Lecture 2

There is a greater difficulty in the case of those who have been made citizens after a revolution, as by Cleisthenes at Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants, for he enrolled in tribes many metics, both strangers and slaves. The doubt in these cases is, not who is, but whether he who is ought to be a citizen.

And there will still be a furthering the state, whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state; for what ought not to be is what is false. Now, there are some who hold office, and yet ought not to hold office, whom we describe as ruling, but ruling unjustly. And the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind of rule or office—he who holds a judicial or legislative office fulfills our definition of a citizen. It is evident, therefore, that the citizens about whom the doubt has arisen must be called citizens.

Whether they ought to be so or not is a question which is bound up with the previous inquiry. For a parallel question is raised respecting the state, whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state; for example, in the transition from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy. In such cases persons refuse to fulfill their contracts or any other obligations, on the ground that the tyrant, and not the state, contracted them; they argue that some constitutions are established by force, and not for the sake of the common good. But this would apply equally to democracies, for they too may be founded on violence, and then the acts of the democracy will be neither more nor less acts of the state in question than those of an oligarchy or of a tyranny.

This question runs up into another: on what principle shall we ever say that the state is the same, or different? It would be a very superficial view which considered only the place and the inhabitants (for the soil and the population may be separated, and some of the inhabitants may live in one place and some in another). This, however, is not a very serious difficulty; we need only remark that the word 'state' is ambiguous.It is further asked: When are men, living in the same place, to be regarded as a single city- what is the limit? Certainly not the wall of the city, for you might surround all Peloponnesus with a wall. Like this, we may say, is Babylon, and every city that has the compass of a nation rather than a city; Babylon, they say, had been taken for three days before some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact. This difficulty may, however, with advantage be deferred to another occasion; the statesman has to consider the size of the state, and whether it should consist of more than one nation or not.

Again, shall we say that while the race of inhabitants, as well as their place of abode, remain the same, the city is also the same, although the citizens are always dying and being born, as we call rivers and fountains the same, although the water is always flowing away and coming again.

Or shall we say that the generations of men, like the rivers, are the same, but that the state changes? For, since the state is a partnership, and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution, when the form of government changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same, just as a tragic differs from a comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical. And in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements as different when the form of their composition alters; for example, a scale containing the same sounds is said to be different, accordingly as the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution, and it may be called or not called by the same name, whether the inhabitants are the same or entirely different. It is quite another question, whether a state ought or ought not to fulfill engagements when the form of government changes.

Sed forte illi magis, etc. After he determined what a citizen is, he here clarifies certain difficulties about the aforementioned things, and determines them. And he puts forward four difficulties that follow upon each other.

Now there is a first difficulty regarding those who, when a change has been made in the regime, are taken up into the union of the regime, as with [the changes] a certain wiseman named Cleisthenes made within Athens, when they threw out the tyrant. For he joined to the society of the city many foreigners and even certain immigrant-slaves, so that, by multiplying the people, the wealthy would not be able to tyrannically oppress them. In order to untangle this difficulty, he says that the difficulty is not about whether these people are citizens; since they were made citizens, they are citizens. But the difficulty is about whether they are justly or unjustly so.

He raises a second difficulty, at equidem cum hoc, etc. For it is possible for someone to doubt whether he who is not justly a citizen is a citizen; as if it were valid in this matter to treat “unjust” as “false”. For it is clear that a false citizen is not a citizen. And he untangles the problem thus: since there are some who govern unjustly, and who nevertheless are held as governors, by the same reasoning also those who are not justly citizens are still citizens, because one is called a citizen from this: that he participates in some government, as was said above.

