Lecture 3

There is a point nearly allied to the preceding: Whether the virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same or not. But, before entering on this discussion, we must certainly first obtain some general notion of the virtue of the citizen.

Like the sailor, the citizen is a member of a community. Now, sailors have different functions, for one of them is a rower, another a pilot, and a third a look-out man, a fourth is described by some similar term; and while the precise definition of each individual's virtue applies exclusively to him, there is, at the same time, a common definition applicable to them all. For they have all of them a common object, which is safety in navigation. Similarly, one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all. This community is the constitution; the virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member. If, then, there are many forms of government, it is evident that there is not one single virtue of the good citizen which is perfect virtue. But we say that the good man is he who has one single virtue which is perfect virtue. Hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man.

The same question may also be approached by another road, from a consideration of the best constitution. If the state cannot be entirely composed of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to do his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, still inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the good citizen- thus, and thus only, can the state be perfect; but they will not have the virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the good state all the citizens must be good.

Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be compared to the living being: as the first elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and body, as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite, the family of husband and wife, property of master and slave, so of all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the state is composed; and, therefore, the virtue of all the citizens cannot possibly be the same, any more than the excellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands by his side. I have said enough to show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and always the same.

But will there then be no case in which the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man coincide? To this we answer that the good ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be a statesman must be a wise man.

And some persons say that even the education of the ruler should be of a special kind; for are not the children of kings instructed in riding and military exercises? As Euripides says: no subtle arts for me, but what the state requires. (Euripides, fr. 16.) As though there were a special education needed by a ruler. If then the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, and we assume further that the subject is a citizen as well as the ruler, the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be absolutely the same, although in some cases they may; for the virtue of a ruler differs from that of a citizen. It was the sense of this difference which made Jason say that he felt hungry when he was not a tyrant, meaning that he could not endure to live in a private station.

But, on the other hand, it may be argued that men are praised for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a citizen of approved virtue who is able to do both. Now if we suppose the virtue of a good man to be that which rules, and the virtue of the citizen to include ruling and obeying, it cannot be said that they are equally worthy of praise.

Since, then, it is sometimes thought that the ruler and the ruled must learn different things and not the same, but that the citizen must know and share in them both, the inference is obvious.

There is, indeed, the rule of a master, which is concerned with menial offices—the master need not know how to perform these, but may employ others in the execution of them: the other would be degrading; and by the other I mean the power actually to do menial duties, which vary much in character and are executed by various classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen, who, as their name signifies, live by the labor of their hands: under these the mechanic is included. Hence in ancient times, and among some nations, the working classes had no share in the government—a privilege which they only acquired under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good man and the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of inferiors except for their own occasional use; if they habitually practice them, there will cease to be a distinction between master and slave.

This is not the rule of which we are speaking; but there is a rule of another kind, which is exercised over freemen and equals by birth—a constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by obeying, as he would learn the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the orders of a general of cavalry, or the duties of a general of infantry by being under the orders of a general of infantry, and by having had the command of a regiment and of a company. It has been well said that 'he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander.'

The two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman—these are the virtues of a citizen. And, although the temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the virtue of a good man will include both; for the virtue of the good man who is free and also a subject, e.g., his justice, will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds, the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and differing as the temperance and courage of men and women differ. For a man would be thought a coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation than the good man; and indeed their part in the management of the household is different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the other to preserve. Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler: it would seem that all other virtues must equally belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion; he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user of the flute.From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the question, whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, or different, and how far the same, and how far different.

Hiis autem quae dicta sunt, etc. After the philosopher shows what a citizen is, he inquires after the virtue of the citizen. This is divided into two parts.

In the first part, he shows that the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man are not the same simply.

In the second part, he raises certain difficulties about this, at circa civem autem, [III.4.1] etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he shows that the virtue of the citizen and of the good man are not the same simply.

