who has no consciousness of it. And if someone like this approaches devoutly, he obtains pardon, as was said above in Distinction 9. (See d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 2.)
Reply Obj. 2: Baptism does not only express Christ’s Passion, but it also causes the baptized to die with Christ. And since the corruption of one thing is the generation of another, while generation is a movement into life, and it does not presuppose life but rather its absence, therefore through baptism mortal sins can be forgiven by the power of the Passion, but not through the Eucharist, by whose reception a man is not signified to have died with Christ, but to have been refreshed as a fruit of Christ’s death, which presupposes life.
Reply Obj. 3: In itself, the grace that the Eucharist confers has the power to remove mortal sins. But by reason of the ordering that it has to life, which it presupposes, it cannot light upon mortal sins, and so neither does it remove them. But if it came upon them in the subject but not in his conscience, it would remove them nevertheless.
Reply Obj. 4: The Eucharist is not only a sacrament but also a sacrifice. Now, as it is a sacrament, it has an effect in anyone living, in whom it requires that life pre-exist. But as it is a sacrifice, it has its effect also on others, on whose behalf it is offered, in whom it does not require spiritual life to exist actually, but only potentially. And so if it finds them disposed, it obtains grace for them by virtue of that true sacrifice from which all grace flows into us. And consequently it removes mortal sins in them, not as proximate cause, but inasmuch as it procures the grace of contrition for them.
And what is said to the contrary, that it is only offered for the members of Christ, is to be understood such that the sacrifice is offered for Christ’s members when it is offered for some people so that they might be members.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the Eucharist, insofar as it is a sacrament, as was said, has for its chief effect the union of man with Christ. And so by the mode of sacrament it only takes away those things that it finds opposed to this union in those who have life. However, the punishment due to mortal sin that has already been forgiven is not one of these things. And so, insofar as it is a sacrament it does not have the effect of forgiving mortal sin; but insofar as it is a sacrifice, it has the nature of satisfaction; and according to this it removes punishment partly or completely, just as other satisfactions, according to the measure of both punishment due for sin and the measure of devotion with which the sacrament is offered. Nor, however, is all the punishment always taken away by this sacrament.
Reply Obj. 1: Someone approaching unworthily, conscious of mortal sin, sins mortally. And so he is culpable for the punishment due to mortal sin. But someone approaching worthily merits eternal life, to which merit is ordered, just as mortal sin is ordered to punishment. However, merit is not directly or principally ordered to the remission of punishment, and so the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 2: For those who are in purgatory, punishment is not always completely taken away by this sacrifice, nor was it taken away by the ancient sacrifices under the Old Law.
And by this the solution to the third objection is clear.
Question 3
The frequency of holy Communion
Next the frequency of this sacrament should be considered; and concerning this, two questions arise:
first, its frequency;
- second, abstention from it.
- Article 1
The frequency of holy Communion
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 80, a. 10; Super I ad Cor. 11, lec. 7.) It seems that a man should not frequent this sacrament, but only receive it once in his life. For anyone who receives a sacrament over and over does injury to the sacrament. But injury should be done less to a nobler thing. Since therefore this sacrament is nobler than others that are not received over and over, it seems that it should only be received once.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Apostle proves the uniqueness of baptism from the uniqueness of the victim or the Passion of Christ (Heb 10). But this sacrament has more to do with Christ’s Passion than baptism, inasmuch as he is the victim. Therefore, since baptism is only received once, this sacrament should also only be received once.
On the contrary, the effect of our salvation grows with frequenting this mystery, as is said in the collect of the Mass. (Moos refers to the postcommunion for the Sunday within the Octave of Corpus Christi. In the Missale Romanum 1962, the prayer appears as the postcommunion for the Fourth Sunday of Advent.) But we should strive for the effect of salvation to grow in us. Therefore, we should receive this sacrament frequently.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that we should receive it on any day. For Ambrose says: this bread is our daily bread; receive daily what will benefit you every day. (Ambrose, On the Sacraments (CSEL 73), Bk. 5, ch. 4, n. 25.)
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the fervor of charity is excited in this sacrament, by which a man is united to Christ. But this should happen daily. Therefore, Communion should be received daily.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book On Church Dogmatics: I neither praise nor condemn receiving the Eucharist daily. (Among works once attributed to Augustine: Gennadius Massiliensis, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, ch. 53 (PL 58:994).) Therefore, Communion should not be received daily.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that one should receive Communion only once per year. For the paschal lamb was the sign of this sacrament. But it was only consumed once per year. Therefore, this sacrament should also be received only once per year.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, this sacrament is the memorial of the Lord’s Passion. But the Church commemorates the Lord’s Passion once a year. Therefore, the time for receiving Communion should be only then.