He puts forward a third difficulty, at de eo autem quod est iuste, etc. And says that whether someone is a citizen justly or unjustly seems to be joined with the preceding doubt, which was raised at the beginning of the third book. For in changing over the regime, a difficulty remains about any city: when were the deeds done by the city, and when were they not--as happens whenever the regime of the city is changed from tyranny or oligarchy into democracy, and then the people, taking the power of the regime, do not want to fulfill the agreements which were made by the tyrant or the wealthy, the previous masters: for they say that if anything was given by the tyrant or the wealthy of the city, the city will not accept it: and thus in many such affairs, because in certain regimes, those who command take hold of something from others not because of its common utility, because of their private convenience. But he untangles this difficulty: because if this city remains the same when the regime has been made to change over, so too does the deed of this city [remain]; that which was done from democracy, and that which was done from oligarchy or tyranny: because just as the tyrant or the rich then held power in the city, so also do the people in the democracy.

He puts forward a fourth difficulty, at videtur autem sermo, etc.

He first puts forward this difficulty in general: and he says that the proper discussion for untangling the third difficulty is about how one must say that the city is the same or not the same.

Second, he divides the aforementioned doubt into two parts: and he says that a question of this sort in itself appears, superficially, to be about two things: namely, about the place of the city, and about the men inhabiting the city. For it happens whenever men are separated from a place in different ways, as when all citizens are expelled from the city, and some are led to one place, and some to another. There can then be a doubt, if other inhabitants are led in upon the place, whether the same city exists or not: and indeed, this doubt is milder, that is, easier [to untangle]. For the city is spoken of in manifold ways. In one way, it is the place itself, and in this way the same city exists; in another way, it is the people of the city, and in this way the same city does not exist.

But then there remains another doubt, which he touches on at similiter autem et hominum, etc. For if the same men always inhabit the same place, there can be a doubt when it is one city, and when it is not. And first he excludes one rationale for oneness: and he says that it cannot be said that men inhabiting the city preserve the identity of the city because of the same walls. For it could happen that one wall circumscribes the whole of one region, such as the Peloponnesus--that is, Achaia--and yet it not be the same city; and thus was Babylon, or any other very great city whatever, in which it is more that one tribe is comprehended than one city. For it is said of Babylon that when it was seized, a certain part of the city did not perceive it until the third day because of the length of the walls.

And he interjects that this doubt -- namely, whether it is advantageous to be a great city thus -- will have to be considered elsewhere, that is, in Bk. VII. For it belongs to politics to know how large a city ought to be, and whether it ought to contain men of one tribe or many.

Then, where he says sed et eisdem, etc., he asks about another rationale of unity: namely, whether for men remaining in the same place, the city ought to be called the same on account of the same tribe of inhabitants, since certain men succeed others, although they are not the same men in number; just as we say that springs or rivers are the same because of the succession of waters, although some [of the waters] flow out, and others come in.

Then, where he says aut homines quidem, etc., untangling [solvens] this doubt, he shows the true reason for the city’s unity. And he says that because of the aforementioned succession of men of one genus, the multitude of men can be called the same in a sense; but it cannot be called the same city if the order of the regime has changed. For since the union of the citizens—which is called the regime—is the rationale of the city, it is clear that a changed regime does not remain the same city, just as we see with those who sing songs in a chorus that it is not the same chorus if at one time it sings comedic songs about the deeds of lowly persons, and at another it is tragic, singing tragic songs about the wars of the governors. And so, also, we see in all other things that consist in some composition or communion, that whenever another species of composition comes to be, the same identity does not remain: just as it is not the same harmony if it is at one time Dorian, on the seventh or the eighth tone, but at another time Phrygian, on the third or the fourth. Since, therefore, all such things have this mode, it is clear that the city is said to be the same with respect to the order of the regime; so that when the order of the regime is changed, the same place and the same men may remain, but it is not the same city, although it may be materially the same. Now a city thus changed can be called either by the same or a different name whether they are the same or different: but if the name is the same, it will be used equivocally. But on account of this--that it does not remain the same city when the regime has made a change-over --whether or not it is just that the conventions of a previous regime should be fulfilled belongs to another consideration--which, indeed, will be determined in what follows.