In the second, he shows that for a certain citizen, there is the same virtue as for a good man, at sed forte erit alicuius, [III.3.5] etc.

About the first of these he does two things.

First, he says what his intention is: because after the aforementioned things have been grasped, it is necessary to consider, as a consequence, whether we ought to posit as the same virtue that of the good citizen and of the good man, or not--which is to seek whether it is from the same thing that someone is called a good man and a good citizen: for virtue is what makes good the one who has it. For this, therefore, so that such a question may receive a worthy inquiry, it is necessary to show first what the virtue of the citizen is, but as a certain type—that is, under a certain figure and likeness.

Second, at sicut igitur nauta, etc., he shows that the virtue of the citizen and of the good man are not the same—for three reasons.

In the first, he presents a likeness in order to show what the virtue of the good citizen is: and he says that just as “sailor” signifies something common to many things, even so does “citizen.” And he clarifies that “sailor” is common to many because, although many people unlike each other in powers—that is, in art and office—are called “sailor,” yet a certain one of them is an “oarsman” who moves the ship with an oar, another is a “helmsman” [gubernator], who directs [dirigit] the movement of the ship from the helm [gubernaculo], and another is “prowsman,” that is, the guard of the prow, which is the forward part of the ship, and others have other names and other offices. It is clear, therefore, that for each of these [people], something [i.e. some name] is fitting for them according to their proper virtue, and something according to what is common. For it belongs to the proper virtue of each to have diligent reason, and care for his proper office, just as the helmsman for the helm, and so also the others. However, the virtue of what is common is a certain thing that is fitting for everyone: for the work of all of them intends this—that the voyage be healthy [salva]: for toward this tends the desire and intention of any of the sailors: and toward this is ordered the common virtue of the sailors, which is the virtue of the sailor inasmuch as he is a sailor. Thus, also, although there are diverse citizens holding dissimilar offices, and dissimilar states in the city, the common work of all is the health [salus] of the community: which community, indeed, consists in the order of the regime. Whence it is clear that the virtue of the citizen, inasmuch as he is a citizen, should be considered in the order toward the regime; so that, evidently, he is a good citizen who works well for the preservation of the regime. Now there are several kinds of regime, as will be said later, and from the above it is also somewhat clear: therefore, men are well-ordered to diverse regimes following diverse virtues. For in one way, democracy will be preserved, and in another mode oligarchy—or tyranny. Whence it is clear that there is not one perfect virtue following which a citizen can be called simply good; but someone is called a good man according to one perfect virtue, namely, according to prudence, from which all the moral virtues hang. It happens, therefore, that someone may be a good citizen who nevertheless does not have the virtue according to which someone is a good man; and this happens in regimes which are other than the best regime.

He puts forward a second reason, at quinimmo et secundum alium modum, etc., and he says that, through another way, by inquiring or arguing, we can arrive at the same reason, and about the best regime—namely, that there is not the same virtue of a good citizen and a good man: because it is impossible, however good the regime may be, that all the citizens should be virtuous: but it is nevertheless necessary that each one should do his own work well that pertains to the city; which, indeed, occurs according to the virtue of the citizen inasmuch as he is a citizen. And therefore I say: “the work which is his own” because not all citizens can be the same, such that the same work belongs to all of them. And from this it follows that there is not one virtue of the citizen and of the good man, which consequence is clear thus: because in the best regime, it is necessary that any citizen have the virtue of a good citizen. For in this way, the city will be the best: but as for the virtue of the good man, it is impossible that everyone have it, since not everyone is virtuous in one city, as was said.