On the contrary, Pope Fabian says: and if not many times, let men communicate at least three times per year, namely, at Easter, Pentecost, and Christmas. (Gratian’s Decretals, Part 3, De consecratione, d. 2, ch. 16 (PL 187:1738).)
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Furthermore, it seems that a person may communicate many times in a day. For it is a bigger thing to celebrate than to receive Communion. But the priest can celebrate many times in one day, if it is necessary. Therefore, any other member of the faithful can also communicate many times.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, extreme unction can be repeated as many times as physical sickness recurs. But the Eucharist is ordered against the sickness of venial sins, which are repeated many times a day. Therefore, in one day a person may communicate several times.
On the contrary, it is said in On Consecration, Distinction 1: let it suffice for a priest to celebrate Mass once a day, for Christ died once and redeemed the whole world. (Gratian’s Decretals, Part 3, De consecratione, d. 1, ch. 53 (PL 187:1723), citing Alexander II.) Therefore, someone should receive Communion only once per day.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that those things that are enacted in this sacrament have a likeness to what happens in physical nourishment. For since a loss of natural moisture happens almost constantly by the action of natural heat and the exercise of labor, therefore it is necessary to take physical food often to restore this loss, lest a continual loss should lead to death. In the same way, from innate concupiscence and by the occupation with externals there arises a loss of the devotion and fervor according to which man is recollected unto God; and so it is necessary that these losses be restored many times, lest a man become completely alienated from God.
Reply Obj. 1: This sacrament’s perfection, as was said in Distinction 8, (See d. 8, q. 1, q. 1, qa. 1.) consists in the consecration of the matter, not in its use. And so the consecration is not repeated upon the same matter out of reverence for the sacrament, but its use can be repeated.
Reply Obj. 2: Baptism represents that victim, according as he causes spiritual life in us; and since the generation of each thing only happens once, baptism is not repeated. But the Eucharist represents that victim according as he refreshes us; and so it is necessary that it be consumed frequently.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that in this sacrament two things are required on the part of the recipient; namely, the desire for union with Christ, which love causes, and reverence for the sacrament, which belongs to the gift of fear. Now the first incites one to frequent this sacrament daily, but the second restrains one from it. Hence if someone experientially noticed that the fervor of his love was increased by daily reception and his reverence was not diminished, this person should receive Communion daily. But if someone perceived that his reverence diminished by daily frequenting, and his fervor was not much increased, this person should sometimes abstain, so that he might later approach with greater reverence and devotion. Hence each person is left to his own judgment in this matter; and this is what Augustine says: one says that the Eucharist should not be received every day, someone else may approve its daily reception; let each one do what he conscientiously believes should be done according to his own faith; (See Augustine, Epistle 54, ch. 3 (CSEL 34.2:162).) and he proves this by the example of Zacchaeus and the centurion, one of whom receives the Lord rejoicing (Luke 19:6), while the other says, I am not worthy that you should enter under my roof (Matt 8:8); and both obtained mercy.
And by this the answers to the objections are clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that according to the different states of the faith, different customs have grown up concerning this. For in the early Church, when devotion thrived more by the recentness of Christ’s Passion, and the attack of unbelievers was greater, for this table is prepared against tribulations of the Church, daily Communion was enjoined upon believers. And this is why Pope Anicletus says, once their consecration is completed, all may receive Communion who do not wish to be without ecclesiastical thresholds. For this is how the apostles established it. (Gratian’s Decretals, Part 3, De consecratione, d. 2, ch. 10 (PL 187:1735).) Afterward it was appointed that at least three times per year they should receive Communion, as was said, because of the solemnity of those days. But later it was reduced so that they should communicate at least once per year, namely, at Easter; and even for this many are found to be not fit. And although one is not permitted to ignore the statutes of the Church, nevertheless it is permitted to communicate many times. Hence Augustine (In the letter cited just above.) praises receiving Communion every Sunday; and so someone can communicate many times a year.
Reply Obj. 1: The paschal lamb was the figure of this sacrament by reason of Christ’s Passion, which only happened once; and so it was only consumed once per year. But manna, which was the figure of this sacrament inasmuch as this sacrament is the food of the faithful, was consumed on any given day.