He puts forward a third reason, at adhuc quoniam et ex dissimilibus, etc., and he says that every city is built out of dissimilar parts, just as an animal is built—usually, at least—out of dissimilar parts, namely, out of soul and body, and likewise, the human soul is built out of the dissimilar, namely, from the rational power and appetitive, and again, household society is built from the dissimilar, namely, from man and wife, and an estate is also built out of master and slave. Now the city is built out of all these differences, and out of many others. But it was said in Bk. I that the virtues of governing and of being subject are not the same, nor is the soul the same, nor are various other things: whence it remains that there is not one and the same virtue for all citizens: just as we see that in the chorus there is not the same virtue for the summi, that is, for he who leads the chorus, and for the astantis, that is, for he who assists. But it is clear that the virtue of the good man is one and the same: it remains, therefore, that the virtue of the good citizen and of the good man are not the same.

Then, where he says sed forte erit alicuius eadem, etc., he shows that the virtue of a certain citizen is the same virtue as that of the good man. And about this he does three things.

First, he shows what was proposed.

Second, from this he concludes that the conclusion is proved in the aforementioned things, at et disciplinam autem, [II.3.6] etc.

Third, he raises a certain difficulty about the aforementioned, and resolves it, at at vero laudatur, [II.3.7] etc.

He says first, therefore, that by chance it will be able to be said that, for that which is the good of a certain citizen, the same virtue is required which is that of the good man. For it is not said that someone is a good prince unless he is good through the moral virtues and prudence. For it was said in Bk. VI of the Ethics that politics is a certain part of prudence: whence it is necessary that someone political, that is, the ruler of a regime, is prudent, and consequently, a good man.

Then, where he says et disciplinam autem, etc., he concludes from this that the virtue of the good citizen and of the good man are not simply the same. And to prove this, he first introduces what some say, that the discipline of a prince, who should be instructed for virtue, is other than the discipline of the citizen--as will appear from this, that the sons of a king are developed in riding and military discipline. Whence Euripides also said, speaking in the person of a prince: “It does not belong to me to know things various and high, which philosophers consider, but those things whose work is for the regime of the city.” And he said this in order to signify what is a certain proper discipline for a prince. And from this he concludes that if the discipline and virtue of a good prince and a good man are the same, and not every citizen is a prince, but even subjects are citizens, then it follows that the virtue of a citizen and of a man are not simply the same, unless by chance of a certain citizen, of him, namely, who is able to be a prince. And this is so because the virtue of a prince and of a citizen are not the same. Because of this Jason said that he used to hunger when he was not tyrannizing, as if he did not know how to live as an ydiota, that is, as a private person.

Then, where he says at vero laudatur, etc., he raises a difficulty about the aforementioned things, and he does two things concerning this.

First, he argues against the aforementioned things.

Second, he resolves the difficulty, at quoniam igitur aliquando videtur, [III.3.8] etc.

Therefore, he says first that sometimes a citizen is praised because of this--that he is well able to govern and to be subject. If, therefore, the virtue of a good man is the virtue of a good prince, but the virtue of a good citizen is inclined toward both, namely, toward governing and being subject, it follows that they are not both similarly praiseworthy—to be a good citizen and a good man—but to be a good citizen is much better.

Then, where he says quoniam igitur, etc., he resolves the aforementioned doubt.

And he first posits in what way the discipline of prince and subject are the same, and in what way they are not.

Second, he shows in what way the virtue of both is the same, at horum autem virtus, [III.3.11] etc.

About the first he does three things.

First, he proposes his intention: and he says that because, as was said before, sometimes both of these [seem correct]—namely, that it is not necessary for the prince and the subject to learn the same things; and again, that the good citizen ought to know both, namely, to govern and to be subject—it is therefore necessary to consider from the following things in what way both are true.