Reply Obj. 2: The Church at Passiontide remembers the Passion in itself, and so it commemorates it only once per year, but in this sacrament the Passion is commemorated inasmuch as we are renewed by it, and since we need such a renewal many times, the Lord’s Passion is commemorated many times in this way.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that a man should not receive Communion many times in a day, so that at least in one day the oneness of the Lord’s Passion would be represented, and so that in one respect reverence would be shown the sacrament by receiving once only.
Reply Obj. 1: A priest is like a public person, and so it is necessary that he not only celebrate for himself, but also for others; and so when necessity compels him he can celebrate many times in a day. But there is not the same reason for those who only receive Communion for themselves.
Reply Obj. 2: There are other remedies by which venial sin can be expiated, and so it is not necessary that someone communicate many times a day to expiate them.
Article 2
Abstention from holy Communion
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 80, a. 11; Super Ioan. 6, lec. 7.) It seems that it is permitted to abstain from holy Communion entirely. For a person is only bound to what is of necessity. But this sacrament, as was said above in Distinction 9, (See d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2.) is not of necessity. Therefore, someone can completely abstain from receiving the sacrament.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is done in reverence for God is not a sin. But someone can completely abstain out of reverence for the sacrament. Therefore, if he completely abstains, it is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says that concerning this sacrament’s reception, everyone should do whatever he conscientiously believes should be done. (In the letter cited just above.) Therefore, he does not sin if he abstains entirely and believes this is to be done.
On the contrary (1), Innocent says: one must be careful lest the reception of this sacrament be deferred too long, and one incur the danger of death. (Innocent III, de Sacro altaris mysterio, Bk. 4, ch. 42 (PL 217:882).) Therefore, it is deadly to abstain from it entirely.
Furthermore (2), it is established by the Church that the faithful should communicate at least once per year. Therefore, whoever abstains entirely, sins.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone who consecrates can abstain from holy Communion. For where there is a greater need, more assistance should be brought according to the due order of charity. But it can happen that after a priest has consecrated, someone becomes sickened unto death, and urgently begs the body of Christ in his last necessity. Therefore, since this is the sacrament of charity, the priest himself should abstain from Communion and give it to the sick person.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is a more grave thing to add sin to sin than to commit one single sin. But someone conscious of mortal sin sins by consecrating, and he also sins by communicating. Therefore, by the fact that he has consecrated, he should at least refrain from receiving.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, receiving the Lord’s body and blood in Communion is equally due to all Christ’s members. But to some people the body of Christ is given without the blood. Therefore, the priest can at least refrain from receiving the blood.
On the contrary (1), is what is said in On Consecration, Distinction 2, where the error of those who wanted to consecrate the body of Christ but not consume it is rejected. (Gratian’s Decretals, Part 3, De consecratione, d. 2, ch. 11 (PL 187:1735).)
Furthermore (2), this same thing is seen by the Lord’s words, which he said when he instituted this sacrament: take and eat (Matt 26:26).
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is more praiseworthy to abstain from this sacrament than to approach it. For we approach God most by humility. But it belongs to humility for a man to desist from Holy Communion out of reverence for the sacrament. Therefore, it seems more meritorious and fruitful than even receiving it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it belongs to true charity to seek more God’s glory than one’s own benefit. But the person who abstains seems to do it for the sake of God’s glory which he reveres; but the one who receives does it for the sake of his own advantage, for he seeks sacred fruit. Therefore, the former belongs to a more perfect charity, and so it is more meritorious.
On the contrary, in the other sacraments it is better for anyone who is permitted to receive the sacrament to receive rather than abstain. But this sacrament is more worthy than the others. Therefore, it is much better for a person who has prepared to receive it, than to desist out of reverence.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that it is not permitted to anyone to abstain from Communion entirely: for the Church has established a time in which the faithful should receive Holy Communion; and so any who desist entirely are made guilty of transgressing a precept. Moreover, the institution of the Church was necessary: for since we are in a daily fight, spiritual life would fade away in us if we did not sometimes receive the food of life.
Reply Obj. 1: Although this sacrament is not necessary for salvation by its first institution, nevertheless the institution of the Church has made it necessary; and even without this it would not be necessary simply, so that there would be no salvation without it, but it would be necessary by the supposition of the end: namely, if a person wished to persist steadily in the spiritual life.
Reply Obj. 2: The reverence due to God is shown in this, that a man does not force himself into divine matters too much above his own mode; but that man entirely remove himself, this belongs to contempt and cowardice.