Second, at est enim principatus, etc., he posits one mode of government, in which one of the things that has been said is verified: namely, that the discipline of a prince is other than that of a subject. And he says that there is a certain despotic government—that is, mastery—in which the prince is the master of the subjects; and it is not necessary that such a prince should know how to do those things that belong to the services necessary for life, but rather, that he should know how to use them: but the others—that are able to serve in those things that belong to the actions of servants—do not seem to be governing or masterful, but rather, servile. But there are diverse kinds of slaves according to the diverse works of servants—among whom, those hold one part who work with their hands, like shoe-makers and cooks. Such men live by the work of their hands, as their names signify: and among such men is counted the artisan banausoi, that is, he who stains his body by the work of his art. And because the works of these artisans are not governing, but rather, slavish, therefore among some in antiquity, artisans did not have any part in the government of the city; and I say that this was before the demos, which is the extreme of the people—that is, before the lowest of the people—took power in the city. Thus, therefore, it is clear that it is not necessary for either the good statesman—that is, the governor of the city—or even the good citizen to learn the works of this sort of subject, unless at times because of some utility to themselves; not so that in this they could serve others, because there would no longer be a distinction between master and slave if masters were to exercise these sorts of slavish works.

Third, at sed est quidam principatus, etc., he puts forth another government in which the other part is verified: namely, that the prince and the subject ought to learn the same thing. And he says that there is a certain government according to which someone governs, not as the master over slaves, but as over those free and equal to himself. And this is a civic government, according to which—in cities—now some, and then others are taken up for government. And it is necessary for a prince of this sort to learn, subjected, how he ought to govern; just as someone learns to govern cavalry through this: that he was a subject among knights; and someone learns to be a commander of an army through this: that he was under the commander of an army, and has been at the head of some particular order, such as one company or one cohort, and has organized plots at the mandate of a commander. For man learns to exercise a great government both through subjection and through exercise in lesser offices. And concerning this, it was well-said in the proverb that he cannot govern well who has not been under a prince.

Then, where he says horum autem virtus quidem, etc., he shows in what way there may be either the same virtue, or diverse ones for a prince and the others. And he says that even in this government there is another virtue for prince and subject: but it is nevertheless necessary that he who is simply a good citizen knows both how to govern and to be subject when the government is not mastery, which is of slaves, but political, which is of the free. And this is the virtue of the citizen: that he is well-prepared for both. And likewise, it is of the good man to do both—namely, to govern well and to be subject well. And so the virtue of the good citizen—inasmuch as it is an ability to govern—is the same virtue as that of the good man; but inasmuch as the citizen is a subject, the virtue of a governor and of a good man is other than the virtue of a good citizen: just as the temperance and justice of a prince is a different kind than the temperance and justice of subordinates. For a subject who is free and good does not have only one virtue, such as justice; but his justice has two kinds; according to one of them he is able to govern well, and according to the other of them he is able to be subject well: and thus also concerning the other virtues.

And he clarifies this through an example: because the temperance and fortitude of a man is other than that of a woman, since a man will be deemed fearful if he is not of greater strength than a strong woman; and a woman, whom silence adorns, will be deemed talkative if she is ornate—that is, eloquent—like a good man. And this results because even in the management of the household, one thing belongs to a man, and another to a woman. For it belongs to the man to acquire wealth, but to the woman to protect it. And things also have themselves like this in the city, concerning the prince and the subject. For properly, the virtue of the prince is prudence—which rules and govers. Certainly, the other moral virtues whose account consists in governing and being subordinate are common to both subordinates and princes: but nevertheless, subordinates participate in something of prudence, namely, when they have a true opinion about acting through which they can govern themselves in their proper acts—following the government of the prince. And he puts forward the example of the one who makes flutes, who is related to the flute player—who uses flutes—just as a subject toward a prince: for he works correctly in making flutes if he has an opinion that is ruled by what the flute player mandated: and so it is in the city, with the subject and the prince. For this is said about the virtue of the subordinate not inasmuch as he is a good man—since he would be in need of prudence—but it is said about him inasmuch as he is a good subordinate: and for this, nothing is required except that he have a true opinion about those things that are mandated to him.

Now in the final epilogue, he concludes that it is clear from what has been set forth whether there is the same virtue or another one for good man and a good citizen; and again, in what way it is the same and in what way it is another—since it is the same inasmuch as it can govern well, but another inasmuch as it can be subject well.