Reply Obj. 3: Augustine’s words refer to receiving every day or not, but not to completely abstaining.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the man who consecrates the body and blood of Christ should always consume them unless he is impeded either by violence or death or illness, or something like that. And the reason for this can be taken on the part of the sacrament itself, whose signification is completed by that very consumption. For, as Augustine says, when the blood is poured from the chalice into the mouth of the faithful, the flow of blood from the side of Christ is indicated; (This may be gathered from Lanfranc’s quotations and discussion in Liber de corpore et sanguine Domini, ch. 13 (PL 150:423).) and its efficacy is completed as well, for it has its ultimate proper effect in being consumed. Therefore, so that the sacrament may be perfect, it is necessary that whoever celebrates the sacrament communicates. The reason can also be taken on the part of the man consecrating, for since he is the minister of divine things to others, he must become first in partaking of divine things, as Dionysius says in Chapter 3 of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 3, p. 3, n. 14 (PG 3:443).)
Reply Obj. 1: In such a case it is not necessary that the priest forego Communion; but he can give to the sick person a part of the consecrated host.
Reply Obj. 2: He would sin more by not consuming, for he would commit a sacrilege by perverting the rite of the sacraments. Nevertheless, this is not a conundrum, for he can turn to God and repent, and then he would receive in such an instance without danger.
Reply Obj. 3: The perfection of this sacrament consists in both things, as is clear from what was said above; and so the celebrating priest who would consume only one or the other would imperfectly carry out the sacrament; and so he is judged culpable for sacrilege according to the canons. (Gratian’s Decretals, Part 3, De consecratione, d. 2, ch. 12 (PL 187:1736).) But it is different for those who do not consecrate the sacrament, since for them the blood is removed because of the danger of spilling; and so the priest on Good Friday, when he does not consecrate, consumes the body without the blood.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that among things that are good by their genus, a sin does not happen, except sometimes incidentally, when they are fulfilled inordinately; and so to complete them is good in itself, but to abstain from them is not good except by reason of something incidental. And this is why, since receiving the Eucharist is good by its genus, to take it is good per se, and to abstain is good incidentally, namely inasmuch as it is feared that it might be consumed inordinately. And because what is per se takes precedence over what is incidental, for this reason simply speaking it is better to consume the Eucharist than to abstain from it. But in a certain case nothing prevents it from being better to abstain, when someone has a probable belief that reverence will be diminished by receiving it. However, if we compare these two things, the reception of the sacrament is found to prevail over abstention from the sacrament, both by reason of the sacrament’s effect, and by reason of preparation, however little it may be; and also by reason of the virtue eliciting the act: for receiving seems to belong to charity, in which the root of merit consists; but abstaining belongs to fear. And love prevails over fear.
Reply Obj. 1: Charity is what directly unites us to God; but humility disposes us to this union, inasmuch as it places someone under God. And this is why merit consists more in charity than in humility.
Reply Obj. 2: The glory and goodness of God is most in this, that he communicates himself to creatures according to their capacity. And so it seems to belong more to the glory of God that someone come to Communion than that he abstain.
Exposition of the Text
Similarly, Christ shows himself to his disciples on the road. (Sent IV, 12.2 (67). 2.) Against this, no false pretenses befit the truth. Therefore, he should not have shown anything to them other than what he was in himself. And so it should be said that Christ showed them his own natural appearance, and the external senses were moved by this; but because of doubt about the Resurrection, the judgment of the interior senses was impeded. And this is why they were seeing him outwardly, as Gregory says, as he was with them interiorly; (See Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, Bk. 2, hom. 23 (CCSL 141).) and so there was no deception on Christ’s part, just as there is no deception in Sacred Scripture by the fact that figures are contrived for angels and for God himself. For it is not done for the understanding to remain in them, but so that it will rise from them to what they signify. And so also by that appearance in which he appeared to them the Lord wished to signify their inward disposition.
Berengar, who confessed before Pope Nicholas, etc. (Sent IV, 12.3 (68). 1.) It seems from this that this opinion is absolutely to be held, for in the beginning of this confession it says, “I consent to the Roman Church, and to the Apostolic See.” Therefore, one is not permitted to hold otherwise. And it is to be said that because Berengar denied that the true body of Christ is on the altar, he was forced to make this confession; and so he does not intend to say that the body of Christ itself is broken, but that the true body of Christ exists under the appearances in which the breaking happens. And in this he says that he consents to the Apostolic See, having reverted from the opposing error.
“He remains whole and entire in your heart.” (Sent IV, 12.3 (68). 3 citing Augustine, Sermo Mai 129.) And this is to be understood as to its effect, not that his body sinks into your mind, for this only belongs to God.
“Where there is a part of the body,” (Sent. IV. 12. 3 (68), 4, attributed to Hilary.) etc. This was discussed above in Distinction 10, Question 1, Article 3, Subquestion 3.
”He is unworthy, who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ gave it.” (Sent IV, 12.4 (69). 3 citing ordinary gloss on 1 Cor. 11, 27, from Ambrosiaster on the same place.) Someone is said to celebrate otherwise who does not preserve the matter and form or the due rite instituted by the Church; and such a person, if he did this out of contempt, should be subject to trial of his position.
And if Christ is immolated every day, or if he was immolated only once. (Sent IV, 12.5 (70). 1.) It should be known that all those words that convey the relation of the Jews to Christ and Christ’s punishment are not said to happen daily. For we do not say that Christ is crucified and killed daily, for the Jews’ act and Christ’s punishment have passed. But those things that convey the relation of Christ to God the Father are said to happen daily, such as to offer, to sacrifice, and the like, by the fact that that victim is perpetual; and this is how what was offered once by Christ can also be offered daily by his members.
In the sacrament is made a remembrance of what was done once. (Sent IV, 12.5 (70). 2.) For a priest represents Christ’s Passion not only by words but also by deeds.
And this is also why in the beginning of the Canon of the Mass he makes three crosses when he says: these gifts, these offerings, these holy and unblemished sacrifices, to signify the threefold handing-over of Christ, namely, by God, by Judas, and by the Jews. But second when he says: be pleased, O God, we pray, to bless, acknowledge, and approve, etc., he makes three crosses over each, to show that Christ was sold to three, namely, the priests, scribes, and pharisees. But he makes two crosses separately above the body and blood, to show the one selling and the one sold. Third, he makes two crosses when he says: he said the blessing, broke the bread: one above the body, another above the blood, to show that this sacrament avails to the health of body and soul. And since the Lord commanded this sacrament to be administered in memorial of his death, for this reason immediately after the consecration, he represents the form of the Cross by the extension of his arms. And so also, as Innocent says, (Innocent III, De sacro altaris mysterio, Bk. 5, ch. 2 (PL 217:888).) the words of consecration, which placed at the end would be like a completion of the whole, are placed in the middle to observe the historical order; for the words of the Canon pertain chiefly to consecrating the Eucharist, but signs pertain to renewing the memory of the story. Fourth, he makes five crosses when he says: pure victim, etc. to represent the five wounds. Fifth, he makes two at: the most holy Body and Blood of your Son, etc., to signify the chains and scourging of Christ. And a third is added, in which the priest signs himself, at: every blessing; for Christ’s wounds are our medicine. Or by these three crosses the threefold prayer is signified, which Christ is read to have prayed in Matthew 26, when his Passion was imminent. Sixth, he makes three crosses at: you sanctify them, fill them with life, bless them, etc., to represent that the Jews said three times, crucify him, crucifying Christ by a word, which was at the third hour. Seventh, again he makes three at: through him, and with him, and in him, to represent the second crucifixion, in which he was crucified by the soldiers at the sixth hour after the space of three hours; or to represent the three forms of torture, namely suffering, suffering on behalf of another, and suffering with another. Next he makes two crosses outside the chalice at: O God, almighty Father, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, all glory and honor is yours, to represent the separation of soul from body, which happened at the ninth hour; or because of the blood and water, which flowed forth from Christ’s side.
Also, the bows made by the priest represent Christ’s obedience to the Father, out of which he underwent death.
Also, the silent speech expresses the counsel of the Jews plotting Christ’s death, or of the disciples, who did not dare to confess Christ openly.
Now what the breaking of the bread signifies has been said. (See this distinction, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3.)
However, since the mingling of body and blood signifies the union of body and soul, for this reason that sign of the Cross that happens at these words: the peace of the Lord be with you always, relates more to the Resurrection, which happened on the third day by the power of the Trinity. Moreover, that the priest turns himself to the people five times signifies that the Lord revealed himself five times on the day of the Resurrection: first, to Mary Magdalen (John 20:14); second, to Peter (Luke 24:34); third, to the women (Matt 28:9); fourth, to the disciples in Emmaus (Luke 24:15); fifth, to the disciples together (John 20:19).
But he greets the people seven times to show the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit. Without which mortal life cannot be led; for even if we are able to avoid individual sins, we still cannot avoid all.
Chapter 148 of 186